State v. J. T.-B. ( 2020 )

414
Submitted October 7, 2020, reversed and remanded November 4, 2020
In the Matter of J. T.-B.,
aka J. R. T.-B., a Youth.
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
J. T.-B.,
aka J. R. T.-B.,
Appellant.
Multnomah County Circuit Court
16JU04451;
Petition Number 160531304;
A172655
476 P3d 538
In a series of juvenile court cases, youth was found to have committed con-
duct that, if committed by an adult, would constitute multiple criminal offenses.
After adjudication, youth filed a pro se motion for appointment of counsel for the
purpose of filing a petition in the juvenile court under ORS 419C.615, which the
trial court denied. Youth appeals that denial, contending that he has a statutory
right to counsel during the post-adjudication process. Held: The trial court erred
in denying youth’s motion for appointment of counsel. Under the juvenile code,
youth had a statutory right to counsel that attached at “all stages” of the pro-
ceedings on youth’s offenses, and the post-adjudication process constituted such
a “stage” for purposes of ORS 419C.615.
Reversed and remanded.
Thomas M. Ryan, Judge.
Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate
Section, and Tiffany Keast, Deputy Public Defender, Office
of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Joanna Hershey, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and James, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
LAGESEN, P. J.
Reversed and remanded.
Cite as 307 Or App 414 (2020) 415
LAGESEN, P. J.
In a series of juvenile court cases, youth was found
to have committed conduct that, if committed by an adult,
would constitute multiple criminal offenses, including
second-degree burglary, second-degree criminal trespass,
interfering with public transportation, possession of a sto-
len vehicle, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and two
counts of second-degree criminal mischief. Youth appealed
in each of those cases and, while his consolidated appeal
was pending, the juvenile court allowed his trial counsel to
withdraw from the cases. This court ultimately affirmed the
judgments on appeal without opinion. State v. J. T.-B., 293
Or App 804, 427 P3d 237, rev den, 363 Or 744 (2018).
After this court affirmed those judgments, youth
filed a pro se motion for appointment of counsel for the pur-
pose of filing a petition in the juvenile court under ORS
419C.615, a statute that authorizes petitions analogous to a
petition for post-conviction relief—that is, where there has
been a substantial denial of the petitioner’s constitutional
rights in the proceedings resulting in the adjudication or
the appellate review of the adjudication.1 The juvenile court
denied youth’s motion for the appointment of counsel, ruling
that youth’s motion “sets forth no authority for appointment
of counsel and sets forth no grounds for any motion pursu-
ant to ORS 419C.615.”
Youth now appeals that denial, arguing that he
has a statutory right to counsel under the juvenile code
that attaches at “all stages of the proceeding” involving
an alleged offense that is classified as a crime. See ORS
419C.200(1)(a)(A) (providing that, “[w]hen a petition is filed
under ORS 419C.005, the court * * * [s]hall appoint coun-
sel to represent the youth at all stages of the proceeding if
1
ORS 419C.615 provides, in relevant part:
“(1) In addition to any other grounds upon which a person may petition a
court under ORS 419C.610, a person may petition the court on the following
grounds to set aside an order finding the person to be within the jurisdiction
of the court under ORS 419C.005:
“(a) A substantial denial in the proceedings resulting in the person’s
adjudication, or in the appellate review of the adjudication, of the person’s
rights under the United States Constitution or the Oregon Constitution, or
both, and the denial rendered the adjudication void[.]”
416 State v. J. T.-B.
the offense alleged in the petition is classified as a crime”).
According to youth, it is clear from the statutory text and
context of ORS 419C.615 that the post-adjudication process
under that statute is a “stage” of his juvenile court proceed-
ing, so the court erred in denying his motion for appointed
counsel.
In response, the state concedes that a petition under
ORS 419C.615 is a stage of the juvenile court proceeding
and that the juvenile court erred in denying youth’s motion.
We agree with and accept that concession. Unlike the stat-
utory scheme for seeking post-conviction relief from a crim-
inal judgment entered in circuit court, which contemplates
a collateral review proceeding, nothing in the text or con-
text of ORS 419C.615 suggests that the legislature intended
that post-adjudication motions would trigger a proceeding
separate from the adjudicative proceeding itself. On the
contrary, contextual clues indicate the legislature intended
that the post-adjudication relief authorized under ORS
419C.615 and the related provision, ORS 419C.610, would
involve the juvenile court setting aside its own adjudication
that occurred at an earlier stage of the same proceeding.
See ORS 419C.615(1) (“In addition to any other grounds upon
which a person may petition a court under ORS 419C.610, a
person may petition the court on the following grounds to
set aside an order finding the person to be within the juris-
diction of the court under ORS 419C.005 * * *.” (Emphasis
added.)); ORS 419C.610(1) (“Except as provided in ORS
419C.613, 419C.615 and 419C.616, the court may modify or
set aside any order made by it upon such notice and with
such hearing as the court may direct.” (Emphasis added.));
accord Smith v. Jester, 234 Or App 629, 635, 228 P3d 1232
(2010) (“[T]he legislature intended a petition brought under
ORS 419C.615 to be brought in the juvenile court in the
county where the jurisdictional hearing was adjudicated.”).
Accordingly, we agree with the parties that a motion to set
aside under ORS 419C.615 is a stage of the juvenile court
proceeding and that, under ORS 419C.200, youth was enti-
tled to have his request for counsel granted at that stage.
We further conclude that the juvenile court’s
perceived deficiencies in the motion—i.e., that it did not
cite authority or set forth grounds for relief under ORS
Cite as 307 Or App 414 (2020) 417
419C.615—did not justify denying it. As youth points out,
“the court effectively denied youth counsel because youth
had not made a legal showing that he could make only if he
had counsel to assist him in doing so.”
For those reasons, we reverse and remand for the
juvenile court to appoint counsel to represent youth for pur-
poses of filing a petition under ORS 419C.615.
Reversed and remanded.