Double Tree Hotel v. Ansarinezhad ( 2021 )

51
Argued and submitted September 28, 2020, affirmed December 1, 2021
In the Matter of the Compensation of
Azam Ansarinezhad, Claimant.
DOUBLE TREE HOTEL/
Aimbridge Hospitality,
Petitioners,
v.
Azam ANSARINEZHAD,
Respondent.
Workers’ Compensation Board
1702232; A172330
504 P3d 41
Employer petitions for judicial review of a final order of the Workers’
Compensation Board (the board) that affirmed an administrative law judge’s
(ALJ) order to set aside employer’s denial of claimant’s injury claim. Employer
denied the claim on the ground that claimant had failed to give timely notice
under ORS 656.256. The issue on review is the intended meaning of the phrase
“notice required by this section” in ORS 656.265(4), and whether it refers to notice
of an accident or to notice of a claim. Held: The plain and unambiguous text of the
statute, in its context, provided that the phrase “notice required by this section”
referred to notice of an accident, which claimant timely provided. Accordingly,
the board did not err in affirming the ALJ’s order to set aside employer’s denial.
Affirmed.
Katherine M. Caldwell argued the cause for petitioners.
Also on the briefs was Babcock Holloway Caldwell & Stires.
Spencer D. Kelly argued the cause for respondent. Also
on the brief was Welch, Bruun & Green.
Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and James, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
JAMES, J.
Affirmed.
52 Double Tree Hotel v. Ansarinezhad
JAMES, J.
Employer petitions for judicial review of a final
order of the Workers’ Compensation Board that affirmed an
administrative law judge’s (ALJ) order to set aside employer’s
denial of claimant’s injury claim. Employer had denied the
claim on the ground that claimant had failed to give timely
notice under ORS 656.256. The issue on judicial review is
the meaning of the phrase “notice required by this section”
in ORS 656.265(4), and whether it refers to notice of an
accident or to notice of a claim. We agree with the board’s
conclusion that the phrase refers to notice of an accident,
which claimant timely provided, and we therefore affirm the
board’s order setting aside the denial.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. Claimant
worked as a housekeeper for the employer. Sometime in
January 2016, claimant injured her left shoulder at work.
After about a week, she orally informed the employer of her
injury. Another worker was assigned to assist claimant with
her job duties, but no paperwork was filled out at that time
for a workers’ compensation claim.1 Claimant commenced
a course of medical treatment and eventually underwent
surgery in 2017. On March 9, 2017, claimant filed a written
claim for compensation. The employer denied the claim on
the basis of untimely notice under ORS 656.265(4).
Claimant requested a hearing. Before the ALJ,
claimant and employer offered different interpretations of
ORS 656.265. Claimant contended that she had given timely
notice of her injury to the employer within 90 days after
the work incident pursuant to ORS 656.265(1). In response,
employer argued that although claimant provided notice of
the accident, claimant’s claim was untimely because she
failed to submit a formal notice of a claim within one year of
her injury, as required by ORS 656.265(4). The ALJ rejected
employer’s timeliness defense and set aside the denial, hold-
ing that ORS 656.265(4) does not add the requirement that
claimant must provide notice of a claim within one year of
an injury. Employer appealed to the board, which adopted
1
Claimant informed her treating physician that she did not want to file a
claim due to her concerns of losing the job.
Cite as 316 Or App 51 (2021) 53
and affirmed the ALJ’s order to set aside employer’s denial.
Employer now seeks judicial review of the board’s final order.
We review the board’s legal conclusions for legal
error, and its determinations on factual issues for sub-
stantial evidence, which includes substantial reason. ORS
183.482(8)(a), (c); SAIF v. Camarena, 264 Or App 400, 404,
332 P3d 341 (2014). “Substantial evidence supports a find-
ing when the record, viewed as a whole, permits a reason-
able person to make that finding.” Camarena, 264 Or App
at 404. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) We review the
board’s interpretation of a statute for legal error. See State v.
Spainhower, 251 Or App 25, 27, 283 P3d 361 (2012) (stating
standard of review for questions of statutory interpretation).
On judicial review, employer renews its contention
that claimant’s claim for compensation was untimely filed
and therefore, should be barred by ORS 656.265.2 The par-
ties’ dispute boils down to a question of statutory interpre-
tation, focusing on the meaning of “notice as required by
this section” in ORS 656.265(4). Employer contends that
the “notice” in subsection (4) refers to notice of a claim, not
notice of an accident. According to the employer, subsection
(4) contemplates a one-year time limit for giving notice of
a claim independent of the period for providing notice of
an accident resulting in an injury under ORS 656.265(1).
To determine the intended meaning of a statute, we use
the analytic framework set forth in State v. Gaines, which
requires us to look to the text of the statute in its context
along with helpful legislative history. 346 Or 160, 171-72,
206 P3d 1042 (2009).
ORS 656.265 provides, in relevant part:
“(1)(a) Notice of an accident resulting in an injury or
death shall be given immediately by the worker or a bene-
ficiary of the worker to the employer, but not later than 90
days after the accident. The employer shall acknowledge
forthwith receipt of such notice. * * *
“(2) The notice need not be in any particular form * * *.
2
It is undisputed that a worker’s oral notice is sufficient under ORS
656.265(1). Godfrey v. Fred Meyer Stores, 202 Or App 673, 124 P3d 621 (2005),
rev den, 340 Or 672 (2006).
54 Double Tree Hotel v. Ansarinezhad
“(3) Notice shall be given to the employer by mail,
addressed to the employer at the last-known place of busi-
ness of the employer * * *.
“(4) Failure to give notice as required by this section
bars a claim under this chapter unless the notice is given
within one year after the date of the accident * * *.”
The statutory language is clear that the notice to
which ORS 656.265(4) refers is of an accident and not a claim.
The text of ORS 656.265(4) provides that a claim is barred
if “notice as required by this section [i.e., ORS 656.265(1), (2)
and (3)]” is not given, unless one of the exceptions is appli-
cable. Textually, ORS 656.265(1) explicitly states that the
notice a worker is required to give is “notice of an accident
resulting in an injury or death.” The requirements for the
methods and delivery of such notice are provided in ORS
656.265(2) and (3). Subsection (2) provides, in relevant part,
that “[t]he notice need not be in any particular form.” The
use of the definite article suggests that “the notice” refers
to “the notice of an accident” mentioned in the immedi-
ately preceding subsection. Vsetecka v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
337 Or 502, 508, 98 P3d 1116 (2004) (discussing that ORS
656.265(2) addresses the form and contents of notice of an
accident that results in an injury or death required by ORS
656.265(1)). Subsection (3) provides that “[n]otice shall be
given to the employer by mail, addressed to the employer
* * *.” Although the definite article is not used, it follows log-
ically that “notice” refers to the same notice that is men-
tioned in subsections (1) and (2) as subsection (3) further
specifies to whom an injured worker must give notice of an
accident for the purpose of satisfying the notice requirement
under ORS 656.265.
Employer contends that the “notice” and the one-
year limitation period in subsection (4) refer to the notice
of the filing of a claim rather than an accident, relying pri-
marily on the legislative history of 1995 amendments to
ORS 656.265. We have reviewed the legislative history of
the statute and found pieces both supporting and undercut-
ting employer’s interpretation. However, “[e]ven assuming
that the legislative history supported claimant’s interpreta-
tion, we are required not to construe a statute in a way that
is inconsistent with its plain text.” Suchi v. SAIF, 238 Or
Cite as 316 Or App 51 (2021) 55
App 48, 55, 241 P3d 1174 (2010), rev den, 350 Or 231 (2011);
see also Gaines, 346 Or at 173 (“When the text of a stat-
ute is truly capable of having only one meaning, no weight
can be given to legislative history that suggests—or even
confirms—that legislators intended something different.”).
The plain and unambiguous text of the statute
shows that the only plausible reading of the phrase “notice
as required by this section” under subsection (4) is that such
notice refers to the “notice of an accident” described in the
preceding subsections (1), (2), and (3). Accordingly, the board
did not err in holding that ORS 656.265(4) does not bar a
claim filed by a claimant over a year after the date of injury,
if the claimant has given timely notice of the accident pursu-
ant to the other provisions of ORS 656.265. Here, employer
conceded that it had timely notice of an accident result-
ing in an injury from claimant under ORS 656.265(1)(a).
Therefore, the board did not err in setting aside employer’s
denial on the basis that claimant provided timely notice to
the employer under ORS 656.265.
Affirmed.