State v. Copeland ( 2022 )

1
Submitted September 14, affirmed December 7, 2022, petition for review denied
March 30, 2023 (370 Or 827)
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
THOMAS WILLIAM COPELAND,
Defendant-Appellant.
Lane County Circuit Court
18CR66765; A173283
522 P3d 909
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction, after a jury trial, for one
count of murder in the second degree with a firearm, ORS 163.115, (Count 1);
one count of unlawful possession of a weapon with a firearm, ORS 166.220,
(Count 2); and two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm, ORS 166.250,
(Counts 3 and 4), arising out of an incident in which he shot a security guard.
Defendant did not dispute at trial that he shot the victim, but he contended that
he acted in self-defense. In his first assignment, defendant contends that the
trial court committed legal error in denying his pretrial motion to exclude from
evidence a one-minute video of the shooting taken by the victim from his body-
camera, which defendant asserts the victim made in violation of ORS 165.450.
In his second assignment, defendant contends that the trial court abused its dis-
cretion in denying his motion for a postponement of trial so that defense coun-
sel could review recordings of telephone calls made by defendant from the jail.
Held: The Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s first assignment of error, con-
cluding that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to exclude
the body-camera recording, because the recording was subject to an exclusion
from the violation of ORS 165.450 for a recording of a “felony that endangers
human life.” The court rejected defendant’s second assignment of error, conclud-
ing that the circumstances cited by the trial court show that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s request for a postponement.
Affirmed.
Charles M. Zennaché, Judge.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Kristin A. Carveth, Deputy Public Defender,
Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Christopher A. Perdue, Assistant
Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
2 State v. Copeland
EGAN, J.
Affirmed.
Cite as 323 Or App 1 (2022) 3
EGAN, J.
Defendant challenges his convictions, after a jury
trial, for one count of murder in the second degree with a
firearm, ORS 163.115, (Count 1); one count of unlawful pos-
session of a weapon with a firearm, ORS 166.220, (Count 2);
and two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm, ORS
166.250, (Counts 3 and 4). Defendant did not dispute at trial
that he shot the victim, but he contended that he acted in
self-defense. In his first assignment, defendant contends that
the trial court committed legal error in denying his pretrial
motion to exclude from evidence a one-minute video of the
shooting taken by the victim from his body-camera, which he
asserts the victim recorded in violation of ORS 165.450 and
was therefore inadmissible under ORS 41.910. In the second
assignment, defendant contends that the trial court abused
its discretion in denying his motion for a postponement of
trial so that defense counsel could review recordings of tele-
phone calls that defendant made from the jail. We hold that
the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to
exclude the body-camera recording and did not abuse its dis-
cretion in denying defendant’s motion for a postponement.
Accordingly, we affirm defendant’s convictions.
We address first defendant’s challenge in his first
assignment of error to the trial court’s denial of his pretrial
motion to exclude from evidence the recording of the shoot-
ing from the victim’s body camera. The admissibility of the
evidence presents a legal question of statutory construction
that we review for legal error. Tri-Met v. Posh Ventures, LLC,
244 Or App 425, 435, 621 P3d 33 (2011) (citing State ex rel
Carlile v. Frost, 326 Or 607, 617, 956 P2d 202 (1998) (when
question is whether a statute precludes the admission of cer-
tain evidence, the trial court’s evidentiary ruling presents a
question of statutory construction that is reviewed for legal
error).
The background facts related to the issues on
appeal are largely undisputed. The victim was working as a
private security guard in the parking lot of a restaurant and
wore a body camera. Defendant and three friends, Clumpke,
Jenkins, and Tiffany, came out of the restaurant at about
midnight and went to Tiffany’s car to smoke marijuana. The
4 State v. Copeland
victim, in his vehicle, pulled up behind Tiffany’s car, stopped
briefly, and then drove to the other side of the parking lot,
where the victim got out of the car and stood by the open
driver’s side door. Defendant, Tiffany, and Jenkins then
walked toward the victim. Without informing defendant,
the victim turned on his body camera as they approached.1
It is undisputed that defendant and the victim stood
close together and engaged in a heated discussion concern-
ing the victim’s authority to ask them to leave the parking
lot. At some point, defendant drew a gun and pointed it at
the victim, and the victim pepper-sprayed in the direction of
defendant and his friends. Defendant fired six shots at the
victim, killing him.
Defendant was charged with the victim’s murder.
He testified at trial that he shot the victim to protect the
two women, because he believed the victim was drawing his
gun.
As relevant here, ORS 165.540(1) defines as a mis-
demeanor the recording of a conversation without notifying
the participants:
1
On the disputed video, the victim is heard telling defendant, Jenkins, and
Tiffany, “Just stand back. Stand back.” Defendant is heard telling the victim,
“Don’t tell me what to do.” Jenkins ran between defendant and the victim and
asked the victim whether he had seen her cartwheel. Defendant then asked the
victim, “Who do you think you are?” The victim responded that he was security
for the property. Defendant said, “Well guess what, you’re security, not police.”
Tiffany stepped between the victim and her friends, directly in front of the victim
and his body camera, saying “Everyone calm down. Hey, we just paid a hundred-
dollar tab at the bar [gesturing behind her and to her left]. We are leaving in two
seconds.” At the same time, the victim can be heard saying, “Back off. Just leave.”
Defendant next stepped forward between Tiffany and the victim saying, “You
leave. You leave.” Tiffany said, “Yes, sir. We are going.” Jenkins moved between
the security guard and defendant, facing defendant as defendant continued
to escalate. Jenkins said “No, no, no, we’re going.” Tiffany can be seen lifting
Jenkins’s backpack, which was strapped over the other woman’s left shoulder.
The victim asked, “Do you want to go to jail?” Jenkins and Tiffany temporarily
block the body camera view of defendant but, as he came back into the image,
defendant clearly displayed a semi-automatic pistol and he can be heard saying,
“You see this? You see what this is?”
There is evidence that, after that, the victim sprayed pepper-spray. The video
then contains two inaudible statements from the victim, after which gun shots
are heard. Defendant testified that, believing the victim was reaching for his
gun, defendant fired his weapon six times. The victim fell to the ground and, as
defendant, Jenkins, and Tiffany left the scene, defendant is heard saying, “fuck
you dude.”
Cite as 323 Or App 1 (2022) 5
“(1) Except as otherwise provided in * * * subsections
(2) to (7) of this section, a person may not:
“* * * * *
“(c) Obtain or attempt to obtain the whole or any part
of a conversation by means of any device, contrivance,
machine or apparatus, whether electrical, mechanical,
manual or otherwise, if not all participants in the conver-
sation are specifically informed that their conversation is
being obtained.”
ORS 165.540(5) provides an exception to that prohibition for
“[a] person who records a conversation during a felony that
endangers human life[.]” ORS 165.540(5)(a).
The state sought to introduce the video and audio
recording of the shooting taken by the victim on his body
camera. Defendant sought to exclude the evidence, on the
ground that the victim had not notified him that he was
being recorded, in violation of ORS 165.540(1)(c). See ORS
41.910(1) (providing that evidence of the contents of any oral
communication intercepted “[i]n violation of ORS 165.540
shall not be admissible in any court of this state”).
The state asserted that the victim’s recording was
not obtained in violation of ORS 165.540(1)(c), because it
was subject to the exception stated in ORS 165.540(5)(a), for
“[a] person who records a conversation during a felony that
endangers human life.” Defendant argued that the excep-
tion applies only in the context of exigent circumstances,
to allow a person to record what the person believes to be a
felony in progress without the required notice. In response
to defendant’s contention that the exception did not apply
because the victim had not initiated the recording during
the felony, the state argued that the exception encompassed
not only the recording of the exact moment of the actus rea of
the felony—the shooting—but the minutes before defendant
had fired the shots, as relevant to defendant’s state of mind
(and to defendant’s claim of self-defense).
The trial court admitted the body-camera footage,
reasoning that ORS 165.540(5)(a) creates an exception to
the misdemeanor offense for “the person” who makes the
6 State v. Copeland
recording that captures a felony.2 The court reasoned that
the victim’s act of recording fell within the exception, i.e., did
not violate the statute, because the recording had captured
a felony that endangered human life. Thus, the court con-
cluded that the recording was admissible.3 Defendant was
convicted after a jury trial in which the state played the
disputed body-camera footage.
In his first assignment of error, defendant chal-
lenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to exclude the
body-camera footage. Defendant argues that the victim’s
recording did not fit within the exception of ORS 165.540(5)(a),
because, at the time the recording was initiated, no felony
that endangered human life was taking place. If, defendant
contends, at its inception, the victim’s recording of the con-
versation between defendant and the victim constituted a
misdemeanor, because no notice of the recording had been
given, then defendant’s subsequent conduct in shooting the
victim could not cause the victim’s unlawful act of making the
recording to fall within the exception of ORS 165.540(5)(a),
and therefore become “legal.”
The state responds that the recording of a felony
endangering human life is within the exception of ORS
165.540(5)(a), whether or not the felony was occurring at
time the recording was initiated. The state further contends
that the moments leading up to the shooting demonstrate
defendant’s culpable mental state and are therefore part of
the felony.
The dispute turns on a question of statutory con-
struction. As noted, ORS 165.540 is a criminal statute, set-
ting forth a misdemeanor offense. If the offense occurred,
ORS 40.910 establishes an exclusionary rule for the unlaw-
fully obtained recording. Thus, the first question of statutory
2
The court explained:
“[ORS] 41.910 says if you violate that statute, * * * [ORS] 165.540, then
you can’t use it in court, so the recording made by the person, i.e. [the vic-
tim], to the extent it captured the commission of a felony, which I think does
include the mens rea portion of it, is not subject to the rule of exclusion [of
ORS] 41.910, and therefore I think that at least a portion of this, if not all of
it, * * * is admissible.”
3
The trial court also admitted the restaurant’s security camera footage, and
defendant does not challenge that ruling.
Cite as 323 Or App 1 (2022) 7
construction here is whether the offense occurred. In this
case, that depends on whether the legislature intended the
exception to criminal liability set forth in ORS 165.540(5)(a)
to apply only when the person has initiated the recording
during the felony itself, or whether the exception arises if
the person’s recording captured a felony but was initiated
before the felony began. We take up the construction of the
statute under the familiar template of State v. Gaines, 346
Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009), and PGE v. Bureau
of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143(1993), examining first the statute’s text in its context, and
any relevant legislative history.
The text of ORS 165.540(5)(a) provides that the pro-
hibition stated in subsection (1)(c) of ORS 165.540 does not
apply to “[a] person who records a conversation during a fel-
ony that endangers human life[.]” It is not disputed that, if
defendant shot the victim with the requisite “intentional”
mental state, see ORS 163.115 (defining murder in the sec-
ond degree), the act constituted a felony, which the victim
captured on his body camera. Because the requisite inten-
tional mental state is an element of the offense, the state’s
argument is that any portion of the recording that had bear-
ing on defendant’s mental state (or his asserted defense of
self-defense) would be relevant to determining whether his
conduct constituted a felony.
But defendant does not contend that only certain
portions of the recording are admissible. Defendant contends
that no part of the recording is admissible, because the vic-
tim did not begin recording during a felony. The question
thus is not whether or what portion of the recording is rel-
evant to establishing defendant’s mental state for purposes
of determining whether defendant committed a felony; the
disputed issue is only whether the victim’s act of recording
violated ORS 165.540(1), so as to make the entire recording
subject to exclusion under ORS 41.910. As the trial court
correctly observed, the exception for recording “during a fel-
ony that endangers human life” applies to the person who
makes the recording. In defendant’s view, the person must
have initiated the recording during the commission of the
felony itself for the exception to apply.
8 State v. Copeland
The difficulty with defendant’s construction of the
statute is that the statute does not place any limitation on
when the person must have initiated the recording. It sim-
ply excepts from the offense a person who records “during”
a felony that endangers human life. “During” is defined
as “1: throughout the continuance or course of * * * 2: at
some point in the course of * * *.” Webster’s Third New Int’l
Dictionary 703 (unabridged ed 2002). Based on those defini-
tions and the undisputed facts, we conclude that the victim’s
body camera recorded “during a felony that endangers human
life.” It makes no difference that the victim also recorded a
conversation that did not constitute a felony. Because the vic-
tim recorded a “conversation during a felony that endangered
human life,” the victim did not violate ORS 165.540(1), and
the recording is not subject to exclusion under ORS 41.910.
Defendant contends that the legislative history of
ORS 165.540(5)(a) shows that the legislature intended the
exception for the recording of a felony that endangers human
life to apply only when the recording is initiated during the
offense itself, as a type of exigent circumstance. We have
reviewed the legislative history, and it neither supports nor
detracts from defendant’s construction, because it does not
explicitly address it.
It is true, as defendant contends, that there is a gen-
eral comment in the legislative testimony during hearings
preceding the enactment of ORS 165.540 by Oregon Laws
1989, chapter 1078, section 1, that the exceptions to liability
in ORS 165.540 are intended to follow the “well-established
legal principle of exigent circumstances.” Testimony, House
Committee on Judiciary, HB 2252, Jan 13, 1989, Ex L
(written testimony of Lieutenant Vic Mann of the Eugene
Department of Public Safety). Defendant draws from that
testimony the legislative intention that the exception stated
in ORS 165.540(5)(a) for the recording of a felony that endan-
gers human life must only apply in the context of an emer-
gency—when an exigency prevents the person recording the
felony from informing the person being recorded that they
are being recorded.
But as we have explained, the statute’s text, which
controls, places no limitation on when the person initiates
Cite as 323 Or App 1 (2022) 9
the recording of a felony that endangers human life. We
therefore conclude that no such limitation was intended
and that the victim’s body-camera recording did not violate
ORS 165.540. See Gaines, 346 Or at 173 (“When the text of
a statute is truly capable of only one meaning, no weight
can be given to legislative history that suggests—or even
confirms—that legislators intended something different.”).
The trial court therefore did not err in denying defendant’s
motion to suppress.
We move on to consideration of defendant’s sec-
ond assignment of error. At a hearing four weeks before
the scheduled trial, the prosecutor advised the trial court
and defense counsel that it had just come into possession
of recordings, made by Telmate, LLC, a contractor for the
Lane County Sheriff’s Department, of approximately 180
hours of defendant’s telephone calls from the jail. The pros-
ecutor was not sure at that point what portion of the record-
ings, if any, it would offer at trial but promised that it would
provide defendant with the recordings by the end of the
week. Ten days before trial, defendant’s counsel said that he
had not yet had time to listen to all of the recordings, and
he asked for a three-week postponement of trial to review
them.
The court was not sympathetic to defendant’s claim
that he had not had a reasonable opportunity to review the
telephone recordings. The court noted that the recordings
were of defendant’s own telephone conversations, some of
which were with persons who had been present on the night
of the shooting; that defendant knew that his conversations
at the jail were being recorded. The court also considered
that the case had been pending for over a year with defen-
dant in custody, that defendant had previously obtained a
lengthy postponement, and that the requested postpone-
ment would delay the trial by at least six weeks, including
the time to summon a jury.4 For all those reasons, the court
denied defendant’s motion for postponement.
4
The court also rejected defendant’s contentions that the prosecutor had
committed a discovery or Brady violation, Brady v. Maryland, 373 US 83, 83 S Ct
1194, 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963), in failing to share the recordings of defendant’s tele-
phone conversation from the jail with defendant as they were made by Telmate;
those rulings are not challenged on appeal.
10 State v. Copeland
In his second assignment, defendant contends that
the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion.
See State v. Wolfer, 241 Or 15, 17, 403 P2d 715 (1965) (A
motion for continuance is addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial court and its ruling thereon will be disturbed
upon appeal only for an abuse of that discretion.); State v.
Powell, 322 Or App 37, 44, 518 P3d 949 (2022) (same). We
have reviewed the record and conclude that the circum-
stances cited by the trial court show that the court’s denial
of defendant’s motion was within the range of the court’s
discretion.
Affirmed.