State v. Hees , 333 Or. App. 775 ( 2024 )

No. 491 July 10, 2024 775
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JUDITH LYNN HEES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Lincoln County Circuit Court
19CR71240; A178696
Marcia L. Buckley, Judge.
Submitted May 31, 2024.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Bruce A. Myers, Deputy Public Defender, Office
of Public Defense Services, filed the briefs for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Kyleigh Gray, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Joyce, Presiding Judge, Lagesen, Chief Judge, and
Armstrong, Senior Judge.
JOYCE, P. J.
Affirmed.
776 State v. Hees
JOYCE, P. J.
Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to driv-
ing under the influence of intoxicants (DUII), ORS 813.010,
and reckless driving, ORS 811.140, reserving her right to
challenge on appeal the trial court’s denial of her motion to
suppress. In that motion, defendant argued that the officer
who stopped her lacked probable cause of a traffic violation or
reasonable suspicion of a crime. The trial court concluded that
the officer had both: probable cause for failure to drive within
lane, ORS 811.370, and reasonable suspicion of DUII. In her
sole assignment of error, defendant challenges that ruling,
raising the same arguments that she did below. We conclude
that the officer had reasonable suspicion of DUII and, there-
fore, we do not reach the question whether there was probable
cause of a traffic violation. Accordingly, we affirm.
Reasonable suspicion exists when an officer “reason-
ably suspect[s]—based on specific and articulable facts—that
[a] person committed a specific crime or type of crime or was
about to commit a specific crime or type of crime.” State v.
Maciel-Figueroa, 361 Or 163, 182, 389 P3d 1121 (2017). The
officer’s subjective suspicion must be “objectively reasonable
in light of the totality of circumstances known to the officer.”
State v. Bradley, 329 Or App 736, 741, 542 P3d 56 (2023).
We review the trial court’s ruling for legal error, but
we are “bound by the trial court’s factual findings if there
is any constitutionally sufficient evidence to support them.”
State v. Krieger, 318 Or App 441, 442, 508 P3d 62 (2022). Here,
the record supports the following findings of fact made by the
trial court: (1) in the middle of the night, an officer observed
defendant driving “at a speed less than the speed limit
(20 mph in a 35 mph speed zone),” (2) defendant “was swerv-
ing in her lane of travel,” and (3) defendant “nearly stop[ped]
unnecessarily twice, including in an intersection.” We con-
clude that those specific and articulable facts were sufficient
to support an objectively reasonable suspicion that defendant
was committing DUII. Therefore, the officer was justified in
initiating a traffic stop to investigate that crime, and the trial
court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress.
Affirmed.