State v. D. J. R. ( 2024 )

No. 492 July 10, 2024 777
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of D. J. R.,
a Youth.
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
D. J. R.,
Appellant.
Yamhill County Circuit Court
19JU07275; A179417
Jennifer K. Chapman, Judge.
Submitted January 9, 2024.
Erica Hayne Friedman and Youth, Rights & Justice filed
the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Jon Zunkel-deCoursey, Assistant
Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
HELLMAN, J.
Affirmed.
778 State v. D. J. R.
HELLMAN, J.
Youth appeals a judgment revoking his probation,
committing him to Oregon Youth Authority (OYA) custody,
and recommending placement in a youth correctional facility.
Youth raises two assignments of error. In a combined argu-
ment, youth argues that the juvenile court erred by order-
ing youth’s continued commitment to OYA custody instead
of committing him to Department of Human Services (DHS)
custody. For the following reasons, we affirm.
In 2019, the juvenile court found youth within its
jurisdiction for conduct which, if committed by an adult,
would constitute rape in the first degree, ORS 163.375, and
sexual abuse in the first degree, ORS 163.427. The court
committed youth to OYA custody and placed him on pro-
bation for five years. In 2022, the state alleged that youth
had violated the conditions of his probation. At the contested
probation revocation hearing, youth admitted that he had
violated the conditions of his probation and argued that the
juvenile court should commit him to DHS custody. After
acknowledging that youth had “a lot of challenges [he has]
had to deal with through no fault of [his] own” and that it
was “a very far way away from giving up on [him],” the juve-
nile court revoked youth’s probation. The court found that,
“pursuant to ORS 419C.478(1), it is in the best interest and
welfare of the youth that he be placed in the legal custody of
the Oregon Youth Authority, State of Oregon, for placement
in a youth correctional facility. There is no less restrictive
placement that will assure the youth will conform his con-
duct to the law and other conditions that may be imposed to
protect the best interests of the youth or community.”
This appeal followed.
We begin with youth’s argument that the juve-
nile court erred when it committed youth to OYA custody
because the court’s “conclusion that it was in [youth’s] best
interest to be committed to OYA custody for incarceration in
a youth correction facility was clearly against logic and the
evidence.”
We review a court’s best interests determination for
abuse of discretion. Sjomeling v. Lasser, 251 Or App 172, 187,
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 333 Or App 777 (2024) 779
285 P3d 1116, rev den, 353 Or 103 (2012). “Thus, we will
reverse only if a trial court’s discretionary determination is
not a legally permissible one.” Id.ORS 419C.478(1) provides:
“The court may, in addition to probation or any other dis-
positional order, place an adjudicated youth who is at least
12 years of age in the legal custody of the Oregon Youth
Authority for care, placement and supervision or, when
authorized under subsection (3) of this section, place an
adjudicated youth in the legal custody of the Department
of Human Services for care, placement and supervision. In
any order issued under this section, the court shall include
written findings describing why it is in the best interests of
the adjudicated youth to be placed with the youth authority
or the department.”
“A best interests assessment is a child-focused consideration
and must be child-centered.” State v. D. B. O., 325 Or App
746, 748, 529 P3d 1004 (2023) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Further, ORS 419C.411(3) requires a juvenile court
to consider several factors “in determining the disposition
of the case,” including “[w]hether the manner in which the
adjudicated youth engaged in the conduct was aggressive,
violent, premediated or willful” and the youth’s “juvenile
court record and response to the requirements and condi-
tions imposed by previous juvenile court orders.”
We have reviewed the record and conclude that
the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion. The record
contained evidence that youth was “experiencing frequent
violation ideation,” that he had exhibited volatile conduct
while in OYA custody, and that he had run away from an
OYA facility. In addition, youth’s probation officer testified
that youth “did do a lot better in very structured, very firm
restricted environments” and the psychologist who recently
evaluated youth testified that he had concerns about youth
“being unsupervised in the community.” The psychologist
also noted that youth used violence as a coping mecha-
nism. In determining that it was in youth’s best interests
to be placed in OYA custody, the court found, in relevant
part: “Youth needs the heightened structure of a youth cor-
rectional facility because of behavior and mental health
780 State v. D. J. R.
concerns” and “[t]ransition to a less restrictive setting than
a correctional facility, such as a proctor home or foster care,
would require planning and preparation that has not yet
been done.” Because the juvenile court considered the rel-
evant facts and circumstances to make its discretionary
determination that it was in youth’s best interests to be
placed in OYA custody, its decision was legally permissible.
As a consequence, we do not reach youth’s argu-
ments that it was in his best interests to be committed to
DHS custody and that the requirements of ORS 419C.478(3)
were satisfied.
Affirmed.