State v. J. A. B. ( 2024 )

No. 469 July 3, 2024 629
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of J. A. B.,
a Youth.
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
J. A. B.,
Appellant.
Lane County Circuit Court
21JU00110; A180395
Bradley A. Cascagnette, Judge.
Submitted June 3, 2024.
Christa Obold Eshleman and Youth, Rights & Justice
filed filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Rebecca M. Auten, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Kamins,
Judge.
TOOKEY, P. J.
Affirmed.
630 State v. J. A. B.
TOOKEY, P. J.
In this juvenile delinquency case, youth appeals a
juvenile court judgment denying his petition to set aside
the judgment of jurisdiction. Youth raises one assignment
of error, in which he contends that the juvenile court erred
in rejecting his single claim for relief under ORS 419C.615
(1)(a).1 In that claim, youth alleged that he was denied his
right to adequate assistance of counsel under Article I,
section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, and his right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, because youth’s counsel failed
to file a motion to suppress incriminating statements that
youth made to law enforcement or to otherwise pursue that
issue prior to youth agreeing to a plea deal.2 Reviewing the
juvenile court’s determinations for legal error and accepting
the juvenile court’s findings of fact that are supported by
the evidence in the record, State v. C. L. E., 316 Or App 5, 6,
502 P3d 1154 (2021),3 we conclude that the juvenile court did
not err in determining that youth was not eligible for post-
adjudication relief.
Youth pleaded “admit” to conduct that, if commit-
ted by an adult, would amount to third-degree rape, ORS
163.355, as a result of a plea deal with the state. During the
investigation leading to the adjudication, youth had made
1
ORS 419C.615 provides, in pertinent part:
“(1) In addition to any other grounds upon which a person may petition a
court under ORS 419C.610, a person may petition the court on the following
grounds to set aside an order finding the person to be within the jurisdiction
of the court under ORS 419C.005:
“(a) A substantial denial in the proceedings resulting in the person’s
adjudication, or in the appellate review of the adjudication, of the person’s
rights under the United States Constitution or the Oregon Constitution, or
both, and the denial rendered the adjudication void[.]”
2
The state raises a preservation issue. It contends that youth did not pre-
serve his arguments concerning counsel’s advice to youth and counsel’s use of the
potential for suppression of youth’s incriminating statements during plea negoti-
ations. We assume without deciding that those arguments were preserved for the
purposes of our review.
3
Youth requests that we take de novo review of this case. We decline to do
so, as this is not an exceptional case in which de novo review would be appropri-
ate. See ORS 19.415(3)(b) (providing this court with discretion to conduct de novo
review in equitable cases); ORAP 5.40(8)(c) (de novo review is appropriate only in
exceptional cases).
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 333 Or App 629 (2024) 631
incriminating statements to law enforcement. Youth made
those statements in an interview in which he repeatedly
invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, and the
interviewing officer nevertheless continued the interview.
Youth petitioned the juvenile court for post-adjudication
relief, alleging that his counsel was inadequate and ineffec-
tive in failing to file a motion to suppress those incriminat-
ing statements before youth accepted the plea offer, and that
he was prejudiced by those failures because, but for counsel’s
deficient performance, he would have pleaded differently or
gone to trial. The juvenile court determined that youth did
not prove that counsel’s performance was deficient and, fur-
ther, that even a successful motion to suppress youth’s state-
ments would not have been “dispositive,” and that the plea
offer that youth accepted was “a likely favorable outcome
that is part of the complex negotiations of plea bargains.”
In evaluating whether youth was entitled to post-
adjudication relief under ORS 419C.615, “we apply the con-
stitutional standards for inadequate and ineffective assis-
tance of counsel[.]” C. L. E., 316 Or App at 6; see also State
v. J. T.-B., 307 Or App 414, 415, 476 P3d 538 (2020) (stat-
ing that ORS 419C.615 “authorizes petitions analogous to a
petition for post-conviction relief”). To establish inadequate
or ineffective assistance of counsel, youth must prove—“by a
preponderance of the evidence,” ORS 419C.615(2)(b)—both a
performance element and a prejudice element. See Johnson
v. Premo, 315 Or App 1, 8, 499 P3d 814 (2021) (stating the
“functionally equivalent” standards for inadequate and
ineffective assistance of counsel under the state and federal
constitutions).
In this case, youth argues, as he did below, that
he was prejudiced because, had counsel moved to suppress
youth’s statements and been successful, “the balance of the
State’s evidence against him would have shifted greatly,
likely resulting in a more favorable plea offer or a decision
by [youth] to go to trial.” However, in the state’s view, the
other evidence in the case—the victim’s statements to deten-
tion staff and the social media messages between youth and
the victim—was sufficient to proceed against youth. The
state further contends that “youth received a favorable plea
632 State v. J. A. B.
offer,” and did not present any evidence that he would not
have taken that offer if counsel had successfully pursued
suppression.
We agree with the state. In particular, we agree
that youth did not offer evidence that, but for counsel’s fail-
ure to pursue the issue of the admissibility of youth’s state-
ments, youth would have pleaded differently. See C. L. E.,
316 Or App at 16 (explaining that “where the adjudication is
based on a plea,” the youth “must show that but for the inad-
equate and ineffective assistance, he would have pleaded
differently”). Youth did not provide evidence in support of
his claim that the strength or ultimate success of a motion
to suppress his statements would have impacted his deci-
sion whether to accept the state’s plea offer. Thus, we con-
clude that, regardless of whether counsel’s failure to move
for or otherwise pursue suppression of youth’s statements
amounted to deficient performance, the juvenile court did
not err in determining that youth had failed to prove prej-
udice, as the record does not establish that any deficiency
in counsel’s performance led to a less favorable outcome.
Therefore, the juvenile court did not err in denying youth’s
petition to set aside the judgment of jurisdiction.
Affirmed.