State v. Boone ( 2024 )

No. 478 July 3, 2024 663
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JEFFREY DAVID BOONE,
aka Jeffery David Boone, aka Jeffrey Boone,
Defendant-Appellant.
Multnomah County Circuit Court
18CR10630; A179968
Andrew M. Lavin, Judge.
Submitted May 14, 2024.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Laura A. Frikert, Deputy Public Defender,
Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Jeff J. Payne, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Kamins,
Judge.
KAMINS, J.
Affirmed.
664 State v. Boone
KAMINS, J.
Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for
unauthorized use of a vehicle and possession of a stolen
vehicle. He raises three assignments of error. In the first
assignment, he argues that the trial court erroneously
denied his motion to suppress evidence that was the product
of his unlawful arrest. In his second and third assignments
of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred by
denying his motions for judgment of acquittal (MJOA) on
each of the charges of which he was convicted.1 The state
responds that the arresting officer had probable cause to
arrest defendant, and that there was sufficient evidence at
trial to satisfy the MJOA standard. We affirm.
We review the denial of a motion to suppress for
errors of law and are bound by the trial court’s findings of
historical fact if they are supported by constitutionally suf-
ficient evidence. State v. Ehly, 317 Or 66, 75, 854 P2d 421(1993). We have reviewed the record, and we conclude that
the trial court did not err when it determined that the offi-
cer had probable cause to arrest defendant and thus cor-
rectly denied the motion to suppress as to the evidence that
was connected with that arrest.
The trial court found that the officer had knowledge
of the following facts at the time of the arrest. The car own-
ers reported the car stolen. Within hours, the car was seen
and reported to police. When an officer arrived, there was
only one person associated with the car—defendant. The
security guard who had spotted the car and called police,
Calhoun, told the officer that defendant had been in the car,
and defendant remained by the car talking with Calhoun.
There was nothing to indicate that any other person was
associated with the car. The officer could draw a reason-
able inference that defendant had been the driver of the car.
Under those circumstances, the officer had probable cause
that defendant was the person who had stolen the vehicle,
or based on the timing, that he was otherwise closely associ-
ated with the theft, and he would therefore have known that
the car was stolen. We affirm on defendant’s first assign-
ment of error.
1
Defendant was acquitted of first-degree burglary.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 333 Or App 663 (2024) 665
Turning to defendant’s second and third assign-
ments of error, “we review the trial court’s denial of a motion
for judgment of acquittal to determine whether, * * * viewing
the facts in the light most favorable to the state, a rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Ritter, 280
Or App 281, 286, 380 P3d 1160 (2016).
In accordance with that standard, we conclude that
the record contains ample additional evidence—including
evidence that defendant was carrying the victim’s personal
property and was seen driving the car approximately 30
minutes after it was reported stolen—from which a fact-
finder could find the elements of the offenses beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. In light of that evidence, a rational trier of
fact could infer that defendant knew the vehicle was stolen.
Thus, the trial court did not err when it denied defendant’s
MJOAs on the unauthorized use of a vehicle and the posses-
sion of a stolen vehicle charges. We therefore affirm on the
second and third assignments of error.
Affirmed.