State v. Williams ( 2024 )

No. 535 July 31, 2024 173
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
EDWIN JOSH WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Jefferson County Circuit Court
21CR26525; A179146
Annette C. Hillman, Judge.
Submitted June 12, 2024.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Brett J. Allin, Deputy Public Defender, Office
of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
HELLMAN, J.
Affirmed.
174 State v. Williams
HELLMAN, J.
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction
for various offenses, including first-degree online sexual
corruption of a child, ORS 163.433. In his sole assignment of
error, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying
his motion for judgment of acquittal (MJOA) on that charge
because the evidence “did not support a rational inference as
to any of the three conduct elements.”
When reviewing the denial of an MJOA, “we view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the state to deter-
mine whether a rational factfinder could have found the
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” State
v. Lewis, 292 Or App 1, 6, 423 P3d 129, rev den, 363 Or 744(2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Having reviewed
the evidence, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
denying the MJOA. We therefore affirm.
ORS 163.433 provides that a person commits first-
degree online sexual corruption of a child when that person
commits second-degree online sexual corruption of a child
and “intentionally takes a substantial step toward physi-
cally meeting with or encountering the child.” A person
commits second-degree online sexual corruption of a child if
(1) “the person is 18 years of age or older” (2) “[f]or the pur-
pose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of the person
or another person” (3) “knowingly uses an online communi-
cation to solicit a child to engage in sexual contact or sexu-
ally explicit conduct” and (4) “[o]ffers or agrees to physically
meet with the child.” ORS 163.432(1). For purposes of those
statutes, a “child” is “a person who the defendant reasonably
believes to be under 16 years of age.” ORS 163.431(1).
In the instant case, defendant was arrested after
exchanging messages and attempting to meet with someone
he believed was a 16-year-old girl, but in fact was a detec-
tive. The detective who was posing as the girl arranged to
meet with defendant in a park for sex. Before the meeting
was to take place, the detective sent defendant a message
representing that she was 15, not 16. After receiving that
message, defendant responded, “Wait rite there k,” and
asked where the park was. The detective told him that the
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 334 Or App 173 (2024) 175
park was on B Street, and that she was waiting in a bath-
room. Defendant sent a “pin” to his location on a map, which
was under a bridge close to the park.
Officers found defendant under the bridge and
arrested him. Defendant had several condoms in his back-
pack. After his arrest, defendant told police officers that he
understood that the girl was 15 years old, and that he was
planning to meet with her. According to the detective, defen-
dant claimed that he got “nervous” when he learned that she
was 15, but he wanted to meet with her anyway because he
did not want to hurt her feelings, and he wanted to “teach
her a lesson” for agreeing to meet with a 50-year-old man.
Defendant acknowledged that he sent the girl his location
with the intent that she would meet him under the bridge.
Those facts provided sufficient evidence for a
rational factfinder to find the elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. In the light most favorable to the state,
defendant planned to meet a minor for sex. After defendant
learned that the minor he was planning to meet was under
the age of 16, he sent additional text messages to further
the plan, including confirming her location, asking her to
stay where she was, and providing her with a place where
he wanted to meet. In the light most favorable to the state,
those messages were solicitations to engage in sexual con-
tact. See Lewis, 292 Or App at 5-6 (holding that text mes-
sages asking, “Can I head over?” and “I’m good to come over
now?” “were requests to engage in sexual contact” and there-
fore met the statutory definition of solicitation). As in Lewis,
“The fact that the initial plan to engage in sexual contact
was made before defendant knew [the child’s] age does not
prevent his later requests to engage in sexual contact from
constituting solicitation as defined by the statute.” Id. at 6.
Because the evidence was sufficient to establish the
essential elements of the crime, the trial court did not err in
denying defendant’s MJOA.
Affirmed.