State v. Valdez ( 2024 )


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  • 142                     July 31, 2024                No. 529
    This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
    pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
    except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
    STATE OF OREGON
    STATE OF OREGON,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    RAUL ALFONSO VILLANUEVA VALDEZ,
    aka Raul Alfonso Villanuevavaldez,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Clackamas County Circuit Court
    19CR06621; A179445
    Katherine E. Weber, Judge.
    Submitted June 17, 2024.
    Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
    Section, and Zachary Lovett Mazer, Deputy Public Defender,
    Office of Public Defense Services, filed the briefs for appel-
    lant. Raul Alfonso Villanueva filed the supplemental brief
    pro se.
    Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
    Solicitor General, and Leigh A. Salmon, Assistant Attorney
    General, filed the brief for respondent.
    Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and Jacquot,
    Judge.
    AOYAGI, P. J.
    Affirmed.
    Nonprecedential Memo Op: 
    334 Or App 142
     (2024)                              143
    AOYAGI, P. J.
    Defendant was convicted of first-degree sexual
    abuse, ORS 163.427. On appeal, he raises four counseled
    assignments of error and two supplemental pro se assign-
    ments of error.1 For the following reasons, we affirm.
    Closing Argument. In his counseled assignments
    of error, defendant alleges that the prosecutor made two
    improper statements during closing arguments and thereby
    deprived defendant of a fair trial. Defendant did not object to
    the statements when they were made, so he requests plain-
    error review. See State v. Wyatt, 
    331 Or 335
    , 341, 15 P3d 22
    (2000) (“Generally, an issue not preserved in the trial court
    will not be considered on appeal.”); ORAP 5.45(1) (recogniz-
    ing our discretion to correct “plain” errors).
    In this specific context, plain-error review “is per-
    mitted, and reversal may be warranted if it is beyond dis-
    pute that the prosecutor’s comments were so prejudicial as
    to have denied defendant a fair trial.” State v. Chitwood, 
    370 Or 305
    , 312, 518 P3d 903 (2022) (internal quotation marks
    omitted). To meet that standard, the prosecutor’s statements
    must have been “so egregious that striking them or giving
    a curative instruction would have been insufficient.” State
    v. Durant, 
    327 Or App 363
    , 365, 535 P3d 808 (2023). “In
    other words, prosecutorial statements that were improper
    but curable are not an appropriate subject of plain-error
    review, because, in such circumstances, the defendant was
    not denied a fair trial.” 
    Id.
     (emphasis in original).
    Having considered each of the challenged state-
    ments, individually and together, we disagree with defen-
    dant that he was denied a fair trial under the Chitwood
    standard. To the extent that either statement was improper,
    the impropriety did not rise to the level of requiring a mis-
    trial and could have been addressed adequately by the trial
    1
    Defendant was originally convicted of two counts of first-degree sexual
    abuse, and his counseled opening brief includes a fifth assignment of error chal-
    lenging the failure to merge the two guilty verdicts. After briefing was complete,
    however, the parties jointly moved the trial court to amend the judgment to merge
    the two guilty verdicts, and the trial court granted that motion and amended the
    judgment on October 18, 2023. As a result, defendant is now convicted of only
    one count of first-degree sexual abuse, and he has withdrawn his counseled fifth
    assignment of error.
    144                                             State v. Valdez
    court, had an objection been made. No reversible error has
    been shown.
    Interpreters. In his first pro se supplemental assign-
    ment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred
    by providing only two court-certified interpreters for trial,
    instead of three or four interpreters as defendant feels was
    necessary. We agree with the state that defendant’s argu-
    ment is not well taken.
    Defendant’s trial was originally scheduled for
    January 2020 but was postponed because only two court-
    certified interpreters were available, which the trial court
    deemed insufficient to meet the expected interpretation
    needs at trial. The trial was rescheduled to March 2020,
    but defendant failed to appear. Defendant was arrested two
    years later, and his trial finally took place in July 2022. The
    trial court was attentive to the interpretation issue during
    the July 2022 trial and apparently had different technology
    available than had been available in March 2020 (perhaps
    due to the intervening COVID-19 pandemic). The court con-
    cluded that it needed two court-certified interpreters for trial,
    which is the number that were provided. Defendant made
    no objection to the number of interpreters (or the quality of
    the interpretation) and in fact thanked the court for “all the
    attention” that it had given to the interpretation issue.
    The claim of error is therefore unpreserved, which
    means that the only review available is discretionary plain-
    error review. Wyatt, 
    331 Or at 341
    ; ORAP 5.45(1). An error
    is “plain” when it is an error of law, the legal point is obvi-
    ous and not reasonably in dispute, and the error is apparent
    on the record without having to choose among competing
    inferences. State v. Vanornum, 
    354 Or 614
    , 629, 317 P3d 889
    (2013). Here, defendant makes an underdeveloped argu-
    ment for plain-error review in his “conclusion” section. Even
    putting aside any procedural shortcomings, defendant has
    not persuaded us that the court committed any plain error.
    Based on the record of the July 2022 trial, it is not obvious or
    beyond reasonable dispute that more than two interpreters
    were needed, especially given the technology used during
    trial. Any error therefore is not “plain,” and we reject the
    first pro se supplemental assignment of error on that basis.
    Nonprecedential Memo Op: 
    334 Or App 142
     (2024)              145
    Ethnicity of Jurors. In his second pro se supplemen-
    tal assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial
    court violated his constitutional rights by failing to “provide
    [him] with jurors of his ethnic background,” which he iden-
    tifies as “Hispanic Mexican,” and instead seating a panel
    of jurors of “Caucasian descent.” Defendant appears to be
    challenging the make-up of the jury pool, rather than the
    process by which the jurors for his trial were selected from
    that pool, but it is not entirely clear because he relies heavily
    on Batson v. Kentucky, 
    476 US 79
    , 
    106 S Ct 1712
    , 
    90 L Ed 2d 69
     (1986), the seminal case holding that racial discrimi-
    nation in the exercise of peremptory challenges violates the
    Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
    If defendant is challenging how the prosecutor exer-
    cised his peremptory challenges, defendant did not make
    any Batson objection at trial, so the claim of error is unpre-
    served. That again means that we are limited to plain-
    error review, which defendant has nominally requested.
    We readily conclude that any error is not “plain.” It would
    be nearly impossible to establish a plain-error Batson vio-
    lation, because it is usually the defendant’s objection that
    leads to the creation of the record necessary to evaluate an
    alleged Batson violation. Here, the record certainly does not
    reveal any plain-error Batson violations; indeed, the record
    does not even identify the racial or ethnic background of the
    seated or stricken jurors.
    If defendant does not mean to challenge the prose-
    cutor’s use of peremptory challenges but instead means to
    protest more generally a lack of “Hispanic Mexican” jurors,
    on the theory that the court was constitutionally required
    to provide him with a jury that was comprised of or at least
    included “jurors of his ethnic background,” that argument
    also fails. As noted, the record is silent regarding the racial
    or ethnic background of the seated and stricken jurors, let
    alone the composition of the larger jury pool from which
    they were drawn. In any event, a criminal defendant “has
    no right to a ‘petit jury composed in whole or in part of per-
    sons of [the defendant’s] own race.’ ” Powers v. Ohio, 
    499 US 400
    , 404, 
    111 S Ct 1364
    , 
    113 L Ed 2d 411
     (1991) (quoting
    Strauder v. West Virginia, 
    100 US 303
    , 311, 
    25 L Ed 664
    146                                          State v. Valdez
    (1879) (brackets in Powers)). Accordingly, we reject the sec-
    ond pro se supplemental assignment of error.
    Affirmed.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A179445

Judges: Aoyagi

Filed Date: 7/31/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/16/2024