Kragt v. Board of Parole ( 2023 )

25
On petitioner’s petition for reconsideration filed May 16, on respondent’s
response to petition for reconsideration filed May 23; opinion filed May 3,
325 Or App 688, 529 P3d 1019; reconsideration allowed, former opinion adhered
to July 12; petition for review allowed November 2, 2023 (371 Or 511)
See later issue Oregon Reports
RANDALL J. KRAGT,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF PAROLE AND
POST-PRISON SUPERVISION,
Respondent.
Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision
A163421
533 P3d 392
After losing his post-conviction appeal, petitioner sought reconsideration
of the Court of Appeals’ cost award to the Board of Parole and Post-Prison
Supervision as the prevailing party. Petitioner argued that the court should
exercise its discretion under ORS 20.310(1) to disallow costs, because petitioner
has court-appointed counsel and is therefore necessarily indigent. Alternatively,
petitioner argued that the court is required to make a record of its reasons for
awarding costs, as a discretionary decision. Held: The court granted reconsider-
ation and adhered to its former opinion. ORS 20.310(1) provides that the Court
of Appeals “shall allow costs and disbursements to the prevailing party,” unless
otherwise proscribed by statute, or unless the court directs otherwise. As such,
it is only the disallowance of costs that involves the exercise of discretion. In
this case, costs were allowed in the ordinary course, and nothing in the petition
for reconsideration persuaded the court that it should vary its normal practice
of awarding costs to the prevailing party in a post-conviction appeal, including
appeals in which the non-prevailing party has court-appointed counsel.
Reconsideration allowed; former opinion adhered to.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Kyle Krohn, Deputy Public Defender, Office of
Public Defense Services, for petition.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Jonathan N. Schildt, Assistant
Attorney General, for response.
Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, and Joyce, Judge, and
Jacquot, Judge.
AOYAGI, P. J.
Reconsideration allowed; former opinion adhered to.
26 Kragt v. Board of Parole
AOYAGI, P. J.
Petitioner seeks reconsideration of our decision in
Kragt v. Board of Parole, 325 Or App 688, 529 P3d 1019
(2023), asking that we reconsider our award of costs to the
board as the prevailing party. Analogizing to Gutierrez v.
Board of Parole, 319 Or App 525, 509 P3d 194, rev den, 370
Or 197 (2022), petitioner argues that we should exercise our
discretion to disallow costs, because we decided his appeal
on procedural grounds, rather than the merits, and because
petitioner has court-appointed counsel and is therefore nec-
essarily indigent. Alternatively, petitioner argues that we
are required to make a record of the reasons for the cost
award, as a discretionary decision, and he asks us to make
that record. The state’s response is limited to pointing out
that Gutierrez is distinguishable. We allow reconsideration
and adhere to our former opinion.
ORS 20.310(1) provides that “[i]n any appeal to the
Court of Appeals * * *, the court shall allow costs and dis-
bursements to the prevailing party, unless a statute provides
that in the particular case costs and disbursements shall
not be allowed to the prevailing party or shall be allowed
to some other party, or unless the court directs otherwise.”
(Emphases added.) It is only when we affirmatively direct
that costs will not be allowed that we are exercising dis-
cretion. We endeavor to be consistent in exercising that
discretion. We may decide that costs generally should be
disallowed in a particular type of case. Otherwise, a deci-
sion to disallow costs in an individual case will neces-
sarily be based on the individual circumstances of that
case.
Because the statute provides that we generally
“shall” allow costs, we do not believe that we are required
to explain allowing costs in the ordinary course—that is,
when we are not exercising our discretion to disallow costs.
Of course, we could choose to explain allowing costs, but
there is little reason to do so where, as here, the parties did
not address costs in their briefing. A party may raise the
issue on reconsideration, but it should be noted that it is not
our practice to explain decisions to deny reconsideration.
Cite as 327 Or App 25 (2023) 27
As for the present case, having granted reconsider-
ation to address petitioner’s alternative argument, we also
will address his request that we exercise our discretion to
disallow costs. This case is not comparable to Gutierrez,
because that appeal was dismissed as moot. Gutierrez,
319 Or App at 526; see also DeYoung/Thomas v. Board of
Parole, 332 Or 266, 276, 27 P3d 110 (2001) (recognizing that
“appellate courts may decline to award costs to the prevail-
ing party in cases of dismissal, for reasons of fairness or
otherwise”). This appeal was decided on the merits, except
insofar as one argument was rejected as having been raised
too late. Kragt, 325 Or App at 689 (declining to address peti-
tioner’s new constitutional argument and rejecting his other
arguments). Moreover, a cost award is not meant to penal-
ize the losing party for a lawyer’s fervent advocacy, which
sometimes includes testing procedural boundaries or mak-
ing novel arguments. Allowing costs is the statutory default
under ORS 20.310(1), so cost awards must be understood as
simply a cost of litigation. Finally, consistent with the stat-
ute, we normally award costs to the prevailing party in a
post-conviction appeal. We are unpersuaded that anything
about this case warrants treating it differently from other
post-conviction appeals involving court-appointed counsel.
Reconsideration allowed; former opinion adhered to.