J. S. v. Hudgins ( 2023 )

220 November 15, 2023 No. 604
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
J. S.,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
Jonas HUDGINS,
Respondent-Appellant.
Deschutes County Circuit Court
22SK03027; A179953
Michelle A. McIver, Judge.
Submitted July 7, 2023.
R. Brady Williams filed the brief for appellant.
J. S. filed the brief pro se. Also on the brief was J. S.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
HELLMAN, J.
Reversed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 329 Or App 220 (2023) 221
HELLMAN, J.
Respondent appeals from the trial court’s entry of a
civil stalking protective order (SPO) against him under ORS
30.866.1 In his assignment of error, respondent contends
that the trial court erred when it determined that the stat-
utory requirements for an SPO were satisfied. Specifically,
he argues that there were not repeated contacts as required
by ORS 30.866 because the only contacts alleged—three of
his text messages—were constitutionally protected speech
under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution.2 As
explained below, we reverse.
As a preliminary matter, we note that neither party
requested de novo review and that this is not a case that war-
rants such review. See ORS 19.415(3)(b) (describing discre-
tionary de novo review); ORAP 5.40(8)(c) (providing that the
court will exercise its discretion to review de novo “only in
exceptional cases”). Therefore, in conducting our review, “ ‘we
view the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be
drawn from it in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
disposition and assess whether, when so viewed, the record is
legally sufficient to permit that outcome.’ ” H. L. P. v. Jones,
309 Or App 108, 109, 481 P3d 415 (2021) (quoting J. D. K.
v. W. T. F., 276 Or App 533, 537, 369 P3d 1181 (2016)).
On appeal, respondent argues that the evidence
was insufficient to support the SPO. We agree. We consid-
ered the same facts in a related case, also decided today,
concerning petitioner’s husband, J. S. v. Hudgins, 329
Or App 176, ___ P3d ___ (2023). In that case, we reversed
petitioner’s husband’s SPO against respondent that was
based on the same text messages at issue in this case. Id. at
177-78. Because the trial court relied on the same text mes-
sages and record to issue the SPO here, we conclude that it
erred for the same reasons that we articulate in our other
opinion. See id. at 180-82 (holding same in related case).
Reversed.
1
In civil stalking cases, we ordinarily refer to the parties by their designa-
tion in the trial court. J. D. K. v. W. T. F., 276 Or App 533, 534 n 1, 369 P3d 1181
(2016) (so stating).
2
Article I, section 8, provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o law shall be passed
restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write,
or print freely on any subject whatever[.]”