Dept. of Human Services v. J. J. ( 2023 )

222 November 15, 2023 No. 605
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of M. M. J.,
a Child.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
J. J.,
Appellant.
Expedited Juvenile Dependency Case
(Not TPR)
Marion County Circuit Court
22JU03633; A180760
Manuel Perez, Judge.
Submitted August 15, 2023.
Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate
Section, and Joel C. Duran, Deputy Public Defender, Office
of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Erica L. Herb, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Hellman, Judge, and
Armstrong, Senior Judge.
HELLMAN, J.
Affirmed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 329 Or App 222 (2023) 223
HELLMAN, J.
Father appeals a juvenile court order taking juris-
diction over father’s then three-year-old child, M. On appeal,
father raises three assignments of error: (1) the juvenile
court erred in asserting dependency jurisdiction over M
because father’s mental health interferes with his ability
to safely parent M; (2) the juvenile court erred in asserting
dependency jurisdiction over M because father’s residential
instability interferes with his ability to safely parent M; and
(3) the juvenile court erred in asserting dependency jurisdic-
tion over M and making him a ward of the court. Father con-
tends that the Department of Human Services (the depart-
ment) did not meet its burden to prove by a preponderance
of competent evidence that father’s “purported (or actual)
deficits, either individually or collectively,” exposed M to a
current threat of serious loss or injury that would likely be
realized without the juvenile court’s intervention through
wardship. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
The juvenile court has dependency jurisdiction in
cases involving “a person who is under 18 years of age” and
“[w]hose condition or circumstances are such as to endanger
the welfare of the person or of others[.]” ORS 419B.100(1)(c).
We center our inquiry “ ‘on the child’s conditions or circum-
stances at the time of the hearing and whether the totality
of those circumstances demonstrates a reasonable likeli-
hood of harm to the welfare of the child.’ ” Dept. of Human
Services v. T. L. H. S., 292 Or App 708, 715, 425 P3d 775
(2018) (quoting Dept. of Human Services v. W. A. C., 263
Or App 382, 393, 328 P3d 769 (2014) (emphasis omitted)).
We have reviewed the evidence, “as supplemented
and buttressed by permissible derivative inferences, in the
light most favorable to the [juvenile] court’s disposition” and
conclude that “the record was legally sufficient to permit”
the juvenile court’s assertion of dependency jurisdiction over
M and that the court did not err when it made M a ward of
the court. Dept. of Human Services v. N. P., 257 Or App 633,
639, 307 P3d 444 (2013); see also Dept. of Human Services v.
Z. M., 316 Or App 327, 329, 504 P3d 1208 (2021) (explaining
that we “assum[e] the correctness of that court’s explicit and
224 Dept. of Human Services v. J. J.
implicit factual findings if any evidence in the record sup-
ports them”).
The record supports that father was experiencing
mental health issues and residential instability at the time
of the jurisdictional trial. Father acknowledged that he had
been diagnosed in the past with bipolar disorder, for which
he stopped taking medication years ago because he could not
afford the medication. However, father testified that he did
not “have any mental issues, never have, never did[,]” and, at
the time of trial, he was not engaged in therapeutic services
or medication management for his mental health. Multiple
witnesses testified about concerns related to father’s erratic
and unpredictable behavior, and the court expressed con-
cern, based on father’s own testimony, that father had unre-
solved mental health issues that were impacting his reality
and his ability to parent M. Regarding father’s residential
instability, there is ample evidence that, during M’s life,
father and M had relocated multiple times and resided in
multiple states, including periods in which they stayed in
hotels and in father’s vehicle. In addition, the record sup-
ports that, at the time of the jurisdictional trial, father’s
mental health and residential instability were interfering
with his ability to safely parent and created a “ ‘current and
nonspeculative’ ” risk of harm to M. Dept. of Human Services
v. W. M., 303 Or App 384, 390, 463 P3d 572 (2020) (quoting
Dept. of Human Services v. F. Y. D., 302 Or App 9, 19, 459
P3d 947 (2020)).
Father contends that the juvenile court “ma[de] the
child its ward based on the department’s firmly held belief
that there is an inherent risk of serious loss or injury to
children from a parent’s poverty or residential instability
or a parent’s antipathy towards the department.” We dis-
agree. The juvenile court did not mention generalities in
its ruling. Instead, the juvenile court’s ruling thoroughly
demonstrated that its exercise of dependency jurisdiction
over M was rooted in a deep understanding of the specifics
of father’s case, a demonstrated nexus between father’s men-
tal health and residential instability, and a current threat
of serious loss or injury to M. T. L. H. S., 292 Or App at 714;
see also Dept. of Human Services v. A. R. S., 258 Or App 624,
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 329 Or App 222 (2023) 225
636, 310 P3d 1186 (2013), rev dismissed, 354 Or 735 (2014)
(explaining that “residential instability is not a sufficient
basis for jurisdiction without a showing that it creates a risk
of harm to the child”).
For example, the record demonstrates that the
juvenile court understood the difficult working relationship
between father and the department, had taken appropriate
steps to facilitate those interactions, and did not fault father
for that situation. In addition, the juvenile court recognized
that father was a “great parent,” and expressed hope that
the department could work with father “to get you back with
your child as soon as possible in a place that is safe for you
and for him.” The juvenile court also expressly recognized
that father had a right to hold views that some may view
as unconventional. However, on the key question before it,
the juvenile court found that father’s unresolved mental
health issues were “affecting his reality” which had nega-
tively impacted his child. That finding was amply supported
by the testimony of family members, law enforcement, and
department staff who all expressed specific concerns for M’s
wellbeing under father’s care, including that father’s fre-
quent moves impacted M’s dental care and exposed M to
physical harm. In addition, father’s own testimony revealed
a lack of awareness of the impact that his mental health and
housing instability had on M’s safety and security, which
further supports that father’s conduct created a “ ‘current
and nonspeculative’ ” risk of harm to M. See W. M., 303
Or App at 390.
We therefore conclude that the juvenile court did not
err when it asserted dependency jurisdiction over M due to
father’s mental health and residential instability and made
M a ward of the court.
Affirmed.