Sanchez and Barragan ( 2023 )

No. 632 November 29, 2023 349
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of the Marriage of
Liduvina Zamudio SANCHEZ,
Petitioner-Appellant,
and
Antonio Zamudio BARRAGAN,
Respondent-Respondent.
Umatilla County Circuit Court
20DR21608; A178433
Eva J. Temple, Judge.
Argued and submitted October 23, 2023.
Laura Graser argued the cause and filed the brief for
appellant.
Morgan Rose Terhune argued the cause for respondent.
On the brief were Thomas A. Bittner, Amy D. Fassler and
Schulte, Anderson, Downes, Aronson & Bittner, P. C.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
HELLMAN, J.
Affirmed.
350 Sanchez and Barragan
HELLMAN, J.
In this dissolution action, wife asserts that the trial
court erred as a matter of law when it failed to award wife
spousal support. Specifically, wife argues that she was enti-
tled to maintenance spousal support based on the factors
set out in ORS 107.105(1)(d)(C) and, further, that the trial
court’s rationale in denying an award of spousal support
was “entirely based on impermissible speculation that wife
‘has a number of potential windfalls to support her in the
future.’ ” We affirm, concluding that under our standard of
review, the trial court did not err.
We review a trial court’s spousal support determi-
nations for abuse of discretion. Kerr and Kerr, 310 Or App
695, 696, 485 P3d 315 (2021); Waid and Waid, 257 Or App
495, 498, 307 P3d 484 (2013) (“Trial courts have a range of
discretion to decide what amount and duration of support
is just and equitable.”). Thus, we will uphold a trial court’s
award of spousal support if, “given the findings of the trial
court that are supported by the record, the court’s deter-
mination that an award of support is ‘just and equitable’
represents a choice among legally correct alternatives.” Berg
and Berg, 250 Or App 1, 2, 279 P3d 286 (2012).
Although the trial court mentioned that wife “has a
number of potential windfalls to support her in the future[,]”
the ruling in its entirety makes it clear that the trial court’s
decision was ultimately made because “[b]oth parties are in
a bad financial situation[,]” that “there are simply too many
debts and not enough assets to adequately provide for both
parties[,]” and that “[h]usband does not have the earning
capacity to pay off debts, rent or purchase a new home and
to pay spousal support.” The trial court also found that the
parties had incurred significant debt to fund their standard
of living prior to their divorce. The record supports those
findings and with them, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it did not award spousal support to wife.
See Abrams and Abrams, 243 Or App 203, 208, 259 P3d 92,
rev den, 350 Or 716 (2011) (“[S]pousal support should not be
set at an amount that is higher than the obligor can reason-
ably afford to pay at the time of dissolution.”); see also Sather
and Sather, 238 Or App 235, 239, 243 P3d 76 (2010) (reducing
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 329 Or App 349 (2023) 351
a spousal support award where payments greatly dimin-
ished husband’s already modest standard of living); Smith
v. Koors, 149 Or App 198, 206, 942 P2d 807 (1997) (explain-
ing that where the parties’ standard of living and lifestyle
involved incurring substantial debt and supplementation
by family, “whatever standard of living existed before their
permanent separation * * * will be difficult to duplicate on
the basis of the available income without supplementation”).
Affirmed.
352 Sanchez and Barragan