State v. Chapman ( 2023 )

552 December 13, 2023 No. 660
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Allison Kate CHAPMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Coos County Circuit Court
21VI50545, 21VI133808, 21VI133804, 21VI125321;
A177574 (Control), A177784, A177785, A177786
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Allison K. CHAPMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Coos County Circuit Court
22VI21989; A179067
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Allison Kate CHAPMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Coos County Circuit Court
22VI37214; A179309
Martin E. Stone, Judge.
Submitted May 5, 2023.
Allison Kate Chapman filed the brief pro se.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Emily N. Snook, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 329 Or App 552 (2023) 553
Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, and Joyce, Judge, and
Jacquot, Judge.
JACQUOT, J.
In A177574, affirmed.
In A179067, affirmed.
In A179309, affirmed.
554 State v. Chapman
JACQUOT, J.
In these cases, consolidated for decision, defendant,
appearing pro se, challenges the trial court’s judgments
finding her guilty of the violation of driving while suspended
(DWS), ORS 811.175, a Class A violation, and imposing fines.
In one assignment of error in each case, defendant argues
that the imposition of fines violated the anti-alienation pro-
vision of the Social Security Act, 42 USC § 407(a), because
social security is her only income, and that her convictions
for DWS must be reversed. We affirm.
Defendant’s driving privileges were suspended
in 2017 due to her failure to pay a fine for an earlier traf-
fic violation.1 Since then, defendant has been convicted of
DWS multiple times based upon the original suspension,
and these appeals address six of those convictions. The
trial court imposed a fine for each of the convictions. On
appeal, defendant appears to challenge (1) the original 2017
suspension, (2) the subsequent convictions for DWS, (3) and
the imposition of a fine for each conviction. The state argues
that defendant may not collaterally attack her original sus-
pension through these proceedings and that, regardless,
there is insufficient evidence that she would have had to use
her social security income to pay the fines. Additionally, the
state argues, to the extent defendant intends to challenge
the fines imposed in the 2021 cases, her appeal is moot.
As an initial matter, we agree that defendant’s chal-
lenge to the fines—but not the convictions—at issue in the
2021 cases is moot. “Mootness results when a change in cir-
cumstance or some intervening event has eliminated the pos-
sibility that the requested relief can be provided.” Garges v.
Premo, 362 Or 797, 801, 421 P3d 345 (2018). In December
2022, the fines in those cases were remitted by order of the
Governor. Because defendant is no longer required to pay
1
Had defendant’s original 2017 traffic violation occurred after October 1, 2020,
her driving privileges would not have been suspended. In October 2020, the Oregon
Legislature repealed ORS 809.210, the statute that authorized the state to sus-
pend driving privileges for failure to pay fines, due to, in part, the disproportion-
ate, cyclical, and devastating impact the practice had on low-income Oregonians
and Oregonians of color. HB 4210 (2020); Testimony, Joint Committee On The First
Special Session of 2020, HB 4210, June 24, 2020 (statement of Rep Chris Gorsek);
Vote Explanation, HB 4210, June 25, 2020 (statement of Rep Tiffiny Mitchell).
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 329 Or App 552 (2023) 555
those fines, we cannot provide her with the relief she seeks as
related to the fines in the 2021 cases, and that issue is moot.
As to defendant’s remaining contentions, we under-
stand defendant’s argument to be that the trial court lacked
authority to impose a fine in the initial 2017 traffic viola-
tion case, meaning that the 2017 suspension based on her
failure to pay the fine was invalid, and therefore all sub-
sequent convictions for DWS and imposed fines are also
invalid. Defendant argues that the trial court could not
impose a fine in 2017, and in any case since, because her
income came exclusively from social security. She points
to the anti-alienation provision of the Social Security Act,
which exempts a beneficiary’s benefits from “execution, levy,
attachment, garnishment, or other legal process.” 42 USC
§ 407(a). Therefore, defendant argues, by imposing fines the
court was necessarily forcing her to “hand over protected
benefits for payment” in violation of federal law.
We understand defendant’s argument about the
2017 suspension to be a collateral attack, and defendant has
not persuaded us that she can collaterally attack her original
2017 suspension. Defendant has not provided any authority
on appeal, nor are we aware of any, that would allow such
an attack. See State v. Jones, 223 Or App 70, 83-84, 195 P3d
78, adh’d to as modified on recons, 224 Or App 451 (2008),
rev den, 346 Or 184 (2009) (in a prosecution for criminal
driving while suspended or revoked, defendant cannot col-
laterally challenge the validity of the underlying suspen-
sion); State v. Sims, 335 Or 269, 274-75, 66 P3d 472 (2003)
(legislature did not intend to permit a defendant to collat-
erally attack the underlying revocation order in a prosecu-
tion for felony driving while revoked). Accordingly, we reject
defendant’s challenge to the 2017 suspension.
As to defendant’s convictions for DWS, her only
argument is that the trial court erred in entering those con-
victions because the 2017 suspension was invalid. Because
we have rejected her challenge to that suspension, we also
reject her challenges to the convictions.
Finally, we turn to defendant’s challenge to the fines
in the 2022 cases. On appeal, defendant has not addressed
556 State v. Chapman
any Oregon authority relevant to her argument concerning
the anti-alienation provision of the Social Security Act, and
we do not “develop arguments * * * that have not been briefed
sufficiently to persuade us of their merit, and that raise
potentially complicated issues.” Trent v. Connor Enterprises,
Inc., 300 Or App 165, 170, 452 P3d 1072 (2019). Although
defendant is correct that the court cannot order direct collec-
tion or garnishment of her social security disability income,
based on the arguments and authorities cited by the par-
ties in this case, she has not persuaded us that her receipt
of such income immunizes her from the imposition of the
financial obligation itself. See State v. Poston, 283 Or App
895, 896, 389 P3d 417 (2017) (evidence that the defendant
received disability income was sufficient to affirm finding
that the defendant “is or may be able” to pay attorney fees);
State v. Eshaia, 253 Or App 676, 680-81, 291 P3d 805 (2012)
(same); Fredenburg v. Mental Health Div., 106 Or App 337,
341-42, 807 P2d 812, adh’d to as modified on recons, 107
Or App 425, 812 P2d 432 (1991) (the state’s consideration
of patients’ social security benefits in calculating liability
for the cost of their care after they were found guilty except
for insanity did not violate 42 USC § 407(a)). We therefore
affirm the judgment in each case.
In A177574, affirmed.
In A179067, affirmed.
In A179309, affirmed.