State v. H. R. , 329 Or. App. 701 ( 2023 )

No. 674 December 20, 2023 701
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of H. R.,
a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
H. R.,
Appellant.
Multnomah County Circuit Court
22CC05938; A179743
Monica M. Herranz, Judge pro tempore.
Submitted November 6, 2023.
Joseph R. DeBin and Multnomah Defenders, Inc., filed
the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Inge D. Wells, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
KAMINS, J.
Affirmed.
702 State v. H. R.
KAMINS, J.
Appellant appeals a judgment involuntarily com-
mitting her to the Oregon Health Authority for up to 180
days and prohibiting her from purchasing or possessing
firearms. ORS 426.130. Absent de novo review, “we view the
evidence, as supplemented and buttressed by permissible
derivative inferences, in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s disposition and assess whether, when so viewed,
the record was legally sufficient to permit that outcome.”
State v. M. J. F., 306 Or App 544, 545, 473 P3d 1141 (2020)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Because the record was
legally sufficient to allow a rational factfinder to conclude
that appellant suffered from a mental disorder that makes
her a danger to herself, we affirm.1 ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A)
(defining a “[p]erson with mental illness” as a person who,
“because of a mental disorder,” is “[d]angerous to self or
others”).
The trial court concluded that appellant suffers
from schizoaffective disorder which renders her dangerous
to herself. The evidence in the record included testimony
that appellant’s disorientation caused her to run into traf-
fic on multiple occasions, forcing cars to honk and swerve
to avoid hitting her, and that she lacked insight into that
behavior. That evidence was legally sufficient to permit a
rational factfinder to conclude that appellant presented a
danger to herself. See State v. W. B., 313 Or App 639, 640,
493 P3d 575 (2021) (holding that an appellant who “repeat-
edly walked into moving traffic without looking, causing
cars to stop abruptly to narrowly avoid hitting him, and * * *
lacks insight into that behavior” presented a danger to him-
self); c.f. State v. S. R. J., 281 Or App 741, 752, 386 P3d 99
(2016) (holding that an appellant stepping into the street
and causing traffic to back up without being in the path of
a car moving at high speed did not present a danger to self,
1
Because we conclude that the state carried its burden of establishing that
appellant suffered from a mental disorder that makes her a danger to herself,
we need not consider appellant’s argument that the state failed to establish that
she is unable to provide for her basic needs. See ORS 426.005(1)(f) (“ ‘Person with
mental illness’ means a person who, because of a mental disorder, is one or more
of the following: * * * Dangerous to self or others[;] * * * Unable to provide for basic
personal needs[.]” (Emphasis added.)); State v. R. A., 209 Or App 647, 652, 149
P3d 289 (2006).
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 329 Or App 701 (2023) 703
but observing that “past near-misses” of walking into traffic
can allow for inference of likelihood of future harm to self).
Affirmed.
704 State v. H. R.