State v. Williams ( 2024 )

222 January 10, 2024 No. 30
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JOSHUA BRANDON WILLIAMS,
aka John Doe,
Defendant-Appellant.
Baker County Circuit Court
22CR05814; A178802
Matthew B. Shirtcliff, Judge.
Submitted August 21, 2023.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Laura A. Frikert, Deputy Public Defender,
Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Erica L. Herb, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Hellman, Judge,
and Armstrong, Senior Judge.
HELLMAN, J.
Affirmed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 330 Or App 222 (2024) 223
HELLMAN, J.
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction
for third-degree robbery, ORS 164.395, and first-degree
criminal trespass, ORS 164.255. In his sole assignment of
error, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it
denied his motion for judgment of acquittal for third-degree
robbery because there was insufficient evidence that defen-
dant used or threatened physical force.
Defendant’s robbery conviction was based, in rele-
vant part, on evidence that he quickly grabbed a motel key
card out of the victim’s hand while the victim was using
it to enter the motel. Defendant concedes that in State v.
Johnson, 215 Or App 1, 5-6, 168 P3d 312, rev den, 343 Or
366 (2007), we held that a person uses “physical force” suffi-
cient to support a conviction for robbery by “taking the vic-
tim’s property so quickly that resistance is futile.” However,
he contends that Johnson is plainly wrong under the test
established in State v. Civil, 283 Or App 395, 406, 388 P3d
1185 (2017). Defendant advances three arguments as to why
Johnson is plainly wrong: (1) it is not consistent with State
v. Hamilton, 348 Or 371, 233 P3d 432 (2010); (2) it is not rec-
oncilable with the plain text of the robbery statute; and (3) it
incorrectly allows a robbery conviction when physical force
was directed only at the property, not at the victim. The
arguments that defendant advances here are not “qualita-
tively new,” nor do they persuade us that Johnson is plainly
wrong under the “rigorous” standard established in Civil.
See Civil, 283 Or App at 416.
Affirmed.