Rankin v. Landers ( 2024 )

No. 218 April 10, 2024 773
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
LAWSON REED RANKIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Sheriff LANDERS,
Defendant-Respondent.
Lincoln County Circuit Court
21CV37655; A179702
Marcia L. Buckley, Judge.
Submitted March 12, 2024.
Jedediah Peterson and O’Connor Weber LLC filed the
brief for appellant.
Brian J. Gardner filed the brief for respondent.
Before Joyce, Presiding Judge, Lagesen, Chief Judge,
and Jacquot, Judge.
LAGESEN, C. J.
Affirmed.
774 Rankin v. Landers
LAGESEN, C. J.
Plaintiff appeals a general judgment dismissing
this habeas corpus proceeding in which plaintiff seeks a
remedy for, among other things, alleged violations of his
constitutional rights with respect to his legal mail. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
Plaintiff petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus
under ORS 34.340 while incarcerated in the Lincoln County
Jail. He alleged, among other things, that jail staff was
opening his legal mail outside of his presence, in violation of
his constitutional rights. Following an evidentiary hearing
under ORS 34.695, the trial court found that plaintiff “has
not been deprived * * * of a constitutional right that requires
immediate judicial attention for which no other timely rem-
edy is practicably available.” In so ruling, the court acknowl-
edged the incidents in which jail staff had opened plaintiff’s
mail outside of his presence but noted that “based on what
I’ve heard,” the court believed “that the mail issue has been
resolved.” The court also observed that it did not believe that
jail staff had opened plaintiff’s mail “in order to gain insight
into his pending legal matters.”
Plaintiff appealed. On appeal, plaintiff does not con-
test the trial court’s factual determination that the mail
issue was not ongoing, or any other factual determination by
the trial court. Instead, plaintiff asserts that the trial court
committed legal error by denying relief once it determined
that plaintiff’s mail had, in fact, been opened outside of his
presence on occasion: “The court’s findings assume plain-
tiff’s mail was being opened, which in itself is enough to
violate plaintiff’s rights and support a habeas corpus claim.”
In support of that argument, plaintiff cites Merriweather v.
Zamora, 569 F3d 307, 317 (6th Cir 2009), for the proposition
that “merely opening legal mail is sufficient to state a claim
for relief, as it implicates the First and Sixth Amendments.”
Because plaintiff challenges only the trial court’s
legal determinations, we review for legal error. We conclude
that the trial court did not err.
As we have explained, “Oregon inmates have the
right to be incarcerated under conditions that comply with
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 331 Or App 773 (2024) 775
state and federal constitutional standards.” Barrett v. Peters,
274 Or App 237, 240, 360 P3d 638 (2015), aff’d, 360 Or 445,
383 P3d 813 (2016). Where an inmate is incarcerated under
conditions that violate constitutional standards, habeas cor-
pus affords a remedy if the deprivation is one “that requires
immediate judicial attention” and if “no other timely remedy
is practicably available to the plaintiff.” ORS 34.310; ORS
34.362; Barrett, 274 Or App at 240. The core function of the
habeas corpus remedy is to provide a mechanism for obtain-
ing immediate relief from confinement that violates a per-
son’s constitutional rights. See id. at 246-47, 250 (discussing
the operation of the habeas corpus remedy).
Here, the trial court was persuaded that, as of
the time of the hearing, the mail issue was not ongoing.
Under those circumstances, the trial court correctly dis-
missed plaintiff’s petition; the fact that the jail was no lon-
ger engaging in the practices alleged to be unconstitutional
meant that there was no need for immediate judicial scru-
tiny. Beyond that, that habeas corpus does not afford a rem-
edy under the circumstances does not mean that plaintiff
lacks a remedy for any violation of his constitutional rights
resulting from the jail’s mail processing practices. It sim-
ply means that habeas corpus is not the proper remedy for
redressing conditions of confinement that no longer exist. As
illustrated by Merriweather, the federal case cited by plain-
tiff, other remedies may be available to plaintiff to remedy
any past violations of his constitutional right to have his
legal mail opened in his presence. See Merriweather, 569 F3d
at 317 (holding that the defendants’ admissions that prison
employees “improperly opened four pieces of legal mail”
addressed to the plaintiff were sufficient to state a claim
against the defendants for damages under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 US 388, 91 S Ct 1999, 29 L Ed 2d 619 (1971)); see also
Barrett v. Williams, 247 Or App 309, 313-14, 270 P3d 285
(2011) (identifying other potential remedies available to an
incarcerated person challenging an institution’s handling
of legal mail in concluding that habeas corpus was not a
proper remedy).
Affirmed.