Dodd v. Beaumont ( 2024 )

No. 229 April 10, 2024 817
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
JUSTIN RAY DODD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Jeremy BEAUMONT,
Superintendent,
Warner Creek Correctional Facility,
Defendant-Respondent.
Lake County Circuit Court
22CV40024; A180533
David M. Vandenberg, Judge.
Submitted March 6, 2024.
Jedediah Peterson and O’Connor Weber LLC filed the
brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Robert M. Wilsey, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and Jacquot,
Judge.
JOYCE, J.
Affirmed.
818 Dodd v. Beaumont
JOYCE, J.
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment dismissing his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In that petition, plain-
tiff claimed that his conviction and sentence were unlaw-
ful and that he could not seek post-conviction relief because
such a claim would be untimely. The trial court rejected his
claims, concluding that the claims were “not properly the
subject matter for” habeas corpus. We affirm.
Plaintiff argues that, under Mueller v. Benning, 314
Or 615, 621, 841 P2d 640 (1992), the trial court should have
treated his petition for a writ of habeas corpus as “misla-
beled claims for post-conviction relief” and applied the ana-
lytical framework for post-conviction claims. We disagree
that Mueller required the trial court to do so. To be sure,
Mueller stands for the proposition that a court “d[oes] not
err when it hear[s] a properly cognizable post-conviction
claim that [has been] mislabeled by the court as a petition
for habeas corpus.” Perry v. Zenon, 127 Or App 682, 685, 874
P2d 89 (1994) (so describing the holding in Mueller). That
said, “[n]othing in Mueller compels a trial court to convert a
petition for habeas corpus into a petition for post-conviction
relief, particularly on its own initiative.” Bates v. Czerniak,
187 Or App 8, 12, 66 P3d 519, rev den, 335 Or 422 (2003).
That holds particularly true when, as here, the petition for
habeas corpus relief expressly acknowledged that the claim
could not be brought as a post-conviction claim. Given that
the trial court was under no obligation to sua sponte convert
plaintiff’s habeas petition into one for post-conviction relief,
we cannot conclude that it erred in not doing so.
Affirmed.