Champion v. Employment Dept. ( 2023 )


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  •                                       71
    Submitted January 6, affirmed March 29, 2023
    Ellen K. CHAMPION,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT,
    Respondent.
    Employment Appeals Board
    2022EAB0554; A179360
    528 P3d 323
    Petitioner seeks judicial review of an Employment Appeals Board (EAB)
    decision upholding the Oregon Employment Department’s (OED) denial of her
    application for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA). She argues that she
    is a “covered individual” under the CARES Act and therefore is eligible for PUA.
    Held: EAB’s conclusion that petitioner did not qualify as a “covered individual”
    was supported by evidence in the record, and EAB adequately explained its
    reasoning in its decision. Because EAB’s decision was supported by substantial
    evidence and substantial reason, EAB did not err in upholding OED’s denial of
    petitioner’s application for PUA.
    Affirmed.
    Ellen K. Champion filed the brief pro se.
    Denise G. Fjordbeck, waived appearance for respondent.
    Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and
    Hellman, Judge.
    HELLMAN, J.
    Affirmed.
    72                            Champion v. Employment Dept.
    HELLMAN, J.
    Petitioner seeks judicial review of an Employment
    Appeals Board (EAB) decision upholding the Oregon
    Employment Department’s (OED) denial of her application
    for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA). In three
    assignments of error, petitioner argues that EAB erred
    in making various findings of fact and conclusions of law.
    Although EAB could have been more straightforward in
    its reasoning, we conclude that that EAB’s decision was
    supported by substantial evidence and substantial reason.
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    We will set aside or remand a board’s order if “the
    order is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.
    Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when
    the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable per-
    son to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c). “Substantial
    evidence” includes “substantial reason.” Put another way,
    the board must provide an explanation for how it reached
    its conclusion. Castro v. Board of Parole, 
    232 Or App 75
    , 83,
    220 P3d 772 (2009).
    On appeal, petitioner argues that she qualifies as a
    “covered individual” under the CARES Act and was thus eli-
    gible for PUA. Under the CARES Act, a person is considered a
    “covered individual” if they are not eligible for other compen-
    sation, including regular unemployment benefits, and if they
    self-certify that they are “otherwise able to work and avail-
    able to work within the meaning of applicable State Law,” but
    cannot do so due to one of 11 reasons related to the COVID-19
    pandemic. Pub L 116-136, § 2102(a)(3). Those reasons include
    that “the individual has been diagnosed with COVID-19 or is
    experiencing symptoms of COVID-19 and seeking a medical
    diagnosis,” or “has become the breadwinner or major support
    for a household because the head of the household has died as a
    direct result of COVID-19.” Pub L 116-136, § 2102(a)(3)(A)(ii)(I).
    “Direct result” as used in section 2102 means that “the unem-
    ployment is an immediate result of the major disaster itself,
    and not the result of a longer chain of events precipitated or
    exacerbated by the disaster.” 
    20 CFR § 625.5
    (c); U.S. Dept of
    Labor, Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 16-20,
    (Apr 5, 2020) (UIPL 16-20) at I-7.
    Cite as 
    325 Or App 71
     (2023)                               73
    The Continued Assistance for Unemployed Workers
    Act (2020) (CAA) made certain changes to the CARES Act.
    Among those changes was the removal of the language
    allowing for self-certification in favor of language dictating
    that, to qualify as a “covered individual,” the applicant must
    submit documentation to substantiate their employment
    or self-employment within 90 days of their application or
    December 27, 2020, whichever date is later. CAA § 241(a);
    UIPL 16-20, Change 4, (Jan 8, 2021) at I-10. Importantly,
    section 201(f) of the CAA modified the CARES Act such that
    claims filed after December 27, 2020, could be backdated to
    no earlier than December 6, 2020. UIPL 16-20, Change 4,
    (Jan 8, 2021) at I-19.
    Petitioner argues that she qualifies as a “covered
    individual” because beginning in March 2020, petitioner and
    her fiancé lost income due to the Governor’s stay-at-home
    order. Alternatively, she argues that she qualified after her
    fiancé passed away due to complications from COVID-19.
    The OED representative testified that if petitioner and her
    fiancé did not qualify for regular unemployment insurance
    (UI) payments at the time of the stay-at-home order, they
    might have qualified for PUA if they had applied sometime
    between March 2020 and December 27, 2020. Similarly,
    petitioner might have qualified for PUA if she did not qual-
    ify for UI after the death of her fiancé.
    However, petitioner did not apply right after either
    of those two events. Instead, petitioner waited to apply
    until a year after the death of her fiancé and nearly one-
    and-a-half years after the start of the stay-at-home order.
    At the time of her application, the CAA was the law. And,
    as set forth in the CAA, applications could only be back-
    dated to December 6, 2020. That meant that many of the
    events that petitioner referenced in her application, which
    may have factually qualified her for PUA, occurred outside
    the window of time that OED could consider in its decision.
    In addition, when she did apply, petitioner provided very
    little documentary support for her application. Because of
    the lack of documentation in the record, OED was unable to
    definitively determine that petitioner qualified as a “covered
    individual.”
    74                                  Champion v. Employment Dept.
    On appeal, EAB also determined that petitioner
    was not a “covered individual” because she had accepted and
    then voluntarily separated from various jobs in the months
    between the asserted “COVID reasons” and the weeks for
    which she claimed PUA benefits.1
    Having reviewed the record, we conclude that EAB’s
    decision was supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner
    does not contest that she held various jobs in the time
    between the asserted “COVID reasons” for her unemploy-
    ment and the weeks for which she claimed PUA coverage.
    Nor does she contest that she voluntarily separated from
    those positions. And while the record indicates that COVID-
    19 related issues contributed to petitioner’s decision to leave
    those jobs, substantial evidence supports EAB’s decision
    that petitioner’s unemployment was “the result of a longer
    chain of events precipitated or exacerbated by the disaster,”
    which would disqualify petitioner from benefits. 
    20 CFR § 625.5
    (c); UIPL 16-20, (Apr 5, 2020) at I-7.
    As to substantial reason, EAB explained that it was
    petitioner’s voluntary separation from various employers,
    which occurred after the asserted “COVID reasons,” that
    caused petitioner’s unemployment and not, as petitioner
    argues, the “COVID reasons” themselves. That reasoned
    explanation, coupled with the evidence in the record, sat-
    isfies EAB’s burden to provide substantial reason for its
    conclusions.
    We reach a similar conclusion regarding petitioner’s
    argument that because she contracted COVID-19, she was
    eligible for PUA. Although petitioner testified that she
    entered her quarantine information into the OED filing sys-
    tem, OED was unable to locate it, and petitioner testified
    that she no longer had access to that information.
    Under the CAA, an individual was no longer able to
    self-certify eligibility for benefits. Thus, petitioner’s benefit
    1
    Given that the EAB ultimately based its decision on petitioner’s voluntary
    separation from various jobs and not on whether petitioner was self-employed or
    became the household’s primary breadwinner after the death of her fiancé, the
    portions of its decision questioning her credibility complicated our review and,
    indeed, caused us to wonder whether the agency’s ultimate decision was based on
    something other than the articulated legal analysis. Ultimately, those concerns
    did not affect the disposition of this case, though they did give us pause.
    Cite as 
    325 Or App 71
     (2023)                                75
    eligibility depended both on the fact that she contracted
    COVID-19 and that she was able to provide documentary
    proof of her illness. EAB’s denial of benefits was not due to
    a determination that petitioner did not contract COVID-19.
    Instead, it was because petitioner “did not offer evidence to
    show when she was rendered unemployed or unavailable to
    work during the weeks at issue as a direct result of COVID-19.”
    Given the lack of documentary evidence in the record, we
    conclude that EAB’s decision was based on substantial evi-
    dence. And we find that the decision was supported by sub-
    stantial reason, given EAB’s explanation coupled with the
    absence of evidence.
    Our role as an appellate court reviewing a decision
    of EAB is not to find facts, nor to relitigate what was liti-
    gated below. Our role is one of error correction. In exercising
    that role, we are bound by the record before us and our stan-
    dard of review. On this record and reviewing for substantial
    evidence and substantial reason, we conclude that EAB did
    not err when it determined that petitioner did not qualify for
    PUA under the CARES Act and CAA.
    Affirmed.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A179360

Judges: Hellman

Filed Date: 3/29/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/15/2024