State v. Fiala ( 2023 )

668
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
Submitted May 25, remanded for resentencing, otherwise affirmed
June 28, 2023
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
KRIS ALLAN FIALA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Linn County Circuit Court
20CR65516; A176948
Brendan J. Kane, Judge.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Anne Fujita Munsey, Deputy Public Defender,
Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Leigh A. Salmon, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, and Joyce, Judge, and
Jacquot, Judge.
AOYAGI, P. J.
Remanded for resentencing; otherwise affirmed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 326 Or App 668 (2023) 669
AOYAGI, P. J.
Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder,
ORS 163.115 (Count 1), and aggravated harassment, ORS
166.070 (Count 2). On appeal, he raises three assignments
of error. He argues that the trial court erred by (1) deny-
ing his motion to suppress evidence; (2) entering a judgment
that denies eligibility for sentence reduction programs on
Count 1; and (3) entering a judgment that denies eligibility
for sentence reduction programs on Count 2. We remand for
resentencing; otherwise, we affirm.
Motion to suppress. A police officer following up on a
9-1-1 call entered onto private property, observed through a
window defendant holding a knife in a threatening manner,
entered the house, and obtained evidence that defendant
had stabbed his mother to death. Before trial, defendant
moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the
officer’s warrantless entry.
The trial court denied the motion, relying on the
emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement. Under
the Oregon Constitution, that exception applies when a law
enforcement officer has “an objectively reasonable belief,
based on articulable facts, that a warrantless entry is neces-
sary to either render immediate aid to persons, or to assist
persons who have suffered, or who are imminently threat-
ened with suffering, serious physical injury or harm.” State
v. Baker, 350 Or 641, 649, 260 P3d 476 (2011) (footnotes omit-
ted). Under the federal constitution, the exception allows
law enforcement officers to “enter a home without a warrant
to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to
protect an occupant from imminent injury.” Brigham City,
Utah v. Stuart, 547 US 398, 403, 126 S Ct 1943, 164 L Ed 2d
650 (2006). The Oregon standard requires a subjective belief
that is objectively reasonable, State v. Powell, 288 Or App
660, 670, 406 P3d 1111 (2017), rev den, 362 Or 508 (2018),
whereas the federal standard is purely objective, Brigham
City, 547 US at 403.
We review the denial of a motion to suppress for
legal error. State v. Vasquez-Villagomez, 346 Or 12, 23, 203
P3d 193 (2009). We are bound by the trial court’s factual
findings if there is evidence in the record to support them.
670 State v. Fiala
Id. Having reviewed the evidence, we agree with the trial
court that the state proved the applicability of the emer-
gency aid exception under both Oregon and federal law. We
therefore reject defendant’s first assignment of error.
Sentencing. After sentencing defendant in open
court, the trial court entered a judgment denying him eli-
gibility for sentence reduction programs on both counts of
conviction. Defendant contends that the court made several
errors in doing so.
The state concedes, and we agree, that the court
erred with respect to Count 2. The court did not state in
open court that defendant would be denied eligibility for sen-
tence reduction programs on Count 2. See State v. Priester,
325 Or App 574, 581, 530 P3d 118 (2023) (“A criminal defen-
dant has the right to have their sentence announced in open
court. A trial court commits reversible error if it does not do
so, and the result is usually a resentencing.” (Internal cita-
tions omitted.)). The court also did not “find[ ] on the record
in open court substantial and compelling reasons to order
that the defendant not be considered for” sentence reduc-
tion programs, as required by ORS 137.750(1). We therefore
remand for resentencing. Because the trial court will be
resentencing defendant, we agree with the state that the
parties’ arguments regarding eligibility for sentence reduc-
tion programs on Count 1 are better directed to the sentenc-
ing court on remand.
Remanded for resentencing; otherwise affirmed.