State v. Sigler ( 2024 )

796 May 30, 2024 No. 361
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JACK EDWARD SIGLER,
aka Jack E. Sigler,
Defendant-Appellant.
Lincoln County Circuit Court
20CR67214; A179916
Eric J. Bergstrom, Judge.
Submitted April 30, 2024.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Meredith Allen, Deputy Public Defender, Office
of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Colm Moore, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
POWERS, J.
Affirmed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 332 Or App 796 (2024) 797
POWERS, J.
In this criminal proceeding, defendant appeals from
a judgment of conviction pursuant to a negotiated guilty
plea for first-degree manslaughter and four counts of first-
degree burglary. At sentencing, the prosecution requested
restitution, and defendant did not object or request a resti-
tution hearing. Ultimately, the trial court awarded a total of
$14,116 in restitution. On appeal, defendant assigns error to
that restitution award, arguing that the trial court plainly
erred because there is “no evidence in the record to support
that award.” The state responds that the error, if any, is not
plain, and that regardless, we should decline to exercise our
discretion to correct it. We agree with the state’s argument
that the error is not plain, and even if it were, we would not
exercise our discretion to correct it. Accordingly, we affirm.
Because the parties are familiar with the under-
lying background and procedural facts, we do not provide
a detailed recitation for this nonprecedential memorandum
opinion. First, as a matter of law, the trial court’s imposition
of restitution in this case was not plain error. An error is
plain if it meets three requirements: (1) the error is one of
law, (2) the legal point is obvious, meaning it is not reason-
ably in dispute, and (3) to reach the error, we do not need to
go outside the record to choose among competing inferences.
State v. Coons, 300 Or App 618, 620, 455 P3d 564 (2019),
rev den, 366 Or 382 (2020). Restitution is authorized under
ORS 137.106, and we have previously held that “nothing on
the face of ORS 137.106, or any other statute of which we
are aware, plainly indicates that the legislature intended to
foreclose a sentencing court from imposing an unobjected-to
amount of restitution.” Coons, 300 Or App at 621 (footnote
omitted). Defendant has not cited to—much less attempted
to distinguish—Coons. Accordingly, we readily conclude
that it is not plain that the trial court erred by imposing the
unobjected-to restitution amount in the judgment.
Second, contrary to defendant’s contention that
there is “no evidence” to support the restitution award,
the record contains sufficient evidence of the “nature and
amount of the damages” to support the trial court’s resti-
tution determination. ORS 137.106(1)(a); see also State v.
798 State v. Sigler
Gruver, 247 Or App 8, 18, 268 P3d 760 (2011) (holding that
the trial court’s imposition of restitution was not plain error
where the defendant did not object to it and the record con-
tained some evidence of the nature and amount of damages).
Specifically, the state filed multiple restitution memos—the
first in early June 2021 and the last dated September 16,
2022—that listed the restitution amounts sought, explained
what they were for, and provided receipts for some of the
expenses. For example, C, the victim’s wife, submitted a
request for a total of $956. Of that, $936 was for six nights
of lodging for the victim’s family, who could not stay in their
home because it was a crime scene. The remaining $20 was
for C’s out-of-pocket payments for two counseling appoint-
ments. Receipts were attached to the restitution memo for
those expenses. In addition, the state submitted restitu-
tion memos that included information about the Oregon
Department of Justice requesting reimbursement to the
Criminal Injuries Compensation Account (CICA) for funeral
expenses and survivor counseling for C, which eventually
totaled $13,160. The change-of-plea hearing and sentenc-
ing occurred on October 4, 2022. The amount of restitution
sought and the documentation for it had been available to
defendant for at least a few weeks, and some of it had been
available for over a year. Thus, the record contains evidence
supporting the award, and to agree with defendant’s posi-
tion on appeal, we would be required to choose between com-
peting inferences, which is not something we will do in a
plain-error posture.
Finally, even if the trial court plainly erred, we
would not exercise our discretion to correct it under the cir-
cumstances of this case. See State v. Vanornum, 354 Or 614,
630, 317 P3d 889 (2013) (explaining that “discretion entails
making a prudential call that takes into account an array of
considerations, such as the competing interests of the par-
ties, the nature of the case, the gravity of the error, and the
ends of justice in the particular case”). As described above,
C’s request for restitution was supported by receipts filed
with a restitution memorandum and detailed requests for
CICA reimbursement, which were filed before sentencing.
In total, there were four restitution memoranda filed with
the court, and in each one there was an updated amount
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 332 Or App 796 (2024) 799
claimed for CICA. From the circumstances of the case, it
is eminently reasonable for C, who witnessed defendant
stabbing her husband to death, to incur costs for survivor
counseling. The other expenses sought—reimbursement for
lodging for six nights and funeral expenses—are equally
reasonable. Further, defendant had ample opportunity to
object or to be prepared to object at sentencing, had he been
opposed to the award of restitution, or restitution in that
amount. For those reasons, even if the court’s imposition of
restitution qualified as plain error, we would not exercise
our discretion to correct it.
Affirmed.