State v. Langston , 336 Or. App. 337 ( 2024 )

No. 836 November 20, 2024 337
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DOARUTHOR LANGSTON II,
aka Doarthor Langston, aka Doarthor Langston II,
aka Doaruthor Langston, aka Doaruthor Langston II II,
Defendant-Appellant.
Jackson County Circuit Court
19CR64536; A181432
Kelly W. Ravassipour, Judge.
Submitted October 22, 2024.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Meredith Allen, Deputy Public Defender, Office
of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Erica L. Herb, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Joyce,
Judge.
AOYAGI, P. J.
Affirmed.
338 State v. Langston
AOYAGI, P. J.
Defendant pleaded no contest to second-degree sex-
ual abuse and was sentenced to three years of probation,
with an agreement that, if he violated probation, he would
receive an upward dispositional departure sentence of 24
months in prison. As a special condition of probation, defen-
dant was required to participate in and successfully com-
plete sex offender treatment. The trial court found defendant
to have violated that condition and revoked his probation.
On appeal, in a single assignment of error, defendant chal-
lenges the finding of a probation violation. We affirm.
As part of his sex offender treatment, defendant
entered into a contract under which his therapist had the
right to decide to suspend or terminate treatment and which
provided, among other things, that defendant would not
“develop an intimate or sexual relationship (unless married
or currently involved)” without the approval of his treatment
team and that he would be honest with his therapist regard-
ing treatment violations in a timely manner. Approximately
one month before the scheduled end of his three-year pro-
bationary term, defendant’s therapist terminated him from
treatment based on defendant’s admission to having sex-
ual contact with a woman other than his girlfriend without
prior approval, which violated the contract, and his thera-
pist’s belief that defendant could not successfully complete
treatment before the end of his probationary period.1
After a show cause hearing, the trial court found
that the state had proved that defendant violated his pro-
bation by failing to successfully complete sex offender
treatment. The court ultimately decided to revoke proba-
tion based on that violation and sentenced defendant to 24
months in prison.
Defendant challenges the trial court’s finding of a
probation violation. He argues that he was “generally com-
pliant” with the treatment program, attended sessions, sub-
mitted to polygraphs, and was honest with his therapist, but
1
The termination letter also references the therapist’s “concern” regarding
defendant often engaging in “rough sex that mimics his index offense,” but at the
hearing, the therapist downplayed the significance of that concern to his termi-
nation decision.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 336 Or App 337 (2024) 339
that he “could not admit to conduct that he maintained that
he did not commit.” In defendant’s view, “it was impossible
for [him] to do more than he did.” He compares his situation
to that in State v. Adams, 302 Or App 730, 740, 462 P3d 761
(2020), in which we held that it was error to find the defen-
dant in violation of a probation condition that required him
to successfully complete family court, where the reason that
he was terminated from family court without completing it
was that the children were returned to their mother’s care
and no longer lived in Oregon, which was outside his control.
Whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to
support a finding of a probation violation is a legal question.2
State v. Stroud, 293 Or App 314, 318, 428 P3d 949 (2018).
Here, there is evidence in the record that defendant was ter-
minated from sex offender treatment without successfully
completing it, thus violating a probation condition. We are
unpersuaded that the situation is analogous to Adams. The
therapist had the right to terminate treatment and did so,
not based on defendant’s refusal to admit to the crime of
conviction, but because defendant had sexual contact with
a woman other than his partner without prior approval,
which violated the treatment contract, and the therapist did
not believe that defendant could successfully complete treat-
ment before the end of his probationary period. Defendant’s
argument that it was impossible for him to do more than
he did to successfully complete treatment is therefore mis-
placed, because he could have not violated the contract.
Accordingly, we reject defendant’s claim that the
trial court erred in finding a probation violation.
Affirmed.
2
By contrast, we review the decision to revoke probation for an abuse of dis-
cretion. State v. Kelemen, 296 Or App 184, 191-92, 437 P3d 1225 (2019); see also
OAR 213-010-0001 (“The decision to revoke probation is discretionary and may
be exercised upon a finding that the offender has violated one or more of the
conditions of probation, or that the offender has participated in new criminal
activity.”). Defendant does not challenge the discretionary decision to revoke pro-
bation, only the finding of a violation itself.