Andritz Inc. v. Cortex North America Corporation ( 2021 )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON ANDRITZ INC., a Georgia corporation, and Case No. 3:20-cv-00029-SB ANDRITZ AB, a Swedish corporation, CLAIM CONSTRUCTION Plaintiffs, OPINION AND ORDER v. CORTEX NORTH AMERICA CORPORATION, an Oregon corporation, Defendant. BECKERMAN, U.S. Magistrate Judge. Andritz Inc. and Andritz AB (together, “Andritz”) bring this patent infringement case against Cortex North America Corporation (“Cortex”). Andritz alleges that Cortex infringed U.S. Patent Nos. 7,159,626 (the “’626 patent”), 7,506,674 (the “’674 patent”), 7,681,609 (the “’609 patent”), and 8,082,958 (the “’958 patent”). The patents concern wood working knives and clamping assemblies that are designed for use in industrial-scale timber processing equipment. /// /// /// The parties disagree over the construction of seventeen claim terms. (ECF No. 47 at 2- 3.1) On May 28, 2021, the Court held a claim construction hearing. Based upon the parties’ submissions and arguments of counsel, the Court construes the disputed claim terms as set forth below. ANALYSIS I. LEGAL STANDARDS2 A patent “infringement analysis entails two steps.” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). First, the court must determine “the meaning and scope of the patent claims asserted to be infringed.” Id. Second, “the factfinder determines whether the accused product or method infringes the asserted claims as construed.” Ni-Q, LLC v. Prolacta Bioscience, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-934-SI, 2018 WL 2943440, at *1 (D. Or. June 12, 2018) (citing Markman, 52 F.3d at 976). The “first step, claim construction, is a matter of law[.]” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Markman, 52 F.3d at 979). “It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). The Supreme Court has explained that “[b]ecause the patentee is required to ‘define precisely what his invention is,’ . . . it is ‘unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of the law, to construe it in a manner different from the plain import of its 1 This Opinion cites to the CM/ECF-generated document and page numbers located at the top of each page. 2 “The proper construction of a patent’s claims is an issue of Federal Circuit law.” Endo Pharm. Inc. v. Actavis LLC, 922 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (simplified). terms.’” Id. (quoting White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 52 (1886)). “Attending this principle, a claim construction analysis must begin and remain centered on the claim language itself, for that is the language the patentee has chosen to ‘particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter which the patentee regards as his invention.’” Innova/Pure Water, 381 F.3d at 1116 (citation omitted). “In determining the proper construction of a claim, the court has numerous sources that it may properly utilize for guidance.” Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. Those sources include “both intrinsic evidence (e.g., the patent specification and file history) and extrinsic evidence (e.g., expert testimony).” Id. It is well settled, however, that in “interpreting an asserted claim, the court should look first to the intrinsic evidence of record, i.e., the patent itself, including the claims, the specification and, if in evidence, the prosecution history,” because that is the “most significant source of the legally operative meaning of disputed claim language.” Id. (citation omitted). The Federal Circuit has “frequently stated that the words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582). “There are two exceptions to this general rule: (1) ‘when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer;’ or (2) ‘when the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during prosecution.’” Boydstun Equip. Mfg., LLC v. Cottrell, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-790-SI, 2017 WL 4682301, at *1 (D. Or. Oct. 18, 2017) (quoting Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); see also Hormone Rsch. Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that it is an “axiom in patent law that a patentee is free to be his or her own lexicographer and thus may use terms in a manner contrary to or inconsistent with one or more of their ordinary meanings”) (citation omitted). “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.”3 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. That is so because “inventors are typically persons skilled in the field of the invention and . . . patents are addressed to and intended to be read by others of skill in the pertinent art.” Id. Notably, “the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Id. (citing Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). “The specification contains a written description of the invention which must be clear and complete enough to enable those of ordinary skill in the art to make and use it,” and which “acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms used in the claims or when it defines terms by implication.” Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (citing Markman, 52 F.3d at 979). The specification is therefore “always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis,” as it is “[u]sually . . . dispositive” and “the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Id. For some claims, “the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases 3 The parties agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “in the field of the [a]sserted [p]atents at the time of the claimed invention would have at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, or equivalent industry experience, including at least two years of experience with the manufacture of cutting edges.” (ECF No. 47 at 14; see also 5/28/21 Tr. at 19:19-23 (“In this case, as we discussed, I think we agree basically on what a POSITA is, I think we now completely agree, so I’m paraphrasing here. It’s a mechanical engineer, and now I think we’ve agreed it’s a mechanical engineer who has at least 2 years of experience in this industry.”). involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314 (citing Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). If that is the case, “general purpose dictionaries may be helpful.” Id. A finding that “‘a claim term needs no construction or has [its] plain and ordinary meaning’ may [also] be sufficient when, for example, a term has only ‘one ordinary meaning or when reliance on a term’s ordinary meaning . . . resolve[s] the parties’ dispute.’” Boydstun, 2017 WL 4682301, at *2 (quoting O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). For other claims, “determining a claim’s ordinary and customary meaning requires further examination . . . because the meaning is not ‘immediately apparent,’ terms ‘have a particular meaning in a field of art,’ or the patentee has used a term ‘idiosyncratically.’” Id. (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314). If that is the case, “a court construing the claim will consider ‘those sources available to the public that show what a person of skill in the art would have understood disputed claim language to mean.’” Id. (quoting Innova/Pure Water, 381 F.3d at 1116). Those sources include “[o]ther claims of the patent in question, both asserted and unasserted, [which can] be valuable sources of enlightenment as to the meaning of a claim term.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314 (citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582). “[T]he usage of a term in one claim can often illuminate the meaning of the same term in other claims” because “claim terms are normally used consistently throughout the patent,” id., and “[c]ourts should . . . interpret claim terms in a manner that does not render subsequent claim terms superfluous.” Boydstun, 2017 WL 4682301, at *2. A court construing a claim may also consider the patent specification, which may reveal a special, governing “definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess,” or which “may reveal an intentional disclaimer, or disavowal, of claim scope by the inventor.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (citations omitted). Furthermore, a court can consider “the patent’s prosecution history, if it is in evidence.’” Id. at 1317 (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 980). The prosecution history consists of the complete record of the proceedings before the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), including “prior art cited during the examination of the patent.” Id. Like the patent specification, the prosecution history, which was “created by the patentee in attempting to explain and obtain the patent,” provides evidence regarding “how the PTO and the inventor understood the patent.” Id. (citations omitted). However, courts have recognized that “because the prosecution history represents an ongoing negotiation between the PTO and the applicant, rather than the final product of that negotiation, it often lacks the clarity of the specification and thus is less useful for claim construction purposes.” Id.; see also Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (explaining that if the prosecution history includes “any express representations made by the applicant regarding the scope of the claims,” it can be of “critical significance in determining the meaning of the claims”). Courts may also consider extrinsic evidence (i.e., “all evidence external to the patent and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises”) to construe a claim. Boydstun, 2017 WL 4682301, at *3 (simplified). Expert testimony, for example, can be useful to a court for a variety of purposes, such as to provide background on the technology at issue, to explain how an invention works, to ensure that the court’s understanding of the technical aspects of the patent is consistent with that of a person of skill in the art, or to establish that a particular term in the patent or the prior art has a particular meaning in the pertinent field. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318 (citations omitted). Nevertheless, “conclusory, unsupported assertions by experts as to the definition of a claim term are not useful to a court,” and “a court should discount any expert testimony that is clearly at odds with the claim construction mandated by the claims themselves, the written description, and the prosecution history, in other words, with the written record of the patent.” Id. (simplified). “In most situations, an analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed claim term,” and “[i]n such circumstances, it is improper to rely on extrinsic evidence.” Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583 (citations omitted). II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION The Court construes the seventeen disputed claim terms below, guided by three key principles. First, the Federal Circuit “indulge[s] a heavy presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning.” Starhome GmbH v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 743 F.3d 849, 857 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (simplified). Second, “[c]ourts often resolve claim construction disputes by rejecting a narrow construction and holding that the disputed term should retain its plain and ordinary meaning.” Uni-Sys., LLC v. U.S. Tennis Ass’n Nat’l Tennis Ctr. Inc., No. 17-cv-00147, 2020 WL 3960841, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 13, 2020) (citing ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Third, it is well settled that “a district court commits no error and properly resolves disputes between parties by giving terms ‘plain meanings that do not require additional construction’ when one party’s ‘proposed construction erroneously reads limitations into the claims.’” Memory Integrity, LLC v. Intel Corp., No. 3:15- cv-00262-SI, 2016 WL 1122718, at *14 (D. Or. Mar. 22, 2016) (quoting ActiveVideo, 694 F.3d at 1326)). A. The ’626, ’674, and ’609 Patents 1. “localized” or “localization” The parties dispute the construction of “localize[d]” or “localization” as used in the ’626 and ’609 patents. Relying on the specification and prosecution history and citing dictionary definitions, Andritz asserts that the Court should construe the terms “localize[d]” or “localization” to mean “concentrate[d] towards.” (ECF No. 47 at 21-22.) Relying largely on the same authorities, Cortex responds that the Court should construe the terms “localize[d]” or “localization” to mean “restrict[ed] to a definite place or locality” or “restriction to a definite place or locality.” (ECF No. 50 at 7-10.) The ’626 and ’609 patents describe multi-application wood working knives and clamping assemblies that are designed for use in wood working machines.* (ECF Nos. 47-1 at 2, 47-3 at 2.) The °626 and °609 patents include these images of knives and clamping assemblies described therein: 23! ae - Uj FIG. 6B UV me 22 □□□ 84 KA Kes. TARENREHS Ss QL 20 (ECF No. 47-1 at 5.) In the Court’s view, the ’626 patent specification suggests that clamping arrangements, such as Figure 6B, employ a combination of both vertical and lateral forces to correctly position the knife: PAGE 15 — OPINION AND ORDER “[T]he knife 32 will also be directed to the predetermined position by engaging the clamping features . . . having the alternative diagonal shape . . . . Essentially, what is required, is to have two opposed inclined edges (whether curved or straight) which cause the knife to self center, or self locate, preferably relative to the rear clamping component 18, as the clamping assembly . . . is clamped onto the knife 32. (ECF No. 47-1 at 13.) Given this language and the language described above, the Court disagrees with Cortex to the extent it suggests that the ’626 patent equates “locating force” with “lateral or sideways forces,” and Cortex has not identified any compelling reason to redefine “balance substantially to zero” with “stops moving laterally.” Based on the above analysis, the Court concludes that the term “the locating forces balance substantially to zero” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. 4. “non load bearing” The parties dispute the construction of “non load bearing” as used in the ’626, ’674, and ’609 patents. Andritz asserts that “non load bearing” should be given its “[p]lain and ordinary meaning.” (ECF No. 47 at 25.) Relying on the ’626 patent specification, prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence, Cortex argues that “non load bearing” should be construed to mean “not experiencing any force when the knife is clamped with a force of at least 3000 pounds per linear inch” (ECF No. 50 at 14), or alternatively to mean “not experiencing any force [or compressive force] when the knife is clamped in a safely usable condition.” (5/28/21 Tr. at 42:11-17.) The ’626 patent specification repeatedly describes “the first clamping surface [as] having opposed clamping features separated by a central smooth uninterrupted non load bearing middle section[.]” (ECF No. 47-1 at 16, 18-19.) For example, in Figure 1, which is shown below, “[t]he knife 32 has a first clamping surface which . . . is a rear clamping surface 40” (ECF No. 47-1 at 10-11): FIG. 1 Om 10 43 | 11° 2 i 11 9° OO 5° 2 2 oS 17 44° 16° - is (FR 7 ro LIG FT 13 ~ 8 " In an example embodiment of the invention, a cross-section of the chip guiding surface 14, 14’ (as showing in FIG. 5) is continuously either planar or concave. That is, this surface includes neither discontinuities nor convex surfaces. Moreover, in this embodiment, the second contact surface 17, 17° is continuous with the inner edge forming surface 10, 10’, such that there is no distinguishable boundary between the two surfaces. Thus, the chip guiding surface 14, 14’ continuously extends from the inner edge forming surface 10, 10’ to the crest of the deflector ridge 13 without any intermediate discontinuities or convex surfaces. Such a continuous surface can result in higher quality chips because, in the absence of abrupt angular changes, chips may be less likely to break or deform while guided away from the cutting edge. The inner side of the chipper knife according to the present invention is not limited to the foregoing description. For example, the chip guiding surface need not be continuous with the edge forming surface. Rather, the edge forming surface may be raised above the chip guiding surface, leading to a discontinuity between the two .... In this case, the chip guiding surface may begin at some distance from the cutting edge. As another example, the radius or curvature of the deflector ridge, i.e., the curvature on either side of the crest of the deflector ridge, can vary from that illustrated in FIG. 5.... (ECF No. 47-4 at 6, 10.) Consistent with this description, some of the ’958 patent specification’s claims refer to a chip guiding surface without “abrupt angular changes,” while others do not mention the absence of “angular changes.” (See ECF No. 47-4 at 12-13, “[T]he concave surface portion is exposed to wood chip flow during use to provide a chip guiding function during use.”; ECF No. 47-4 at 13, “[T]he concave surface portion is exposed to chip flow during use and chips cut by the first PAGE 29 — OPINION AND ORDER cutting edge are guided along the chip guiding surface without any abrupt changes in direction during guiding.”). Cortex’s proposed construction of “to provide a chip guiding function during use” is “to guide wood chips along a surface without any abrupt changes in direction,” and Cortex argues that the applicant “disclaim[ed] any other claim scope” during prosecution. (ECF No. 50 at 28, citing ECF No. 50-2 at 2.) The Court disagrees. The prosecution history reflects that the applicant stated that “the claims of the present application are directed to the embodiment of the invention shown in Figure 8” (ECF No. 50-2 at 2) below: 12° oe : _ i CZ (Zk ES) I —BRES“=™INM KS Lig 8 j QJ 4 (ECE No. 47-4 at 7.) Notably, however, the prosecution history does not reflect that the applicant clearly and unambiguously disavowed any chip guiding surfaces with abrupt angular changes by stating that the claims are “directed” to the embodiment/example shown in Figure 8. See Boydstun, 2017 WL PAGE 30 — OPINION AND ORDER 4682301, at *8 (noting that a “[d]isavowal requires that the specification or prosecution history make clear that the invention does not include a particular feature,” courts “decline[] to apply the doctrine of prosecution disclaimer where the alleged disavowal of claim scope is ambiguous,” and the alleged infringer did “not identify anything in the prosecution history that unambiguously disavows any particular element or design”) (simplified); see also Cal. Inst. of Tech. v. Hughes Commc’ns Inc., 35 F. Supp. 3d 1176, 1184 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (“An embodiment is simply an example of an invention encompassed by the patent.”). The ’958 patent specification also suggests that the invention is not necessarily limited only to chip guiding surfaces without abrupt angular changes. Accordingly, the Court declines Cortex’s invitation to apply the doctrine of prosecution disclaimer here, and instead construes “to provide a chip guiding function during use” as having its plain and ordinary meaning. See Memory Integrity, 2016 WL 1122718, at *14 (explaining that “a district court commits no error and properly resolves disputes between parties by giving terms ‘plain meanings that do not require additional construction’ when one party’s ‘proposed construction erroneously reads limitations into the claims” (quoting ActiveVideo, 694 F.3d at 1326)). 3. “has no distinguishable boundary with” The parties dispute the construction of the term “has no distinguishable boundary with,” a term used three times in the ’958 patent. (See ECF No. 47-4 at 12-13, describing knives “wherein the first flat planar surface portion has no distinguishable boundary with the first inner edge forming surface,” and “wherein the first planar surface has no distinguishable boundary with the first inner edge forming surface”). Cortex opposes Andritz’s assertion that “has no distinguishable boundary with” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning, arguing that the term should be construed to mean “is coplanar with” (i.e., is on the same plane with). (ECF No. 50 at 29.) In support of its argument and by way of example, Cortex notes that a POSITA looking at Figure 5 would see that “surfaces 10, 10’ are .. . coplanar with surfaces 17, 17°” (ECF No. 50 at 30): Tv □□□ 2 x 11 3° □□ — 2 oS Wo4a° 16° we we TOR 47 10 FT 13 ~ 8 (ECF No. 47-4 at 6.) Cortex’s proposed construction improperly reads limitations into the claims. As discussed above, the ’958 patent specification suggests that some embodiments involve coplanar surfaces, but it also makes clear that (1) the invention is “not limited to” the example embodiment described and shown in Figure 5, (2) the “chip guiding surface need not be continuous with the edge forming surface,” and (3) the “edge forming surface may be raised above the chip guiding surface, leading to a discontinuity between the two.” (ECF No. 47-4 at 10.) Furthermore, the term “coplanar” is never mentioned in the ’958 patent specification. Accordingly, the Court construes “has no distinguishable boundary with” as having its plain and ordinary meaning. 4. “chips cut by the first cutting edge are guided along the chip guiding surface without any abrupt changes in direction during guiding” The parties dispute the construction of the term “chips cut by the first cutting edge are guided along the chip guiding surface without any abrupt changes in direction during guiding,” which appears in claim thirteen of the °958 patent. (See ECF No. 47-4 at 12-13, describing a knife “whereby the concave surface portion is exposed to chip flow during use and chips cut by the first cutting edge are guided along the chip guiding surface without any abrupt changes in direction during guiding”’). Andritz asserts that the Court should give the term its plain and ordinary meaning (ECF No. 47 at 36), and Cortex argues that the Court should construe the term PAGE 32 — OPINION AND ORDER to mean “the chip guiding surface does not include any abrupt angular changes.” (ECF No. 50 at 31.) Cortex asserts that its proposed construction is proper because (1) “wood chips will be ‘guided along the chip guiding surface without any abrupt changes in direction’ if and only if ‘the chip guiding surface does not include any abrupt angular changes,’” and (2) the prosecution history reflects the applicant disavowed any chip guiding surfaces with abrupt angular changes. (ECF No. 50 at 31, arguing that the prosecution history is ”dispositive”). Andritz argues that Cortex’s construction “improperly narrows the meaning of the limitation by incorporating (and then modifying) language from an example embodiment disclosed in the ’958 patent’s specification,” and that the prosecution history “does not include any clear and unambiguous statements disclaiming claim scope, and it certainly does not state that the chip guiding surface does not include any abrupt angular changes.” (ECF No. 47 at 37.) Andritz also argues that “Cortex’s construction conflates the structure of the chip guiding surface with the actual movement and direction of the chips, while the claim language does not suggest this conflation.” (ECF No. 51 at 39.) The Court finds Cortex’s reliance on the prosecution history unpersuasive, for the reasons discussed above. Based on its reading of the patent specification and prosecution history, the Court concludes that the term “chips cut by the first cutting edge are guided along the chip guiding surface without any abrupt changes in direction during guiding,” as used in claim thirteen, is readily understandable and should be given its common-sense meaning without further construction. The Court thus construes “chips cut by the first cutting edge are guided along the chip guiding surface without any abrupt changes in direction during guiding” as having its plain and ordinary meaning. 5. “the chips remain in substantially continuous contact with the chip guiding surface during guiding” The parties’ next dispute concerns the construction of the term “the chips remain in substantially continuous contact with the chip guiding surface during guiding.” Andritz asserts that the Court should give the term its plain and ordinary meaning. (ECF No. 47 at 37.) Relying on the ’958 patent specification and its disclaimer argument, Cortex responds that the term should be construed to mean that “the values of α and β as shown in Fig. 8 are 29° and 4°, respectively.” (ECF No. 50 at 32.) The Court is not persuaded by Cortex’s arguments. As discussed, the ’958 patent prosecution history does not reveal a clear and unambiguous disclaimer or disavowal of claim scope by the inventor. Further, although the patent specification states that the “[m]ost preferred value of α and β are 29° and 4°, respectively” (ECF No. 47-4 at 11), it does not require that α and β must be 29° and 4°, respectively.9 Accordingly, because Cortex’s proposed construction erroneously reads limitations into the claims, the Court construes “the chips remain in substantially continuous contact with the chip guiding surface during guiding” as having its plain and ordinary meaning. 6. “dihedral acute angle” During the hearing, the parties agreed that the Court should give “dihedral acute angle” its plain and ordinary meaning. The Court agrees and therefore adopts that construction here. 7. “concave surface” The parties’ joint claim construction and prehearing statement does not identify “concave surface” as a disputed term for the ’958 patent. (See ECF No. 46 at 25-28; see also ECF No. 51 9 Figure 8 on page thirty-two “illustrates angular values associated with various embodiments of the invention.” (ECF No. 47-4 at 11.) at 42, reflecting that although Cortex did not identify “concave surface” as a disputed term for the ’958 patent, “Andritz is generally comfortable with a construction of ‘concave surface’ as [a] ‘surface that curves inward’” but objects to Cortex’s proposed construction, “an inwardly rounded surface with no abrupt changes in direction”). The Court concludes that its construction of “concave surface” discussed above (i.e., a “surface that curves inward”) also aligns with the ’958 patent’s descriptions and drawings of the invention. (See ECF No. 47-4 at 7, 9, 11, showing and describing the surface that curves inward “between the first inner edge forming surface and the ridge” similar to 72 in Figure 3). The ‘958 patent specification does not necessarily limit the invention to chip guidance without “abrupt changes in direction,” as some of the claims discussed therein refer to the absence of “abrupt changes in directions” and some do not. The Court therefore construes “concave surface” to mean a “surface that curves inward.” 8. “means for engaging” The parties’ final dispute concerns the construction of the term “means for engaging.” Andritz asserts that the Court should construe “means for engaging” to mean “features that correspond with the corresponding engaging features on the outer side of the knife.” (ECF No. 47 at 40.) Cortex initially argued that “means for engaging” should be construed to mean “a pair of parallel grooves configured to engage with corresponding parallel ridges on the outer clamping member” (ECF No. 50 at 36), and clarified its proposed construction at the hearing: “a pair of parallel grooves configured to engage with corresponding parallel ridges on the outer side of the knife body.” (5/28/21 Tr. at 92:16-20.) The parties agree that “means for engaging” is a means-plus-function limitation and that the construction of such a limitation involves two steps. First, the Court must “determine the claimed function.” JVW Enters., Inc. v. Interact Accessories, Inc., 424 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). Second, the Court must “identify the corresponding structure in the written description that performs that function.” Id. A structure is only deemed “corresponding” when the patent “specification or prosecution history clearly links or associates that structure to the function recited in the claim.” Default Proof Credit Card Sys., Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 412 F.3d 1291, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The term “means for engaging” appears in claims twenty-six and twenty-seven of the ’958 patent. (See ECF No. 47-4 at 13-14, describing “an outer clamping member having a knife engaging means for engaging the outside of the knife body and determining the position of the knife with respect to the outer clamping member”). The parties “agree[] that the function performed is ‘engaging the outside of the knife body and determining the position of the knife with respect to the outer clamping member.’” (ECF No. 51 at 43.) The Court agrees and therefore focuses on the “corresponding structure in the written description that performs that function.” The Court concludes that the clamping member, which has the “knife engaging means for engaging the outside of the knife body and determining the position,” is the corresponding structure in the written description that performs the agreed-upon function. Although the patent specification reflects that the means for engaging “can” include a pair of parallel grooves, it also states that “[t]hose skilled in the relevant art will recognize that suitable designs for the engaging portions, both those on the outside of the knife and those on the outer clamping member, are not limited to the design shown” in Figure 6 (i.e., “parallel ridges”), and that “suitable designs are any that provide support . . . and limit the knife’s displacement with respect to the outer clamping member.” (ECF No. 47-4 at 10.) Accordingly, the Court construes “means for engaging” as “features that correspond with corresponding engaging features on the outer side of the knife.” CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court construes the seventeen disputed claim terms as follows: 1. “localize[d]” or “localization” means “concentrated toward a definite place or locality”; 2. “clamping force[s]” or “force exerted (on or by) the rear clamping component” are given their plain and ordinary meaning; 3. “the locating forces balance substantially to zero” is given its plain and ordinary meaning; 4. “non load bearing” is given its plain and ordinary meaning; 5. “smooth” or “smooth uninterrupted” are given their plain and ordinary meaning; 6. “concave hollow[s]” means an “indentation that curves inward”; 7. “convex projection” means a “projection that curves outward”; 8. “directed toward,” “sized and shaped to direct clamping forces . . . away from said [] middle section,” and “to direct the clamping force” are given their plain and ordinary meaning; 9. {“register with,” “engages with,” or “engaging”} “only at said [opposed] clamping features” means “making contact only upon the opposed clamping forces”; 10. “concave surface” means a “surface that curves inward”; 11. “is exposed to [wood] chip flow during use” is given its plain and ordinary meaning; 12. “to provide a chip guiding function during use” is given its plain and ordinary meaning; 13. “has no distinguishable boundary with” is given its plain and ordinary meaning; 14. “chips cut by the first cutting edge are guided along the chip guiding surface without any abrupt changes in direction during guiding” is given its plain and ordinary meaning; 15. “the chips remain in substantially continuous contact with the chip guiding surface during guiding” is given its plain and ordinary meaning; 16. “dihedral acute angle” is given its plain and ordinary meaning; and 17. “means for engaging” means “features that correspond with corresponding engaging features on the outer side of the knife.” IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED this 30th day of July, 2021. HON. STACIE F. BECKERMAN United States Magistrate Judge