Albertsons Cos. v. Clackamas County Assessor ( 2023 )


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  •                                        IN THE OREGON TAX COURT
    MAGISTRATE DIVISION
    Property Tax
    ALBERTSONS COMPANIES,                                       )
    )
    Plaintiff,                                )   TC-MD 210135G
    )
    v.                                                   )
    )
    CLACKAMAS COUNTY ASSESSOR,                                  )
    )
    Defendant.                                )   DECISION
    This case concerns the 2020–21 real market value of a grocery store and underlying land
    in Milwaukie, identified in Defendant’s records as Account 05005715. At trial, Plaintiff was
    represented by Alex Robinson, attorney-at-law, and Defendant was represented by Kathleen
    Rastetter, Senior Counsel in the Office of Clackamas County Counsel. Testifying for Plaintiff
    were David Demers, commercial broker for HSM Pacific Commercial Real Estate, and T. Chad
    Plaster, JD, MAI, of Moscato, Okoneski & Associates, Inc. Testifying for Defendant was David
    Sohm, Registered Appraiser for Clackamas County. Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 and Defendant’s
    Exhibits A to G were admitted.
    I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
    A.     Overview
    The subject is a separately owned lot within a neighborhood shopping center, improved
    by a 47,512-square-foot (net rentable area) building operated as a Safeway grocery store. 1 (Exs
    1 at 5–6; A at 7–8.) The subject’s improvements were completed in 2004, when Safeway Inc.
    acquired the subject, demolished the previous improvements, and built its store. (Ex A at 26.)
    The store’s features include a brick veneer over its concrete tilt-up construction, a loading dock
    1
    Defendant’s appraiser has the net rentable area as 47,525 square feet; the difference is immaterial.
    DECISION TC-MD 210135G                                                                                            1 of 18
    with a shed roof, heavy electrical service, cashier stations, “vinyl tile and wood-look LVT”
    flooring in the sales area, “a receiving/storage area, office area, bakery, butcher block, pharmacy,
    deli/food service, and utility rooms.” (Exs 1 at 36–37; A at 44–45.)
    As part of a portfolio sale involving multiple properties, Safeway Inc. sold the subject to
    a third party in January 2018 for $8,931,554 and leased it back to Plaintiff. 2 (Exs A at 26; 1 at
    75.) That third party in turn sold the subject to investors in May 2018 for $10,973,000. (Exs 1 at
    14; A at 26.) Both the portfolio sale and the subsequent resale to investors were arm’s-length
    transactions. (Id.)
    The board of property tax appeals upheld the $11,545,317 real market value placed on the
    2020–21 assessment and tax roll by Defendant, and this appeal followed. Each party now
    requests that the court reduce the subject’s real market value to the amount found by its
    appraiser: $7,750,000 for Plaintiff and $11,250,000 for Defendant.
    B.     The Appraisals
    Plaintiff submitted an appraisal prepared by Mr. Plaster, and Defendant submitted an
    appraisal prepared by Mr. Sohm. (Exs 1; A.) Both appraisers agree the subject’s current use (as
    of the assessment date) was its highest and best use, but they characterize that use at different
    levels of generalization. Mr. Plaster describes the use as “big box retail”; Mr. Sohm describes it
    as “occupied supermarket.” (Exs 1 at 44; A at 48.)
    1.         Plaintiff’s appraisal
    Mr. Plaster developed the cost approach, the sales comparison approach, and a direct
    capitalization income approach in his appraisal.
    ///
    2
    Safeway Inc. and Plaintiff are related entities.
    DECISION TC-MD 210135G                                                                       2 of 18
    a.      Plaintiff’s cost approach
    In his cost approach, Mr. Plaster accepted the tax roll’s land value of $2,030,000,
    calculated the replacement cost of the improvements using Marshall and Swift to be $9,710,127
    when new, and deducted estimated depreciation of $3,373,182 to conclude to a rounded value of
    $8,365,000. (Ex 1 at 58.)
    Although he developed the cost approach, Mr. Plaster wrote that “buyers of single-tenant
    retail properties like the subject place little, if any, weight on the Cost Approach[.]” (Ex 1 at 80.)
    On cross-examination, he admitted that he did not put any weight on it.
    b.      Plaintiff’s sales comparison approach
    In Mr. Plaster’s selection of comparable sales, “[e]mphasis was placed on locating sales
    of larger retail box stores that were not leased at the time of sale.” (Ex 1 at 59.) Mr. Plaster
    considered vacant properties more similar to the subject than leased ones because the former
    reflected “the fee simple interest” that he was trying to determine for the subject. (Id.)
    Of Mr. Plaster’s six sales comparables, three sold vacant and three sold while leased.
    (Ex 1 at 62.) His only quantitative adjustments were time trending and a flat upward adjustment
    of $18 per square foot to each of the vacant sales to reflect the buyer’s cost to prepare those
    buildings for occupancy. (Id. at 60.)
    Mr. Plaster evaluated the similarity of his comparables to the subject qualitatively
    because he lacked data for paired sales analyses. (Ex 1 at 61.) He compared each sale to the
    subject based on its size (two of the vacant buildings were significantly larger than the subject),
    age, location, quality, condition, parking ratio, and site coverage. (Id. at 61–62.) For one sale,
    he made a qualitative upward adjustment for “sale conditions” because the buyer agreed to close
    “in two weeks all cash.” (Id. at 62, 65.) His focus on the subject’s fee simple interest impacted
    DECISION TC-MD 210135G                                                                        3 of 18
    his qualitative evaluation of the leased sales, which he judged to be qualitatively superior in that
    respect “based on the additional value created by the long-term leases in place and credit
    tenancy.” (Id. at 59, 62.)
    Mr. Plaster concluded that two of his leased sales were most similar to the subject: a store
    leased by discount retailer Kohl’s that sold for an adjusted price of $143 per square foot, and a
    Safeway store that sold for an adjusted price of $251 per square foot. (Ex 1 at 66–67.) Of those
    two, Mr. Plaster considered the Kohl’s store the better comparable. (Id.) Mr. Plaster reasoned
    that the Safeway store was “a spin-off from a previous portfolio purchase of properties leased
    back [to] Safeway at favorable lease terms[.]” (Id. at 66.) He argued that such a sale does not
    reflect market value because it includes “long term leases at above-market rents * * *
    generat[ing] investment value that exceeds the value of the real estate.” (Id.) For the same
    reason, Mr. Plaster did not consider the subject’s prior sale to be comparable and did not include
    it among his selected sales.
    Mr. Plaster concluded to an indicated value of $165 per square foot under the sales
    comparison approach.
    c.      Plaintiff’s income approach
    (1)     Net operating income
    Mr. Plaster selected six lease comparables, to which he applied a time trend and made
    qualitative adjustments similar to those made for his sales comparables. (Ex 1 at 70.) Two of
    the comparables were identified as former Albertson’s grocery stores, now leased by a hobby
    store and a hardware store, which Mr. Plaster ranked as inferior to the subject. (Id.) Their
    (slightly adjusted) triple-net lease rates of $8.00 and $8.25 per square foot were therefore low
    indicators. (Id.) Two of the comparables had been discount general retailers; one was leased by
    DECISION TC-MD 210135G                                                                        4 of 18
    a farm supply store from Walmart, and the other was leased by Target. (Id. at 73–74.) Mr.
    Plaster ranked those two slightly inferior to the subject, with their adjusted lease rates of $9.82
    and $9.88 per square foot as slightly low indicators. (Id.) The remaining two comparables were
    operating Safeway grocery stores—one of which he had also used in his sales comparison
    approach. (Id. at 74.)
    Mr. Plaster ranked one of the Safeway stores as generally similar to the subject and one
    of them—the one used in his sales comparison approach—as superior. (Ex 1 at 74.) The
    “similar” Safeway store had an unadjusted rent of $10.20 and an adjusted rent of $10.35 per
    square foot, which Mr. Plaster determined was a “reasonable, if slightly low indicator.” (Id.)
    Mr. Plaster disclosed that the “similar” store’s rent was set through an arbitration process as
    follows:
    “In February 2018, Safeway renewed its lease for a five-year term, with the rent
    being set through an arbitration process involving three MAI-designated
    appraisers. The concluded market rent by this process was $12.00/SF on a triple-
    net expense basis, but the lease specified that rent be set at 85% of the market
    rent, or $10.20/SF.”
    (Id. at 74.) Thus, the rent for the “similar” Safeway store was ostensibly set at a below-market
    rate.
    The remaining, “superior” Safeway store was so ranked on the basis of slight qualitative
    adjustments in four out of ten categories: a slightly inferior location, but slightly superior
    condition, “appeal,” and site coverage. (Ex 1 at 70.) By comparison, Mr. Plaster ranked the
    “slightly inferior” farm store and Target as “inferior” or “slightly inferior” to the subject in six
    out of ten categories, and “slightly superior” in one category. (Id.) The “superior” Safeway’s
    adjusted rent was $13.75 per square foot, which Mr. Plaster determined was a high indicator.
    (Id. at 74.)
    DECISION TC-MD 210135G                                                                           5 of 18
    On the basis of those comparables, Mr. Plaster determined a market rent for the subject of
    $10.50 per square foot and a potential gross income of $498,876. (Ex 1 at 75–76.) After
    deducting 2.5 percent in vacancy and credit losses and 5 percent in operating expenses, Mr.
    Plaster determined a net operating income of $462,310. (Id. at 76–77.)
    (2)     Capitalization rate
    Mr. Plaster chose a capitalization rate of 6.0 percent, based primarily on his analysis of
    five sales and supported by a PricewaterhouseCoopers national investor survey. (Ex 1 at 77–79.)
    The survey showed a range of capitalization rates from 4 to 8 percent for net leased properties
    nationally, with an average of 6.16 percent. (Id. at 78.) The five sales included two used in the
    sales comparison approach—the “superior” Safeway (5.45 percent) and the hardware store
    (6.50%)—and three others located in Washington and southern Oregon—a home improvement
    store (5.85%), another hardware store (6.26%), and a farm supply store (7.16%). (Id. at 77–78.)
    Mr. Plaster narrowed the range indicated by the five sales by discarding the sale of the
    Safeway store and the farm supply store as high and low indicators. (Ex 1 at 78.) He concluded
    that the Safeway sale was a low indicator even though he thought its rent was above market
    because it was “for a long term with a credit tenant.” (Id.) He reasoned that the farm supply
    store was a high indicator because it was “an older facility with a renovation prior to the tenant
    taking occupancy, with an inferior location, and an older date of sale[,]” with a rental rate
    reflecting “the risk characteristics of the tenant and the more questionable long-tern durability of
    the lease[.]” (Id.) Because of unspecified differences in the remaining sales’ “market location,
    tenancy, remaining lease term and physical characteristics[,]” Mr. Plaster determined that a
    capitalization rate “closer to the lower end of this range, or 6.00%[,] is supported for the subject
    on a fee simple stabilized basis.” (Id.)
    DECISION TC-MD 210135G                                                                          6 of 18
    Given a net operating income of $462,310 and a capitalization rate of 6.00 percent, Mr.
    Plaster concluded to an indicated value of $7,705,160 under the income approach. (Ex 1 at 79.)
    d.      Plaintiff’s final reconciliation
    Mr. Plaster placed primary weight on the income approach and supporting weight on the
    sales comparison approach, noting that “few recent fee simple sales were found of similar big
    box retail stores in the subject’s immediate market area.” (Ex 1 at 80.) He placed “little, if any,
    weight on the Cost Approach[.]” (Id.) His final indicated value was $7,750,000. (Id.)
    2.      Defendant’s appraisal
    Defendant’s appraiser, Mr. Sohm, developed the sales comparison approach and the
    income approach.
    a.      Defendant’s sales comparison approach
    Mr. Sohm relied for comparables on seven sales of stores leased by Safeway, including
    the sale of the subject 19 months before the assessment date. (Ex A at 52–55.) All seven sales
    had the same seller, who had purchased 50 stores from Plaintiff in 2016 in a sale-leaseback
    transaction. (Id. at 53.)
    Mr. Sohm made qualitative adjustments to the portfolio spinoff sales for time, location,
    and exposure, determining a range of indicated values between $226 and $254 per square foot.
    (Ex A at 53–55.) Giving most weight to the subject’s own sale, which he found had an adjusted
    sale price between $239 and $246 per square foot, as well as the three most similar properties’
    sales, Mr. Sohm concluded to a per-square-foot value of $242 for the subject, or $11,500,000.
    (Id.)
    ///
    ///
    DECISION TC-MD 210135G                                                                       7 of 18
    b.        Defendant’s income approach
    Mr. Sohm’s income approach relies on lease data contained in a confidential addendum
    to his appraisal report. He describes the market segment of his lease comparables as “involving
    occupied supermarkets similar to the subject.” (Ex A at 56.) According to Mr. Sohm, such
    properties “typically have long term tenants in place that provide the purchaser a low level of
    risk that the future income will not be realized.” (Id.) “The leases reported in the confidential
    addenda to this report were the most comparable leases that the appraiser was able to identify
    and verify in terms of time, location, physical features and lease characteristics.” (Id.)
    Based on that confidential data, Mr. Sohm concluded to an annual market rent of $12.40
    per square foot for the subject. (Ex A at 56, 59.) That market rent was “slightly lower than the
    contract rent for 2020.” (Id. at 59.) He therefore determined a potential gross income and net
    operating income of $589,310. (Id. at 56.) Mr. Sohm’s concluded net operating income was the
    same as potential gross income because, according to “brokers in the subject net lease market
    segment,” deductions for vacancy, expenses, and reserves are not typical for this kind of
    property. (Id. at 59.)
    Mr. Sohm selected a capitalization rate based on data published by CoStar, as well as
    confidential data. (Ex A at 56.) He presented the CoStar data in a table of 14 sales of
    “Investment Class Supermarket Properties”—including the subject—with overall capitalization
    rates ranging from 4.50 to 5.87 percent. (Id. at 57.) The subject’s capitalization rate at the time
    of its May 2018 sale was 5.25 percent. (Id.) Mr. Sohm determined that 5.25 percent was still
    applicable to the subject as of the assessment date because the data did not show any “significant
    change in overall capitalization rates between mid-2018 and early 2020.” (Id. at 58.)
    ///
    DECISION TC-MD 210135G                                                                       8 of 18
    Dividing a net operating income of $589,310 by a capitalization rate of 5.25 percent, Mr.
    Sohm’s income approach reached an indicated value of $11,225,000.
    c.       Defendant’s final reconciliation
    Mr. Sohm gave secondary weight to his sales comparison approach in his final
    reconciliation because of “a degree of subjectivity” in the adjustments for location, age, and size.
    (Ex A at 59.) Giving primary weight to his income approach, he concluded to a final estimated
    real market value of $11,250,000. (Id.)
    II. ANALYSIS
    The subject’s 2020–21 real market value is at issue, and Plaintiff must bear the burden of
    proving a value lower than conceded by Defendant. See ORS 305.427. 3
    The parties’ appraisals reflect striking differences in choices of comparable sales and
    leases. For Plaintiff, Mr. Plaster disfavored sales of leased properties as failing to show the “fee
    simple” interest. For Defendant, Mr. Sohm relied entirely on sales and leases of properties spun
    off from a portfolio sale-leaseback of grocery stores, which Mr. Plaster largely rejected in favor
    of vacant properties and former supermarket buildings repurposed for new uses. The parties’
    differences in choice of comparables reflect different views of the property interest being valued.
    A.     The Interest Valued and the “Fee Simple” Interest
    The property interest valued in a tax assessment is described by our Supreme Court in
    Swan Lake Moulding Company v. Department of Revenue, 
    257 Or 622
    , 
    478 P2d 393
     (1970)
    (Swan Lake I), reh’g den, 
    257 Or 622
    , 
    480 P2d 713
     (1971) (Swan Lake II). In Swan Lake I, the
    taxpayer argued that certain long-term commercial leases reduced its property’s income potential
    and thus its value, while the county argued the leases had no effect on value. Swan Lake I, 257
    3
    The court’s references to the Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) are to 2019.
    DECISION TC-MD 210135G                                                                        9 of 18
    Or at 624–25. The court held for the county: “In fixing the true cash value of land for property
    tax purposes the effect of existing leases on the value to the owner is disregarded.” Id. at 625.
    The court reasoned:
    “The basis for such a principle is that the tax is levied upon the land and is a tax
    upon all the interests into which the land might be divided. Admittedly, a lease
    might decrease the price which the owner might receive; however, the tax is not
    merely upon the owner’s interest; the tax is upon all the interests in the land,
    including the leasehold interest. This is so because of the corollary principle that
    taxes are assessed only against the one having title[.] * * *.”
    Id. (citing First National Bank of Portland v. Marion County, 
    169 Or 595
    , 612–13, 
    130 P2d 9
    (1942) (leaseholds and other interests in real property generally “are not, for the purpose of
    taxation, made severable and assessable in the names of the owners of the respective interests”).
    Although a property’s owner is responsible for the taxes, it is not only the owner’s interest that is
    appraised, but “[t]he entire beneficial interest in the property.” Commonwealth, Inc. v. Dept. of
    Rev., 
    259 Or 140
    , 145, 
    484 P2d 1103
     (1971).
    The holding of Swan Lake I shows how the market-value standard for tax assessment
    (called “true cash value” when Swan Lake I was decided and “real market value” today) 4 applies
    where the price for which an owner could sell the property is affected by a below- or above-
    market lease. Swan Lake I, 257 Or at 625. “If the rent reserved in the lease is less than the
    property is capable of producing, the lessee’s interest is more valuable and it is the entire group
    of interests in the property, lessor’s and lessee’s, that is valued.” Swan Lake II, 257 Or at 629.
    Thus, even a commercial property with a long-term, below-market lease should be valued for
    ///
    4
    Compare 1955 Or Laws, ch 691, § 1 (“[t]rue cash value of all property, real and personal, means market
    value as of the assessment date”) with ORS 308.205(1) (“[r]eal market value of all property, real and personal,
    means the amount in cash that could reasonably be expected to be paid by an informed buyer to an informed seller,
    each acting without compulsion in an arm’s-length transaction occurring as of the assessment date for the tax year”).
    DECISION TC-MD 210135G                                                                                     10 of 18
    assessment purposes as if its rent were at market rate, and a property with an existing above-
    market lease should be treated similarly.
    In Powell Street I, LLC v. Multnomah County Assessor, 
    365 Or 245
    , 445 P3d 297 (2019),
    our Supreme Court restated the rule of Swan Lake using the term “fee simple” to describe the
    interest being valued in property assessment, while making clear that it was not thereby
    excluding leaseholds from the assessment:
    “When the property is subject to leases (as is the case for the shopping
    center here), the value for property tax purposes may differ from the price that the
    owner actually might receive for the property. That is because the property tax is
    assessed on the fee simple interest in the property, which is the value of all
    interests in the property, including those of the owner (ordinarily the lessor) and
    any lessees. That rule was relied upon and explained in Swan Lake Mldg. Co. v.
    Dept. of Rev., 
    257 Or. 622
    , 
    478 P.2d 393
     (1970), reh’g den, 
    257 Or. 622
    , 
    480 P.2d 713
     (1971).”
    Powell Street, 
    365 Or at 248
     (footnote omitted) (noting easements appurtenant are exception to
    general rule).
    Although the Powell Street court explicitly adopted the holding of Swan Lake that a
    property’s value for tax purposes includes the value of both owners’ and lessees’ interests, its use
    of the term fee simple is potentially ambiguous because lawyers and appraisers use that term
    differently. See Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate at 60–61 (15th ed 2020).
    According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the term fee simple is short for “fee simple
    absolute”; it is “the broadest property interest allowed by law, endur[ing] until the current holder
    dies without heirs[.]” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed 2019), s.v. “fee simple.” Nothing in that
    definition implies that a fee simple interest is composed of lesser interests, such as leaseholds.
    To the contrary, an owner’s fee simple interest endures even when that owner becomes a lessor
    and grants the leasehold estate to a lessee. If the lease is unfavorable to the owner, the market
    ///
    DECISION TC-MD 210135G                                                                      11 of 18
    value of the owner’s interest may be diminished, as allegedly occurred in Swan Lake I. That
    owner’s interest is the fee simple interest, as the term fee simple is used by lawyers.
    In contrast, appraisers use the term fee simple to distinguish unencumbered property from
    what they term “leased fee” property. The latter term, which is not used in law, refers among
    appraisers to the property interest retained by a lessor or landlord. The Appraisal of Real Estate
    at 62. The appraiser’s “leased fee,” in legal terms, is equivalent to “fee simple subject to lease.”
    The appraiser’s definition of fee simple differs from the lawyer’s in that it concerns
    encumbrances rather than durability: “Absolute ownership unencumbered by any other interest
    or estate, subject only to the limitations imposed by the governmental powers of taxation,
    eminent domain, police power, and escheat.” Id. at 60, quoting Appraisal Institute, The
    Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal (6th ed 2015). It is well contrasted with the legal definition
    by the following example: “A lender requesting a valuation of the fee simple estate likely intends
    to refer to an unencumbered interest, whereas a deed that conveys fee simple title would
    generally be understood to mean an interest that will endure indefinitely, including all
    encumbrances.” Id. at 61.
    In using the term fee simple, the Powell Street court relied on the testimony of the
    appraisers and on the 14th edition of The Appraisal of Real Estate. 5 Powell Street, 
    365 Or at 251
    . Unlike the 15th edition, the 14th edition does not distinguish the legal and appraisal senses
    of fee simple. Cf. Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate at 441 (14th ed 2013). While
    the court accurately identified the subject of valuation as including both lessors’ and lessees’
    interests, the term fee simple creates an ambiguity for appraisers, who are accustomed to
    5
    While the court characterized Swan Lake as stating a holding regarding fee simple valuation, the term fee
    simple is not used in that case. Likewise, the term is not found in a law review article relied on by the court. Cf.
    Joan M. Youngman, Defining and Valuing the Base of the Property Tax, 58 Wash L Rev 713 (1983).
    DECISION TC-MD 210135G                                                                                     12 of 18
    choosing unleased comparables when they perform “fee simple” valuations: “When the fee
    simple interest is valued, the presumption is that the property is available to be leased at market
    rates.” 
    Id.
     (Emphasis added.)
    For tax purposes a property must be valued as if it were being put to its highest and best
    use—and the highest and best use of a rental property surely includes generating market rent
    from a lessee. See Powell Street, 365 Or at 247–48 (“real market value is derived from the
    ‘highest and best use’ of the property—the most profitable use, for which a buyer would be
    expected to pay the highest price”). Thus, a vacant commercial property may require a
    “stabilization” adjustment to account for its lacking the immediate capacity to generate its
    potential gross income. See 
    id.,
     365 Or at 260–62 (upholding lower court’s finding that such an
    adjustment was appropriate). A stabilization adjustment implies that a commercial property
    without a rent-paying tenant for an extended period is not exhibiting typical market behavior.
    Thus, applying the sales comparison approach for tax assessment purposes does not
    require appraisers to avoid “leased fee” comparables for commercial buildings. To the contrary,
    all else being equal, sales of commercial properties leased at market rents are better indicators of
    market value than are vacant buildings that meet the appraiser’s definition of “fee simple.”
    B.     The Appraisals
    1.      Plaintiff’s appraisal
    The above considerations guide the court’s evaluation of Mr. Plaster’s appraisal. There is
    no dispute that continued operation of the subject in its current use was viable under the market
    conditions of the assessment date. Thus, all else being equal, stabilized commercial properties
    would be more comparable to the subject than vacant ones.
    ///
    DECISION TC-MD 210135G                                                                      13 of 18
    Mr. Plaster’s sales comparison approach relies heavily on vacant properties, which
    comprise half his comparable sales. To his credit, neither of the two sales he identified as “most
    comparable” were of vacant properties. Yet those two sales yielded a wide range—$143 per
    square foot for a Kohl’s store versus $251 per square foot for a Safeway—and the vacant sales
    evidently influenced Mr. Plaster in his choice of a value of $165 per square foot, near the low
    end of that range.
    Although Mr. Plaster gives limited weight to the $251-per-square-foot Safeway sale, he
    completely discounts the sale of the subject itself at $231 per square foot, giving it “no weight.”
    He disfavors both sales for the same reason; namely, that they are spinoffs from the portfolio
    sale-leaseback. It is not clear why one Safeway spinoff sale is among the two most comparable,
    while the sale of the subject is given no weight at all.
    In applying the income approach, Mr. Plaster relies heavily on properties in second-
    generation use, with at least half of his lease comparables involving tenants who were not the
    original occupants. 6 Built-to-suit properties that have shifted from first- to second-generation
    use may have undergone a shift in highest and best use, such that they participate in a different
    market. See Helms Deep LLC v. Multnomah County Assessor, TC–MD 190153N, 
    2021 WL 3137981
     at *3, *7 (July 23, 2021) (accepting testimony to that effect). Here, the rents required
    by the second-generation leases are notably less than the rent required by the one first-generation
    lease set at market rent, leaving open the question of whether the properties participate in
    different markets.
    The lease on which Mr. Plaster places primary weight is a first-generation Safeway store
    rented at $10.35 per square foot. In concluding to a market rent of $10.50 per square foot,
    6
    It is unclear whether the Target lease is original occupancy.
    DECISION TC-MD 210135G                                                                         14 of 18
    however, Mr. Plaster does not address the fact that that Safeway’s rent was set by arbitration at
    85 percent of what “three MAI-designated appraisers” concluded was its market rent of $12.00
    per square foot. While those appraisers were not present at trial to testify, the evidence suffices
    to show that that property’s lease rent is suspect as an indicator of market rent.
    As occurred among his sales comparables, Mr. Plaster was inconsistent in assigning
    weight to Safeway leases. He identified one other Safeway lease as comparable—the lease for
    the same store he identified as a sales comparable—but gave the subject’s own lease “no
    weight,” although both stores were spinoffs from the portfolio sale.
    Given its primary reliance on the Safeway lease that was set in a mediation process
    designed to reach a nonmarket rent, its rejection of the subject’s own lease and sale while
    accepting a similarly situated Safeway’s lease and sale, and its extensive reliance on vacant sales
    and second-generation leases even though the subject remains viable as a first-generation
    supermarket, Mr. Plaster’s appraisal is not a sufficiently reliable indicator of the subject’s real
    market value.
    2.       Defendant’s appraisal
    The physical characteristics of the properties identified by Mr. Sohm are exceptionally
    similar to the subject. The properties from which he draws his sales and lease comparables are
    predominantly operating supermarkets. The seven sales on which he relies for his sales
    comparison approach are all Safeway stores. The lease comparables supporting his income
    approach are confidential. Were it not for the fact that Mr. Sohm’s appraisal relies on spinoff
    sales from the January 2018 portfolio sale-leaseback, there would likely not be a dispute as to its
    accuracy.
    ///
    DECISION TC-MD 210135G                                                                       15 of 18
    Plaintiff argues that relying on those spinoff sales is wrong. The leases of the sold
    properties were all negotiated between Safeway and the buyer, who received a price for the
    subject ($8,931,554) about $2 million lower than the price for which the subject was sold to
    individual investors just four months later ($10,973,000). According to Mr. Plaster, the leases
    negotiated at that time were above-market and the spinoff sales then included a premium over
    the market price because of favorable rents.
    The circumstances of the portfolio sale certainly obscure the motives of the parties to the
    transaction. One possibility is that Safeway agreed to below-market sale prices, offering its
    buyer a “bulk discount” in order to sell as many stores as it needed to raise sufficient capital.
    Whether Safeway accepted higher-than-market leases during the sale-leaseback is difficult to
    discern.
    Although there is limited evidence to test Mr. Plaster’s assertion that the portfolio leases
    were above-market, evidence of the subject’s capitalization rate is suggestive. According to a
    PricewaterhouseCoopers survey cited by Mr. Plaster, the range of expected capitalization rates
    for this type of property was 4 to 8 percent. Mr. Plaster relied in part on one of his second-
    generation sales comparables in concluding to a capitalization rate of 6 percent. Considering the
    likelihood that such a property would participate in a different market than the subject, it is to be
    expected that the subject’s capitalization rate would be somewhat lower. According to data from
    CoStar included in Mr. Sohm’s appraisal, the subject’s capitalization rate for its May 2018 sale
    was 5.25 percent—a “somewhat lower” amount.
    Supposing a 5.25-percent capitalization rate were accepted, the subject’s rent and its
    spinoff sale price could not both be above market. Because the capitalization rate is the ratio of
    net operating income (NOI) over market value, above-market rents would tend to increase the
    DECISION TC-MD 210135G                                                                       16 of 18
    NOI and thereby reduce the sale price; conversely, an above-market sale price would require a
    decreased NOI, implying below-market rents.
    Capitalization rates are always uncertain, and there is not a true cross-check here—only a
    theoretical expectation that the rate should be “somewhat lower” than a rate derived using a
    second-generation sale. It remains possible that the subject’s actual capitalization rate is half a
    point higher, for instance, and that its rent and spinoff sale price are somewhat high.
    Nevertheless, the 5.25-percent capitalization rate is plausible. For all the uncertainties attending
    the portfolio sale and the leaseback, they involve similar properties and market participants
    operating at arm’s length. Whether Mr. Sohm’s appraisal could bear the burden of proof is
    unclear, but it remains more plausible than Mr. Plaster’s.
    III. CONCLUSION
    On the evidence before the court, Plaintiff has not borne its burden of proof. Now,
    therefore,
    IT IS THE DECISION OF THIS COURT that the 2020–21 real market value of the
    property identified in Defendant’s records as Account 05005715 is, as conceded by Defendant,
    $11,250,000.
    Dated this ____ day of December 2023.
    POUL F. LUNDGREN,
    MAGISTRATE
    If you want to appeal this Decision, file a complaint in the Regular Division of
    the Oregon Tax Court, by mailing to: 1163 State Street, Salem, OR 97301-2563;
    or by hand delivery to: Fourth Floor, 1241 State Street, Salem, OR.
    Your complaint must be submitted within 60 days after the date of this Decision
    or this Decision cannot be changed. TCR-MD 19 B.
    DECISION TC-MD 210135G                                                                       17 of 18
    This document was signed by Magistrate Poul F. Lundgren and entered on
    December 22, 2023
    DECISION TC-MD 210135G                                               18 of 18
    

Document Info

Docket Number: TC-MD 210135G

Judges: Lundgren

Filed Date: 12/22/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/11/2024