Dept. of Rev. v. Sahhali South, LLC , 21 Or. Tax 148 ( 2013 )


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  • 148                           March 4, 2013                             No. 21
    IN THE OREGON TAX COURT
    REGULAR DIVISION
    DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE
    and Tillamook County Assessor,
    Plaintiffs,
    v.
    SAHHALI SOUTH, LLC,
    Defendant.
    (TC 4994)
    Plaintiffs (the department) appealed from a Magistrate Division decision
    as to the real market value (RMV) of lots in Tillamook County. Following trial,
    the court found that the valuation approach of the department’s appraiser, albeit
    with minor flaws, was far superior to the analysis of the appraiser for taxpayer
    who did not undertake a full highest and best use analysis, and that the RMV
    of the property at issue should be as determined by the department, less certain
    subdivision costs accounted for by a risk discount of 25 percent.
    Trial was held December 15 and 16, 2011, in the court-
    room of the Oregon Tax Court, Salem.
    Douglas M. Adair, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
    Department of Justice, Salem, argued the cause for Plaintiffs
    (the department).
    Rohn M. Roberts, Arnold Gallagher, et al., Eugene,
    argued the cause for Defendant (taxpayer).
    Decision rendered March 4, 2013.
    HENRY C. BREITHAUPT, Judge.
    I.   INTRODUCTION
    This property tax case is before the court after trial.
    The tax year is 2008-09. The property involved in the case
    comprises 36 townhome lots, and two larger undivided lots,
    all on the Oregon coast just north of the town of Neskowin.
    In the Magistrate Division a decision was entered in favor of
    Defendant (taxpayer). Plaintiffs (collectively referred to as
    the department) have appealed from the decision of the mag-
    istrate. The parties have stipulated as to the value of eight
    detached home lots that had been at issue in the Magistrate
    Division.
    Cite as 
    21 OTR 148
     (2013)                                 149
    II.   FACTS
    Reference is made to the decision of the magistrate
    for background facts about which there is no disagreement.
    The subject properties are all part of a development of single
    family house—or detached—lots and townhome lots. The
    properties, by all accounts, generally have view and location
    features of very high to superior quality.
    The townhome lots are smaller than the detached
    home lots in the development. Lot size could be smaller
    given a common and completed septic system that did not
    require additional lot area for individual septic systems. The
    lots are located on a sloping bluff generally within 1000 feet
    of the ocean. Between the development and the ocean is a
    federally protected wetland through which one can walk to
    the ocean. Protections of the wetland insure that there will
    not be development of the land between the development and
    the ocean.
    The project lots have high quality streets, curbs and
    storm drains and have all underground utilities. The town-
    home lots, while separate, are part of a development plan
    that calls for construction of one townhome immediately
    adjacent to its neighbor. This feature means that the lots
    will be developed only when the “sister” lot is also developed
    with a completed townhome structure. These townhome fea-
    tures result in townhome lots often, but not always, being
    sold to developers or builders who market lots with com-
    pleted structures when they have purchasers for both parts
    of a pair of lots.
    Taxpayer developed the lots in the context of an
    agreement with Butterfield Homes, Inc. (Butterfield), an
    unrelated company in the business of building and mar-
    keting completed townhome packages consisting of land
    and the townhome improvement. The parties, or affiliates,
    had also cooperated in the development, construction and
    sale of completed townhomes in a project, Sahhali Shores,
    located adjacent, but across Highway 101, from the subject
    properties.
    As the Sahhali Shores project was coming to com-
    pletion in 2005, taxpayer negotiated with Butterfield an
    150                      Dept. of Rev. v. Sahhali South, LLC
    exclusive Option Agreement (the Option), pursuant to
    which—subject to certain conditions and over a 43-month
    period of time—Butterfield could purchase lots, improve
    those lots with townhomes and sell the resulting package of
    land and improvement. Taxpayer did not invite bids from or
    negotiate with other builders with respect to the purchase
    of lots, completion of townhomes and marketing of the land
    and completed townhomes. The prices under the Option var-
    ied according to the location of lots, and were composed of a
    base price and an amount equal to 2 percent of the sale price
    of the completed package of lot and townhome.
    In May of 2006 the parties negotiated increases in
    base price for purchases by Butterfield under the Option.
    This occurred in connection with additional development
    costs incurred by taxpayer in connection with construction
    of highway turn lanes required by government authorities.
    The additional highway construction requirements also
    resulted in a delay in the ability of Butterfield to complete
    sales. This delay caused a loss of sales as potential purchasers
    went to other projects or, as the overall market began to
    change, decided not to complete a purchase. The loss of sales
    also resulted in Butterfield falling behind on minimum
    sales or “takedown” obligations under the Option. Taxpayer
    did not, however, seek to cancel or renegotiate the terms of
    the Option.
    In addition to the townhome lots, two other lots are
    at issue in this case. They are lots 13 and 48. Those lots
    were initially platted and approved as single family resi-
    dence lots. Subdivision of those lots was legally possible as
    of January 1, 2008. Indeed, one of the lots was subdivided in
    2009.
    III. ISSUE
    The issue in this case is the real market value
    (RMV), as of January 1, 2008, of the lots at issue in this
    case.
    IV.   ANALYSIS
    There are three main points of disagreement
    between the parties in this case. The first is the signifi-
    cance, if any, of the Option, and the prices thereunder, in
    Cite as 
    21 OTR 148
     (2013)                                                    151
    application of the comparable sales indicator of value.1 The
    second disagreement is as to the comparable sales chosen by
    the respective appraisers for the parties. Finally, the parties
    disagree as to the highest and best use of lots 13 and 48.
    Taxpayer’s appraiser took the position that the highest and
    best use of the lots was for sale without subdivision of the
    lots. The department’s appraiser took the position that the
    highest and best use of the lots was subdivision and sale.
    A. The Option
    Taxpayer maintains that the prices Butterfield was
    required to pay for townhome lots upon exercise of the Option
    are a very good indicator of the value of a lot on January 1,
    2008—an indicator so good that the concluded value as of the
    assessment date is very close to the Option price, taking into
    account some element for the additional price attributable
    to taxpayer’s share of ultimate sales price. The department,
    for various reasons, objects to consideration of the prices set
    under the Option as evidence of RMV as of the assessment
    date.
    Taxpayer stresses that the Option was negotiated
    between two unrelated parties, each of whom had every
    incentive to maximize its economic return flowing from the
    Option. That appears to be true. However, those features of
    a comparable sale—that is, unrelated parties acting without
    compulsion—are not enough to satisfy the criteria of a com-
    parable sale for use in the proof of RMV. They do not over-
    come the fact that what the parties negotiated was not a sale
    at all, but rather the grant to Butterfield of rights to buy
    which, if exercised, would create an obligation of taxpayer to
    sell.
    The rights of Butterfield extended over a signifi-
    cant time—43 months. That fact together with the exclusive
    rights of Butterfield and the pricing arrangement under the
    Option show that the Option cannot be relied upon to provide
    a valid sale for appraisal at any given point in time. Whatever
    market forces and realities led to the establishment of the
    1
    Both parties agree that the comparable sales indicator of value is the proper
    indicator on which to rely in determining RMV for the property at issue in this
    case.
    152                             Dept. of Rev. v. Sahhali South, LLC
    pricing provisions of the Option, they could not prevent mar-
    ket realities from changing such that sales completed under
    the Option in no way necessarily reflected market realities
    at the time of exercise of the Option. If prices for individual
    lots escalated after the Option was signed, the price paid by
    Butterfield would not be RMV as defined in ORS 308.205.2
    Rather the RMV would be a combination of the Option
    price and the economic value of the Option to Butterfield.3
    Indeed, if the market for townhome lots declined, it would
    also be true that the Option price would not indicate the
    RMV either. Of course the option holder would most likely
    not exercise the Option in such a case. But that economically
    rational act does not supply a price in a transaction in the
    market. It only indicates that the Option price is, in fact, not
    the RMV of the property.
    The usefulness of the comparable sales indicator of
    RMV is that where a comparable property is involved, the
    binding decisions of a buyer and a seller provide evidence of
    value far superior to the other indicators of value and, as in
    this case, the only real evidence of value. Buyers and sellers
    are not committed to a possibility; they are committed to an
    actual transaction.
    The department argues that the Option also had
    features of a bulk sale. To the extent that is the case, Oregon
    law is clear that the prices agreed upon by taxpayer and
    Butterfield would not be good evidence of RMV. See, e.g.,
    Mathias v. Dept. of Rev., 
    312 Or 50
    , 
    817 P2d 272
     (1991).
    Taxpayer correctly argues that the transaction under the
    Option was not in fact a bulk sale. However, it was a bulk
    option to purchase and, as such, has some of the troublesome
    elements of a bulk sale. Most notably, the Option applied to
    2
    There is evidence from both parties that the market was rising between the
    time the Option was entered into and the assessment date, although the increase
    in prices and values had leveled off as of the assessment date. All references to
    the Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) are to the 2007 edition.
    3
    There is a provision in the Option for an additional increment of price to be
    paid by Butterfield. This is two percent of final sales price of the lot and town-
    home to the ultimate purchaser. There was no showing at trial as to whether, or
    to what extent, such a price increment caused sale prices to be below, at or even
    above general market values. In this regard, as in so many regards in taxpayer’s
    proof, what the option prices showed was what the option prices were. That is
    simply not enough.
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    21 OTR 148
     (2013)                                  153
    all the townhome lots and had a term that contemplated
    the complete build out of the townhome project. There
    was also only one possible purchaser under this exclusive
    arrangement—an arrangement entered into without any
    effort by taxpayer to entertain proposals from other builders
    or developers. Although it is not clear what all the consid-
    erations of the parties were in negotiating the Option, the
    record demonstrates that both sides of the agreement were
    interested in having a rapid build out and sale of the town-
    homes. Indeed, that goal appears to have also influenced
    taxpayer in choosing one option party for all the lots and to
    have that option party be a builder who would also under-
    take marketing and sales efforts.
    The court does not question the good faith of the
    witnesses who explained these considerations that moti-
    vated the option parties. However, as with a bulk sale of lots,
    this bulk option of lots accommodates the business goals of
    only these particular parties. The transaction does not sup-
    ply good evidence of whether or at what price others, or even
    these parties, would have sold and bought lots individually
    on or about January 1, 2008. And third party offers or inter-
    est in buying lots from taxpayer was effectively barred by
    the existence of the Option.
    For these reasons, the court gives little to no weight
    to the prices of sales of lots under the Option.
    B. Comparable Sales
    The views of the parties about the extent to which the
    Option provides market evidence also affects the approach
    the appraisers for each party took to finding and analyzing
    an overall group of comparable sales. Taxpayer’s appraiser
    relied on a number of sales that had occurred under the
    Option and took the sales prices paid by Butterfield as evi-
    dence of the market value of lots as of January 1, 2008. For
    the reasons stated above, the court cannot agree with this
    analytical step of taxpayer’s appraiser.
    The appraiser for taxpayer also identified several
    lot sales at other locations and used the results of those sales
    to support his conclusion of value. However, in this step of
    his analysis, the testimony of the appraiser for taxpayer
    154                     Dept. of Rev. v. Sahhali South, LLC
    indicates that he committed one of the most fundamental
    errors in reasoning—he assumed as his major premise his
    own conclusion as to value. His testimony indicates that
    he first took the Option sales as evidence of value. He then
    located lot sales, in fact far distant from the subject prop-
    erty and in no way comparable to the subject property, as
    to location and view amenities. He testified, however, that
    they were comparable to the subject because they were in
    the same price range as he had concluded applied to the sub-
    ject lots—based on his reliance on the Option sales.
    The non-subject sales upon which the appraiser for
    taxpayer relied were, in fact, not comparable to the subject.
    First, they were located at some distance from the subject.
    Second, many, if not most of them had decidedly inferior
    view characteristics. Indeed, many had no ocean view what-
    soever whereas the main attraction of the subject lots is the
    good to extremely good ocean views available. Similarly, the
    purported comparables were at significant distances from
    the ocean. The evidence indicates that distance from the
    ocean is the other feature that makes the subject lots very
    attractive.
    Based both on the logical error of the appraiser for
    taxpayer and the court’s own evaluation of the supposedly
    comparable non-subject sales, the court places no weight on
    the opinion of the appraiser for taxpayer as to the compara-
    bles he employed in the comparable sales indicator of RMV.
    The appraiser for the department also used only
    the comparable sales indicator in determining RMV. Many
    of the comparables used by this expert were sales that had
    been analyzed by the appraiser for taxpayer. However, those
    sales were apparently used by the appraiser for the depart-
    ment but discounted or not relied upon by the appraiser for
    taxpayer. In this category one sale stands out. It was a sale
    of a townhome lot located near the subject property. The sale
    was of the lot alone and apparently made to the end user. The
    date of the sale, June 26, 2008, was reasonably close to the
    assessment date. The property sold had very good view and
    location amenities. The sale price was $375,000, consistent
    with the conclusion of the appraiser for the department as
    to the subject property. However, the appraiser for taxpayer
    Cite as 
    21 OTR 148
     (2013)                                                 155
    did not rely on this sale and did not have a good reason for
    not doing so, other than, apparently, that the value was out
    of line with the Option prices.
    Some of the sales relied upon by the appraiser
    for the department are after the assessment date and, in
    some cases, significantly so. However, the appraiser for the
    department analyzed the trending of sales prices during the
    post-assessment date period and concluded that the mar-
    ket for lots on the coast was relatively stable during this
    period. Post-assessment date sales may be used when it is
    shown that markets have not moved significantly during
    the post-assessment period. Ernst Brothers Corp. v. Dept. of
    Rev., 
    320 Or 294
    , 305, 
    882 P2d 591
     (1994). The appraiser
    for taxpayer questioned the reliance by the department on
    these sales, arguing that the market was declining during
    the relevant period and not stable. To support this point,
    the appraiser for taxpayer used sales trends for all types
    of property in all areas of three counties. That data source
    significantly weakens the criticism leveled by appraiser
    for taxpayer. This is so because the property in question
    here is prime ocean front property, not the general census
    of residential lots or improved properties in a county. The
    court concludes that the sales data used by the appraiser for
    the department from periods after the assessment date is
    reliable.4
    In testing the reasonableness of their conclusions
    as to lot value, each appraiser undertook some form of “lot
    residual” analysis. This involved taking the ultimate sale of
    a lot and townhome “package” and then multiplying that by
    a developed lot to total ratio in order to extract the contribu-
    tion to ultimate value of the lot. The department’s appraiser
    located developments, other than the subject development,
    where lots sales occurred and later, sales of land and
    improvement occurred. The appraiser compared the lot sale
    price to the finished “package” price and developed a lot to
    “package” ratio of approximately 40 percent. Using approx-
    imately that figure and the asking prices for the lots that
    4
    In any case, even if the criticism of the appraiser for taxpayer were well
    taken, the downward trend of the market after the assessment date would not
    support a conclusion that the sales could not be used. They would, at most, pro-
    vide evidence of an RMV below that for which the department contends.
    156                     Dept. of Rev. v. Sahhali South, LLC
    remained unsold, the appraiser for the department showed
    that the residual method supported his values determined
    under the comparable sales approach.
    The appraiser for taxpayer once again allowed the
    Option to dominate his analysis. In developing a residual
    approach value, he looked only at sales that occurred at the
    subject development. He then compared the Option price to
    the final sales price of the “package” and calculated that
    the lot to “package” ratio was approximately 25 percent.
    Multiplying that percentage by the actual sales of the com-
    pleted “packages” that had occurred, the appraiser, not sur-
    prisingly, showed that the ratio of lot to “package” values
    was 25 percent. Of course, all this analysis proved was that
    the ratio for this set of sales was the ratio for this set of
    sales. The appraiser for taxpayer did not seek out external
    sales or determine if his ratio was supported by market evi-
    dence from other comparable developments.
    The test of reasonableness used by the appraiser
    for the department is not totally free of criticism, mainly
    because the lot sales were on lots different from those under-
    lying the “package” sales used in the analysis. However,
    the department’s appraiser did review the comparability of
    lots involved in the analysis and concluded that they were
    similar.
    The approach of the department’s appraiser, what-
    ever its minor flaw, is far superior to the analysis of the
    appraiser for taxpayer. That appraiser again started from
    the proposition that the prices under the Option were RMV
    and having assumed the correctness of that point proceeded
    to “prove” that it was true. The failure of that appraiser to
    develop any market evidence from other sales or develop-
    ments renders his approach unreliable.
    The court concludes that the department has borne
    its burden of proof that the lot values for the townhome lots,
    other than lots 13 and 48, are as it maintains.
    C. Highest and Best Use and Valuation of Lots 13 and 48
    These two lots were not subject to the Option and,
    as originally platted, were significantly larger than the
    townhome lots. There was testimony from the developer
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    21 OTR 148
     (2013)                                  157
    that concern for initial plat approval motivated the devel-
    oper not to include these lots sites for location of two townho-
    mes. However, in 2009, these lots were, in fact, subdivided.
    The parties differ as to the initial appraisal ques-
    tion of the highest and best use of these lots. The depart-
    ment takes the position that subdivision of the lots produced
    the highest value, and was legally possible. Taxpayer takes
    the position that approval of any subdivision application was
    subject to the risk of no approval being granted. The depart-
    ment values these lots at the rate applicable for the view and
    location characteristics they have, minus an allowance for
    the costs of subdivision. Taxpayer does not take into account
    any subdivision but adjusted the value of the lots upward
    from others in order to take into account the greater size of
    the lots. The testimony of the appraiser for taxpayer indi-
    cates he apparently did not undertake a full highest and
    best use analysis.
    The court is of the opinion that the highest and best
    use of these lots was subdivision, as in fact occurred shortly
    after the assessment date. However, the court also views
    the department’s valuation methodology as incorrect inso-
    far as it does not provide a discount for the risk of land use
    approvals. While the subdivision of the lots was legally pos-
    sible, approval was not a certainty. The difficulties that this
    development had with government approvals, especially in
    connection with highway access, demonstrate the risks that
    approvals present.
    V. CONCLUSION
    Now, therefore,
    IT IS THE DECISION OF THIS COURT that
    Plaintiffs’ value for each lot, less the subdivision costs with
    which the department agrees, is an appropriate base. The
    value of the lots should then be further reduced by a risk
    discount of 25 percent.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: TC 4994

Citation Numbers: 21 Or. Tax 148

Judges: Breithaupt

Filed Date: 3/4/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/11/2024