CatLand v. Yamhill County Assessor ( 2012 )


Menu:
  •                                      IN THE OREGON TAX COURT
    MAGISTRATE DIVISION
    Property Tax Exemption
    CATLAND,                                                  )
    )
    Plaintiff,                               )   TC-MD 111066C
    )
    v.                                                )
    )
    YAMHILL COUNTY ASSESSOR,                                  )
    )
    Defendant.                               )   DECISION
    Plaintiff appeals the denial of a property tax exemption for property identified as Account
    480483 (subject property) for the 2010-11 and 2011-12 tax years. By Order issued February 22,
    2012, the court dismissed the appeal for the 2010-11 tax year. A telephone trial for the 2011-12
    tax year was held on July 24, 2012. A. John Ochsner IV (Ochsner), President, Chief Executive
    Officer, and Director of Plaintiff, appeared and testified on behalf of Plaintiff. Brian A. Linke
    (Linke), Commercial Appraiser for Yamhill County Assessment & Taxation, and Jeff Ivie (Ivie),
    Chief Appraiser for Yamhill County Assessment & Taxation, appeared and testified on behalf of
    Defendant. Plaintiff‟s Exhibits 1 through 50 and Defendant‟s Exhibit A were submitted without
    objection.
    I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
    A.      Subject property
    The subject property is a 20 acre parcel located three miles north of Newberg, Oregon,
    owned by Ochsner and leased to Plaintiff. The following improvements are on the property: a
    one-and-a-half-story home, a manufactured home, a barn, a shed, a shop, and a recreational
    vehicle.1 (Def‟s Ex A at 1.) Ochsner testified that he occupies the residence and that, as of the
    assessment date, he shared some of the space with 25 to 30 cats. Defendant‟s witness, Linke,
    1
    Ochsner testified that the shop and manufactured home are not used by Plaintiff, and they are not part of
    its exemption application. His exemption application, however, does not exclude those structures. (See Def‟s Ex A
    at 7.)
    DECISION TC-MD 111066C                                                                                            1
    disputed the number of cats on the property, testifying that when he inspected the property he
    saw only about 10 to 12 cats, and that most, if not all, had names. Linke further testified that the
    cats are fenced in and cannot get to the “wildlife” area. In Linke‟s opinion, the property is no
    different than many other rural properties, having a private residence in the woods with a few pet
    cats and a gate that excludes the public. Also, when cross-examined by Ivie, Ochsner testified
    that he is not a veterinarian or a veterinarian‟s assistant, and that he has no relevant education.
    Ochsner testified that the manufactured home is rented by a “relative” who pays rent to
    Plaintiff.2 (See Ptf‟s Ex 35 (reporting as income to Plaintiff three monthly rent installments of
    $150 each for October, November, and December 2011).) When questioned on cross-
    examination, Ochsner testified that the relative renting the manufactured home is his sister, who
    is also on the board of his organization, CatLand (the Plaintiff in this appeal).
    The barn is purportedly a shelter for wildlife, such as birds, raccoons, squirrels, and one
    llama, but the barn also stores items such as a sink, chairs, ladder, lumber, and woodworking
    equipment. (Def‟s Ex A at 2, 23.) Other items on the property include several animal shelters
    (equipped with heat and a sources of fresh water), and at least eight vehicles are “scattered about
    the property * * *.”3 (Id. at 2, 3; see e.g., id. at 39 (photographs of the subject property showing
    several vehicles stored in grassy areas).)
    Ochnser testified that cats should never roam free as they are a threat to other wildlife,
    especially to birds that nest on the ground. As such, some areas of the subject property are
    fenced. There is a one-quarter acre area abutting the residence containing three animal shelters
    and another 0.42 acre area with a shelter and litter box for those animals with the fatal disease
    ///
    2
    Ochsner did not explain how a tenant is permitted at all, given that Plaintiff‟s lease of the property states
    that the premises “cannot be subleased to any other party or organization * * *.” (Def‟s Ex A at 11.)
    3
    Ochsner reported that a recreational vehicle located on the subject property is used by the tenant to house
    cats.
    DECISION TC-MD 111066C                                                                                                     2
    Feline Infectious Peritonitis (FIP). (Ptf‟s Ex 1 at 40, 28,29.) It was not clear to the court
    whether there were any animals with FIP living within the enclosure.
    Both parties submitted photographs of the interior of the one-and-a-half story home
    (Ochsner‟s residence). (Ptf‟s Exs 36-39; Def‟s Ex A at 21, 27-38.) The photograph of the lower
    level of the garage depicts a vehicle, bicycles, tools, and equipment; the photograph of the upper
    level depicts musical equipment, a couch, and storage bins (Defendant reports that the upper
    level serves as Plaintiff‟s employee lounge, but there was no evidence of employees). (Def‟s Ex
    A at 21.) The photographs of the kitchen present both human and animal living space. (Id. at 27
    (photographs depicting a counter-top watering and feeding station as well as a refrigerator, a
    stove, dishes, and cupboards containing human food such as the candy “Dots”).) Photographs of
    the living room show similar co-habitation – feeding stations, litter boxes, cat beds, chairs,
    tables, lamps, a speaker, and storage bins. (Id. at 29-31; Ptf‟s Ex 37.) The main floor bedroom
    and hallway contain cat beds, feeding and watering stations, and animal carriers. (Def‟s Ex A at
    33-34.) The photographs of the upstairs of the home depict an office, two bedrooms with
    feeding stations, cat shelters, a carpeted post, and a bathroom with a litter box and a feeding
    station. (Id. at 35, 36.) Defendant testified that one of the bedrooms was blocked with a gate at
    the door because of the feral cat inside. There was no testimony as to exactly what portion of the
    home Ochsner occupies, but he testified that, in his opinion, living on property leased by Plaintiff
    is inconsequential to the court‟s determination.
    Ochnser testified that the basement is kept free from cats, as it is a “ „safe haven‟ for
    mice[,]” “a break room for volunteers[,] and a work area for constructing cat shelves.” (Def‟s Ex
    A at 2; Ptf‟s Ex 46.) Photographs show a room with a pool table, a bathroom, an office, a utility
    room with animal traps, a vacuum cleaner, paint canisters, and the like. (Def‟s Ex A at 37, 38.)
    Ochnser claims that those areas are used in Plaintiff‟s operations. For example, the pool table is
    used as a work station to cut boards for cat shelves. (Ptf‟s Ex 39.)
    DECISION TC-MD 111066C                                                                               3
    Defendant points out that the subject property is not “open to the public” as the term is
    commonly used; there are no signs to invite the public to contact anyone about opportunities to
    enjoy the wildlife on the property, and, in fact, the gated driveway prevents vehicles from driving
    up to the animals‟ structures without assistance. (Def‟s Ex A at 1.) Ochsner responded that the
    public is free to enjoy the wildlife area on the subject property from the highway, and that it is
    not uncommon for a vehicle to pull over to the shoulder of the road and the occupants to get out
    and look at his property. (Ptf‟s Ex 1 at 38.)
    B.     Plaintiff’s organization
    Plaintiff is a corporation “organized for the charitable, scientific[,] and educational
    purposes of Animal Welfare & Wildlife Conservation.” (Def‟s Ex A at 8, 9.) Plaintiff is exempt
    from federal income tax under Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3). (Ptf‟s Ex 42.) Its
    activities “include providing food, water, shelter, and sanctuary to homeless animals and
    wildlife[,]” primarily stray or feral cats. (Def‟s Ex A at 9.) Ochsner testified that Plaintiff
    utilizes volunteers, advertises on a website, participates in the Yamhill County Cat Coalition,
    educates the public, and accepts donations. (See Ptf‟s Ex 1.) Ochsner also testified that Plaintiff
    does not charge for any of its services.
    Ochsner testified that the primary purpose of Plaintiff is to prevent the spread of disease
    from feral cats to other healthy animals. To that end, Ochsner provided printed pages of internet
    commentary on issues such as “the feral cat problem in McMinnville” and copied excerpts from
    various web pages. (Ptf‟s Exs 12, 13, 17-22; see, e.g., id. at 21 (excerpt from www.peta.org
    regarding that organization‟s view that feral cats should be isolated from sources of harm).)
    Plaintiff provided articles published by the American Bird Conservancy on www.abcbirds.org
    titled “Domestic Cat Predation on Birds and Other Wildlife,” “The Great Outdoors is No Place
    for Cats,” and “Trap, Neuter, Release: The Wrong Solution to a Tragic Problem.” (Ptf‟s Exs
    23-25, 31.) There is also a report from the Oregon State University Veterinary Diagnostic
    DECISION TC-MD 111066C                                                                               4
    Laboratory, diagnosing Ochsner‟s cat “Lisho” with the fatal disease FIP in 2002. (Ptf‟s Ex 27.)
    Information about FIP – whether it‟s contagious, signs and symptoms of the disease, etc., was
    also provided. (Ptf‟s Ex 28 - 29.) Ochsner testified that there is no definitive test for FIP at this
    time.
    To support Plaintiff‟s contention that its purpose is a laudable one, Ochsner presented
    emails from Congressman David Wu and United States Senator Jeffrey A. Merkley (Merkley)
    thanking Ochsner for sharing his thoughts on the following: cuts to conservation programs, the
    threat of mining to the Grand Canyon, the regulation of polluted stormwater runoff, and the
    conservation of a farm bill – all issues related to protecting wildlife. (Ptf‟s Exs 14-16; See also
    id. at 3 (letter from Merkley to Better Lives for Cats volunteers).) Ochsner also presented
    affidavits from individuals who sought help finding homes for cats. (Ptf‟s Exs 5-8, 44, 45, 49,
    50.) The following is a list of each affidavit and a short summary of its content (all affidavits
    contain the identical opinion that Plaintiff‟s efforts constitute “giving” and that Plaintiff
    “provides a benefit to the public and community at large”):
    1) Affidavit of Janet Zeider, dated January 12, 2012, attesting to Ochsner‟s
    willingness to take custody of various stray cats (“Pumpkin,” “Sam,” and
    “Cinder,” “See Spot Canter”) at some point in the past at Ochsner‟s previous
    residence and at the subject property.
    2) Affidavit of Angela Creech dated December 14, 2011, attesting to Ochsner‟s
    willingness to take custody of a stray cay, “Sasha,” at the subject property around
    September 2010.
    3) Affidavit of Julie Allen dated November 15, 2011, attesting to Ochsner‟s
    willingness to take custody of her cats “Char” and “TK” at the subject property
    around November 2011.
    4) Affidavit of Cuma Hall dated December 8, 2011, attesting to Ochsner‟s
    willingness to take custody of a “colony of about eight feral cats” at the subject
    property around November 2011.
    5) Affidavit of Chuck Dunn dated July 9, 2012, attesting to Ochsner‟s
    willingness to take custody of stray cats “Tom Tom,” “Snowball,” and Snowball‟s
    kittens at the subject property around December 2011. Snowball was later
    returned to her human family.
    DECISION TC-MD 111066C                                                                                  5
    6) Affidavit of Dona Richardson dated July 9, 2012, attesting to Ochsner‟s
    willingness to help Cuma Hall and his willingness to take custody of stray cat,
    “Eddie,” at the subject property at some point in the past.
    7) Affidavit of Don Borlaug (Borlaug) dated July 2, 2012, attesting to Ochsner‟s
    efforts to adopt out and deliver three feral cats to Borlaug, along with cat beds,
    blankets, feeders, cat food, water bowl, litter boxes, and cat litter around
    December 2011.
    8) Affidavit of Marcy McDowell (McDowell), Vice-President on the Board of
    Directors for Homeward Bound, dated July 13, 2012, attesting to Plaintiff‟s
    receipt of donations from Homeward Bound. McDowell‟s affidavit also states
    that she was present at Defendant‟s inspection of the subject property, that the two
    upper floors of the house are used by cats, and that she has referred those seeking
    homes for cats to Plaintiff.
    (Id.)
    Ochsner presented lists of Plaintiff‟s income and expenses for 2010 and 2011. (Ptf‟s Exs
    34, 35.) Reportedly, Plaintiff had no income in 2010 and $6,520 in expenses for security,
    medications, veterinary fees, food, litter, gas used to transport cats, etc. (Ptf‟s Ex 34.) In 2011,
    Plaintiff had $1,125 in income from rent and unspecified donations. (Ptf‟s Ex 35.) Ochsner
    testified that the donations came from several donors, but that he preferred to keep the sources
    anonymous. Expenses for 2011 included items similar to those in 2010, totaling $5,694. (Id.)
    Ochsner offered no explanation as to how Plaintiff affords to operate given the great disparity
    between its income and its expenses, except to say that “the funds come from [his] own pocket.”
    Ochsner did not provide any receipts for any of Plaintiff‟s expenses.
    II. ANALYSIS
    “[A]ll real property in Oregon is taxable unless specifically exempted.” Serenity Lane,
    Inc. v. Lane County Assessor, TC-MD No 101243C at 10 (Mar 7, 2012); see also ORS 307.030.4
    ///
    ///
    4
    All references to the Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) and to the Oregon Administrative Rules (OAR) are
    to 2009.
    DECISION TC-MD 111066C                                                                                                6
    Plaintiff seeks an exemption under ORS 307.130 as a charitable organization. ORS 307.130
    provides, in pertinent part:
    “(2) Upon compliance with ORS 307.162, the following property owned or being
    purchased by art museums, volunteer fire departments, or incorporated literary,
    benevolent, charitable and scientific institutions shall be exempt from taxation:
    “(a) Except as provided by ORS 748.414, only such real or personal property, or
    proportion thereof, as is actually and exclusively occupied or used in the literary,
    benevolent, charitable or scientific work carried on by such institutions.”
    Because Plaintiff leases the property from Ochsner, Plaintiff must satisfy the
    requirements of ORS 307.112, a statute extending property tax exemption to qualifying entities
    that lease or sublease property from taxable owners, provided the organization has been “granted
    exemption or the right to claim exemption for any of its property under ORS 307.130 * * *.”
    Among the requirements for lessee is that they use the property “in the manner, if any, required
    by law for the exemption” and that the parties “expressly agree[] within the lease * * *
    agreement that the rent payable by the institution * * * has been established to reflect the savings
    below market rent resulting from the exemption from taxation.” ORS 307.112(1)(a) (b). The
    court‟s focus in its analysis is primarily on the use of the property.
    To determine whether a taxpayer is allowed an exemption, the court follows the principle
    that property tax exemption statutes are strictly but reasonably construed. SW Oregon Pub. Def.
    Services v. Dept. of Rev. (SW Oregon), 
    312 Or, 82
    , 88-89, 
    817 P2d 1292
     (1991) (citation
    omitted). “Strict but reasonable construction does not require the court to give the narrowest
    possible meaning to an exemption statute. Rather, it requires an exemption statute be construed
    reasonably, giving due consideration to the ordinary meaning of the words of the statute and the
    legislative intent.” North Harbour Corp. v. Dept. of Rev. 
    16 OTR 91
    , 95 (2002) (citation
    omitted).
    ///
    ///
    DECISION TC-MD 111066C                                                                             7
    The Oregon Supreme Court has stated that, taken together, Oregon case law and
    Department of Revenue rule OAR 150-307.130-(A) “indicate that there are three elements to
    qualifying as a „charitable institution‟ under ORS 307.130: (1) the organization must have
    charity as its primary, if not sole object; (2) the organization must be performing in a manner that
    furthers its charitable object; and (3) the organization‟s performance must involve a gift or
    giving.” SW Oregon, 312 Or at 89.
    Satisfying the element of “gift or giving” requires proof that the property is used
    primarily for charitable purposes. OAR 150-307.130-(A)(4). The rule states, in pertinent part,
    “[t]he use of the property must substantially contribute to the furtherance of the charitable
    purpose and goal of the organization. * * *. Only the portion of a property used for [charitable
    purposes] shall be granted an exemption * * *.” OAR 150-307.130-(A)(4)(d)(A), (B). Statute
    and rule contemplate a scenario where “[p]roperty may be in part taxable and exempt.” OAR
    150-307.130-(A)(4)(d)(B); ORS 307.130(2) (providing a property tax exemption only for “such
    real or personal property, or proportion thereof, as is actually and exclusively occupied or used in
    the literary, benevolent, charitable or scientific work carried on by such institutions”).
    In cases regarding exemptions for residences, the court analyzes whether the residence
    serves an essential function of the organization. See e.g., Mult. School of Bible v. Mult. Co., 
    218 Or 19
     
    343 P2d 893
     (1959) (holding that a residence occupied by two college employees was
    exempt because the employees were required to live on campus and their function was essential
    to the mission of the college). If the taxpayer cannot establish that the residence and its
    occupation are essential to the organization‟s charitable purpose, exemption is denied. See e.g.,
    Golden Writ of God v. Dept. of Rev., 
    300 Or 479
    , 486 
    713 P2d 605
     (1986) (denying an
    exemption of a farmhouse occupied by adherents and stating that the residence was like any
    other, “no different from the farms and homes in which millions of Oregonians have meditated
    and prayed since this state was founded in 1859”).
    DECISION TC-MD 111066C                                                                              8
    “The burden of establishing entitlement to an exemption is on the taxpayer claiming the
    exemption.” SW Oregon, 312 Or at 88 (citation omitted). “[A] preponderance of the evidence
    shall suffice to sustain the burden of proof.” ORS 305.427. “Preponderance of the evidence
    means the greater weight of evidence, the more convincing evidence.” Feves v. Dept. of
    Revenue, 
    4 OTR 302
    , 312 (1971) (citation omitted). “In close cases, exemptions must be
    denied.” Washington Co. Assessor II v. Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
    18 OTR 409
    , 422 (2006) (citation
    omitted).
    Plaintiff failed to carry its burden in several respects. Plaintiff has not established that it
    was involved in a qualifying activity as of the assessment date (January 1, 2011). Moreover, the
    court found Ochsner‟s testimony to be vague and evasive, at times misleading, and in some
    instances simply not credible. It is not clear to the court that Plaintiff is operating in a manner
    that furthers the objective of “Animal Welfare & Wildlife Conservation.” The affidavits show
    that, over time, Ochsner has arranged custody for 21 cats (plus Snowball‟s litter), many of which
    he agreed to care for at the subject property. Evidence shows that many cats continue to be cared
    for at the subject property; there are many feeding stations, litter boxes, and cat beds within the
    residence; Ochsner has built outdoor shelters with heat and watering systems; Plaintiff lists
    veterinary care and animal supplies as expenses. However, there is no convincing evidence that
    those cats carried disease or posed a specific threat to wildlife, or that there is particularly
    vulnerable wildlife on the subject property requiring protection from cats. In fact, Ochsner
    testified that at this time there is no definitive test to determine if a cat is infected with the fatal
    and contagious disease FIP.
    Ochsner presented many articles and excerpts to support his belief that preventing cats
    from roaming free protects wildlife. Although that may be, and likely is, true, the court is not
    convinced that Plaintiff‟s intermittent acceptance of new cats sufficiently promotes wildlife
    ///
    DECISION TC-MD 111066C                                                                                     9
    protection or animal (cat) welfare. Furthermore, the court is not persuaded that the cats on the
    property are anything more than pets, Ochsner‟s testimony to the contrary notwithstanding.
    The evidence before the court shows that members of the public can only access
    Plaintiff‟s services through word-of-mouth, that is, if they happen to speak to someone who is
    familiar with Plaintiff. Plaintiff does not advertise. Additionally, the public education that
    Ochsner performs on Plaintiff‟s behalf does not take place on the subject property, and occurs
    only on rare occasions. The court is not convinced that Plaintiff‟s operations have anything to do
    with protecting wildlife or animal welfare on the whole, except for the care and custody of cats,
    some of which were given to Ochsner because the owner was unable or unwilling to continue to
    care for the animal.
    Furthermore, Plaintiff has not established the element of gift or giving. Although
    Plaintiff‟s affiants repeat the same form language to that effect (that Plaintiff – actually Ochsner
    – provides services that constitute valuable gifts), the standard the court uses is that set forth by
    the applicable law, not conclusions of third parties who do not testify and who have not been
    shown to be qualified to render such opinions, which are, in the context of this case, legal
    conclusions, or that the affiants are sufficiently personally knowledgeable to form an opinion on
    the matter. In part, Plaintiff must show that the subject property is “used primarily for charitable
    purposes.” OAR 150-307.130-(A)(4) (emphasis added). On the contrary, the court finds that the
    evidence plainly shows that the subject property is used primarily as Ochsner‟s residence, as well
    as that of Plaintiff‟s tenant (who is Ochsner‟s sister), as storage space for vehicles and equipment
    presumably owned by Ochsner, and as living space for Ochsner‟s pet cats and llama. Plaintiff
    did not offer sufficient explanations for how any of the ancillary activities on the subject
    property are used to further animal welfare or wildlife conservation. Plaintiff did not sufficiently
    explain why areas such as the garage, which is Ochsner‟s personal storage space for a car,
    bicycles, tools, etc., was not excluded from Plaintiff‟s exemption application. For the subject
    DECISION TC-MD 111066C                                                                              10
    property to qualify for a property tax exemption under the strict but reasonable standard, Plaintiff
    must show that, of all the uses of the subject property, the primary use is to further animal
    welfare and wildlife conservation. Plaintiff has failed to do so.
    III. CONCLUSION
    After careful review of the evidence, the court concludes that Plaintiff failed to prove that
    it was involved in a qualifying charitable activity as of the assessment date or that the subject
    property was used primarily for a charitable purpose. Thus, the subject property does not qualify
    for property tax exemption under ORS 307.112 and ORS 307.130. Now, therefore,
    IT IS THE DECISION OF THIS COURT that Plaintiff‟s appeal for the 2010-11 tax year
    is dismissed;
    IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION OF THIS COURT that Plaintiff‟s appeal for the
    2011-12 tax year, which seeks property tax exemption for certain real property identified in the
    assessor‟s records as Account 480483, is denied.
    Dated this       day of October 2012.
    DAN ROBINSON
    MAGISTRATE
    If you want to appeal this Decision, file a Complaint in the Regular Division of
    the Oregon Tax Court, by mailing to: 1163 State Street, Salem, OR 97301-2563;
    or by hand delivery to: Fourth Floor, 1241 State Street, Salem, OR.
    Your Complaint must be submitted within 60 days after the date of the Decision
    or this Decision becomes final and cannot be changed.
    This document was signed by Magistrate Dan Robinson on October 30, 2012.
    The Court filed and entered this document on October 30, 2012.
    DECISION TC-MD 111066C                                                                              11
    

Document Info

Docket Number: TC-MD 111066C

Filed Date: 10/30/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/11/2024