Hansen v. Lane County Assessor ( 2014 )

IN THE OREGON TAX COURT
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
Property Tax
JASEN D. HANSEN, )
)
Plaintiff, ) TC-MD 140096C
)
v. )
)
LANE COUNTY ASSESSOR, )
)
Defendant. ) FINAL DECISION
This Final Decision incorporates without change the court’s Decision entered October 14,
2014. The court did not receive a request for an award of costs and disbursements within 14
days after its Decision was entered. See TCR-MD 19.
Plaintiff appeals the real market value of property identified as Account 1686938 (subject
property) for the 2013-14 tax year. A trial was held by telephone on September 10, 2014.
Plaintiff, an Oregon-licensed certified general appraiser with an MAI designation from the
Appraisal Institute, appeared and testified on his own behalf. Bryce Krehbiel (Krehbiel) and
Faith Bowlsby (Bowlsby) appeared and testified for Defendant. Bowlsby prepared Defendant’s
appraisal report. Plaintiff’s Exhibits 3, 6, and 7 were received without objection. Defendant’s
Exhibits A to G, J to Y, and AA were received without objection.
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The subject property is Plaintiff’s residence. The home is a 3,558 square foot, two-story
structure built in 2006, and has four bedrooms and three bathrooms.1 (Def’s Exs A at 1, B at 1,
4, C at 1, 3, 5.) The home has an oversized two-car garage, and sits on a 0.27 acre (11,761
square feet), irregularly shaped lot. (Ptf’s Ex 3 at 1; Def’s Exs C at 1, D at 1, E at 1.)
1
The evidence conflicts in some respects on the number of bedrooms, as discussed below, but the court
finds that the home has four bedrooms and three bathrooms.
FINAL DECISION TC-MD 140096C 1
Bowlsby testified that Defendant’s original records indicated that the home had a total of
3,420 square feet of finished living area, with three bedrooms and two and one-half bathrooms.
(See also Def’s Ex B at 1.) Bowlsby testified that she inspected the property on June 18, 2014,
in preparation for her testimony, and determined that there were errors in Defendant’s records
related to the size of the home, the number of bedrooms, certain features and amenities, and the
class of the home. Defendant determined that the home was slightly larger (3,558 square feet)
and the garage slightly smaller (660 square feet) than Defendant’s records had shown. (Def’s Ex
C at 1.) Defendant changed the home’s class from a six to a five-plus. (Compare Def’s Ex B at
1 with Def’s Ex C at 1.) Defendant appears to agree Plaintiff’s home has four bedrooms, not
three, although the county records Defendant submitted into evidence (the RLID records),
printed August 26, 2014 (two weeks before the trial), still show only three bedrooms and the
lesser, incorrect square footage of the home (3,420 square feet).2 (Def’s Ex B at 1.) However,
Bowlsby’s written narrative, which are notes from her physical inspection of the subject
property, indicate that the home does indeed have 3,558 square feet. (Def’s Ex C at 1.)
The subject property is a nice quality home. According to Bowlsby’s uncontroverted
testimony, which is supported by Defendant’s documentary evidence, the subject property is a
modern contemporary style home with composition lap siding that features some stucco on the
front exterior façade, a covered two-story column entry in the front of the home and a similar
matching column entry in the rear of the home, additional paving behind the garage, a small
2
On cross examination, Bowlsby asked Plaintiff a number of questions about the subject property,
including the size of the lot compared to Plaintiff’s comparables, and the size of the garage. Bowlsby never
questioned or challenged the bedroom count in Plaintiff’s appraisal or his trial testimony, both of which describe the
subject property as a four bedroom home. (Ptf’s Ex C at 1.) And, in its case-in-chief and closing argument,
Defendant focused on the subject property’s overall square footage, neighborhood characteristics, the age of the
subject property and Defendant’s comparable sales, the home’s classification (five-plus versus six), and the
proximity of the sale dates of Defendant’s comparable sales to the applicable assessment date. Defendant made very
little mention of the bedroom count.
FINAL DECISION TC-MD 140096C 2
utility shed, a tiled hip roof, vaulted ceilings, some tile floors in the kitchen and bathrooms,
granite counters in the kitchen, and a long, brick paver driveway. (Def’s Exs A at 2, C at 1.)
Bowlsby’s uncontroverted testimony was that the home also has a covered brick patio at the back
of the home with an outdoor grill and granite counter(s).
As for location of the home, the parties agree that the subject property is in a
neighborhood of class 5 and class 6 homes, identified by Defendant as an A-minus or A2
neighborhood, meaning that the area has primarily class 5 homes. (Def’s Ex C at 1.) Bowlsby
testified that the surrounding neighborhoods feature lesser-quality class 3 and 4 homes. (See
also Def’s Ex C at 1.)
Defendant set the RMV of the subject property at $571,333, with $119,556 allocated to
the land and $451,777 to the improvements. (Ptf’s Compl at 2.) Plaintiff appealed that value to
the local county board of property tax appeals (Board), and the Board reduced the RMV slightly
to $557,000. (Id.) The Board’s reduction of $14,333 was applied to the RMV of the
improvements; the land RMV was not changed. (Id.) The maximum assessed value (MAV) and
assessed value (AV) are $369,928; the Board’s RMV reduction did not lower those values
because of the state constitutional and statutory scheme for setting those values.3 (See id.)
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3
Under Oregon law, RMV represents the market value (i.e., likely selling price) of a property. ORS
308.205. MAV was established in 1997 as 90 percent of the property’s 1995 RMV on the rolls, with annual
increases thereafter of three percent. Or Const, Art XI, §11(1)(a) ) (providing that a property shall have a MAV for
the 1997-98 tax year “that does not exceed the property’s real market value for the tax year beginning July 1, 1995,
reduced by 10 percent.”); Or Const, Art XI, § 11(1)(b) (providing that “[f]or tax years beginning after July 1, 1997,
the property’s maximum assessed value shall not increase by more than three percent from the previous tax year”);
ORS 308.146(1) (providing that MAV is the greater of 103 percent of the property’s prior year AV, or 100 percent
of the property’s prior year MAV). Finally, AV is the lesser of the property’s RMV or MAV. ORS 308.146(2).
Thus, whereas RMV is tied to market conditions that can vary each year both in terms of direction (up or down) and
magnitude, MAV is a simple mathematical calculation based on an annual increase of three percent. And, AV is
simply the lesser of RMV or MAV. ORS 308.146(2).
FINAL DECISION TC-MD 140096C 3
Plaintiff appealed the Board’s order to this court, requesting a further reduction in the
RMV to $400,000. (Id. at 1.) Defendant filed an Answer requesting there be no change in the
RMV or AV. (Def’s Ans at 1.)
Plaintiff had three exhibits admitted at trial. The first is an excerpt from an appraisal
report for the subject property. (Ptf’s Ex 3.) That document includes five comparable sales, all
located within a few blocks of the subject property. (Id.) Three of the five sales (comparables 1
through 3) occurred within six months immediately prior to the January 1, 2013, assessment date
for the tax year at issue. (Id. at 1-2.) The other two sales (comparables sales 4 and 5) occurred
in July and August 2011. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff testified that all five sales are “highly comparable”
to the subject property (his personal residence) and noted that only minor adjustments were made
for differences in size, number of garage spaces (two versus three), room count, and age. No
location adjustment was made due to the physical proximity of the comparable sales to the
subject property. The three sales occurring in the last half of 2012 (comparable sales 1 through
3) sold for $405,000, $360,000, and $485,000, respectively. (Id. at 1.) The sale dates were
September 27, 2012, December 7, 2012, and July 24, 2012, respectively. (Ptf’s Exs 3 at 1; 6 at
1, 3; Def’s Ex T at 1.) Plaintiff’s adjusted sale prices for those properties are $392,500,
$388,000, and $421,350, respectively. (Ptf’s Ex 3 at 1.) Those adjusted sale prices translate to
per-square-foot prices (rounded to the nearest dollar) of $115, $139, and $102, respectively.
Defendant used Plaintiff’s comparable 1 in its valuation table. (Def’s Ex J at 1.) Defendant
applied a time trend to the to the $405,000 September 2012 sale price which increased the
“trended” sale price to $407,714, or $135 per square foot. (Id.)
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FINAL DECISION TC-MD 140096C 4
Plaintiff’s second exhibit is the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) information for four of
Plaintiff’s five comparable sales. (Ptf’s Ex 6.) For reasons not explained at trial, the sales
information for Plaintiff’s comparable sale 3 is not part of that exhibit.
Plaintiff’s third exhibit includes a table showing the fluctuation of “the average and
median sale price for all homes sold in Greater Lane County, Oregon.” (Ptf’s Ex 7.) That graph
shows a rise in both average and median sale prices from December 2003 to a peak on or about
June 2007, followed by a decline in prices until sometime between December 2011 in June 2012,
followed by a low rise in average prices through June 2013. (Id.) Plaintiff testified that the
graph shows that both average and median sale prices were fairly stable from 2011 to January
2013, and that prices then began to increase after January 1, 2013. The graph generally supports
that testimony.4 Plaintiff noted that his five comparable sales all occurred before January 1,
2013.
Twenty-four of Defendant’s exhibits were admitted into evidence, but for purposes of the
valuation issue presented by this appeal, the court will discuss only several of those exhibits
because many of Defendant’s exhibits are not pertinent to the valuation issue presented by this
appeal. Defendant’s Exhibit C contains a value estimate Bowlsby calculated by trending back to
January 1, 2013, the sum of (1) the value of the newly discovered improvements and amenities
she observed during her June 2014 inspection and (2) Defendant’s January 1, 2014, value for
Plaintiff’s property. (Def’s Ex C at 2.) Bowlsby’s value estimate under that approach is
$525,602. (Id.)
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4
Two points are worth noting. First, prices declined from June 2011 through June 2012, and then rose
slightly through approximately September 2012, followed by another lesser, decline in prices. (Ptf’s Ex 7.) Second,
average and median sale prices rose fairly sharply through approximately July or August 2013, and then began
declining at about the rate they had been rising for the first seven or eight months of that year. (Id.)
FINAL DECISION TC-MD 140096C 5
Defendant’s other exhibit directly relevant to the value of the subject property is
Bowlsby’s table of comparable sales. (Def’s Ex J.) Bowlsby used six comparable sales, all class
5-plus homes, similar in size to the subject property, and in the same neighborhood classification
as the subject property (neighborhoods comprised of class 5 and class 6 homes; primarily class 5
homes). (Id.) Three of the six sales occurred in 2012; one in June and two in September. (Id.)
The other three homes sold in March, May, and July 2013. (Id.) Defendant’s six comparable
sales were of homes built between 1998 and 2006. (Id.) The subject was built in 2006.
Bowlsby adjusted the sale prices for time (i.e., market conditions) and then converted those
adjusted sale prices to a price per square foot. (Id.) Bowlsby’s adjusted price per square foot
ranged from a low of $135 to a high of $167. (Id.) Bowlsby calculated the average price per
square foot to be $153 and concluded that the value of the subject property was $555,048 as of
January 1, 2013. (Id.) Bowlsby’s testimony was that the value of Plaintiff’s home was $156 per
square foot, which she used in arriving at her $555,048 value estimate. The estimated value
would be $544,374 using the $153 per square foot average value reported by Bowlsby in
Defendant’s Exhibit J.5
II. ANALYSIS
The issue before the court is the RMV of the subject property for the 2013-14 tax year.
ORS 308.205(1) defines RMV:6
“Real market value of all property, real and personal, means the amount in
cash that could reasonably be expected to be paid by an informed buyer to an
informed seller, each acting without compulsion in an arm’s-length transaction
occurring as of the assessment date for the tax year.”
5
The court arrived at that number by multiplying Bowlsby’s corrected square footage for the home (3,558
square feet) by her $153 per square foot average value derived from the six comparable sales Defendant included in
its comparable sales grid. (Def’s Ex J.)
6
The court’s references to the Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) are to 2011.
FINAL DECISION TC-MD 140096C 6
For the 2013-14 tax year, the assessment date was January 1, 2013. See ORS 308.007; ORS
308.210.
As the party seeking affirmative relief, Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the
subject property’s RMV on the tax roll is incorrect. See ORS 305.427. Plaintiff must establish
his claim “by a preponderance of the evidence, or the more convincing or greater weight of
evidence.” Schaefer v. Dept. of Rev., TC No 4530, WL 914208 at *2 (July 12, 2001) (citing
Feves v. Dept. of Revenue, 4 OTR 302 (1971)). “[I]f the evidence is inconclusive or
unpersuasive, the taxpayer will have failed to meet his burden of proof * * *.” Reed v. Dept. of
Rev., 310 Or 260, 265, 798 P2d 235 (1990). Taxpayers cannot sustain the burden of proof
merely through noting errors in a county’s position, but must instead “provide competent
evidence of the RMV of their property.” Poddar v. Dept of Rev., 18 OTR 324, 332 (2005)
(quoting Woods v. Dept. of Rev., 16 OTR 56, 59 (2002)). “Competent evidence includes
appraisal reports and sales adjusted for time, location, size, quality, and other distinguishing
differences, and testimony from licensed professionals such as appraisers, real estate agents, and
licensed brokers.” Danielson v. Multnomah County Assessor, TC-MD No 110300D at 7 (Mar
13, 2012).
There are three separate approaches to valuation – cost approach, sales comparison
approach, and income approach – that are to be considered in valuing a property. Allen v. Dept.
of Rev. (Allen), 17 OTR 248, 252 (2003); OAR 150-308.205-(A)(2)(a). Although each approach
must be reviewed, the court may determine that all three cannot be reasonably applied to the
subject property’s valuation. OAR 150-308.205-(A)(2)(a). Ultimately, the selection of the
appropriate valuation approach is a question of fact “to be determined by the court upon the
FINAL DECISION TC-MD 140096C 7
record.” Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Dept. of Rev. (Pacific Power), 286 Or 529, 533, 596 P2d
912 (1979).
This court has previously noted that value is a range rather than an absolute. Price v.
Dept. of Rev., 7 OTR 18, 25 (1977). Finally, “the court has jurisdiction to determine the real
market value or correct valuation on the basis of the evidence before the court, without regard to
the values pleaded by the parties.” ORS 305.412.
In this case both parties used the sales comparison approach. This court has previously
stated:
“Under the sales comparison approach, the value of a property is derived
by comparing the subject property with similar properties, called comparable
sales. That comparison is based on many factors, and adjustments are made for
any differences between the comparable sales and the subject property so that the
appraiser can derive a value for the subject property. * * *.”
Magno v. Dept. of Rev., 19 OTR 51, 58 (2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);
see also OAR 150-308.205-(A)(2)(c) (stating that “[i]n utilizing the sales comparison approach
only actual market transactions of property comparable to the subject, or adjusted to be
comparable, will be used”). Thus, “[t]he court looks for arm’s length sale transactions of
property similar in size, quality, age and location * * * in order to determine the real market
value” of a property. Richardson v. Clackamas County Assessor, TC-MD No 020869D, WL
21263620 at *3 (Mar 26, 2003).
Plaintiff valued the subject property at $400,000 using five comparable sales. (Ptf’s Ex
3.) All Plaintiff’s comparable sales were located within the same neighborhood as the subject
property, and all but his comparable sale 3 were built around the same time as the subject
property. Plaintiff made a negative $24,250 adjustment to comparable sale 3 because that
property was only approximately one year old, compared to seven years for the subject property.
FINAL DECISION TC-MD 140096C 8
(Id.) That adjustment appears to be five percent (assuming it is based on a sheer difference in
age).7 While five percent might seem low, Plaintiff submitted an exhibit showing that the market
declined between 2006, when the subject property was built, and January 1, 2013. (Ptf’s Ex 7 at
1.) Defendant did not challenge that evidence. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s negative $24,250 age
adjustment seems appropriate to the court.
On cross-examination by Krehbiel, Defendant raised two concerns with Plaintiff’s
appraisal. The first concern regarded the disparity between the size of Plaintiff’s lot compared to
the lots on which the five comparable sales are situated. Plaintiff’s home sits on an 11,761-
square-foot lot, whereas Plaintiff’s comparable sales sit on lots between 6,534 square feet
(comparable 2) and 9,147 square feet (comparable 4). (Ptf’s Ex 3 at 1-2.) Plaintiff, who is a
certified appraiser with an MAI designation from the Appraisal Institute, responded that, while
his lot is larger than the comparable sales, his lot is also an irregularly-shaped flag lot and that
much of the square footage is not really usable. A review of the aerial photographs submitted by
Defendant supports that testimony. (Def’s Ex E.) Plaintiff struck the court as knowledgeable
and sincere in his explanation, and the court found his reasoning persuasive.
Defendant’s second concern was over the adjustments that were and were not made to
Plaintiff’s comparable sales for differences in the size of the garages. Krehbiel and Bowlsby
noted that three of Plaintiff’s five comparable sales had negative adjustments of $7,500 for
differences in garages compared to the subject property. (Ptf’s Ex 3 at 1-2.) They noted that the
same dollar adjustment was made to all three comparables with larger garages, but that no
adjustments were made for the two comparable sales (2 and 3) that had smaller garages.
Moreover, the garage for comparable 5, Defendant noted, was only 47 square feet larger whereas
7
Plaintiff’s sale number three sold for $485,000. (Ptf’s Ex 3 of 1.)
FINAL DECISION TC-MD 140096C 9
the garages for comparables 1 and 4 were approximately 150 square feet larger – yet all received
the same negative $7,500 dollar adjustment. (Id.) Plaintiff responded by noting that the $7,500
adjustment to the three comparables was due to the fact that they had true three car garages that
would hold three cars whereas his home had an oversized two-car garage. Plaintiff’s appraisal
did indicate that the comparables received the $7,500 adjustment because they had “[s]uperior
three car garages.” (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff noted further that the percentage of the adjustment was
only one or two percent. The court found Plaintiff’s explanation for the adjustment reasonable
and persuasive.
Turning to Defendant’s valuation evidence, Defendant had two valuation approaches and
the court finds neither to be convincing or persuasive. Bowlsby’s first valuation estimate was
simply a process of adjusting the county’s 2014 preliminary value determination for Plaintiff’s
home by adding the newly discovered improvements and additional square footage and “back
valuing,” or trending (backwards) that value to January 1, 2013. The court finds such a
mechanical process to be without merit. Similar approaches have often been presented to the
court by inexperienced taxpayers, and the court has generally, if not universally, rejected those
simplistic methodologies because they are not tied to the market in a viable way.
Defendant’s second valuation approach, while tied to the market, is similarly
unpersuasive because of Bowlsby’s simplistic methodology. Bowlsby simply time trended six
comparable sales, derived a per-square-foot value range, and then extracted an “average” value
per square foot, which she then multiplied by the size of the subject property to arrive at a value
estimate for Plaintiff’s home. (Def’s Ex J.) Bowlsby testified to the similarities between her
comparable sales and the subject property, but made no adjustments for the differences between
those properties and the subject property, such as year built, dwelling size, lot size, date of sale,
FINAL DECISION TC-MD 140096C 10
etc., notwithstanding the fact that she challenged Plaintiff’s appraisal for failing to make similar
adjustments. Because of those deficiencies, the court places no weight on Defendant’s valuation
evidence or conclusions.
III. CONCLUSION
After carefully considering the evidence, the court finds that Plaintiff has established by a
preponderance of the evidence that the value of the subject property was $400,000 as of
January 1, 2013. Now, therefore,
IT IS THE DECISION OF THIS COURT that Plaintiff’s appeal is granted, and that the
real market value of the property identified as Account 1686938 was $400,000 on January 1,
2013.
Dated this day of October 2014.
DAN ROBINSON
MAGISTRATE
If you want to appeal this Final Decision, file a Complaint in the Regular
Division of the Oregon Tax Court, by mailing to: 1163 State Street, Salem, OR
97301-2563; or by hand delivery to: Fourth Floor, 1241 State Street, Salem, OR.
Your Complaint must be submitted within 60 days after the date of the Final
Decision or this Final Decision cannot be changed.
This document was signed by Magistrate Dan Robinson on October 31, 2014.
The court filed and entered this document on October 31, 2014.
FINAL DECISION TC-MD 140096C 11