Dept. of Rev. v. Rainsweet, Inc. (TC 5206) , 21 Or. Tax 494 ( 2014 )


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  • 494                                                           September 16, 2014              No. 62
    62
    21 OTR
    Dept.
    2014  of Rev. v. Rainsweet, Inc. (TC 5206)                                                             September 16, 2014
    IN THE OREGON TAX COURT
    REGULAR DIVISION
    DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
    Plaintiff,
    v.
    RAINSWEET, INC.,
    and RS Growers Inc.,
    Defendants.
    (TC 5206)
    Plaintiff Department of Revenue (the department) appealed a Magistrate
    Division decision where Defendants (taxpayer) had prevailed in their argument
    that the department had abused its discretion refusing to take jurisdiction of
    disputes as to certain property tax accounts. The parties agreed that the rele-
    vant administrative rule provided that the department would proceed to a merits
    hearing if all parties to the proceeding agreed to facts indicating a likely error
    on the rolls. In the department’s supervisory hearing, the relevant county did
    not agree with any facts asserted by taxpayer. On the basis that the parties to
    the proceeding did not agree on facts, the department did not proceed to a merits
    hearing. Taxpayer argued that the provisions of OAR 150-306.126(1)(6) required
    that the governmental unit responsible for the valuation of a portion of industrial
    property is responsible for defending that appraisal in “any appeals,” reasoning
    that a petition under ORS 306.115 was an “appeal” and concluding that because
    the case involved industrial property to be appraised under ORS 306.126, only
    the department should have been considered a party to the petition. Granting
    the department’s motion, the court ruled that the interpretation by the depart-
    ment of its own rule was that the county was a party to the petition and that the
    department did not abuse its discretion by interpreting its rule OAR 150-306.115
    as allowing it to consider the position of the county. Because that decision was not
    inconsistent with any statute or rule and was not clearly wrong, the department
    did not abuse its discretion by refusing to proceed to a merits hearing.
    Oral argument on cross-motions for summary judgment
    was held June 30, 2014, in the courtroom of the Oregon Tax
    Court, Salem.
    Douglas M. Adair, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
    Department of Justice, Salem, filed the motion and
    argued the cause for Plaintiff Department of Revenue (the
    department).
    David A. Hilgemann, Garrett Hemann Robertson PC,
    Salem, filed the cross-motion and argued the cause for
    Defendants (taxpayer).
    Decision for Plaintiff rendered September 16, 2014.
    Cite as 
    21 OTR 494
     (2014)                                                 495
    HENRY C. BREITHAUPT, Judge.
    I.   INTRODUCTION
    This matter is before the court on cross-motions
    for summary judgment. As the appeals relate to a decision
    by Plaintiff (the department) that it did not have jurisdic-
    tion over the matters under ORS 306.115, the record is that
    made in the supervisory hearing held by the department.
    In the Magistrate Division, Defendants (taxpayer)
    prevailed in their argument that the department had abused
    its discretion in concluding that it would not take jurisdic-
    tion of disputes as to certain accounts. From that decision
    the department appeals.
    II.   FACTS
    The tax year at issue is 2010-11.1 This appeal
    relates to only certain of the accounts as to which taxpayer
    sought relief under ORS 306.115. The accounts in question
    contained both land and improvements to land.2
    The improvements to land in the accounts were
    such that the department had the responsibility to appraise
    improvements to the land. ORS 306.126 (providing for
    department appraisal of industrial properties). However,
    pursuant to OAR 150-306.126(1)(2) Polk County (the county)
    had the responsibility to appraise the land.
    1
    Taxpayer originally sought review in the department for tax years 2008-
    09, 2009-10, and 2010-11. The Magistrate Division decision granted summary
    judgment to the department on all claims for the 2008-09 and 2009-10 tax years.
    Rainsweet Inc. & RS Growers Inc. v. Polk Co. Assessor, TC-MD No 130049N, 
    2013 WL 6283069
    , at *5-7 (Dec 3, 2013). Because the department appealed only the
    Magistrate Division’s denial of summary judgment on certain accounts for the
    2010-11 tax year, and taxpayer did not file a cross-appeal, only the 2010-11 tax
    year is at issue.
    2
    Eight accounts are not at issue in this case. Taxpayer originally sought
    review in the department for 11 accounts, five containing only land, four con-
    taining both land and improvements to land, one containing only personal prop-
    erty, and one containing only improvements to land. The Magistrate Division
    decision granted summary judgment to the department on eight of the accounts
    and denied summary judgment to the department on three accounts that con-
    tained both land and improvements to land. Rainsweet, 
    2013 WL 6283069
    , at
    *6-7. Because the department appealed only the Magistrate Division’s denial
    of summary judgment on the remaining accounts, and taxpayer did not file a
    cross-appeal, only three of the accounts containing both land and improvements
    remain at issue.
    496                    Dept. of Rev. v. Rainsweet, Inc. (TC 5206)
    At the supervisory hearing on this matter, the
    department considered the county to be a party to the pro-
    ceeding. The county stated that it did not agree with any
    facts asserted by taxpayer in its petition. Based on that posi-
    tion, the department declined to proceed to a merits hearing
    and denied the petition for relief.
    III. ISSUE
    The issue is whether the department abused its
    discretion in considering the county to be a party to the
    proceeding.
    IV.    ANALYSIS
    Taxpayer concedes that the issue is the decision of
    the department to consider the county to be a party to the
    proceeding. That decision was coupled with the provisions of
    OAR 150-306.115(4)(b)(A) that provide the department will
    proceed to a merits hearing if all parties to the proceeding
    agree to facts indicating a likely error on the rolls.3 In the
    supervisory hearing on this matter, the county did not agree
    with any facts asserted by taxpayer. On the basis that the
    parties to the proceeding did not agree on facts, the depart-
    ment did not proceed to a merits hearing.
    Taxpayer also concedes that the review by this
    court is to be for abuse of discretion in the actions of the
    department. Here the relevant action of the department
    is the interpretation and application of its rule, OAR 150-
    306.115(4)(b)(A) so as to include the county as a party to the
    petition.
    The legislature has placed few, if any, constraints
    on the department in connection with its power under ORS
    306.115 to correct the property tax roll when, in the discre-
    tion of the department, there is reason to do so.4 The depart-
    ment has promulgated rules requiring it to conduct merits
    hearings but only when stated conditions exist.
    3
    There are other bases in OAR 150-306.115(4) for the department to pro-
    ceed to a merits hearing. Taxpayer does not argue that any of those other bases
    apply in this case.
    4
    The court’s references to the Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) are to 2009.
    Cite as 
    21 OTR 494
     (2014)                                497
    The condition at issue here is the existence, or not,
    of agreement of parties to a petition as to facts indicating
    a likely error on the roll. The interpretation by the depart-
    ment of its own rule is that the relevant county is a party to
    the petition.
    In cases where an agency charged with adminis-
    tration and enforcement of a statute adopts interpretative
    regulation, courts give that interpretation “careful consid-
    eration.” Knapp v. City of North Bend, 
    304 Or 34
    , 41, 
    741 P2d 505
     (1987) (citing Van Ripper v. Liquor Cont. Com., 
    228 Or 581
    , 593, 
    365 P2d 109
     (1961)). In this case, even more
    deference is appropriate because the statute vests broad
    discretion in the agency. The court concludes that there is
    nothing unreasonable about the interpretation made by the
    department in this case. Quite to the contrary, it appears
    to the court that there are good reasons for the department
    to include the county as a party whose views or positions
    on facts should be considered in determining whether the
    department will continue to a merits hearing.
    As stated above, in this case industrial property is
    involved and appraisal responsibilities are divided between
    the department and the county. In each of the accounts
    at issue, land and improvements are components of the
    account. Accordingly, under the decision in Flavorland
    Foods v. Washington County Assessor, 
    334 Or 562
    , 54 P3d
    582 (2002), the aggregate values of land and improvements
    would be considered in applying the provisions of Measure
    50 in order to determine the assessed value of all property
    in the account.5
    Further, the county, after receipt of the appraisal
    conclusions of the department as to industrial improvements,
    administers the levy and collection of tax. ORS 306.126(2);
    ORS Chapter 311. Finally, if a successful challenge to the
    appraisal of the property in the account ensues, the county
    is the entity with the responsibility to make refunds. ORS
    311.806(1)(a) - (b).
    The department rules under ORS 306.115 provide
    that county officers and taxpayers are the ones who can
    5
    Or Const, Art XI, § 11(1)(a).
    498               Dept. of Rev. v. Rainsweet, Inc. (TC 5206)
    initiate a petition. OAR 150-306.115(1). In this case tax-
    payer initiated the petition, but the department solicited
    and received a response from the county as to its view of
    the factual matters involved in the case. It appears that
    if a county were to initiate a petition as to a property, the
    department would solicit, and take into account, the views
    of the taxpayer involved in the process of determining how
    to proceed.
    Taxpayer asserts, however, that the provisions
    of OAR 150-306.126(1)(6) require a different conclusion.
    That rule of the department provides that the governmen-
    tal unit responsible for the valuation of a portion of indus-
    trial property is responsible for defending that appraisal
    in “any appeals.” Taking that provision as its premise,
    taxpayer then reasons that a petition under ORS 306.115
    is an “appeal.” Taxpayer then concludes that because this
    case involves industrial property to be appraised under ORS
    306.126, only the department should be considered a party
    to the petition.
    Taxpayer’s position is not well taken. First, taxpayer
    overlooks the fact that in each of the accounts at issue, land
    valued by the county was at issue in the petition that was
    filed. Therefore, even if a petition is an “appeal,” the county
    would, under taxpayer’s view of OAR 150-306.126(1)(6),
    need to be involved because the county would have the duty
    to defend its valuation of land.
    Additionally, it has long been settled that a peti-
    tion under ORS 306.115 is not an appeal. Ohio State Life
    Ins. Co. v. Dept. of Rev., 
    12 OTR 423
     (1993). The process is
    not a remedy for a taxpayer or an assessor. Rather, it is one
    process, among several, designed to assist the department
    in its administration of the property tax laws. Indeed, it is
    that purpose that supports the conclusion that actions of
    the department pursuant to its role under ORS 306.115 are
    reviewed only for an abuse of discretion.
    The department did not abuse its discretion by
    interpreting its rule OAR 150-306.115 as allowing it to con-
    sider the position of the county in this matter. That decision
    was not inconsistent with any statute or rule and was not
    clearly wrong.
    Cite as 
    21 OTR 494
     (2014)                          499
    V. CONCLUSION
    The motion of the department is granted and the
    cross-motion of taxpayer is denied. Now, therefore,
    IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for
    Summary Judgment is granted;
    IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’
    Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is denied; and
    IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that costs shall be
    awarded to neither party.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: TC 5206

Citation Numbers: 21 Or. Tax 494

Judges: Breithaupt

Filed Date: 9/16/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/11/2024