St. Mary Star of the Sea II v. Dept. of Rev. , 22 Or. Tax 496 ( 2017 )

496 December 28, 2017 No. 44
IN THE OREGON TAX COURT
REGULAR DIVISION
ST. MARY STAR OF THE SEA
CATHOLIC CHURCH, ASTORIA,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
Defendant.
(TC 5248)
Following the conclusion of litigation of substantive claims in this matter,
Plaintiff (taxpayer) requested attorney fees. Taxpayer attempted to show that
the county acted arbitrarily and subjectively in denying taxpayer’s application
and declining to either investigate further or to request additional documenta-
tion from taxpayer. Defendant (the department) objected on two grounds: first, as
to whether fees were appropriate, and second, as to whether any award of fees to
taxpayer could exceed the actual amount charged by counsel for services to tax-
payer. While the court found there was no question that taxpayer’s claims in the
case were objectively reasonable—the court determined that taxpayer’s rectory
was completely subject to exemption—the court ultimately rejected the depart-
ment’s position as to reasonable necessity in this case, but did not consider the
department’s arguments or its use of authority to be objectively unreasonable.
The court found that the department had made a reasoned argument on the facts
in the case under the appropriate legal standard. However, taxpayer’s victory,
alone, was insufficient to support an award of fees. Upon evaluation of the eight
statutory factors for an award of attorney fees, the court found that an award of
attorney fees was not appropriate in this case.
Submitted on Plaintiff’s request for attorney fees and
Defendant’s response.
Mark K. Sellers, Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, PC,
Portland, filed the request for Plaintiff (taxpayer).
Daniel Paul, Assistant Attorney General, Department of
Justice, Salem, filed the response for Defendant Department
of Revenue (the department).
Decision rendered December 28, 2017.
HENRY C. BREITHAUPT, Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the court on the request for
attorney fees made by Plaintiff St. Mary Star of the Sea
Cite as 22 OTR 496 (2017) 497
Catholic Church, Astoria (taxpayer) regarding legal ser-
vices rendered in the Magistrate Division and the Regular
Division of this court. Defendant Department of Revenue
(the department) has filed objections to that request, to
which taxpayer has responded.
II. BACKGROUND
Taxpayer’s request for attorney fees relates to liti-
gation costs it incurred to appeal the denial by the Clatsop
County Assessor (the county) of taxpayer’s application for
exemption from property taxation for property used for reli-
gious purposes under ORS 307.140.1 The record shows the
following facts.2
The property at issue in the underlying case is a
rectory owned by taxpayer. Taxpayer previously owned
other rectories that were exempt from property tax, or
at least not challenged by the county in the prior years.
The previous rectory used by taxpayer was leased by tax-
payer. That lease contained an option to purchase the
rectory.
Instead of purchasing that rectory, which was
immediately adjacent to taxpayer’s church, taxpayer pur-
chased the rectory at issue in this case, which was 1.5 miles
away from the church. After purchasing the rectory, tax-
payer applied for exemption from property taxation.
The county denied taxpayer’s application. The
county did not request any additional information from tax-
payer before denying taxpayer’s application.
Taxpayer appealed the county’s denial to the
Magistrate Division of the court. After trial, the magistrate
determined that taxpayer’s rectory was not exempt from
property taxation. Taxpayer appealed that decision to the
Regular Division of the court.
1
Unless otherwise indicated, the court’s references to the Oregon Revised
Statutes (ORS) are to the 2013 edition.
2
Some evidence introduced or relied upon by taxpayer is discussed by the
court in the analysis portion of this order.
498 St. Mary Star of the Sea II v. Dept. of Rev.
On cross-motions for summary judgment and
largely stipulated facts,3 the court held that the rectory com-
pletely qualified for exemption as an “ ‘other additional build-
ing[ ] * * * used solely for administration, education, literary,
benevolent, charitable, entertainment and recreational pur-
poses’ by taxpayer.” See St. Mary Star of the Sea I v. Dept. of
Rev., 22 OTR 312, 317 (2016) (quoting ORS 307.140(1)).
Taxpayer then made its request for attorney fees
under ORS 305.490(4)(a). That statute provides:
“If, in any proceeding before the tax court judge involv-
ing ad valorem property taxation, exemptions, special
assessments or omitted property, the court finds in favor of
the taxpayer, the court may allow the taxpayer, in addition
to costs and disbursements, the following:
“(A) Reasonable attorney fees for the proceeding under
this subsection and for the prior proceeding in the matter,
if any, before the magistrate; and
“(B) Reasonable expenses as determined by the court.
Expenses include fees of experts incurred by the individual
taxpayer in preparing for and conducting the proceeding
before the tax court judge and the prior proceeding in the
matter, if any, before the magistrate.”
ORS 305.490(4)(a).
The department makes two objections. The first
objection is whether fees are appropriate. The second objec-
tion is whether any award of fees to taxpayer may exceed
the actual amount charged by counsel for services to tax-
payer.4 Because the court ultimately concludes that an
award of attorney fees is not appropriate in this case, it does
not address the amount of fees requested by taxpayer.
3
Taxpayer also supplemented the record with evidence regarding the use of
the rectory, and the county’s conduct leading up to the litigation in this case. This
court noted that the county’s conduct might be relevant to a request for attorney
fees, but it was not relevant to a request for exemption. St. Mary Star of the Sea I
v. Dept. of Rev., 22 OTR 312, 315 (2016).
4
Taxpayer’s counsel introduced evidence that taxpayer was charged a lower
rate for its services than it otherwise would have because of the religious and
nonprofit nature of taxpayer. However, taxpayer’s counsel requested attorney
fees commensurate with the market rate for such services.
Cite as 22 OTR 496 (2017) 499
III. ANALYSIS
In evaluating a request for attorney fees, this court
first considers the factors contained in ORS 20.075(1) in
determining whether to award attorney fees. Preble v. Dept.
of Rev., 331 Or 599, 602, 19 P3d 335 (2001). There are eight
factors; each one will be addressed in turn.
A. Factor A
The first factor the court considers is “[t]he conduct
of the parties in the transactions or occurrences that gave
rise to the litigation, including any conduct of a party that
was reckless, willful, malicious, in bad faith or illegal.” ORS
20.075(1)(a). This factor addresses the pre-litigation conduct
of the parties.5 See Ellison v. Dept. of Rev., 362 Or 148, 170,
404 P3d 933 (2017). Additional evidence relevant to this fac-
tor is discussed below before being analyzed by the court.
1. Additional evidence
Taxpayer applied for exemption from property tax
for the rectory using the department’s Application for Real
and Personal Property Tax Exemption form. That form
required current copies of taxpayer’s articles of incorpora-
tion, by-laws, and proof of nonprofit status to be sent to the
county. The department’s form contains blank spaces in
which a taxpayer is directed to explain the “purpose” of the
organization and the “use” of the property.
Taxpayer filled out the form and submitted the rel-
evant documentation to the county. Taxpayer described the
purpose of the organization as “Religious,” and the use of
the property as “Parish Rectory.” No additional documenta-
tion or explanation was included with taxpayer’s application,
nor was any required on the face of the department’s form.
Therefore, this court finds that in this respect the form was
5
In taxpayer’s argument under this factor, it stated, “Let us be clear: Clatsop
County is the party that is responsible for any award of attorney fees and costs in
this case.” This statement is ambiguous. If taxpayer intended to say that it is appro-
priate to look at the county’s conduct in denying taxpayer’s application to determine
whether fees may be appropriate, taxpayer is correct. If, however, taxpayer intended
to say that the county is financially obligated to pay any award of fees in this case,
taxpayer is not correct. ORS 305.490(4)(b) provides that the payment of attorney fees
shall be made by the department.
500 St. Mary Star of the Sea II v. Dept. of Rev.
completely filled out, although perhaps not as detailed as it
could have been.
As previously stated, the county denied taxpayer’s
application for property tax exemption for the rectory (tax-
payer’s application). In evaluating taxpayer’s application,
the county assessor did not request additional informa-
tion. Taxpayer introduced evidence to show that the county
would have denied taxpayer’s application regardless of any
additional information it might have obtained from tax-
payer. This is purportedly because the county viewed the
rectory as a residence and questioned whether a rectory not
adjacent to taxpayer’s church is reasonably related to the
religious purposes of the church.
The county communicated its denial of exemption
to taxpayer by letter (the denial letter). As the contempora-
neous record of the reasons for denial of taxpayer’s applica-
tion, the court finds particularly relevant and discusses the
language of the letter at length.
The letter acknowledged the stated purpose of tax-
payer’s rectory as a “Parish Rectory.” The letter also com-
pared the current rectory with taxpayer’s previous rectory,
which was closer to the church grounds.
The letter then quoted or discussed ORS 307.130,
ORS 307.140, and case law interpreting ORS 307.130 and
ORS 307.140 as it applies to residences. Of particular inter-
est is the discussion in the denial letter of Roman Catholic
Archdiocese v. Dept. of Rev., 13 OTR 211, 213 (1995). That
discussion is reproduced below:
“In [Roman Catholic Archdiocese] the Plaintiff’s Director
of Clergy Services testified concerning the purpose and use
of Roman Catholic Church rectories. He stated that the
Archdiocese’s goal is to have a rectory on the grounds of
each church where possible. The archdiocese requires the
continuous presence of a priest near the church so he may
be available at all times to attend to the need of the parish.
The rectory is one facility used by the priest to meet the
needs of the parish.
“The [prior rectory], formerly leased by St. Mary, Star
of the Sea Catholic Church, met the stated goal (of prox-
imity) as it was immediately adjacent to the church. The
Cite as 22 OTR 496 (2017) 501
[new rectory], being approximately 1.5 miles away from the
church, does not appear to meet the stated goal (of proxim-
ity) and raises the question as to whether it meets the test
of reasonable necessity for the accomplishment of religious
objectives of the church.
“Going further, were the [new rectory] to meet the test
of reasonable necessity for the accomplishment of religious
objectives of the church, it would need to meet the test of
whether the actual use of the property is consistent with ful-
filling the religious purposes of the church. There is no docu-
mentation accompanying the Application for Real Property
Exemption that would identify the actual use of the prop-
erty as being consistent with fulfilling the religious pur-
poses of the church.”
(Emphases added.)
The letter indicates that the county denied taxpay-
er’s application for two reasons. The first reason is that the
distance of the rectory from the church did not appear to
meet the goal stated in a prior case of having a rectory “on
the grounds” of the church. The second reason is that, even
if the distance from the church reasonably met that goal,
there was no information provided with which the county
could determine whether the rectory was actually being
used for religious purposes.
Notably, taxpayer was informed to appeal the coun-
ty’s denial if taxpayer disagreed with the determination.
Notwithstanding the finality of that language, the
county’s Tax Court Rule (TCR) 39 C(6) deposition witness,
John Solheim, stated that taxpayer “could come into [the
county’s] office” to “discuss the denial.” However, the avail-
ability of such informal review was not communicated to
taxpayer in the denial letter or otherwise.
2. Analysis
The events giving rise to this litigation are interest-
ing. Depending on how broad the appropriate field of vision
is, the department, the county, and taxpayer could each be
viewed as at least partially responsible for the need for liti-
gation in this case.
The department’s form, which was provided for use
by taxpayers and counties, does not indicate that a taxpayer
502 St. Mary Star of the Sea II v. Dept. of Rev.
requesting exemption should attach, in addition to the other
items specifically requested, any additional documentation
that taxpayer might consider necessary for the county to
evaluate the application for exemption. Such language could
have avoided litigation in this case and could avoid similar
situations in the future twofold.
First, such language would put a taxpayer on notice
to attach additional documentation if a taxpayer deemed
such documentation to be necessary or helpful. Second,
the county arguably may be required to request additional
documentation if it determined that the lack of certain
additional information rendered a taxpayer’s application
incomplete. See OAR 150-307-0190(4) (Providing that, “The
assessor shall return any application that is incomplete to
the applicant for completion.”).
However, regardless of whether taxpayer was spe-
cifically instructed to attach additional documentation, the
fact is that taxpayer chose not to include any such detail.
Furthermore, taxpayer merely indicated that the use of the
property was as a “Parish Rectory.” Under the relevant case
law, and even this court’s decision in this case, not all par-
ish rectories are exempt from taxation.6 Therefore, one could
reasonably expect a taxpayer to have included some amount
of additional information to assist the county in its review of
taxpayer’s application.
Taxpayer argues the county was required to request
further information from taxpayer before denying taxpayer’s
application. The authority for that assertion is OAR 150-307-
0190(4) (previously OAR 150-307-162(1)(4)). OAR 150-307-
0190(4) provides: “The assessor shall return any application
that is incomplete to the applicant for completion.”
6
Taxpayer argues that the county denied taxpayer’s application for
exemption in large part because some dictionaries define a rectory as a res-
idence, which the county considered not subject to exemption. However, not-
withstanding the fact that the rectory in this case was actually determined
to be exempt, there is no specific statutory exemption for religious residences.
As seen in the analysis under the next factor, some religious residences are
exempt from taxation and some are not. It is not improper for the county to sub-
ject religious residences, including rectories, to more scrutiny than the county
would otherwise treat applications for exemption of other types of religious
property.
Cite as 22 OTR 496 (2017) 503
However, taxpayer’s application in this case was
complete. All the requested fields and documents were com-
pleted or attached. OAR 150-307-0190(4) does not require
the county to request clarification or further detail on use
before denial, and therefore the county’s failure to request
additional information cannot be said to be improper.7 Put
another way, the fact that an application fails on its face to
adequately support the claimed exemption does not mean
that the application was incomplete.
However, the county also contributed to the need for
litigation in this matter. Neither the county’s denial letter
nor any other communication from the county to taxpayer in
this case informed taxpayer that it could discuss the denial
with the county before filing a complaint in this court, even
though such an informal discussion was permissible. Failure
to inform taxpayer of the alternatives to litigation was likely
a contributing factor to the need for litigation in this case.
Having made the observations above, it is now
appropriate to discuss taxpayer’s argument under this fac-
tor. Taxpayer argues at length in an attempt to show that
the county acted arbitrarily and subjectively in denying
taxpayer’s application and declining to either investigate
further (such as reviewing canon law) or to request addi-
tional documentation from taxpayer. The primary piece of
evidence relied upon by taxpayer for this argument is the
deposition transcript of John Solheim, which transcript was
attached in full to taxpayer’s motion for summary judgment
in this case.
After reviewing the entirety of the deposition tran-
script, the court is not convinced that the county acted arbi-
trarily in denying taxpayer’s application for exemption for
the rectory. Moreover, to the extent that Solheim’s deposi-
tion testimony raises questions as to the county’s practices
7
It appears that the county could have requested information to provide
clarification. OAR 150-307-0190(5) contemplates such a request: “If the assessor
returns an application for completion or clarification, the applicant must return
the application to the assessor within 15 days of the date it was mailed to the
applicant or by the filing deadline, whichever is later, for the assessor to accept
the application as a timely filing.” (Emphasis added.) However, nothing in the
administrative rules cited by taxpayer requires the county to request clarifying or
additional information from a taxpayer if the application is otherwise complete.
504 St. Mary Star of the Sea II v. Dept. of Rev.
regarding the review of applications for exemption, the
denial letter in this case is evidence tending to show that
the county seriously considered taxpayer’s application
before denying it. However, for purposes of this order, it does
not matter. Even if this court accepted taxpayer’s reading
of the transcript—and found that this factor supported an
award of attorney fees—this court would still deny taxpay-
er’s request on the basis of the other factors as applied to
this case.8
B. Factor B
The second factor the court considers is “[t]he objec-
tive reasonableness of the claims and defenses asserted by
the parties.” ORS 20.075(1)(b).
There is no question in this case that taxpayer’s
claims were objectively reasonable—this court determined
that taxpayer’s rectory was completely subject to exemption.
However, that does not mean that the department’s argu-
ments to the contrary were objectively unreasonable.
With respect to the defenses raised in this case,
taxpayer argues:
“The County’s testimony was that its sole basis for
denial of the exemption was its reference to a dictionary
definition of the term ‘rectory;’ the County admitted that
it disregarded the statutory criteria of ORS 307.140 and
controlling case authority entirely. Accordingly, the record
speaks for itself on this statutory element.”
Taxpayer’s argument under this factor is misplaced.
Taxpayer confuses the analysis under factor A, which con-
cerns the pre-litigation conduct of each party, with the
analysis under factor B, which concerns the conduct of each
party during litigation.
The department’s argument in the Regular Division
was that the rectory was not exempt because taxpayer’s
8
That is not to say that the pre-litigation conduct of a party is irrelevant or is
weighed less than the other attorney fees factors. If the pre-litigation conduct of a
party is exceptionally egregious, that fact alone could support an award of attor-
ney fees notwithstanding whether other attorney fees factors weighed against
an award of attorney fees. However, even if this court found that the county’s
conduct in this case was wrongful, that conduct is not so wrongful as to ipso facto
require an award of attorney fees.
Cite as 22 OTR 496 (2017) 505
priest was not required to live in the rectory by religious
doctrine or practical necessity, and residence in the rec-
tory was not reasonably related to the religious purposes
of taxpayer. The department gleaned these requirements
from ORS 307.140, as interpreted by German Apost. Christ.
Church v. Dept of Rev., 279 Or 637, 569 P2d 596 (1977), and
Washington Co. Assessor II v. Jehovah’s Witnesses [hereinaf-
ter Jehovah’s Witnesses], 18 OTR 409 (2006).
Specifically, the department argued that the priest
was not required to live in the property by church doctrine,
and that in any event the proximity of the rectory to the
church was not necessary to further religious objectives.
Both arguments focused at least in part on the fact that the
rectory is 1.5 miles away from the church.
First, as to church doctrine, the department argued
that church doctrine required the priest to live near the
church. The department appears to have interpreted that
requirement as limiting the rectory to being placed on or
adjacent to church grounds. Because the rectory in this case
was 1.5 miles away, the department argued that church doc-
trine did not support the priest living in the specific rectory
in this case.9
Although the court considers the department’s
argument as to where the priest is permitted to reside under
church doctrine to be too narrow, the court does not find
such argument to be objectively unreasonable. The depart-
ment cited the appropriate tenets of church doctrine and
case law, and made a reasoned argument on the facts of this
case.
Second, as to reasonable necessity, the department
argued that the fact of taxpayer’s priest living in a residence
1.5 miles away from the church was not reasonably related
to the church’s religious purposes. The department argued
that the priest could prepare sermons and hold meetings at
the offices in the church, and that the priest did not use the
rectory often enough for meetings or religious purposes to
9
The department similarly argued that the 1.5 mile distance from the
church precluded a finding that the priest in this case was required to live in the
rectory by practical necessity.
506 St. Mary Star of the Sea II v. Dept. of Rev.
demonstrate its necessity. The department argued that the
primary use of taxpayer’s rectory was a residence for the
priest, which use is not exempt under the governing law.
In support of these arguments, the department
relied on cases from this court and the Supreme Court apply-
ing the exemption statutes to religious property including
rectories, some of which held that the property was exempt
from taxation and some of which held that the property was
not exempt from taxation. See, e.g., German Apost. Christ.
Church, 279 Or 637 (residence not exempt except for office);
House of Good Shepherd v. Dept. of Rev., 300 Or 340, 710 P2d
778 (1985) (residence exempt); Golden Writ of God v. Dept.
of Rev., 300 Or 479, 713 P2d 605 (1986) (property including
residence not exempt); Washington County v. Dept. of Rev.,
11 OTR 251 (1989) (residence not exempt except for study
room); Roman Catholic Archdiocese v. Dept. of Rev., 13 OTR
211 (1995) (residence exempt); Jehovah’s Witnesses, 18 OTR
409 (residence not exempt).
This court ultimately rejected the department’s
position as to reasonable necessity in this case. However,
the court does not consider the department’s arguments or
its use of authority to be objectively unreasonable. Again,
the department made a reasoned argument on the facts in
this case under the appropriate legal standard.
With respect to the county’s arguments in the
Magistrate Division, it is notable that the magistrate denied
exemption, relying on many of the same cases relied upon by
the department in the Regular Division.
It appears that taxpayer’s argument under this fac-
tor is that because the court ultimately determined that the
rectory was exempt from property tax, this factor supports
an award of attorney fees. That proposition was rejected by
the Supreme Court in Clackamas Cty. Assessor v. Village at
Main Street, 352 Or 144, 152-56, 282 P3d 814 (2012). A tax-
payer’s victory, alone, is insufficient to support an award of
fees.
This court concludes that the defenses tendered in
the Magistrate Division and the Regular Division of the
Cite as 22 OTR 496 (2017) 507
court were objectively reasonable, and therefore this factor
weighs against an award of attorney fees.
C. Factor C
The third factor the court considers is “[t]he extent
to which an award of an attorney fee in the case would deter
others from asserting good faith claims or defenses in simi-
lar cases.” ORS 20.075(1)(c).
This factor weighs against an award of attorney
fees in this case. It is important to consider the court’s hold-
ing. The court did not hold that all rectories are exempt.
Rather, the court applied the statutory test for exemption of
residences as found in German Apost. Christ. Church, 279 Or
637, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, 18 OTR 409, and determined
that taxpayer’s rectory is exempt from taxation. Each case
ultimately turns on its facts, and the court distinguished
this case from other similar cases in which exemption was
denied. See, e.g., Washington County, 11 OTR 251; Jehovah’s
Witnesses, 18 OTR 409.
The court considers the defenses asserted by the
department and the county to have been made in good faith,
and an award of attorney fees in this case would deter tax-
ing authorities in the future from asserting that exemptions
should be denied. Further, and although it is not dispositive,
it is relevant to the good faith nature of the department’s
and the county’s defenses that taxpayer failed to initially
prove its claim for exemption in the Magistrate Division.
D. Factor D
The fourth factor the court considers is “[t]he extent
to which an award of an attorney fee in the case would deter
others from asserting meritless claims and defenses.” ORS
20.075(1)(d).
The court does not consider the department’s
defense in the Regular Division against taxpayer’s claim of
exemption to be meritless. Furthermore, taxpayer failed to
prove its claim of exemption in the Magistrate Division, so
such defense as was tendered cannot lightly be character-
ized as meritless. This factor does not apply.
508 St. Mary Star of the Sea II v. Dept. of Rev.
E. Factor E
The fifth factor the court considers is “[t]he objec-
tive reasonableness of the parties and the diligence of the
parties and their attorneys during the proceedings.” ORS
20.075(1)(e).
There is no evidence that the parties were unrea-
sonable in their litigation of this case. The department
agreed to scheduling changes, and stipulated to a number of
facts that avoided a trial in this matter. This factor weighs
against an award of attorney fees.
F. Factor F
The sixth factor the court considers is “[t]he objec-
tive reasonableness of the parties and the diligence of the
parties in pursuing settlement of the dispute.” ORS 20.075
(1)(f).
This factor does not support an award of attorney
fees. In taxpayer’s initial request for attorney fees, it stated
that the department did not engage in meaningful settle-
ment negotiations in the Regular Division.10 The depart-
ment responded that it had offered 10 percent exemption on
the subject property as a potential settlement figure. That
offer was not accepted, and taxpayer’s counsel declared that
he did not believe that 10 percent was a reasonable settle-
ment offer.
Interestingly, the department purportedly proposed
the 10 percent exemption figure because that was the approx-
imate size of the home office in the rectory, which offer was
based on the result in German Apost. Christ. Church, 279
Or at 639 (holding rectory office exempt). However, there is
no evidence that the department informed taxpayer of the
basis for its settlement offer. On the other hand, there is no
evidence that taxpayer inquired as to the basis of the settle-
ment offer.
The parties’ difficulties in arranging settlement
may demonstrate a failure to communicate, but it does not
10
Neither party introduced evidence of any settlement discussions or lack
thereof in the Magistrate Division.
Cite as 22 OTR 496 (2017) 509
demonstrate a lack of reasonableness on either side. Nor
does it demonstrate a lack of diligence. This factor does not
support an award of attorney fees.
G. Factor G
The seventh factor the court considers is “[t]he
amount that the court has awarded as a prevailing party
fee under ORS 20.190.” ORS 20.075(1)(g). This court is not
one of the courts listed in ORS 20.190 as being authorized
or directed to issue a prevailing party fee. Accordingly, this
factor does not apply to this court.
H. Factor H
The eighth and final factor the court considers is
“[s]uch other factors as the court may consider appropriate
under the circumstances of the case.” ORS 20.075(1)(h).
The department has introduced evidence tending to
show that assessors within Oregon were split on whether
exemption should have been initially granted in this case.
After taxpayer filed its complaint in the Magistrate Division,
the county informed the department by email that the
county believed this case to be a matter of statewide impor-
tance that would give guidance to assessors in the future,
and requested either support in the litigation of the case or
for the department to take over the entirety of the defense.
In that email, the county stated that a “rough poll” showed
50 percent of assessors believed exemption was appropriate
and 50 percent believed exemption was not appropriate.
Given that the department’s and the county’s argu-
ments before the court were reasonable, even if incorrect,
the court considers the desire to obtain clarity on the issue of
exemption for rectories to be an understandable and accept-
able motivation to litigate this case fully and to conclusion.
This factor weighs against an award of attorney fees.
IV. CONCLUSION
Factors B, C, E, and H weigh against an award of
attorney fees, and factor F does not support an award of
attorney fees. Factors D and G do not apply. Assuming that
the court found that fees were supported by factor A, the
510 St. Mary Star of the Sea II v. Dept. of Rev.
court concludes in its discretion that an award of attorney
fees is not appropriate in this case. The record shows that
the issues in this litigation were reasonably raised and lit-
igated. Because the court has determined that an award of
attorney fees is not appropriate, there is no need to analyze
whether the amount of fees requested by taxpayer is appro-
priate. Now, therefore,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Request for
Attorney Fees is denied.