Kaur v. Clackamas County Assessor ( 2019 )

IN THE OREGON TAX COURT
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
Property Tax
AMARJIT KAUR, )
)
Plaintiff, ) TC-MD 180242G
)
v. )
)
CLACKAMAS COUNTY ASSESSOR, )
)
Defendant. ) FINAL DECISION1
This case is ready for decision after trial. Plaintiff (taxpayer) appealed Defendant’s (the
county’s) removal of Western Oregon forestland designation from the subject for tax year 2018–
19.2,3 Although taxpayer’s use of the land in prior years had not been consistent with its
forestland designation, the evidence showed that at the time relevant to this appeal she intended
to replant trees during the next planting season. Because the subject was being held for the
predominant purpose of growing and harvesting marketable trees, taxpayer’s appeal is granted.
Taxpayer was represented at trial by Dale Hult, and the county was represented at trial by
Todd Cooper, Appraisal Supervisor. Three witnesses testified: taxpayer; Kashmir Dhadwal,
taxpayer’s husband; and Anthony Hunter, Senior Appraiser for the county. Taxpayer’s exhibits
1 and 2 were admitted without objection. Taxpayer’s exhibit 3 was admitted as to the preprinted
form, but not as to the information filled out on the form. Taxpayer’s exhibit 4 was admitted as
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Sections I and II of this Final Decision are identical to those sections in the court’s Decision, entered
1
December 10, 2018. Section III addresses taxpayer’s subsequently filed cost request and the county’s objection.
2
The subject is property identified as Account 01684243.
3
The court denied taxpayer’s motion to amend her complaint at trial by adding an appeal of the county’s
denial of the application for forestland designation she made subsequent to the county’s disqualification notice.
That claim is now moot.
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to the photograph of the cone-bearing tree on one side of the sheet of paper. The county’s
exhibits A to G were admitted without objection.
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The subject is an approximately nine-acre parcel of undeveloped land adjacent to the
highway in Brightwood. Several years before 2015, the subject’s former owner commercially
harvested the timber and replanted with seedlings. The subject remained designated as Western
Oregon forestland and was specially assessed accordingly.
In 2015, taxpayer had the subject’s trees cleared in a noncommercial logging operation to
prepare the site for development as an RV park. The parties agreed that some mature trees were
not cleared, but offered conflicting testimony as to how many were left. Mr. Dhadwal testified
that either “4 or 5” or “3 or 4” acres remained forested. Mr. Hunter testified that “an acre,” “an
acre and a half,” or “less than two acres” remained forested. Photographs submitted by the
county, dated February 2017 and January 2018, showed a cleared expanse of ground with a line
of trees in the background. (Ex G at 2–3.) An undated photograph submitted by taxpayer
showed a clearing with a single cone-bearing tree in the foreground and additional trees in the
background. (Ex 4.)
At the time the trees were cleared, the county sent notice that it had removed the subject’s
forestland designation for the 2016–17 tax year, and taxpayer appealed. In Kaur v. Clackamas
County Assessor, TC–MD 160294N, WL 3895756 (Or Tax M Div, Sept 6, 2017) (Kaur I), the
court held that the county’s disqualification notice was defective and reinstated the subject into
special assessment.
Meanwhile, taxpayer’s land use application was denied, and her plans to develop the
subject did not reach fruition. Taxpayer did not replant the subject during the pendency of
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Kaur I; Mr. Dhadwal testified that he and taxpayer refrained from planting because at that time
there was still some possibility that development as an RV park would be allowed.
On September 13, 2017, one week after the court issued its final decision in Kaur I, Mr.
Hult sent the following email to an appraisal manager for the county: “We received the courts
order, what happens now, can they get a refund? Can they replant their land?” (Ex F at 5
(original punctuation, emphasis added).) The county’s manager responded as follows on the
same day:
“We processed the correction to the roll this week when we received the
final judgment. A refund will be forthcoming. Additionally, they will have forest
deferral for the 2017/18 tax year since the decision was not issued until after
August 15th.
“Trees will have to be planted and meet stocking requirements by January
1, 2018 in order for the property owner to keep their deferral. * * *.”
(Id.) (Emphasis added.)
On January 4, 2018, Mr. Hunter visited the subject and took the photographs showing
treeless land. On February 26, 2018, the county issued its “Notice of Declassification of Special
Assessment 2018–2019—Deferred Tax Due.” (Ex A at 1.) The first sentence of that notice was
as follows: “As required by Oregon Revised Statute 321.367, 8.08 acres of Designated
Forestland on the above referenced property has been removed from special assessment for not
meeting minimum stocking requirements effective January 1, 2018.” (Id.) The notice stated that
additional tax would appear on the subject’s 2018–19 property tax statement. (Id.)
Mr. Dhadwal testified that upon receiving the county’s notice he immediately purchased
seedlings that were planted on the subject in March. Mr. Dhadwal—who owns a tree nursery
and cooperated with his wife in managing the subject—testified that the January 1 deadline given
by the county in September was unreasonable. He testified that the best time for planting trees is
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March or April, when the ground has thawed, rain is still plentiful, nursery inventory is high, and
the next winter freeze is far off. He testified that planting trees in early fall was possible, but not
optimal, and that planting trees was not possible once temperatures at the subject fall below
freezing in late fall.
A forester from the State Forester’s office inspected the subject and wrote the following
report, dated May 22, 2018:
“This inspection was done at the request of the Clackamas County
Assessor’s office for Forest Deferral eligibility. This parcel is 26E26AA 00103
on Hwy 26 that was masticated a couple years ago and then replanted sometime
this past spring. I took 10 plots on the 9 acre unit yesterday. I came up with 360
living trees per acre and 80 dead trees per acre. They were planted on about a 10
foot spacing. This will have to be monitored and checked again this coming
winter because about two thirds of the 360 living trees have mostly brown needles
of existing foliage but the buds are healthy and leafing out. Technically those
trees are alive but may not survive through a dry summer. There is also a lot of
competition from thistles, blackberries, bracken fern and other herbaceous plants.
I recommend control of competing vegetation this coming fall. I can refer you to
a forestry consultant to assist you with achieving at least 200 free to grow trees
per acre to qualify for Forest Deferral.”
(Ex 2.) That forester had previously sent emails to the county indicating the subject did not
qualify for forestland special assessment because it did not meet minimum stocking
requirements. (Exs C, D.) The forester’s emails were dated October 2016 and March 2017.
(Id.)
Taxpayer asks the court to order the subject to remain in forestland special assessment for
tax year 2018–19. The county asks the court to uphold its removal of forestland designation.
II. ANALYSIS
The issue in this case is whether the subject qualified for Western Oregon forestland
special assessment at the relevant time.
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FINAL DECISION TC-MD 180242G 4 of 12
Property meeting statutory definitions of forestland qualifies for special assessment under
the tax laws of Oregon, with separate statutes applying to forestland east and west of the Cascade
Range. See ORS 321.257 to 321.390 (western Oregon); 321.805 to 321.855 (eastern Oregon);
Angel v. Dept. of Rev., 21 OTR 444, 447 (2014).4 Once land receives forestland designation, it
remains in special assessment until the assessor removes the designation as authorized by statute.
ORS 321.359(1)(a).
Assessors are authorized to remove forestland designation by two statutes relevant here.
First, ORS 321.359(1) requires assessors to remove a forestland designation if any of four listed
events occur. The only one of those events pertinent here is the following: “Discovery by the
assessor that the land is no longer forestland[.]” ORS 321.359(1)(b)(C). Second, ORS
321.367(4) requires assessors to cease treating land as forestland “upon receipt of * * * notice
from the State Forester” that the land is not being properly managed.
Here, the county’s notice explicitly relied on the second statute: “As required by Oregon
Revised Statute 321.367, 8.08 acres of Designated Forestland on the above referenced property
has been removed from special assessment for not meeting minimum stocking requirements
effective January 1, 2018.” The court’s analysis therefore begins with ORS 321.367.
A. ORS 321.367
ORS 321.367 establishes a process by which the State Forester evaluates the management
of designated forestlands that are inadequately stocked with trees. The State Forester is required
to “identify all of the forestlands that fail to meet the minimum stocking” and are therefore
underproductive. ORS 321.367(1). Where the State Forester has reason to believe forestland is
not being properly managed, “the State Forester shall review the owner’s management plan, if
4
The court’s references to the Oregon Revised Statutes are to 2017,
FINAL DECISION TC-MD 180242G 5 of 12
any, and inspect the property.” ORS 321.367(2). If the State Forester determines a proper
management plan is not being followed, the State Forester shall advise the owner that a plan
“must be developed and activated within one year after the date of the advisement.” ORS
321.367(3)(a). After the deadline set in the advisement, the State Forester shall again view the
land to determine whether it is being properly managed. ORS 321.367(3)(c). If not, then the
State Forester shall give notice to the owner and the assessor that the land is not being managed
as forestland. Id. Only then does the assessor remove the property’s forestland designation.
ORS 321.367(4).
Thus, failure to meet minimum stocking requirements is not by itself an adequate reason
for disqualifying land from forestland special assessment under ORS 321.367. Lands failing to
meet minimum stocking requirements may still be “forestlands.” ORS 321.367(1). Such lands
are tracked by the State Forester, who conducts a process of inspection, advisement, and
reinspection that allows owners at least a year to develop and activate forestland management
plans before a determination about their management practices is made and county assessors are
notified.
In this case, it is doubtful whether the emails sent by the State Forester to the assessor in
October 2016 and March 2017 were notices requiring disqualification under ORS 321.367(4).
Neither email stated a conclusion about whether the subject was being managed in accordance
with a qualifying plan. Cf. ORS 321.367(3). Neither email stated whether the forester had
inspected the subject or whether a one-year advisement period had been given in which to
implement a new management plan. Given the emails’ absence of reference to ORS 321.367
processes, they do not appear to be notices under ORS 321.367. Instead, they appear to be
advice to aid the county in discovering for itself that the subject was no longer forestland. Under
FINAL DECISION TC-MD 180242G 6 of 12
ORS 321.359(1)(b)(C), discussed below, upon making such a discovery the county might have
disqualified the subject without the one-year advisement period required before the State
Forester could give the notice required for disqualification under ORS 321.367(4).
Whatever the State Forester’s intent in sending the emails, it is clear is that the county did
not disqualify the subject for the 2018–19 tax year because of those emails. ORS 321.367(4)
requires assessors to cease treating land as forestland “upon receipt” of the State Forester’s
notice. Here, approximately six months after the later of the two emails was sent, the county
informed taxpayer that the subject could remain in special assessment if trees were planted by
January 1, 2018.5 By making the subject’s disqualification contingent on planting trees, the
county showed that its disqualification was not based on prior notice from the State Forester.
The evidence shows instead that the county disqualified the subject based on its own inspection
on January 4, 2018. Authority for the disqualification is therefore not found in ORS 321.367(4).6
Taxpayer did not challenge the sufficiency of the reason stated in the county’s notice, and
both parties presented evidence on the issue of whether the subject was forestland. The court
will proceed to analyze the question of whether the subject was disqualified under
ORS 321.359(1).
B. ORS 321.359(1)
Forestland designation must be removed upon “[d]iscovery by the assessor that the land
is no longer forestland[.]” ORS 321.359(1)(b)(C). In western Oregon,
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5
The assessor did not identify its authority for setting that date as a deadline for replanting.
6
Regulations setting standards for forestland management are cited in the forester’s emails. A taxpayer’s
failure to comply with those regulations is not sufficient for disqualification under ORS 321.367(4) of land already
designated as forestland without notice from the State Forester to the county assessor.
FINAL DECISION TC-MD 180242G 7 of 12
“ ‘[f]orestland’ means [1] land in western Oregon that is being held or used for
the predominant purpose of growing and harvesting trees of a marketable species
and has been designated as forestland or [2] land in western Oregon, the highest
and best use of which is the growing and harvesting of such trees.”
ORS 321.257(2). The parties have presented no argument or evidence on the highest and best
use of the subject, and they agree that the subject was designated as forestland before the
county’s disqualification notice. Therefore, the subject was forestland if it was “held or used for
the predominant purpose of growing and harvesting trees of a marketable species.”
A taxpayer’s predominant purpose in holding land is “a highly subjective question of fact
that the court must answer by reference to the objective circumstances.” Rosalie Ridge LLC v.
Dept. of Rev., 21 OTR 434, 438 (2014). While the current use of land is a relevant circumstance,
it is not controlling because “[i]t is possible for land with no current use or with another current
use to be held for future forest use and qualify as forestland.” Prahar v. Dept. of Rev., 13 OTR
232, 234–35 (1995); see also Sanok v. Grimes, 294 Or 684, 698, 662 P2d 693 (1983) (stating
eligibility for forestland designation depends on actual “or planned” use of land for growing
marketable trees). Furthermore, a taxpayer’s predominant purpose for holding land may change
over time. See Rosalie Ridge, 21 OTR at 439 (finding predominant purpose of growing and
harvesting trees despite “nearly incontrovertible” evidence that purpose in prior years was sale
for development).
The relevant date for determining predominant purpose is probably the date on which an
assessor alleges to have discovered that land is no longer forestland. See Angel, 21 OTR at 448.
However, where “[n]either the notices themselves nor any other evidence in the record specifies
a date for this discovery,” the court evaluates predominant purpose as of the notice date. Id. In
many cases, like this one, the distinction between the two dates will be unimportant because no
evidence indicates the taxpayer’s purpose changed during the interval.
FINAL DECISION TC-MD 180242G 8 of 12
Here, the county’s date of discovery was January 4, 2018. The other possible discovery
dates suggested by the evidence are October 2016 and March 2017, the dates of the State
Forester’s emails to the county. However, the subject’s qualification for forestland designation
was still an open question for the county on September 13, 2017, when its email stated the
subject could continue in special assessment if it was replanted. The stated reason for the
eventual disqualification was that the subject did not meet stocking requirements. The county’s
appraiser made that determination when he visited the subject on January 4, 2018.
There is no dispute that taxpayer intended to develop the subject in 2015, when she razed
some portion of the trees on the land. Mr. Dhadwal testified that he and taxpayer did not replant
during the pendency of the Kaur I case because they still hoped to be able to develop the subject
as an RV park.
Purposes may change, however, and there is evidence that taxpayer’s did. Immediately
after the conclusion of Kaur I in September 2017, taxpayer’s representative inquired about
replanting trees. Given the failure of taxpayer’s development plans and the court’s explanation
of the law in Kaur I, it is plausible that taxpayer would determine to again grow trees on the
subject for harvest and sale.
Although the county presented evidence that the subject lacked trees on January 4, 2018,
it did not controvert Mr. Dhadwal’s credible testimony that the months between September and
January were not optimal for tree planting. Likewise, the county did not put on evidence
contravening Mr. Dhadwal’s testimony that the best time for planting trees on the subject was
March or April.
Taxpayer’s rapid planting of the subject after receiving the county’s notice of February
2018 might indicate that her purpose changed when confronted with an additional tax
FINAL DECISION TC-MD 180242G 9 of 12
assessment. However, that planting is also consistent with Mr. Dhadwal’s testimony that they
desired to replant when the weather permitted. Taxpayer’s delay in replanting is inconclusive
because the county issued its notice before the planting season was over. A taxpayer’s failure to
replant by the end of planting season would carry more weight. Quite the contrary was found,
however; the State Forester determined the subject met minimum stocking requirements in May
2018. It is not disputed that the trees planted were of a marketable species.
The county apparently considered itself bound to inspect the subject and determine its
forestland status based on its quantity of trees on January 1.7 However, qualification as
forestland does not depend on number of trees per se, but on the predominant purpose for which
the land is held or used. ORS 321.257(2); Prahar, 13 OTR at 234–35. Counting trees in January
is of limited value in showing whether there is a purpose to replant at the next available
opportunity. Perhaps it is for that reason that assessors have until June 30 to remove a forestland
designation from the tax roll, and that a timely notice sent thereafter causes the disqualification
to relate back to January 1. ORS 321.366; OAR 150-308-1530.
The subject should have been disqualified in a previous year. However, previous years
are not at issue, and taxpayer was not bound to continue in the course she followed in those
years. Although the evidence is limited, that is not unusual in forestland special assessment
cases given the slow pace and long periods of inactivity associated with growing trees. Rosalie
Ridge, 21 OTR at 441. What evidence there is shows that taxpayer changed her mind within a
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7
It is not clear by what authority the county considered itself obliged. The county may have mistakenly
relied on Oregon Administrative Rule (OAR) 150-321-0340(3)(d), which states that “[a]t least 20 percent, but not
less than two acres, of the area in the plan must be planted by December 31 of the first assessment year that the land
is designated as forestland.” By its terms, that regulation applies to newly designated forestland. Here, the subject
had been designated forestland for many years.
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week after receiving the court’s decision in Kaur I. Waiting for favorable weather to replant was
consistent with her new purpose of growing and harvesting marketable trees.
III. COST REQUEST
Taxpayer filed a request for costs and disbursements pursuant to Tax Court Rule –
Magistrate Division (TCR–MD) 16 C in which she reported incurring fees totaling $9,067.50,
representing 46.5 hours of Mr. Hult’s time at an hourly rate of $195. A parenthetical noted that
the amount “includes research, preparation, travel, mileage, fees, and copies.” No itemization or
additional proof was provided. The county objected on several grounds.
“Costs, like attorney fees, are not recoverable in the absence of a statute or contractual
provision authorizing the award.” Compton v. Weyerhaeuser, 302 Or 366, 367, 730 P2d 540,
540 (1986). Magistrates’ authority to award costs and disbursements is found in ORS
305.490(2). Wihtol I v. Dept. of Rev., 21 OTR 260, 267–68 (2013). By definition, such costs
and disbursements do not include expenses for legal services. TCR–MD 16 A.8 Nor do they
include expenses for experts, which are allowable “in addition to costs and disbursements” in
Regular Division proceedings. ORS 305.490(4)(a).
Here, taxpayer neither itemized any recoverable costs nor attached appropriate proof. See
TCR–MD 16 C(1). Mr. Hult’s fees are either for legal services or expert services, neither of
which is recoverable as costs and disbursements.
IV. CONCLUSION
The subject’s disqualification was not due to a notice received from the State Forester,
and, beginning in September 2017, the subject was held for the predominant purpose of growing
and harvesting trees of a marketable species. Now, therefore,
8
Tax Court Rules – Magistrate Division (TCR–MD)
FINAL DECISION TC-MD 180242G 11 of 12
IT IS THE DECISION OF THIS COURT that the subject qualified for forestland special
assessment at the time relevant to the county’s notice for tax year 2018–19. Taxpayer’s appeal is
granted. The parties will bear their own costs.
Dated this day of January, 2019.
POUL F. LUNDGREN
MAGISTRATE
If you want to appeal this Final Decision, file a complaint in the Regular
Division of the Oregon Tax Court, by mailing to: 1163 State Street, Salem, OR
97301-2563; or by hand delivery to: Fourth Floor, 1241 State Street, Salem, OR.
Your complaint must be submitted within 60 days after the date of the Final
Decision or this Final Decision cannot be changed. TCR-MD 19 B.
This document was signed by Magistrate Poul F. Lundgren and entered on
January 18, 2019.
FINAL DECISION TC-MD 180242G 12 of 12