Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Barrett , 467 Md. 61 ( 2020 )

Motor Vehicle Administration v. Brian Barrett, No. 22, September Term, 2019
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW — DUE PROCESS — RIGHTS AFFORDED TO
DETAINEES — The Court of Appeals held that where a motorist refuses a blood alcohol
concentration test pursuant to MD. CODE, ANN., TRANS. § 16-205.1(b) (Lexis Nexis Supp.
2018), if an administrative law judge finds that the motorist was fully advised of his or her
rights despite being distracted while the Advice of Rights form was being read, that
determination will not be disturbed if it is supported by substantial evidence.
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
Case No. C-02-CV-18-002886
Argued: October 31, 2019
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 22
September Term, 2019
MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION
v.
BRIAN J. BARRETT
Barbera, C.J.,
McDonald
Watts
Hotten
Booth
Harrell, Glenn T., Jr.,
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned)
Greene, Clayton, Jr.,
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned)
JJ.
Opinion by Barbera, C.J.
Filed: January 24, 2020
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal
Materials Act
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic.
2020-01-24 14:00-05:00
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk
The question before this Court involves application of Maryland’s “implied
consent” statute, MD. CODE, ANN., TRANS. (“TR”) § 16-205.1(b) (Lexis Nexis Supp.
2018). We must decide the proper outcome under the statute when a motorist refuses to
take a blood alcohol concentration test after having been advised via the Motor Vehicle
Administration (“MVA”) DR-15 “Advice of Rights” form and later claims a failure of the
law enforcement officer to “fully advise” the motorist of his rights.
Brian J. Barrett, Respondent, had his driver’s license suspended because he refused
to take a blood alcohol concentration test after being detained for suspicion of driving while
under the influence of alcohol. An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) upheld the MVA’s
Order of Suspension after finding that Respondent had been advised in conformity with
MVA form DR-15. The ALJ modified the suspension to allow Respondent to participate
in the Ignition Interlock Program for one year. Respondent’s refusal to take the test
nevertheless resulted in a one-year disqualification of his Maryland Commercial Driver’s
License (“CDL”). On judicial review, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County reversed
the suspension after finding that Respondent was not fully advised of his rights because he
was distracted while the detaining police officer explained the administrative sanctions for
refusing to take a blood alcohol concentration test.
Petitioner, the MVA, appeals that decision. For reasons we explain, we hold that
Respondent was fully advised of his rights per TR § 16-205.1(b)(1) despite two police
officers speaking to him simultaneously—one reading the DR-15 and the other asking
questions. We therefore affirm the determination by the ALJ that the police officers’
simultaneous speaking did not prevent Respondent from understanding his rights and the
sanctions for refusing to submit to a blood alcohol concentration test, as outlined in the
DR-15.
The Facts
The Traffic Stop
Respondent is a Maryland resident and possesses a CDL. On April 22, 2018, Officer
Thornton observed Respondent commit multiple traffic violations, including driving above
the posted speed limit and making unsafe lane changes. Officer Thornton executed a traffic
stop, approached Respondent, and detected a strong odor of alcohol; he also noticed that
Respondent’s eyes were bloodshot and he exhibited slurred speech. Officer Thornton
ordered Respondent out of the vehicle and conducted standardized field sobriety tests.
Because Respondent performed poorly on the tests and showed other signs of impairment,
Officer Thornton handcuffed Respondent and placed him in the front passenger seat of a
patrol vehicle.
While Officer Thornton and Respondent were roadside in the patrol vehicle, Officer
Thornton read Respondent the DR-15. Respondent was given a copy of the form so he
could follow along as it was read to him. As the DR-15 advisement of rights was being
read, another police officer, Officer Claytor, approached Respondent. Through the open
window on the passenger side of the patrol vehicle, Officer Claytor asked Respondent
several questions, such as whether he “would blow,” i.e., submit to a blood alcohol
concentration test. Officer Claytor asked those questions while Officer Thornton was
reading the DR-15 aloud. Once Officer Thornton finished reading the form, he and Officer
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Claytor asked Respondent multiple times whether Respondent would submit to the test.
After asking a seventh time without a response from Respondent, Officer Thornton marked
on the DR-15 that Respondent refused to take the test. Respondent was transported to the
police station for processing.
At the station, Officer Thornton and Respondent signed the DR-15 form. The
acknowledgment on the DR-15 states, “I, the undersigned driver, acknowledge that I
have been read or I have read the above stated Advice of Rights as certified by the police
officer.” Below the acknowledgment, the form asks, “Having been so advised, do you
now agree to submit to a test?” Officer Thornton checked the box below that states, “No
– Alcohol concentration test refused[,]” and Respondent’s signature appears underneath.
As required by TR § 16-205.1, Respondent’s driver’s license was subject to a 270-day
suspension, and his refusal to take the test prompted a one-year disqualification of his CDL.
Administrative Proceedings
Respondent requested an administrative hearing, which took place on July 12,
2018.1 At the hearing, Respondent averred that he was not fully advised of his rights due
to the roadside noise and Officer Claytor’s questioning him while the DR-15 was being
read. The hearing was continued, and the ALJ subpoenaed Officer Thornton. When the
hearing resumed on September 25, 2018, Officer Thornton and Respondent testified about
the incident.
1
Under TR § 16-205.1(f)(1)(ii), a motorist whose driver’s license was
suspended for a test refusal may request a hearing before an ALJ.
3
Officer Thornton detailed the events surrounding Respondent’s arrest. He testified
that after Respondent was handcuffed and seated in the patrol vehicle, Officer Thornton
read the DR-15 aloud to Respondent. While reading, Officer Claytor asked Respondent
questions. Respondent testified that he could not hear Officer Thornton over Officer
Claytor and asked Officer Claytor to stop speaking. He further testified, “I could hear him
reading. I only recall a few parts of [the DR-15], very small parts and I could not
understand what [Officer Thornton] was trying to tell me.” After Officer Thornton was
done reading, the officers repeatedly asked Respondent whether he would take the test, and
Respondent asked several times, “what should I do?” After asking a seventh time whether
Respondent would take the test, Officer Thornton interpreted Respondent’s unresponsive
utterances as a refusal.
Based on that testimony, the ALJ concluded that Respondent violated TR § 16-
205.1. The ALJ explained that there was sufficient evidence to determine that Respondent
was apprised of the administrative sanctions that would be imposed if he refused to take
the test. In coming to that conclusion, the ALJ made a credibility determination, stating
“although the officer may have been talking, I just don’t find credible that he could talk so
much that you couldn’t understand the form that was there in front of you.” The ALJ
specifically noted that Respondent had a copy of the DR-15 while Officer Thornton read it
aloud, he asked Officer Thornton several times whether or not he should take the test, and
he later signed the form at the station before his release. Based on those facts, the ALJ
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ordered that Respondent’s CDL remain disqualified for a year,2 but in lieu of upholding
the 270-day driver’s license suspension the ALJ allowed Respondent to participate in the
Ignition Interlock System Program. TR § 16-404.1(f)(1)(i) (permitting an ALJ to
“[m]odify a suspension and issue a restricted license” to a motorist who qualifies as a
program participant).
The Circuit Court Hearing
Respondent appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County pursuant to TR § 12-209(a),3 and a hearing was held on March 18, 2019. At the
hearing, Respondent argued that he was not fully advised of his rights as required by TR §
16-205.1. Respondent argued that he was distracted by Officer Claytor’s questioning and
therefore Respondent could not understand the DR-15 as it was read to him by Officer
Thornton.
The MVA countered that the Advice of Rights need only be made available to the
driver; police officers are not obligated to ensure that motorists understand those rights.
The ALJ made a factual finding that the DR-15 was read aloud to Respondent and he was
2
Under TR § 16-205.1(b)(1)(iii) and § 16-812(a)(3), the MVA disqualifies a CDL
for one year if the motorist holding the CDL refuses to take a blood alcohol concentration
test.
3
TR § 12-209(a) states:
(1) Any aggrieved party to a hearing may appeal from a decision or order of
the Administration in accordance with this subsection.
(2) If the matter concerns the license of an individual to drive and the
individual is a resident of this State, the aggrieved party may appeal to the
circuit court for the county in which the individual resides.
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given a copy to read himself. The MVA further argued that a police officer cannot fully
ensure that a presumably intoxicated motorist understands the DR-15 form. Based on the
facts presented, the ALJ did not find it credible that Officer Claytor’s questioning inhibited
Respondent from understanding those rights.
On judicial review, the circuit court understood the issue presented in the instant
case to be a mixed question of law and fact. The circuit court found in favor of Respondent
and reversed the decision of the ALJ. The circuit court was concerned about the limitations
on a “compromised human mind . . . to be read and understand something” when another
police officer is simultaneously asking questions. The circuit court reasoned that
Respondent could not be expected to understand and decide whether to take the test while
being questioned by an officer; therefore, the ALJ erroneously decided that Respondent
was fully advised of his rights. The credibility determination of the ALJ was not mentioned
in the circuit court’s ruling. This appeal followed.
As stated at the outset, we reverse the circuit court and affirm the determination of
the ALJ.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews “an administrative agency’s decision under the same statutory
standards as the Circuit Court.” Gigeous v. E. Corr. Inst., 363 Md. 481, 495 (2001). It is
not this Court’s role to “substitute its judgment for the expertise of those persons who
constitute the administrative agency[.]” United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. People’s Counsel for
Balt. Cty., 336 Md. 569, 576–77 (1994). “Therefore, ordinarily the court reviewing a final
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decision of an administrative agency shall determine (1) the legality of the decision and (2)
whether there was substantial evidence from the record as a whole to support the decision.”
Gigeous, 363 Md. at 496 (internal quotations omitted). Substantial evidence is defined as
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Id. at 497 (internal quotations omitted).
DISCUSSION
The MVA argues that the circuit court substituted its judgment for that of the ALJ
and misconstrued the law when it concluded that Respondent’s inattention excused his test
refusal. Respondent counters that (1) permitting officers to distract motorists while they
are being read the DR-15 violates due process, and (2) his statutory right to be fully advised
of the sanctions for a test refusal was frustrated by Officer Claytor’s questioning. We
explain below why the MVA has the better part of the argument.
Due Process is Satisfied When the DR-15 is Read to or by the Motorist.
Any person who is detained under suspicion of driving or attempting to drive in the
state while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or both has given implied consent to take
a blood alcohol concentration test, per § 16-205.1(a)(2) of the Transportation Article.
Subsection 16-205.1(a)(2) provides that “[a]ny person who drives or attempts to drive a
motor vehicle on a highway or on any private property that is used by the public in general
in this State is deemed to have consented . . . to take a [chemical breath] test [to determine
blood alcohol concentration] if the person should be detained on suspicion of driving or
attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol[.]” The purpose of TR § 16-205.1
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“is not to provide procedural protections to drivers who are suspected to be impaired by
alcohol, drugs, or both; instead, TR § 16-205.1’s purpose is to protect the public by
deterring drunk and/or drugged driving.” Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Seenath, 448 Md. 145,
192 (2016) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
As a prerequisite to the MVA’s suspension of a driver’s license for refusing to
submit to a blood alcohol concentration test, a police officer must advise the driver of the
administrative sanctions attendant to that refusal. TR § 16-205.1(b)(2)(iv). After a test
refusal, a police officer must also inform the driver that he or she has several rights
available, such as the right to request a hearing. TR § 16-205.1(b)(3). The DR-15 is a
standard form created by the MVA that outlines the sanctions for test refusal4 and it
contains all the advice officers are required to provide to detained motorists. See Owusu
v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 461 Md. 687, 691 (2018).
We have repeatedly held that due process is satisfied when the motorist reads or is
read the DR-15 because the DR-15 “accurately and adequately conveys to the driver the
rights granted by the statute” and “the consequences of a test refusal.” Motor Vehicle
Admin. v. Delawter, 403 Md. 243, 262 (2008) (citing Forman v. Motor Vehicle Admin.,
4
The DR-15 includes a provision regarding test refusals by CDL holders:
If you hold a commercial driver’s license (CDL) and were driving a non-
commercial motor vehicle when you were stopped, and you refuse to submit
to a test, your CDL or privilege shall be disqualified for 1 year for a 1st
offense or for life if your CDL or privilege has been previously disqualified
for at least 1 year under Maryland Transportation Article § 16-812(a) or (b),
a federal law, or any other state’s law.
8
332 Md. 201, 218 (1993); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Atterbeary, 368 Md. 480, 496 (2002)).
“[T]he DR-15 adequately capture[s] the full advisement of administrative sanctions
because the language in the form is unambiguous, with no prejudice or roadblocks to inhibit
a driver’s decision-making process.” Owusu, 461 Md. at 706 (citing Seenath, 448 Md. at
180).
Based on that precedent, Respondent’s due process argument is without merit. As
the ALJ found, Respondent possessed a copy of the DR-15 as Officer Thornton read it to
him, and Officer Claytor’s simultaneous questioning did not inhibit Respondent from
understanding his rights and the sanctions for refusing the test.
Whether There was Substantial Evidence to Support the ALJ’s Conclusion that
Respondent was Fully Advised of his Rights.
While reading the DR-15 aloud or giving a copy of it to the motorist to read may
fully advise the motorist of the sanctions for a test refusal, this Court has held that a motorist
is not fully advised if the police officer confuses or misleads the motorist about the
sanctions. See Hare v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 326 Md. 296, 304 (1992) (cautioning that
police officers may not “mislead the defendant or construct road blocks, thus unduly
burdening that decision-making”), superseded by statute on other grounds, Chapter 407 of
the Acts of 1993. In Forman v. Motor Vehicle Administration, this Court addressed
whether a motorist was fully advised of her rights despite the arresting officer encouraging
the motorist to refuse a blood alcohol concentration test and inaccurately explaining the
sanctions for the refusal. 332 Md. at 206. In that case, the officer led the motorist to believe
that if she refused the test, the MVA would be able to modify the suspension of her license.
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Id. at 210. Additionally, the officer encouraged the motorist to refuse the test by promising
to take her to a friend’s house rather than to the police station so that her husband would
not find out about her arrest. Id. at 209–11.
We held in Forman that a police officer must provide a detained motorist with an
opportunity to make a knowing and voluntary decision to refuse a blood alcohol
concentration test. Id. at 218–19. A detained motorist is deprived of the opportunity to
make a knowing and voluntary decision regarding whether to take the test if the motorist
is not fully advised of the sanctions for a refusal. Id. at 216–17. In reaching that
conclusion, we stated:
“Fully advised” means not only advised initially, but the detaining officer
must also take care not to subsequently confuse or mislead the driver as to
his or her rights under the statute. Further, the officer certainly must not in
any way induce the driver into refusing the test, a result running counter to
the statute’s purpose of encouraging drivers to submit to alcohol
concentration tests.
Id. at 217 (emphasis in original).
Critical to the case at bar, we went on to explain that whether an officer “has
prevented a detained driver from making a knowing and voluntary decision to refuse the
test is a matter that must be decided by the [ALJ] in view of the facts of the particular case.”
Id. at 219.
Contrary to Respondent’s assertions, Officer Claytor’s questions did not frustrate
Respondent’s understanding of his rights. The ALJ found substantial evidence that
Respondent was fully advised of his rights—Respondent was given a copy of the DR-15,
had it read aloud by Officer Thornton, and he later signed it. Substantial evidence is present
10
if “a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency
reached.” Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apartments, 283 Md. 505, 512 (1978) (internal
quotations omitted). We agree with the ALJ that there was substantial evidence that
Respondent was fully advised of his rights.
Although Respondent testified that he could not hear and understand Officer
Thornton, the ALJ did not find credible Respondent’s assertion that he was not properly
advised because of Officer Claytor’s questioning. “[T]he resolution of conflicting
evidence and inconsistent inferences involves making credibility determinations.” Motor
Vehicle Admin. v. Karwacki, 340 Md. 271, 284 (1995). We have stated “that, in an
administrative proceeding, credibility findings of the agency representative who sees and
hears witnesses are entitled to great deference on further agency review and should not be
reversed absent an adequate explanation of the grounds for the reviewing body’s
disagreement with those findings.” Id.The circuit court misapplied established standards of proof to overcome a prima
facie case established by the police officer’s sworn statement. The circuit court improperly
substituted its judgment for that of the ALJ by determining that Respondent incur no
sanctions for his violation of the implied-consent statute. Simply put, Respondent was
appropriately asked to take a test for blood alcohol concentration; he refused. The ALJ
credited the facts as asserted by the MVA, and we have no cause to disturb that credibility
determination. The ALJ imposed the required consequence—a 270-day driver’s license
suspension, CDL disqualification, and the opportunity for modification to allow
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Respondent to participate in the Ignition Interlock Program. It follows that we reverse the
judgment of the circuit court and remand the matter to the MVA for action consistent with
our holding.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY
REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT
COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
AFFIRM THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE’S DECISION. COSTS TO BE PAID
BY RESPONDENT.
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