State v. Muir , 2024 Ohio 3223 ( 2024 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Muir, 
    2024-Ohio-3223
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    LUCAS COUNTY
    State of Ohio                                        Court of Appeals No. L-23-1283
    Appellee                                     Trial Court No. CR0202302090
    v.
    Ashley Muir                                          DECISION AND JUDGMENT
    Appellant                                    Decided: August 23, 2024
    *****
    Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and
    Randy L. Meyer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
    Laurel A. Kendall, for appellant.
    *****
    ZMUDA, J.
    I. Introduction
    {¶ 1} This matter is before the court on appeal from the Lucas County Court of
    Common Pleas judgment of October 27, 2023, sentencing appellant, Ashley Muir, to an
    indefinite prison term of 4 years to 6 years for robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2)
    and (B), a felony of the first degree. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    II. Facts and Procedural History
    {¶ 2} On June 3, 2023, appellant and her co-defendant, Matthew Kanouff, were
    stopped as they attempted to leave the parking lot of a store, after appellant was seen
    leaving the store with unpaid merchandise. When approached by police, Kanouff exited
    the car and attempted to flee, but was apprehended. Appellant did not exit the car, but
    instead attempted to drive away, first reversing into an occupied vehicle driven by M.P.
    and causing property damage to M.P.’s car, and then shifting into drive and striking the
    police cruiser, causing property damage to the police cruiser. As appellant attempted to
    drive away, a deputy sheriff was attempting to pull her from the vehicle, and because of
    appellant’s attempts to drive away, the deputy suffered a left shoulder separation, left
    rotator cuff strain, and bruising to his left arm and hand, requiring medical treatment and
    loss of full use of his left arm for weeks following the incident.
    {¶ 3} Once the officers took appellant and her co-defendant into custody, they
    discovered two scales with apparent drug residue, $1,117.00 in U.S. currency, a glass
    pipe, baking soda, a glass measuring cup, and two unopened bags containing small bags.
    Additionally, the officers seized substances in glass containers from the car that
    subsequent analysis identified as 31.88 grams of methamphetamine and 2.14 grams of
    crack cocaine.
    {¶ 4} On July 19, 2023, appellant was indicted on six counts as follows: Count 1:
    robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) and (B), a felony of the second degree; Count
    2: aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(1)(d), a
    2.
    felony of the second degree; Count 3: aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C.
    2925.11(A) and (C)(1)(c), a felony of the second degree; Count 4: vehicular assault in
    violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(2)(b) and (C), a felony of the third degree; Count 5: driving
    under suspension in violation of R.C. 4510.11(A),(D),(E),(F) and (G), a misdemeanor of
    the first degree; and Count 6: resisting arrest in violation of R.C. 2921.33(B) and (D), a
    misdemeanor of the first degree. On July 28, 2023, appellant appeared for arraignment
    with counsel and entered a plea of not guilty to the indictment.
    {¶ 5} On October 5, 2023, appellant withdrew her former plea of not guilty and
    entered a guilty plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 
    400 U.S. 25
     (1970) to Count 1,
    robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) and (B), a felony of the second degree, and
    agreed to pay restitution in the amount or $500 to M.P. In return for her plea, the state
    agreed to dismiss the remaining counts in the indictment at sentencing. The trial court
    conducted the required colloquy with appellant with no indication appellant’s plea was
    not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Appellant also specifically indicated that she was
    satisfied with her trial counsel’s representation.
    {¶ 6} At the plea hearing, the prosecutor recited the facts that would have been
    proved, had the matter proceeded to trial, as follows:
    Had the matter proceeded to trial, the State of Ohio would have shown
    beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 3rd day of June, 2023, in Lucas
    County, Ohio, that the defendant in attempting or committing a theft offense or in
    fleeing immediately after the attempt or offense did knowingly inflict, attempt to
    inflict, or threaten to inflict physical harm on another. Judge, on that date she and a
    codefendant were at the Kohl’s store here in Lucas County…on Holland Sylvania
    Road here in Lucas County. After having committed a theft offense in the store,
    they were approached and engaged with law enforcement in the parking lot.
    3.
    During that interaction, Deputy Bretzloff attempted to remove the defendant from
    her vehicle. During that attempt, she put the truck in reverse, backed up, striking
    another vehicle, hence the restitution. …
    Thereafter then the vehicle went into drive and then struck the marked
    patrol vehicle which still had its lights going. During that altercation, Deputy
    Bretzloff suffered a separated shoulder and required care immediately and then
    some continuing care for recovery. He missed about three weeks of work
    constituting the injury, and this occurred in Lucas County, Ohio. Thank you.
    The trial court continued the matter for sentencing on October 25, 2023.
    {¶ 7} At the sentencing hearing, appellant’s trial counsel advocated for treatment
    instead of incarceration, despite appellant’s history with substance abuse, her criminal
    record that included a pending criminal case in federal court, and the fact appellant was
    on probation in other jurisdictions at the time of the incident in the present case. In
    response, the state noted the danger that appellant placed others in by attempting to flee
    and requested a prison sentence. Appellant also spoke and apologized for the harm she
    caused, stating, “It was not intentional.” Appellant expressed a desire to “turn my life
    around.”
    {¶ 8} In imposing sentence, the trial court expressed a desire for rehabilitation
    rather than sending drug-addicted offenders to prison. However, the trial court also noted
    the injury to the deputy sheriff, and that there were “plenty of people that come in front of
    me that are suffering from addictions that don’t violently hurt other people let alone law
    enforcement, and there needs to be consequences for not complying with law
    enforcement and harming law enforcement.” The trial court found appellant was not
    amenable to community control and imposed a prison term of four to six years. The trial
    4.
    court also ordered restitution and entered a nolle prosequi as to Counts 2 through 6 of the
    indictment, pursuant to the plea agreement.
    {¶ 9} Appellant filed a timely appeal of this judgment.
    III. Assignment of Error
    {¶ 10} In challenging the judgment on appeal, appellant raises the following
    assignments of error:
    I.     The court committed plain error by accepting the disputed facts of the
    parties, as consistent with the offense of robbery, when both sides arguably
    agreed that the physical harm suffered by the deputy was not intentional on
    the part of appellant.
    II.    Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel
    recommended she plead guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford to
    robbery, a felony of the second degree, arguably absent any intent by
    appellant to inflict physical harm during or immediately after the offense.
    {¶ 11} Because appellant argues the lack of intent as to each assignment of error,
    we address the assignments of error together.
    IV. Analysis
    {¶ 12} Appellant’s assignments of error rest on the premise that a robbery
    conviction requires proof of intent to cause physical harm. In her first assignment of
    error, appellant argues that the facts recited into the record failed to include an intent to
    cause physical harm to the deputy, claiming this intent is a necessary element for the
    5.
    offense. In her second assignment of error, appellant argues her trial counsel provided
    ineffective assistance by recommending the Alford plea absent facts to support the
    element of intent to inflict physical harm. In support, appellant cites to no authority that
    requires proof of an intent to inflict physical harm as an element of robbery.
    {¶ 13} An Alford guilty plea, “absent an assertion of actual innocence, is an
    admission of guilt.” State v. Griggs, 
    2004-Ohio-4415
    , ¶ 14. Thus, appellant’s plea was an
    admission that she committed robbery as charged in the indictment, as appellant did not
    also assert actual innocence but entered the plea “because the rest of my charges are
    going to be dropped.” Appellant’s later claim, for purposes of sentencing, that she did not
    intend to cause physical harm to the deputy was not a claim of actual innocence relative
    to her guilty plea. See State v. Johnson, 
    2018-Ohio-1387
    , ¶ 23 (8th Dist.) (claim that harm
    was not intended was not a claim of innocence, but expression of remorse).
    {¶ 14} Appellant was convicted of robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) and
    (B), which provides:
    (A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense or in fleeing
    immediately after the attempt or offense, shall do any of the following:
    …
    (2) Inflict, attempt to inflict, or threaten to inflict physical harm on another;
    ...
    (B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of robbery. A violation of
    division (A)(1) or (2) of this section is a felony of the second degree.
    {¶ 15} Contrary to appellant’s argument, the culpable mental state for robbery is
    provided by the underlying theft offense, with nothing in R.C. 2911.02 that includes an
    intent requirement relative to infliction of physical harm. See State v. Tolliver, 2014-Ohio-
    6.
    3744, ¶ 18. “R.C. 2911.02(A) predicates every robbery on the elements of a completed or
    an attempted ‘theft offense,’” which includes “the mental states of ‘purpose’ and
    ‘knowingly.’” Tolliver at ¶ 18, citing R.C. 2913.02(A). Thus, “the section defining
    robbery makes clear which elements of the offense require proof of culpability,” and R.C.
    2911.02(A)(2) contains no additional intent elements. 
    Id.
    {¶ 16} Therefore, the offense of robbery does not require proof of an intent to
    cause physical harm, and appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit.
    Additionally, because robbery does not require proof of an intent to cause physical harm,
    appellant’s trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to consider this issue in
    recommending the plea.
    {¶ 17} To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must show that
    her trial counsel’s performance was deficient, and that this deficient performance resulted
    in prejudice. State v. Bradley, 
    42 Ohio St.3d 136
     (1939), paragraph two of the syllabus,
    citing Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
     (1984). Because appellant entered a guilty
    plea, she has waived the right to assert an ineffective assistance of counsel claim unless
    she asserts her trial counsel’s errors affected the knowing and voluntary nature of her
    plea. State v. Rivera, 
    2021-Ohio-1343
    , ¶ 10 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Green, 2018-Ohio-
    3536, ¶ 18-19 (11th Dist.).
    {¶ 18} Appellant does not assert that her plea was not knowing and voluntary. At
    most, appellant is critical of her trial counsel’s advice regarding the plea, based on the
    incorrect premise that the offense of robbery requires proof of an intent to cause physical
    7.
    harm. As previously addressed, the offense of robbery does not require proof of an intent
    to cause physical harm, and appellant’s trial counsel, therefore, was not deficient in
    failing to consider this issue. Appellant’s second assignment of error, accordingly, is
    without merit.
    {¶ 19} Based on the forgoing, we find appellant’s first and second assignments of
    error not well-taken.
    V. Conclusion
    {¶ 20} Finding substantial justice has been done, we affirm the judgment of the
    Lucas County Court of Common Pleas. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this
    appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
    Judgment affirmed.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
    See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
    Thomas J. Osowik, J.                             ____________________________
    JUDGE
    Gene A. Zmuda, J.
    ____________________________
    Charles E. Sulek, P.J.                                      JUDGE
    CONCUR.
    ____________________________
    JUDGE
    This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
    Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
    version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
    http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
    8.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: L-23-1283

Citation Numbers: 2024 Ohio 3223

Judges: Zmuda

Filed Date: 8/23/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/23/2024