Dept. of Human Services v. C. L. M. ( 2019 )

603
Submitted September 12, reversed and remanded November 20, 2019
In the Matter of H. L. W.,
a Child.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
C. L. M.,
Appellant.
Lane County Circuit Court
17JU10544; A170727
454 P3d 28
Mother appeals from a permanency judgment in which the juvenile court
denied her motion to dismiss dependency jurisdiction and terminate wardship
over her child. Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in denying her motion
because she had ameliorated the sole basis for jurisdiction. The Department of
Human Services concedes the error. Held: The juvenile court erred in denying
mother’s motion to dismiss after the factual basis for jurisdiction ceased to exist.
Reversed and remanded.
Josephine H. Mooney, Judge.
Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate
Section, and Holly Telerant, Deputy Public Defender, Office
of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Inge D. Wells, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Shorr, Judge, and
James, Judge.
ORTEGA, P. J.
Reversed and remanded.
604 Dept. of Human Services v. C. L. M.
ORTEGA, P. J.
Mother appeals from a permanency judgment in
which the juvenile court denied her motion to dismiss
dependency jurisdiction and terminate wardship over her
teenaged daughter. Mother argues that the juvenile court
erred in denying her motion because she had ameliorated
the sole basis for jurisdiction. The Department of Human
Services (DHS) concedes the error and agrees that the juve-
nile court’s wardship over the child should be terminated in
this case. We agree and reverse and remand.
As pertains to mother, the juvenile court took juris-
diction over her child based on the single-admitted allega-
tion that “mother uses inappropriate discipline and needs
the assistance of DHS to manage the behavior of the child
and safely parent.” After completing services, mother moved
to dismiss jurisdiction, which the juvenile court denied after
a hearing. At a subsequent permanency hearing, mother
renewed that motion. DHS agreed with mother that she had
completed all services and had ameliorated the sole basis
for jurisdiction but requested that jurisdiction continue for
another 90 days during continued family counseling. The
child opposed mother’s motion, arguing that the basis for
jurisdiction was not ameliorated because the child “needs
the support of the agency to meet her physical and emotional
needs by having a safe place to live while she’s [going to fam-
ily counseling with mother].” The juvenile court found that
“everybody’s agreed” that mother had ameliorated the basis
for jurisdiction. However, the court denied mother’s motion,
ordered that the dependency petition be amended to include
a new allegation to reflect the child’s current circumstances
of mother being unable to meet the child’s emotional needs,
and scheduled a trial on the new allegation.1
On appeal, mother argues that the juvenile court
erred in denying her motion to dismiss because the basis for
jurisdiction did not persist. DHS concedes that error.2 We
accept DHS’s concession.
1
The court order amending the petition to add a new allegation was later
vacated by the court.
2
The child has not appeared on appeal.
Cite as 300 Or App 603 (2019) 605
“If * * * the bases for the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
‘cease to exist,’ then the juvenile court must terminate the
wardship and dismiss the case[.]” Dept. of Human Services v.
T. L., 279 Or App 673, 678, 379 P3d 741 (2016). Here, mother
successfully participated in services and there was no evi-
dence that she would again engage in inappropriate disci-
pline of the child or that the jurisdictional basis exposed
the child to a current risk of serious loss or injury that was
reasonably likely to occur. See id. at 684-85 (setting out two-
part inquiry for motion to dismiss). Thus, the basis for juris-
diction over the child ceased to exist.
We do note that recently the Supreme Court has
stated that “the court may be able to assert jurisdiction
based on * * * new circumstances” that endanger a ward’s
safety, when the original factual bases for jurisdiction no
longer exist. Dept. of Human Services v. J. C., 365 Or 223,
235, 444 P3d 1098 (2019) (citing ORS 419B.809(6) (“The
court on motion of an interested party or on its own motion,
may at any time direct that the petition be amended.”)). We
understand that statement to reflect that a juvenile court
may continue jurisdiction where it has adjudicated addi-
tional jurisdictional facts based on new allegations that
have been added in an amended petition, but not that a
court can continue jurisdiction and hold a case open to allow
an amended petition to be filed at a later date when the orig-
inal factual basis has ceased to exist. Here, the court had
not taken jurisdiction over the child based on new circum-
stances. Thus, the juvenile court erred in denying mother’s
motion to dismiss the wardship over the child.
Reversed and remanded.