Reed v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp. ( 2020 )

825
Argued and submitted May 31, 2018; reversed and remanded as to Toyota
Motor Credit Corporation and Toyota Financial Services, otherwise affirmed
January 23, 2020
Erik Loyal REED,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TOYOTA MOTOR CREDIT CORPORATION
and Toyota Financial Services, foreign corporations,
and Capitol Toyota, an Oregon corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.
Marion County Circuit Court
15CV19134; A164222
459 P3d 253
Plaintiff and defendant Toyota Financial Services (TFS) entered into an
employment separation agreement that, among other things, allowed plaintiff to
retain the TFS truck he had been using during his employment. TFS installed a
global positioning system (GPS) tracking device onto the truck without plaintiff’s
knowledge or consent. When plaintiff discovered the GPS device on the truck, he
filed this claim for invasion of privacy. The trial court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of TFS and defendant Capitol Toyota (Capitol). Plaintiff appeals the
grant of summary judgment as to both defendants. Held: The trial court erred as
to TFS but did not err as to Capitol. Viewing the summary judgment record in the
light most favorable to plaintiff, there was evidence from which a jury could find
that TFS’s covert installation of a GPS device on a vehicle for plaintiff’s exclusive
use was an intentional physical intrusion and that it was highly offensive, but, as
to Capitol, plaintiff had not presented evidence of a civil conspiracy or the under-
lying tort of invasion of privacy that would create a genuine issue of material fact.
Reversed and remanded as to Toyota Motor Credit Corporation and Toyota
Financial Services; otherwise affirmed.
Donald D. Abar, Judge.
George W. Kelly argued the cause and filed the briefs for
appellant.
Paul W. Cane, Jr., argued the cause for respondents Toyota
Motor Credit Corporation and Toyota Financial Services.
Also on the brief were Paul Hastings LLP, Elizabeth A.
Falcone, and Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart,
P.C.
Michael B. Merchant argued the cause for respondent
Capitol Toyota. Also on the brief was Black Helterline LLP.
826 Reed v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and
Mooney, Judge.*
MOONEY, J.
Reversed and remanded as to Toyota Motor Credit Corpo-
ration and Toyota Financial Services; otherwise affirmed.
______________
* Mooney, J., vice Garrett, J. pro tempore.
Cite as 301 Or App 825 (2020) 827
MOONEY, J.
Plaintiff and defendants Toyota Motor Credit
Corporation/Toyota Financial Services (TFS)1 entered into
an employment separation agreement that, among other
things, allowed plaintiff to retain the TFS truck he was
already using. TFS installed a global positioning system
(GPS) tracking device onto the truck without plaintiff’s
knowledge or consent. When plaintiff discovered the GPS
device on the truck, he filed this claim for invasion of privacy.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of TFS
after concluding that, despite having installed the device,
TFS did not actually access or monitor the data collected by
it and, therefore, there was no invasion of privacy. The court
granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Capitol
Toyota (Capitol) because it concluded Capitol had nothing to
do with the installation of the GPS device. We affirm as to
Capitol and reverse and remand for further proceedings as
to TFS.
Because this case is before us on the grant of sum-
mary judgment to defendants, we view the record in the
light most favorable to plaintiff to determine whether there
are any genuine issues of material fact and, if not, whether
defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
ORCP 47 C; Brown v. Guard Publishing Co., 267 Or App
552, 562, 341 P3d 145 (2014). Under ORCP 47 C, no genuine
issue as to a material fact exists if no objectively reason-
able juror could return a verdict for the party opposing the
motion—here, plaintiff—on the matter that is the subject of
the motion.
We state the facts in accordance with that standard.
TFS is part of the worldwide financial services operations
for Toyota Motor Corporation, providing consumer loans for
purchases of Toyota vehicles with branch offices throughout
the United States. Plaintiff worked for TFS as an area sales
manager in Lake Oswego, Oregon. His immediate super-
visor was the office manager, Estes. The human resources
(HR) department is in California.
1
Toyota Motor Credit Corporation and Toyota Financial Services are one
and the same entity. The company is best known by the acronym TFS, and we
therefore refer to it as such.
828 Reed v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp.
In October 2012, a TFS employee reported that
plaintiff was wearing a “large, dagger-style blade” at his
belt line while at work. That same employee also provided
HR with an online product review that plaintiff wrote about
a similar “military-style serrated dagger” in which plain-
tiff commented that he tried wearing the belt but that it
“did not wear well because of the length and the constant
up and down of working in an office.” The employee reported
that he and other employees were concerned for their safety.
Toyota has a policy that expressly prohibits employees from
possessing weapons, including knives and daggers, on TFS
property. Plaintiff disputes that he wore the dagger to work
indicating instead that it was a “trainer” he wore to see how
it felt while moving throughout the day.
Given the employee concerns as well as information
from Estes that he “sensed increasing hostility” from plain-
tiff during performance reviews, TFS decided to place plain-
tiff on administrative leave in order to investigate the safety
concerns. HR personnel were not able to immediately reach
plaintiff to advise him of the decision and so they worked
with the TFS IT team to locate plaintiff’s company-owned
iPad. They were able to watch the iPad on a map as it exited
the freeway and travelled to a point outside Estes’s house.
According to Estes, there was no reason for plaintiff to be in
front of his home. Later that morning, HR reached plaintiff
and informed him of the investigation and that he was being
placed on leave.
The subsequent investigation included nine inter-
views with plaintiff’s coworkers. Those interviewed dis-
closed additional concerns about plaintiff, ranging from
comments that he was “odd” and a “loner” to reports that
he posted online about buying a bulletproof vest and that he
watched videos of bullet making and shooting firearms on
his work computer in front of his colleagues. Additionally,
an employee emailed an HR manager that “I can’t help but
think this could become one of those classic cases when
someone goes over the edge, and later everyone says things
like . . . well he was kind of odd, he was a loner, he was a real
gun nut, etc. So, I do want to go on the record by expressing
my concerns in writing, should something ever happen in
the future.” (Ellipses in original.)
Cite as 301 Or App 825 (2020) 829
TFS terminated plaintiff’s employment and decided
to pursue a separation agreement with plaintiff to “reduce
the risk that [plaintiff] would become violent or otherwise
lash out at any of TFS’s personnel.” After several months
of negotiations, the separation agreement was executed in
March 2013.
As part of the separation agreement, TFS agreed
to lease to plaintiff the Toyota Tundra that he had been
using during his employment “for five years without cost to
[plaintiff], after which the vehicle will be given to” plaintiff,
subject to certain conditions. One of the relevant conditions
required plaintiff to have the Tundra taken to Capitol for
maintenance and a safety inspection. Despite that condition,
plaintiff took the Tundra to a different Toyota dealership
for an oil change and safety inspection. When he submitted
a “repair order” from that service to demonstrate that the
safety inspection had been completed, TFS informed him
“that they would not honor the Settlement unless [plaintiff]
took the truck to Capitol Toyota immediately.” Plaintiff then
took the truck to Capitol, where he was required to leave it
for two days.
While the truck was at Capitol, Toyota’s corporate
security office, at the direction of TFS, installed a GPS
device into the Tundra without plaintiff’s permission or
knowledge. The security office set up “geo-fences” across the
public roadways leading to two locations that TFS consid-
ered to be at risk: TFS’s Lake Oswego office and the Estes
family home.2 According to the manager of Toyota’s corpo-
rate security office,
“the device was programmed to communicate only with
Toyota’s Corporate Security Office in Southern California.
There, the geo-fence system was set up to trigger an alarm
if and only if the Tundra crossed one of the geo-fence lines,
which were placed to provide sufficient warning time to
the Lake Oswego office and the Estes family in the event
[plaintiff] drove to either location. * * * If that happened, a
member of the security team was to contact those locations,
2
According to Toyota, “ ‘Geo-fences’ are virtual gates. The locations of the
gates can be programmed into a computer system using an online map, and an
‘alarm’ will sound if the devise passes through one of the gates.”
830 Reed v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp.
and log-on to the system to begin monitoring [plaintiff’s]
location. [An additional geo-fence] was set-up * * * that
would sound the alarm if the Tundra was nearing in on
the targets.”
(Emphasis omitted.) After the device was installed and other
work was completed on the Tundra, the truck was returned
to plaintiff. He was not told about the installation of the
GPS device or the geo-fences.
About one month later, plaintiff discovered the
GPS device when he noticed wires hanging behind the gas
and brake pedals of his truck. Eventually, plaintiff learned
that the device had been installed by TFS, and he subse-
quently filed this case against TFS and Capitol for invasion
of privacy.
Each defendant filed a motion for summary judg-
ment, with Capitol primarily relying upon the points and
authorities and supporting documentation submitted by
TFS. TFS admitted that the GPS device was installed by
its agents at its direction and no evidence was submitted
by any party to show that Capitol had anything to do with
the GPS device. TFS also produced evidence that the GPS
device never triggered the alarm. “That could have been
because [plaintiff] did not drive the Tundra to the exact
spots on the public roadways that would have triggered
the alarm. It [also] could have been because the geo-fence
was not working properly.” The trial court granted Capitol’s
motion because it concluded that there was no evidence “to
show that they’re involved in [the case] whatsoever.” The
trial court granted TFS’s motion because it found that plain-
tiff “was never monitored. He was trespassed upon—his
vehicle—but he was never monitored, so I don’t know how
there is a private place to be intruded upon.”
Plaintiff appeals the general judgment of dismissal,
assigning error to the trial court’s decision to grant the
summary judgment motions. We begin our review with the
following historical and legal perspective on the nature of
the claim presented.
Invasion of privacy is a tort; that is to say, a civil
wrong. Oregon has long recognized a common-law cause of
Cite as 301 Or App 825 (2020) 831
action for invasion of privacy, on four different theories, all
of which protect the right of a person “to be let alone.” Mauri
v. Smith, 324 Or 476, 482, 929 P2d 307 (1996). The right “to
be let alone” is not a new legal concept. In 1888, Thomas
Cooley wrote that “[t]he right to one’s person may be said to
be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone.” Thomas M.
Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts or the Wrongs Which
Arise Independent of Contract 29 (2d ed 1888).
Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren referred to
Cooley’s “right to be let alone” when they explained that the
tort of “invasion of privacy” derives from, and protects, the
right to be let alone. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis,
The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv L Rev 193, 195 (1890). They
wrote in response to “[r]ecent inventions and business meth-
ods [that] call attention to the next step which must be
taken for the protection of the person” and out of concern
that “numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good
the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be
proclaimed from the house-tops.’ ” Id. They noted that the
“law affords a principle which may be invoked to protect
the privacy of the individual from invasion * * * by the * * *
press, the photographer or the possessor of any other mod-
ern device for recording or reproducing scenes or sounds.”
Id. at 206 (emphasis added). GPS technology came long after
Brandeis and Warren’s groundbreaking article on privacy.
But, the common law adapts to the times to meet the needs
of society and one’s use of GPS technology today must of
necessity be circumscribed by the same right to be let alone
that Brandeis and Warren wrote about well over 100 years
ago.
This invasion of privacy case relies upon the “intru-
sion upon seclusion” theory. To prevail at trial, plaintiff must
prove three elements: (1) an intentional intrusion, physical
or otherwise, (2) upon the plaintiff’s solitude or seclusion or
private affairs or concerns, (3) which would be highly offen-
sive to a reasonable person. Mauri, 324 Or at 482-83. In
order to proceed to trial and present his case to a jury, plain-
tiff must respond to defendants’ motions for summary judg-
ment by producing sufficient evidence to show that triable
issues remain on those elements challenged by defendants.
832 Reed v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp.
We begin with the motion of TFS. It disputes plain-
tiff’s allegation that it intruded upon his privacy by enter-
ing into the truck for the purpose of secretly installing the
tracking device and by monitoring plaintiff’s location with
the GPS device.3 First, TFS argues that entry into the truck
to install the GPS device was not an intrusion because the
truck belonged to TFS and that plaintiff “merely had the
right to free use of it under the Separation Agreement.”
Second, TFS contends that the GPS system did not intrude
on plaintiff’s privacy because it was a “passive system” that
was not monitored and did not alarm. Third, TFS contends
that it did not intrude on a “private place” or “area of seclu-
sion.” And, fourth, TFS contends that its actions would not
be highly offensive to a reasonable person—a necessary ele-
ment for the tort.
The first argument presupposes that ownership of
the truck provides a defense. TFS assumes it owns the truck
to the exclusion of any rights in plaintiff. The parties’ rights,
however, are determined by the terms of the lease and sep-
aration agreement. Basic property law concepts remind us
of the idiom, bundle-of-sticks; that “collection of individual
rights which, in certain combinations, constitute property.”
United States v. Craft, 535 US 274, 278, 122 S Ct 1414, 152
L Ed 2d 437 (2002).
“Property is more than just the physical thing—the land,
the bricks, the mortar—it is also the sum of all the rights
and powers incident to ownership of the physical thing. It
is the tangible and the intangible. Property is composed of
constituent elements and of these elements the right to use
the physical thing to the exclusion of others is the most essen-
tial and beneficial. Without this right all other elements
would be of little value.”
Dickman v. C. I. R., 465 US 330, 336, 104 S Ct 1086, 79 L Ed
2d 343 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis
added); see also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 US 164,
176, 100 S Ct 383, 62 L Ed 2d 332 (1979) (“[O]ne of the most
essential sticks in the bundle of rights * * * [is] the right to
exclude others.”).
3
Neither party disputes that TFS acted intentionally; therefore, we do not
further discuss that element of the tort.
Cite as 301 Or App 825 (2020) 833
ORS 72A.1030(1)(j) defines a “lease” as “a transfer of
the right to possession and use of goods for a term in return
for consideration” and, therefore, it divides “the bundle” of
individual property rights to the leased property differently
than a full conveyance would. Neither the lessor nor lessee
holds the entire bundle. As explained in Dickman, the right
to use the leased property includes the “right to use * * * to
the exclusion of others.” 465 US at 336. Through the lease,
TFS transferred to plaintiff the right to use and to exclude
others (including TFS except as agreed in the separation
agreement) from the truck. Given the right to exclude others
and evidence that plaintiff did not consent to the installa-
tion of the GPS device, we conclude that the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment for TFS insofar as a genu-
ine issue exists on the question of whether TFS intruded
into plaintiff’s privacy by installing the GPS device.
We are likewise unpersuaded by TFS’s second argu-
ment that there is no evidence that it intruded on plaintiff’s
privacy “[b]ecause the alarm never sounded, TFS’s Corporate
Security never was prompted to, and never did, monitor the
Tundra’s location.” TFS cites several out-of-state cases for
the proposition that there is no intrusion “in the installation
of a listening device that never is used.” Those cases have
no mandatory precedential effect in this court, and they
are not persuasive here. They are distinguishable in this
important way: There was actual monitoring in the case
before us. Although the evidence is that nobody accessed the
location data, the record shows that data was collected on a
continuous basis.4
Oregon courts follow the Restatement (Second) of
Torts approach to evaluating the tort of invasion of privacy.
Mauri, 324 Or at 482. Commentary to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts provides that an invasion or intrusion
may occur with “the use of the defendant’s senses, with or
4
TFS also raises Marks v. Bell Telephone Co., 460 Pa 73, 331 A2d 424 (1975),
to argue that a claim for invasion of privacy cannot be established “even when
a plaintiff’s conversations were recorded, [because] there was no intrusion if no
one ever listened to the recordings.” We reject that argument. That case involved
the Pennsylvania Anti-Wire Tap Act, not the common-law tort of invasion of pri-
vacy. To the extent that the court addressed the common-law tort of invasion of
privacy, it did so while addressing the appellant’s argument on damages, not the
merits of the claim.
834 Reed v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp.
without mechanical aids, to oversee or overhear the plain-
tiff’s private affairs.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B
comment b (1974); see also Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 48
Cal Rptr 3d 780, 787 (2006), rev’d on other grounds, 47 Cal
4th 272, 211 P3d 1063 (2009) (“Intrusion involves a plain-
tiff’s peace of mind and right to be left alone. The focus is on
whether the defendants penetrated ‘some zone of physical or
sensory privacy surrounding, or obtained unwanted access
to data about, the plaintiff,’ not whether the data was ever
obtained or disclosed.” (Emphasis added.)). We conclude that
a genuine issue of fact exists on the question whether TFS
intruded into plaintiff’s seclusion by entering the truck and
installing the GPS device and by its ongoing collection of
location data.
TFS’s third argument is that it is not liable, even if
it intruded, because no “private place” or area of “seclusion”
is involved in this case given that plaintiff was driving on a
public road and had no reasonable expectation of privacy. To
support its argument, TFS again relies on cases that are not
binding on this court. And, importantly, the Oregon Supreme
Court rejected that same argument in State v. Campbell, 306
Or 157, 159, 759 P2d 1040 (1988), where it was called upon
to decide “whether police use of a radio transmitter to locate
a private automobile to which the transmitter has been sur-
reptitiously attached is a ‘search’ or ‘seizure’ under Article I,
section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.” While Campbell was
decided in a different context, it is instructive here.
In Campbell, the state argued that attaching the
device was neither a search nor a seizure for two reasons:
First, no privacy interest was infringed “because the trans-
mitter disclosed only what any member of the public could
legitimately have observed” and, second, even if the trans-
mitter “enhanced” the police’s observations, “defendant had
no privacy interest outside ‘protected premises.’ ” Id. at 165.
In the state’s view, “the police [would] engage in a search
only if they monitor a transmitter while it is within ‘pro-
tected premises’ such as a home.” Id.As to the first argument, the court rejected the state’s
theory—that “information legitimately available through
one means may be obtained through any other means”—on
Cite as 301 Or App 825 (2020) 835
legal grounds by stating that “[t]he issue is not whether
what the police learned by using the transmitter * * * was
‘exposed to public view,’ but whether using the transmitter
is an action that can be characterized as a search.” Id. at
166-67. Therefore, the court concluded that the “use of a
radio transmitter to locate an object to which the transmit-
ter is attached cannot be equated with visual tracking.” Id. at
171-72 (emphasis added). The court also rejected the state’s
second argument—that only government actions “that
observe conduct or objects within ‘protected premises’ are
searches, [because] * * * it is only within ‘protected prem-
ises’ that an individual has a privacy interest protected by
Article I, section 9.” Id. at 167. The court explained that
“the rules laid down for the government by Article I, sec-
tion 9, must be rules that the government is capable of fol-
lowing. Using a transmitter is either a search or it is not.
Whether using the transmitter is a search cannot depend
upon the fortuity of where the transmitter happens to be
taken by the person under observation. In order to decide
whether the government has searched, we must look to the
nature of the act asserted to be searched.”
Id. at 170. The court concluded that the act of attaching the
transmitter was a search, in part, because,
“[w]ith respect to the use of radio transmitters to locate
objects and people, it is not even possible to ascertain
whether the use is directed at a ‘protected premise’ until
after the object or person is located. Learning the loca-
tion of the object or person is, after all, the purpose of the
device.”
Id. at 169-70.
Although the court announced those principles in a
different legal context, they logically apply to this invasion
of privacy case. We look to these principles not only because
of their rational clarity, but also because “[g]overnment scru-
tiny aside, individual freedom from scrutiny is determined
by social and legal norms of behavior, such as trespass laws
and conventions against eavesdropping”—that is, the two
analyses inform each other. Id. at 170 (emphasis added);
see also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 US 83, 88, 119 S Ct 469,
142 L Ed 2d 373 (1998) (“[I]n order to claim the protection
836 Reed v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp.
of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate
that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place
searched, and that his expectation is reasonable; i.e., one
that has ‘a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either
by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to
understandings that are recognized and permitted by soci-
ety.’ ” (Emphasis added.)); State v. Lien/Wilverding, 364 Or
750, 759-60, 441 P3d 185 (2019) (although Article I, section 9,
rights are “not defined by private property or contractual
rights,” they “may inform the analysis in a given case”);
Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 47 Cal 4th 272, 286, 211 P3d
1063, 1072 (2009) (“As to the first element of the common
law tort, the defendant must have ‘penetrated some zone
of physical or sensory privacy * * * or obtained unwanted
access to data’ by electronic or other covert means, in vio-
lation of the law or social norms.”).5 Just because the data
recorded by the GPS device was not used does not mean that
the secret installation of the device onto plaintiff’s leased
vehicle was not an invasion of his privacy. An issue of mate-
rial fact remains for a jury to decide whether, under the cir-
cumstances of this case, the installation of the GPS device
amounted to an intrusion into a private place.
Finally, TFS disputes that its actions would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, a critical element of
the tort. “In determining whether the defendant’s conduct
was tortious, the fact that it constituted an unlawful tres-
pass is only one factor to be considered.” Magenis v. Fisher
Broadcasting, Inc., 103 Or App 555, 562, 798 P2d 1106(1990). A jury may find other factors relevant to whether
the defendant’s conduct was “highly offensive,” such as “the
extent of the intrusion, the context, conduct and circum-
stances surrounding the intrusion, the defendant’s motives,
the setting into which defendant intruded and the plaintiff’s
expectation of privacy.” Id.TFS argues that the context and circumstances of
this case include the complaints and concerns of plaintiff’s
coworkers, plaintiff’s location outside of Estes’s house, and
the then-recent shootings at the Clackamas Town Center
5
We acknowledge that Hernandez explicitly “sidestepped cases” involving
government searches. 47 Cal 4th at 294 n 9, 211 P3d at 1078.
Cite as 301 Or App 825 (2020) 837
and Sandy Hook Elementary School. TFS argues that its
“only motive was to protect its workforce” and that it took a
“narrowly tailored approach” to carry out that “obligation.”
TFS cites Hernandez, 47 Cal 4th at 295, 211 P3d at 1078, to
argue that, as a matter of law, its actions could not be highly
offensive to a reasonable person. But, unlike Hernandez,
the device in this case was installed after the employment
relationship ended. The case before us is not about the rea-
sonableness of an employer’s HR process designed to pro-
tect its workforce from internal safety threats. This case is
about the steps TFS took after it identified safety concerns
involving plaintiff and terminated him from employment.
Had TFS reported its ongoing safety concerns to the police
at that point, a warrant would have been necessary before
officers could place any sort of tracking device on plaintiff’s
truck. A jury might reasonably conclude that TFS’s covert
placement of the GPS device was highly offensive.
Viewing the summary judgment record in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is evidence
from which a jury could find that the covert installation of a
GPS device on a vehicle intended for plaintiff’s exclusive use
is an intentional physical intrusion and that it was highly
offensive. The trial court erred in granting summary judg-
ment in favor of TFS.
We now address Capitol’s motion for summary judg-
ment. Plaintiff seeks to hold Capitol liable on a theory of
civil conspiracy.
“A civil conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons
by concerted action to accomplish an unlawful purpose,
or to accomplish some purpose not in itself unlawful by
unlawful means. It is not a separate tort or basis for recov-
ery but, rather, a theory of mutual agency under which a
conspirator becomes jointly liable for the tortious conduct
of his or her coconspirators. To establish a civil conspiracy,
petitioners must establish (1) Two or more persons * * *;
(2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of the minds
on the object or course of action; (4) one or more unlaw-
ful overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate result
thereof.”
Osborne v. Fadden, 225 Or App 431, 436-37, 201 P3d 278,
rev den, 346 Or 213 (2009) (internal citations and quotation
838 Reed v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp.
marks omitted). Plaintiff has not presented evidence to sup-
port such a theory of liability. While the GPS was installed
on the truck at Capitol’s service center, the record contains
no evidence that Capitol knew about or participated in its
installation. TFS admitted that it procured and installed
the GPS device and denied that Capitol had any involvement
with that. No evidence was presented to support a meeting
of the minds to establish a civil conspiracy or the underlying
tort of invasion of privacy. We conclude that the evidence
viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff reveals no
genuine issue of material fact. Capitol was entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment to TFS but did not err in
granting summary judgment to Capitol.
Reversed and remanded as to Toyota Motor Credit
Corporation and Toyota Financial Services; otherwise
affirmed.