State v. Dickey ( 2021 )

501
Submitted May 26, 2020, reversed November 3, 2021
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ROBERT MATTHEW DICKEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Multnomah County Circuit Court
18CR19522; A168055
500 P3d 688
Defendant appeals a judgment convicting him of giving false information to a
peace officer, ORS 162.385(1)(a). Defendant contends that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that, to obtain a convic-
tion under ORS 162.385(1)(a), the state must prove, as an element of the offense,
that some provision of ORS chapter 153 gave the officer to whom he provided
false information actual authority to cite him. He further argues that the officer
in this case, who testified that he was acting under the authority of ORS 153.042,
lacked actual authority to cite him because he did not personally observe the
conduct related to the citation. The state implicitly acknowledges that the officer
did not observe the conduct, but contends that the officer did have actual author-
ity because he was working “in tandem” with a fare inspector that observed the
conduct and had authority to issue a citation under ORS 153.042. Held: The trial
court erred. By its plain terms, ORS 153.042(1)’s grant of authority to issue cita-
tions is officer specific; it is insufficient that an officer reasonably believes con-
duct constituting a violation has occurred based on observations of another offi-
cer. Thus, the officer in this case did not have authority under a provision of ORS
chapter 153, as required for a conviction under ORS 162.385(1)(a).
Reversed.
Andrew M. Lavin, Judge.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Kristin A. Carveth, Deputy Public Defender,
Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Christopher Page, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before DeVore, Presiding Judge, and DeHoog, Judge, and
Mooney, Judge.
502 State v. Dickey
DeHOOG, J.
Reversed.
Mooney, J., dissenting.
Cite as 315 Or App 501 (2021) 503
DeHOOG, J.
A jury found defendant guilty of giving false infor-
mation to a peace officer as defined by ORS 162.385(1)(a).
That provision states, in relevant part:
“A person commits the crime of giving false information
to a peace officer in connection with a citation * * * if the
person knowingly uses or gives a false or fictitious name,
address, or date of birth to any peace officer when:
“(a) The peace officer is issuing or serving the person a
citation under authority of * * * ORS chapter 153[.]”
Defendant appeals, arguing that, to obtain a conviction
under that provision of ORS 162.385, the state must prove,
as an element of the offense, that some provision of ORS
chapter 153 gave the officer to whom he provided false infor-
mation actual authority to cite him. On appeal, as at trial,
defendant argues that no provision of that chapter autho-
rized that officer to issue a citation under the circumstances
of this case. He therefore contends that he was entitled to a
judgment of acquittal on that charge. For the reasons that
follow, we agree and reverse.
In reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment of
acquittal (MJOA), we view “the evidence in the light most
favorable to the state” to determine whether “a rational trier
of fact, making reasonable inferences, could find the essen-
tial elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State
v. Hedgpeth, 365 Or 724, 730, 452 P3d 948 (2019) (internal
quotation marks omitted); State v. Peterson, 309 Or App 31,
34, 482 P3d 68 (2021). In this case, the relevant facts are
few and, for purposes of appeal, undisputed. Defendant was
a passenger on a MAX train when a TriMet fare inspec-
tor, Coryell, asked him for proof that he had paid the fare,
which defendant could not provide. Defendant also did not
present proof of his identity at that time. Rather, when
Coryell asked defendant for his name, he began to provide
one name before “correct[ing] himself” and giving another.
That caused Coryell to suspect that defendant had given
him a false name, and he contacted Portland Police Officer
Helfrich to assist him with establishing defendant’s true
identity. From another location, Helfrich searched for the
name that defendant had given Coryell, but he was unable
504 State v. Dickey
to find a match in the police database. Helfrich then met
up with Coryell and defendant, who got off the MAX train
at the next station, where Helfrich impressed upon defen-
dant the importance of giving accurate information so that
a citation could be issued. Helfrich then asked defendant his
name.
As with Coryell, defendant gave Helfrich one name
before “correct[ing]” himself and giving another, for which
again Helfrich could find no record. Ultimately, Helfrich
was able to determine defendant’s true name using one
of a substantial number of identification cards that defen-
dant had in his possession. Using that name, Coryell issued
defendant a citation for the TriMet fare violation, as autho-
rized by ORS 153.042.1 Based upon that sequence of events,
the state subsequently charged defendant with giving false
information to a peace officer, ORS 162.385(1)(a).
At trial, the state conceded that, as a fare inspector,
Coryell was not a “peace officer” for purposes of the false-
information statute, and the trial court instructed the jury
accordingly. Helfrich testified, however, that he too had
authority to issue violation citations under ORS 153.042.
In arguing for a judgment of acquittal, defendant did not
dispute that, as a general matter, Helfrich was an “enforce-
ment officer” within the meaning of that provision. But here,
defendant argued, he was entitled to an acquittal because,
despite Helfrich’s authority to issue citations for violations
taking place in his presence, Helfrich did not have authority
to issue the citation in this case. That is, because defendant
had committed the fare violation in Coryell’s presence, not
Helfrich’s, ORS 153.042 did not authorize Helfrich to cite
defendant for that offense. It followed, defendant reasoned,
that, at the time he gave Helfrich a false name, Helfrich was
not “issuing or serving [defendant] a citation under author-
ity of * * * ORS chapter 153[.]”
1
ORS 153.042(1) authorizes the issuance of a citation for conduct constitut-
ing a violation under that chapter and provides, in relevant part:
“[A]n enforcement officer may issue a violation citation only if the conduct
alleged to constitute a violation takes place in the presence of the enforce-
ment officer and the enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe
that the conduct constitutes a violation.”
Cite as 315 Or App 501 (2021) 505
The trial court ultimately denied defendant’s
MJOA.2 The court reasoned that Helfrich and Coryell “were
working essentially in tandem to issue the same citation[.]”
On appeal, the state endorses the trial court’s reasoning.
Defendant, on the other hand, contends that the trial court’s
reasoning is inconsistent with the plain text of ORS 162.385
and therefore cannot be what the legislature intended when
it enacted that provision. We agree with defendant’s reading
of ORS 162.385.
“When legal disputes are encompassed in the argu-
ments for and against a motion for judgment of acquit-
tal, we resolve them as we would any other legal ques-
tion[.]” State v. Turnidge (S059155), 359 Or 364, 455, 374
P3d 853 (2016), cert den, ___ US ___, 137 S Ct 665 (2017).
And because the legal issue at the core of defendant’s MJOA
requires us to construe ORS 162.385(1)—and, to a lesser
degree, ORS 153.042—we follow the familiar Gaines meth-
odology of statutory construction. State v. Gaines, 346 Or
160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009) (evaluating statutory text
in context, considering any helpful legislative history, and
turning to canons of construction when necessary). Applying
those principles, we conclude that the trial court incorrectly
construed the applicable statutes and, accordingly, erred in
denying defendant’s MJOA.
As a starting point for our analysis, we note that
the state does not dispute that the phrase “under authority
of * * * ORS chapter 153” establishes an element that it must
make out as part of its case. Nor does the state dispute that,
to satisfy that element, it must establish that someone had
actual authority under chapter 153 to cite defendant for a
violation. Finally, the state concedes that the only potential
source of actual authority for the citation at issue in defen-
dant’s case is ORS 153.042(1), which provides, in relevant
part:
“[A]n enforcement officer may issue a violation citation only
if the conduct alleged to constitute a violation takes place
2
Initially, in light of the state’s theory that Helfrich was the relevant officer
for purposes of ORS 153.042, the trial court allowed the state to reopen its case,
at which time Helfrich testified that his authority to issue violation citations
came exclusively from ORS 153.042.
506 State v. Dickey
in the presence of the enforcement officer and the enforce-
ment officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the con-
duct constitutes a violation.”
(Emphases added.) In so conceding, the state implicitly rec-
ognizes that an officer who does not observe conduct consti-
tuting a violation typically may not issue a citation under
that provision.3 And here, the state acknowledges, Helfrich
did not personally observe defendant engaging in the con-
duct that allegedly constituted a violation.
The state nonetheless contends that the trial court
did not err in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of
acquittal. At trial, the state argued that Helfrich was him-
self issuing the citation at issue and that he was doing so
“under authority of * * * ORS chapter 153.” On appeal, how-
ever, the state has shifted its argument slightly. Taking its
cue from the trial court’s ruling, the state now argues that
Coryell, the TriMet fare inspector, had actual authority to
cite defendant for a fare violation and that Helfrich was
working “in tandem” with Coryell to issue the citation under
authority that Coryell possessed, and not under Helfrich’s
own authority. The state therefore reasons that the evidence
was sufficient to convict defendant, because a rational jury
could find that defendant had given false information to a
peace officer—Helfrich—who had requested it “for the pur-
pose of issuing and serving a citation under the statutory
authority possessed by the transit officer,” Coryell. That
is, the state no longer contends that Helfrich had author-
ity under ORS 153.042 to cite defendant. Rather, the state
argues that, because Coryell had that authority, and the
jury could find that Helfrich was working with him, the evi-
dence was sufficient to satisfy the “under authority” element
of ORS 162.385(1)(a).
Before turning to the state’s working “in tan-
dem” theory, we first consider whether, as the state effec-
tively concedes, it was required to prove, as an element of
3
We recognize that ORS 153.042(1) refers to conduct that “takes place in
the presence” of an officer; that provision does not specifically require that the
officer “observe” the conduct. For ease of reading, we use the term “observe” in
this opinion, and, because it has no bearing on this case, we leave for another day
whether conduct might take place in an officer’s presence even if the officer does
not observe it.
Cite as 315 Or App 501 (2021) 507
the charged offense, that Helfrich issued or served a cita-
tion “under authority of * * * ORS chapter 153[.]” See ORS
162.385(1)(a). If the legal authority for the citation (or for
Helfrich’s issuance of it) is not an element that the state was
required to prove as part of its case, then it is immaterial
whether Helfrich was issuing a citation “under authority of
ORS chapter 153” within the meaning of ORS 162.385(1)(a).
We have not expressly decided that issue. In a dif-
ferent context, we considered whether there was probable
cause to arrest a defendant for violating ORS 162.385(1)
when he gave a false name to officers who, at the time, were
looking for a different person. State v. Allen, 222 Or App 71,
191 P3d 762, rev den, 345 Or 503 (2008). We explained that,
“[t]o demonstrate that a defendant violated ORS 162.385,
the state must show (1) that ‘the person knowingly uses
or gives a false or fictitious name, address or date of birth
to any peace officer’ and (2) that the officer asked for that
information for the purpose of ‘issuing or serving the per-
son a citation’ or ‘arresting the person on a warrant.’ ” 4
Id. at 77. Notably, in listing those elements of giving false
information to a peace officer in Allen, we omitted any sug-
gestion that, to prove a violation of ORS 162.385(1) in a case
involving a citation, the state must also prove that an officer
issued or served the citation “under authority of * * * ORS
chapter 153[,]” ORS 162.385(1)(a).5 Id. Our focus in Allen,
however, was on whether the officers that had detained the
defendant had been executing a warrant; they had not been,
and the officers therefore lacked probable cause to make an
arrest under the false-information statute. Id. As a result,
we had no reason to consider whether “under authority * * *
of ORS chapter 153” establishes a separate element that the
state must prove in a prosecution under ORS 162.385(1)(a),
4
At the time of the Allen decision, ORS 162.385(1)(b) (2007) amended by Or
Laws 2007, ch 771, § 1, made it a crime for a person to give false information to a
peace officer for purposes of the officer arresting the person on a warrant. That
paragraph has since been amended to require only that there be an outstanding
warrant for the person, whether or not the person is actively being arrested at the
time. That change does not affect our analysis.
5
Under ORS 162.385(1)(a), an officer may also be issuing or serving a cita-
tion “under authority of ORS 133.055 to 133.076.” In this case, however, only an
officer’s authority under ORS chapter 153 is at issue, so we focus on that chapter.
508 State v. Dickey
and our listing of the elements in that case provides little
guidance here.
One might suggest that, because whether some-
thing is “under authority” of a certain statute appears to
be a question of law, it cannot be an element that the state
must prove to the jury as the trier of fact. See State v. Kenny,
262 Or App 702, 705-06, 327 P3d 548 (2014) (noting with-
out expressly addressing trial court’s rationale that ques-
tion whether a citation was “issued under ORS 133.055 to
133.076” within the meaning of ORS 133.076 was a mat-
ter for the court to decide). But that does not appear to be
the case, or at least not inevitably so. In State v. Litscher,
207 Or App 565, 142 P3d 549 (2006), we considered whether
the defendant was entitled to a judgment of acquittal on a
burglary charge, where he had allegedly entered the vic-
tim’s home with the intent of violating a restraining order.
We concluded that, because the violation of a restraining
order was not a “crime” within the meaning of the burglary
statutes, ORS 164.205 to 164.225, the facts alleged in the
indictment and proved at trial were insufficient, as a mat-
ter of law, to convict the defendant for burglary. Id. at 569;
see also id. (whether violation of a restraining order con-
stituted a “crime” within meaning of ORS 164.225 was a
question of statutory construction). Thus, even though the
question whether a restraining order violation constituted a
“crime” was a legal issue for the trial court to decide, it was
incumbent on the state to prove facts to the jury sufficient
to establish, as an element, that the defendant had held the
requisite intent when he unlawfully entered or remained in
the victim’s home. See id. at 568-69.
The same analysis would seem to apply here.
Although the question of when a citation is deemed to have
been issued, served, or otherwise “under authority of * * *
ORS chapter 153” is a legal matter for the court to decide,
the question of whether the circumstances give rise to that
authority will almost always turn on predicate findings of
historical fact, which are certainly within the province of
the jury. As a result, the state’s apparent concession that it
must prove, as an element of its case, that Helfrich issued a
citation “under authority of” ORS chapter 153, appears well
taken.
Cite as 315 Or App 501 (2021) 509
The next question, then, is what exactly the state
was required to prove to satisfy the allegation in the
complaint—which tracks ORS 162.385(1)(a)—that the offi-
cer was issuing and serving defendant a citation “under
authority of ORS [chapter] 153.” According to defendant,
there must be evidence showing that Helfrich—the peace
officer to whom defendant gave false information but who did
not observe defendant’s unlawful conduct—possessed per-
sonal and actual authority to issue the citation.6 As noted,
the state does not appear to dispute that ORS 162.385(1)(a)
requires proof that someone possessed actual authority to
cite defendant; the state’s argument is that it need not have
been Helfrich that had that authority, because he was work-
ing with someone who did. We conclude otherwise.
Once again, ORS 162.385(1)(a) applies when a
“peace officer is issuing or serving [a] person a citation under
authority of * * * ORS chapter 153[.]” As a simple matter of
sentence structure, “under authority” may modify either (or
both) of two things: (1) the issuance or service of a citation;
or (2) the citation itself. Here it does not matter which of
those two things the phrase “under authority” is intended
to modify, because either conclusion leads to the same out-
come. That is, if it applies to the issuance of the citation,
defendant would be entitled to an acquittal because, as we
explain below, ORS 153.042 did not authorize Helfrich to
issue a citation under the circumstances. And if, instead, it
applies to the citation itself, defendant would still be entitled
to an acquittal because Coryell, and not Helfrich, ultimately
issued the citation. In our view, the state’s contrary under-
standing is not supported by the legislative history or the
applicable rules of statutory construction.
In seeking to determine the plain meaning—
and, therefore, the meaning most likely intended by the
legislature—of “under authority,” the following dictionary
definitions are helpful: “Under” commonly means “required
by : in accordance with : bound by,” “in conditions or cir-
cumstances of,” “attested or warranted by <issued [under]
the royal seal>,” and “subject to the bidding or authority of.”
6
Consistent with its position at trial, the state does not contend that Coryell
was a “peace officer” for purposes of the false information statute, ORS 162.385(1).
510 State v. Dickey
Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary (unabridged ed 2002)
at 2487. “Authority” means “justifying grounds : basis, war-
rant.” Id. at 146. Two things are apparent from those dictio-
nary definitions. One is that there is some definitional over-
lap between the words “under” and “authority,” as “under”
itself may be understood to mean “subject to the * * * author-
ity of.” Id. at 2487. The other, more significant observation
is that the most logical reading of those two words is that
they refer to citations that ORS chapter 153 renders effec-
tive, and not citations that might, if the facts were different,
have been effective. That is, as an examination of ORS
162.385(1)(a)’s plain text demonstrates, it applies to cita-
tions that are “bound by,” “in accordance with,” and “in con-
ditions or circumstances of” the provisions of ORS chapter
153, not those that might, under different circumstances, be
permitted by those provisions.
Thus, given the plain language of ORS 162.385(1)(a),
unless the state establishes that a citation issued by a
peace officer would be effective under ORS 153.042(1), the
state cannot satisfy the “under authority” element of ORS
162.385(1)(a). And to conclude, as the state suggests, that
ORS 162.385(1)(a) can apply to a citation that Coryell could
issue, even if Helfrich could not, would require us to deviate
from that plain meaning. Specifically, it would require us
to read ORS 162.385(1)(a) to apply when a “peace officer or
another person is issuing or serving a citation.” That under-
standing would require us to add words to the statutory
text that the legislature omitted, something we may not do.
See ORS 174.010 (in construing statutes, the court’s “office”
is “not to insert what has been omitted” from the statute).
Moreover, even if that were otherwise permissible, noth-
ing about the statutory context or any legislative history of
which we are aware supports such a construction.
Because there appears to be no justification for
deviating from the plain language of ORS 162.385(1)(a), we
turn to whether in fact a citation issued by Helfrich would
be effective under ORS 153.042(1). Again, ORS 153.042(1)
provides, in relevant part:
“[A]n enforcement officer may issue a violation citation only
if the conduct alleged to constitute a violation takes place
Cite as 315 Or App 501 (2021) 511
in the presence of the enforcement officer and the enforce-
ment officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the con-
duct constitutes a violation.”
(Emphases added.) By its terms, that provision gives “an”
officer authority to issue a violation citation such as the one
issued in this case. Id. However, it conditions that authority
on two things. First, an officer may issue a citation only if
the conduct being cited occurs in that officer’s presence. See
id. (authorizing issuance of a citation only if conduct occurs
in presence of “the” enforcement officer). Second, the officer
must have “reasonable grounds to believe that the conduct
constitutes a violation.” Id. Only the first of those two condi-
tions is at issue in this case.
Several other things are apparent from the lan-
guage of ORS 153.042(1). One is that the action it describes
closely parallels the action described in ORS 162.385(1)(a).
That is, the officer who may issue a citation under ORS
153.042(1) is, or so it seems, the officer whose issuance of
a citation may, under certain circumstances, give rise to
a charge of false information to a peace officer under ORS
162.385(1)(a). More specifically, ORS 162.385(1)(a) applies
when an officer is issuing a citation under ORS 153.042(1),
and, in turn, ORS 153.042(1) permits an officer to issue a
citation under specific circumstances. In that sense, the two
statutes join together seamlessly to form a whole, with one
statute describing permissible conduct by an officer, and
the other describing impermissible conduct by a suspect in
response.
Another thing evident from that language is that,
although it begins with the indefinite article “an,” the
action that ORS 153.042(1) authorizes is officer specific—
it does not purport to allow an officer to issue a citation
so long as conduct constituting a violation occurs in the
presence of some officer; it expressly authorizes the issu-
ance of a citation “only if the conduct alleged to constitute
a violation takes place in the presence of the enforcement
officer.” (Emphases added.) And, to the extent that one is
tempted to read the statute to permit—as the trial court’s
“in tandem” theory would require—one officer to issue a
citation based on a second officer’s observations, the final
512 State v. Dickey
requirement of the statute precludes that understanding.
That requirement states that the officer must have reason-
able grounds to believe that conduct constituting a violation
occurred. Id. Read together with the immediately preced-
ing language of the statute, it is evident that “the” officer
who must have reasonable grounds to believe a violation
occurred—so as to authorize the issuance of a citation—
must be “the” same officer in whose presence the conduct
occurred.
The final thing that is apparent from the statutory
text of ORS 153.042(1) is that its inverse also is true. In
other words, while an officer who observes a violation taking
place may cite a person for that conduct, an officer who does
not observe a violation may not issue a citation. The text
explicitly authorizes an officer to issue a citation “only if”
the conduct believed to constitute a violation occurs in the
presence of the officer issuing the citation; issuing a citation
for conduct that has occurred outside the officer’s presence,
therefore, cannot plausibly be understood to constitute issu-
ing a citation “under authority of * * * ORS chapter 153.”7
Applying ORS 162.385(1)(a) and ORS 153.042(1) as
we understand them, we conclude that the trial court erred
in denying defendant’s MJOA. First, as noted, the state does
not dispute that it must establish as an element of its case
that defendant was being issued a citation “under authority
of * * * ORS chapter 153.” See ORS 162.385(1)(a) (establish-
ing that requirement). As explained above, that concession
is well taken. Second, the state similarly concedes that it
must establish that at least some officer had actual author-
ity under ORS chapter 153 to issue defendant the citation
in this case; that concession, too, is well taken, as it is sup-
ported by the plain text of ORS 162.385(1)(a) and neither
the context nor legislative history of that provision support
a different understanding. Third, the state does not con-
tend that Helfrich had actual authority to issue the citation,
whether or not Coryell did.
Under those circumstances, the trial court’s—and,
belatedly, the state’s—theory that Helfrich was issuing a
7
As noted, the state does not contend that any other provision of ORS chap-
ter 153 provided authority for the citation at issue in this case.
Cite as 315 Or App 501 (2021) 513
citation under authority of ORS 153.042 “in tandem” with
Coryell cannot support defendant’s conviction. Accepting
that Coryell had authority under ORS 153.042(1) to cite
defendant, the relevant question under ORS 162.385(1)(a) is
whether Helfrich was a “peace officer * * * issuing” a “citation
under authority of * * * ORS chapter 153.” He was not. To
conclude that Helfrich was himself issuing the citation sim-
ply because he was helping Coryell—whom ORS 153.042(1)
authorized to issue the citation—would permit an officer to
do what ORS 153.042(1) prohibits: to issue a citation based
upon another officer’s observation of unlawful conduct. See
315 Or App at 511-12 (by its plain terms, ORS 153.042(1)’s
grant of authority to issue citations is officer specific; it is
insufficient that an officer reasonably believes conduct con-
stituting a violation has occurred based on observations of
another officer).
Ultimately, whether Helfrich was working with
Coryell or working alone, he did not observe conduct consti-
tuting a violation; it necessarily follows that ORS 153.042(1)
did not authorize him to issue a citation to defendant, and
further that he was therefore not “issuing or serving [defen-
dant] a citation under authority of * * * ORS chapter 153”
within the meaning of ORS 162.385(1)(a). The trial court
erred in concluding otherwise.
Reversed.
MOONEY, J., dissenting.
Defendant violated TriMet Code (TMC) 29.15 when
he failed to carry proof of payment while riding the MAX
Light Rail. That was not a crime. It was not even a traffic
infraction. When the fare inspector, Coryell, asked defen-
dant for his name, defendant gave the inspector a false
name. That was also not a crime. But it was another vio-
lation of the TMC and it did make it difficult for Coryell
to issue defendant an accurate citation. Coryell’s next step
was to contact the Portland Police Bureau (PPB) transit
division for assistance in correctly identifying defendant.
TriMet and the PPB had an ongoing contractual arrange-
ment under which PPB’s transit division regularly assisted
TriMet with code enforcement issues. PPB’s Officer Helfrich
514 State v. Dickey
responded and, according to his testimony, advised defen-
dant that, “[f]or the purposes of citation, I need your true
name and date of birth. If you lie about either one of those,
you can be arrested for the crime of furnishing false info
to the police for the purposes of citation.” Defendant then
provided Helfrich with a false name. The majority concludes
that, given the wording of the statutes in question, that was
not a crime. But, given our standard of review,1 I cannot
see my way clear to agree. In the end, the majority offered
one plausible—and even persuasive—interpretation of the
key statutory provisions. But it is not the only reasonable
interpretation. This may be one of those occasions when the
legislature will—and perhaps should—step in and clarify
its intent.
The majority accurately recites the relevant facts. I
would add that Helfrich responded to assist Coryell pursu-
ant to an existing contract between the two governmental
agencies specifically for the purpose of TMC enforcement.
That contractual relationship and the manner in which the
TMC is routinely enforced are facts that were before the
trial court when it concluded that Coryell and Helfrich were
working “in tandem.”2 Certainly, one reasonable inference
to draw from the intentional and collaborative law enforce-
ment efforts that occurred here is that the officers issued the
citation together. Indeed, the citation would not likely have
issued—at least not in defendant’s correct name—without
the joint efforts of the inspector and the officer.
The majority adheres to this court’s preference
for using Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
(unabridged ed 2002) to determine “the plain meaning” of
1
We review the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal to determine
whether the facts—viewed in the light most favorable to the state—support a
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Derry, 200 Or App 587, 589,
116 P3d 248 (2005), rev den, 340 Or 34 (2006).
2
At the close of the state’s evidence, defendant moved for a judgment of
acquittal on the basis that the state failed to produce evidence that Helfrich had
the authority to issue the citation. The court denied the motion, observing that
Helfrich and Coryell were “essentially working in tandem” for the purposes of
issuing the TriMet citation. The court concluded that, based on the evidence, a
rational juror could infer that defendant provided false information to Helfrich
when Helfrich was “issuing” defendant a citation “under the authority of * * *
ORS chapter 153.”
Cite as 315 Or App 501 (2021) 515
the key statutory language.3 See Jack L. Landau, Oregon
Statutory Construction, 97 Or L Rev 583, 653-54 (2019) (not-
ing preference for that dictionary). I would not restrict my
search for the “plain meaning” of words to one dictionary—
especially those words selected and passed into law by
Oregon’s citizen legislature. We are more likely to iden-
tify the “ordinary” usage of words by consulting more
than one dictionary and doing so also “avoids the possibil-
ity that dictionary selection affects [our conclusion].” Id. at
655. I would, thus, turn to the Oxford Advance Learner’s
Dictionary. I would select that online dictionary intended
for those teaching and learning American English because
it seems likely that it will provide insight into the basic and
ordinary usage of the words in question. To “issue” is to
“make something known formally” or to “give something to
somebody, especially officially.” Oxford Advanced Learner’s
Dictionary, https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/
definition/english/issue_2 (last visited July 7, 2021). The
word “under” is “used to say who or what controls, governs or
manages somebody/something.” Oxford Advanced Learner’s
Dictionary, https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/
definition/english/under_1?q=under (last visited July 7, 2021).
And, “authority” means “power,” “authority to do something,”
or “the power or right to do something.” Oxford Advanced
Learner’s Dictionary, https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.
com/us/definition/english/authority?q=authority (last visited
July 7, 2021).
In light of the recent addition of the phrase “in con-
nection with” to the text of subsection (1) of ORS 162.385,
which modifies the words “a citation or warrant” in the
context of paragraphs (a) and (b) of that subsection, I note
also that the word “connection” is defined to mean “3a : rela-
tionship or association in thought (as of cause and effect,
logical sequence, mutual dependence or involvement) <the
3
The textual dispute focuses on the language of ORS 162.385(1)(a):
“A person commits the crime of giving false information to a peace officer
in connection with a citation or warrant if the person knowingly uses or gives
a false or fictitious name, address or date of birth to any peace officer when:
“(a) The peace officer is issuing or serving the person a citation under
authority of ORS 133.055 to 133.076 or ORS chapter 153[.]”
(Emphases added.)
516 State v. Dickey
[connection] of intelligence and success> b : context, refer-
ence, occasion <in this [connection] the word has a differ-
ent meaning>[.]” Webster’s at 581. The phrase “in connection
with” is defined by Lexico, https://www.lexico.com/definition/
in_connection_with (last visited July 7, 2021), an online
Oxford dictionary of phrases, to mean “with reference to;
concerning.”
Considering those definitions in isolation and then
considering them together in the context of ORS 162.385(1)(a)
as written, I think a reasonable reading of ORS 162.385(1)(a)
is:
“(1) A person commits the crime of giving false infor-
mation to a peace officer concerning a citation * * * if the
person knowingly uses or gives a false or fictitious name,
address or date of birth to any peace officer when:
“(a) The peace officer officially makes known to or gives
the person a citation governed by or based upon * * * ORS
chapter 153.”
(Emphases added.) Under that reading of the statute, the
trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for
judgment of acquittal—even if one is not persuaded that
Coryell and Helfrich were working together to issue that
citation—because defendant gave Helfrich a false name
concerning an ORS chapter 153 (i.e., nontraffic) citation for
which Helfrich was gathering information and that Helfrich
officially made known to defendant at that time.
This case demonstrates the ambiguity of the perti-
nent statutory language and calls out for clarification. This
is why: This case began with an almost trivial violation—
one that may well have been more about economic hardship
than anything else. But, for whatever reason, defendant
escalated the situation when he lied to the enforcement
officer, setting into motion a series of additional steps that
required additional resources. Ultimately, when defendant
was told that he was speaking with a police officer concern-
ing a citation for the TMC violation and that it would be a
crime for him to give a false name to the officer, defendant
chose to give him a false name anyway. Surely, ORS 162.385
was intended to apply to that set of facts.
Cite as 315 Or App 501 (2021) 517
I note, finally, the importance of the most recent
legislative amendments to ORS 162.385. In 2003, House
Bill 2725 expanded the scope of ORS 162.385 to include pro-
viding false information to a police officer “who is attempt-
ing to serve an arrest warrant.” In 2017, House Bill 2987
amended ORS 162.385 by eliminating the specific purpose
requirement and replacing it with the more general phrase
“in connection with a citation or warrant.” It also extended
criminal liability to persons who provide false information
to officers in connection with outstanding warrants regard-
less of the officer’s intent with respect to the warrant at that
time. I doubt that the legislature intended for the statute
to be read so narrowly that the criminality of providing
false information to a police officer turns on what the offi-
cer observed, intended, or did, rather than on defendant’s
conduct and associated state of mind. But we are left with
the language the legislature selected. I would nevertheless
affirm the trial court to reach the result that, it seems to
me, aligns most closely with the legislature’s objective.
With due regard for my colleagues in the majority, I
dissent.