Dept. of Human Services v. A. H. ( 2022 )

65
Argued and submitted September 27, 2021, affirmed June 2, 2022
In the Matter of M. R. D. H.,
a Child.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Respondent,
and
M. R. D. H.,
Respondent,
v.
A. H.,
Appellant.
Josephine County Circuit Court
18JU04205; A175515
511 P3d 1133
Sarah E. McGlaughlin, Judge.
Kristen G. Williams argued the cause and filed the briefs
for appellant.
Christa Obold Eshleman argued the cause for respondent
M. R. D. H. Also on the brief was Youth, Rights & Justice.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Jona J. Maukonen, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent Department of Human
Services.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Shorr, Judge, and
Powers, Judge.
PER CURIAM
Affirmed.
66 Dept. of Human Services v. A. H.
PER CURIAM
Mother appeals from the permanency judgment
changing the case plan for her child, M, from reunification
to adoption.1 She has three primary arguments. First, she
argues that the juvenile court erred in entering the judg-
ment because it failed to include all the findings required by
ORS 419B.476. Mother acknowledges that she did not raise
that issue below but contends that she had no practical abil-
ity to do so because it did not arise until entry of judgment.
Second, mother asserts that the court erred by concluding,
as necessary to change the plan, that the reunification
efforts of the Department of Human Services (DHS) were
reasonable. Third, mother contends that the court erred
by ruling that there were no compelling reasons to relieve
DHS of its obligation to file a petition to terminate mother’s
parental rights to M. In the companion case addressing the
guardianship of M’s older siblings, C and L, Dept. of Human
Services v. A. H., 317 Or App 697, 505 P3d 1064 (2022), we
addressed and rejected mother’s first two arguments that
she also makes here. Because those same facts and find-
ings applied to the permanency judgment entered for M,
we adopt those facts and findings here and write only to
address mother’s third argument. As to that argument, we
conclude the court did not err by ruling that there were no
compelling reasons to relieve DHS of its obligation to file a
petition to terminate mother’s parental rights. Accordingly,
we affirm.
This case involves one of mother’s five children, M.
M and three other children, C, L, and J, were removed from
the custody of mother and father based on their treatment
of J and an older half-brother who lived out of state.2 We
previously set out the pertinent facts that apply here, in the
companion case, A. H. and, thus, we do not repeat them. For
purposes of the argument that we address in this case, we
set out the following relevant findings of the court:
“And so given [the children’s] need for permanency and
that they have [sic] that high need a year and a half ago,
1
Father is not a party to this appeal.
2
Mother separately appealed the permanency judgment as to C and L, which
we affirmed. A. H., 317 Or App at 699.
Cite as 320 Or App 65 (2022) 67
which has not diminished in the year and a half since those
evaluations, I do find that the reasonable amount of time
would be a very short, short period. It would have to be
something where the court could say, you know, the parents
are on the cusp of becoming safe, or the home environment
is on the cusp of manifesting so that the children could be
placed in that in a very short period of time. I don’t find
that that’s the situation that we have here. I don’t find that
either parent has made sufficient progress to allow the
children to return to their home safely now.
“* * * * *
“And then because I find that the children have such a
high need of permanency, I don’t find that further efforts
would make it possible for them to return home safely
within a reasonable amount of time.
“* * * * *
“Mother needs that kind of intensive counseling neces-
sary for her to develop insight into her relationship with
[f]ather and to develop the skills that will allow her to be
more protective of her children in a home environment
than protective of [f]ather and his psychological needs.
“Both evaluators went into detail about the type of
counseling this would take. * * * Clausel’s report also out-
lined the type of counseling that—or the type of topics that
should be covered in counseling. What happened here, and
this was raised by [mother’s attorney] in his closing too, is
that [m]other underwent over a year of counseling that was
largely ineffective at addressing the core issue, which is the
family dynamics. It addressed the sort of peripheral issue
of the anxiety and the depression around the situation and
around those unhealthy dynamics, but it didn’t address the
mechanism for harm for the children and so DHS’s argu-
ment at our last hearing was that’s why it was ineffective.”
The court also took into account M’s “need for per-
manency, her age, her strong bond to her foster parents, and
her desire into account” and changed her permanency plan
from reunification to adoption. The court incorporated its
oral findings into the written judgment.
In this case, mother asserts that the juvenile court
erroneously concluded that there was not a compelling reason
to forgo the plan of adoption because she was participating
68 Dept. of Human Services v. A. H.
in services that would make it possible for M to return
home within a reasonable time. DHS responds that the
court correctly found that there were no compelling rea-
sons to forgo the filing of a petition to terminate mother’s
parental rights to M. It asserts that mother did not demon-
strate that M could return home within a reasonable time.
M, who appears in this appeal, contends that the court
permissibly found that mother had not proven a compel-
ling reason to delay filing a termination of parental rights
petition.
We review for “whether there was evidence in the
record to support the juvenile court’s findings of fact upon
which its conclusion in each case that there was not a ‘com-
pelling reason’ was based.” Dept. of Human Services v.
S. J. M., 364 Or 37, 56-57, 430 P3d 1021 (2018). Mother had
the burden to prove the existence of a “compelling reason”
under ORS 419B.498(2) and ORS 419B.476(5)(d) that it is
in M’s best interest to delay terminating mother’s parental
rights. S. J. M., 364 Or at 53. Whether there is a “compel-
ling reason” to delay moving toward adoption for a child is
a “child-centered determination.” Dept. of Human Services
v. S. S., 283 Or App 136, 142, 388 P3d 1178 (2016) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Here, mother failed to establish a compelling rea-
son to forgo filing a petition to terminate her parental rights
to M and the evidence is sufficient to support the juvenile
court’s determination. We agree with the juvenile court that
a delay moving toward an adoption for M would be reason-
able if it “would be a very short, short period.” Given mother’s
progress, that is not feasible here. Mother was not success-
fully participating in services and continued to deny she
caused harm to any of her children. As Dr. Clausel and other
providers stated, in order for mother to make adequate prog-
ress, it was essential for her to acknowledge her role in the
harm done to her two oldest children and take accountabil-
ity for her role in the children’s removal. Yet, mother made
no progress towards those fundamental goals. Further, she
had not engaged with Family Care Collaborative, which
would have provided wraparound programming for the fam-
ily, and was offered to mother multiple times. Ultimately,
mother did not prove she participated in additional services
Cite as 320 Or App 65 (2022) 69
that would allow for M to safely return to her in a reason-
able amount of time.
Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s judg-
ment changing M’s plan from reunification to adoption.
Affirmed.