Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia Ex Rel. State Corporation Comm'n , 70 S. Ct. 927 ( 1950 )

Mr. Justice Black

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In an effort to protect its citizens from “unfairness, imposition or fraud” in sales of certificates of insurance and other forms of securities, the Virginia “Blue Sky Law” requires those selling or offering such securities to obtain a permit from the State Corporation Commission.¹ Applicants for permits must meet comprehensive conditions: they must, for example, provide detailed information concerning their solvency, and must agree that suits can be filed against them in Virginia by service of process on the Secretary of the Commonwealth.²

While violation of the Act is a misdemeanor punishable by criminal sanctions, § 6 provides another method for enforcement. After notice and a hearing “on the merits,” the State Corporation Commission is authorized to issue a cease and desist order restraining violations of the Act. The section also provides for service by registered mail where other types of service are unavailable “because the offering is by advertisement and/or solicitation through periodicals, mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, or other means of communication from beyond the limits of the State The highest court of Virginia rejected contentions that this section violates constitutional requirements of due process, and the case is properly here on appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2).

In this case cease and desist proceedings under § 6 were instituted by the State Corporation Commission against Travelers Health Association and against R. E. Pratt, as treasurer of the Association and in his personal capacity. Having received notice by registered mail only, they appeared “specially” for “the sole purpose of objecting to the alleged jurisdiction of the Commonwealth of Virginia and of its State Corporation Commission, and of moving to set aside, and quash service of summons The agreed stipulation of facts and certain exhibits offered by the state can be summarized as follows:

The appellant Travelers Health Association was incorporated in Nebraska as a nonprofit membership association in 1904. Since that time its only office has been located in Omaha, from which it has conducted a mail-order health insurance business. New members pay an initiation fee and obligate themselves to pay periodic assessments at the Omaha office. The funds so collected are used for operating expenses and sick benefits to members. The Association has no paid agents; its new members are usually obtained through the unpaid activities of those already members, who are encouraged to recommend the Association to friends and submit their names to the home office. The appellant Pratt in Omaha mails solicitations to these prospects. He encloses blank applications which, if signed and returned to the home office with the required fee, usually result in election of applicants as members. Certificates are then mailed, subject to return within 10 days “if not satisfactory.” Travelers has solicited Virginia members in this manner since 1904, and has caused many sick benefit claims to be investigated. When these proceedings were instituted, it had approximately 800 Virginia members.

The Commission, holding that the foregoing facts supported the state’s power to act in § 6 proceedings, overruled appellants’ objection to jurisdiction and their motion to quash service. The Association and its treasurer were ordered to cease and desist from further solicitations or sales of cértificates to Virginia residents “through medium of any advertisement from within or from without the State, and/or through the mails or otherwise, by intra- or inter-state communication, . . . unless and until” it obtained authority in accordance with the “Blue Sky Law.” This order was affirmed by the Virginia Court of Appeals. 188 Va. 877, 882, 51 S. E. 2d 263, 271.

Appellants do not question the validity of the Virginia law “to the extent that it provides that individual and corporate residents of other states shall not come into the State for the purpose of doing business there without first submitting to the regulatory authority of the State.” As to such state power see, e. g., Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539. Their basic contention is that all their activities take place in Nebraska, and that consequently Virginia has no power to reach them in cease and desist proceedings to enforce any part of its regulatory law. We cannot agree with this general due process objection, for we think the state has power to issue a “cease and desist order” enforcing at least that regulatory provision requiring the Association to accept service of process by Virginia claimants on the Secretary of the Commonwealth.

Appellants’ chief reliance for the due process contention is on Minnesota Assn. v. Benn, 261 U. S. 140. There a Minnesota association obtained members in Montana by the same mail solicitation process used by Travelers to get Virginia members. The certificates issued to Montana members also reserved the right to investigate claims, although the Court pointed out that Benn’s claim had not been investigated. This Court held that since the contracts were “executed and to be performed” in Minnesota, the Association was not “doing business” in Montana and therefore could not be sued in /Montana courts unless “consent” to Montana suits could be implied. The Court found the circumstances under which the insurance transactions took place insufficient to support such an implication.

But where business activities reach out beyond one state and create continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of another state, courts need not resort to a fictional “consent” in order to sustain the jurisdiction of regulatory agencies in the latter state. And in considering what constitutes “doing business” sufficiently to justify regulation in the state where the effects of the “business” are felt, the narrow grounds relied on by the Court in the Benn case cannot be deemed controlling.

In Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U. S. 53, 62, we recognized that a state has a legitimate interest in all insurance policies protecting its residents against risks, an interest which the state can protect even though the “state action may have repercussions beyond state lines . . . .” And in Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U. S. 313, 316, we rejected the contention, based on the Benn case among others, that a state’s power to regulate must be determined by a “conceptualistic discussion of theories of the place of contracting or of performance.” Instead we accorded “great weight” to the “consequences” of the contractual obligations in the state where the insured resided and the “degree of interest” that state had in seeing that those obligations were faithfully carried out. And in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 316, this Court, after reviewing past cases, concluded: “due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ”

Measured by the principles of the Osborn, Hoopeston and International Shoe cases, the contacts and ties of appellants with Virginia residents, together with that state’s interest in faithful observance of the certificate obligations, justify subjecting appellants to cease and desist proceedings under § 6. The Association did not engage in mere isolated or short-lived transactions. Its insurance certificates, systematically and widely delivered in Virginia following solicitation based on recommendations of Virginians, create continuing obligations between the Association and each of the many certificate holders in the state. Appellants have caused claims for losses to be investigated and the Virginia courts were available to them in seeking to enforce obligations created by the group of certificates. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, at 320.

Moreover, if Virginia is without power to require this Association to accept service of process on the Secretary of the Commonwealth, the only forum for injured certificate holders might be Nebraska. Health benefit claims are seldom so large that Virginia policyholders could afford the expense and trouble of a Nebraska law suit. In addition, suits on alleged losses can be more conveniently tried in Virginia where witnesses would most likely live and where claims for losses would presumably be investigated. Such factors have been given great weight in applying the doctrine of jorum non conveniens. See Gulj Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, 508. And prior decisions of this Court have referred to the unwisdom, unfairness and injustice of permitting policyholders to . seek redress only in some distant state where the insurer is incorporated.³ The Due Process Clause does not forbid a state to protect its citizens from such injustice.

There is, of course, one method by which claimants could recover from appellants in Virginia courts without the aid of substituted service of process: certificate holders in Virginia could all be garnished to the extent of their obligations to the Association. See Huron Corp. v. Lincoln Co., 312 U. S. 183, 193. While such an indirect procedure would undeniably be more troublesome to claimants than the plan adopted by the state in its “Blue Sky Law,” it would clearly be even more harassing to the Association and its Virginia members. Metaphysical concepts of “implied consent” and “presence” in a state should not be solidified into a constitutional barrier against Virginia’s simple, direct and fair plan for service of process on the Secretary of the Commonwealth.

We hold that Virginia’s subjection of this Association to the jurisdiction of that State’s Corporation Commission in a § 6 proceeding is consistent with “fair play and substantial justice,” and is not offensive to the Due Process Clause.

Appellants also contend that § 6 as here applied violates due process because the Commission order attempts to “destroy or impair” their right to make contracts in Nebraska with Virginia residents. Insofar as this contention can be raised in a special appearance merely to contest jurisdiction, it is essentially the same as the due process issue discussed above. For reasons just given, Virginia has power to subject Travelers to the jurisdiction of its Corporation Commission, and its cease and desist provisions designed to accomplish this purpose “can not be attacked merely because they affect business activities which are carried on outside the state.” Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, supra, 320-321. See also Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U. S. 53, 62. These two opinions make clear that Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, requires no different result.

Appellants concede that in the Osborn and Hoopeston cases we sustained state laws providing protective standards for policyholders in those states, even though compliance with those standards by the insurance companies could have repercussions on similar out-of-state contracts. It is argued, however, that those cases are distinguishable because they both involved companies which were “licensed to do business in the state of the forum and were actually doing business within the state . . . .” But while Hoopeston Canning Co. had done business in New York under an old law, it brought the case here to challenge certain provisions of a new licensing law with which it had to comply if it was to do business there in the future. Thus it was seeking the same kind of relief that appellants seek here, and for the same general purpose. What we there said as to New York’s power is equally applicable to Virginia’s power here.

It is also suggested that service of process on appellants by registered mail does not meet due process requirements. What we have said answers this contention insofar as it alleges a lack of state jurisdiction because appellants were served outside Virginia. If service by mail is challenged as not providing adequate and reasonable notice, the contention has been answered by International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, 320-321. See also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 U. S. 306.

The due process questions we have already discussed are the only alleged errors relied on in appellants’ brief,⁴ and appellants’ special appearance only challenged state jurisdiction and the service of process. We therefore have no occasion to discuss the scope of the Commission’s order, or the methods by which the state might attempt to enforce it.⁵

Affirmed.

1 Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia, 1928, c. 529, p. 1373, as amended, Acts of 1932, c. 236, p. 434; Michie’s 1942 Code of Virginia, § 3848 (47) et seq.

2 Michie §3848 (51), (55).

3 Lumbermen’s Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U. S. 407, 418, 419; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602, 619; cf. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 319.

4 One federal question suggested in the appellants’ statement of jurisdiction was that § 6 as interpreted by the state court infringed federal control of the mails delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 7 of the United States Constitution. But appellants’ brief on submission of the ease does not include this question in the “specifications of errors relied upon” and does not even mention that constitutional clause.

5 For examples of problems which might be raised by attempts to impose punishment for violation of the order, see Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U. S. 280, 284-285; cf. Hyatt v. Corkran, 188 U. S. 691, 712, 719. Section 6 itself provides no method for enforcement, except insofar as such stature might be attributed to its provision for giving a cease and desist order “publicity ... to the public through the press or otherwise as the commission may, in its discretion, determine to be advisable for the reasonable information and protection of the public.”