People v. Adams , 2013 IL App (1st) 111081 ( 2013 )

ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appellate Court
People v. Adams, 2013 IL App (1st) 111081
Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption LEIVANTE ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. First District, Sixth Division
Docket No. 1-11-1081
Filed August 23, 2013
Held The denial of defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive
(Note: This syllabus postconviction petition was reversed and the cause was remanded for
constitutes no part of further proceedings, since defendant presented exculpatory affidavits of
the opinion of the court three eyewitnesses of the murder of defendant’s former girlfriend and at
but has been prepared least two of the affidavits provided newly discovered evidence setting
by the Reporter of forth a colorable claim of defendant’s actual innocence.
Decisions for the
convenience of the
reader.)
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 03-CR-13790; the
Review Hon. Stanley J. Sacks, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Reversed and remanded.
Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, and Deborah K. Pugh, all of State
Appeal Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Anita M. Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg and
Brian K. Hodes, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court,
with opinion.
Justices Gordon and Reyes concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant Leivante Adams1 appeals from the denial of his motion to file a successive
petition for postconviction relief. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in
denying him leave to file because he presented a colorable claim of actual innocence based
on the exculpatory affidavits of three eyewitnesses. For the reasons that follow, we reverse
and remand for further proceedings.
¶2 Following a 2004 jury trial, defendant was found guilty of first degree murder and
sentenced to 45 years in prison. On direct appeal, defendant contended that the trial court
abused its discretion by admitting evidence of a prior crime, and that the State failed to prove
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence.
People v. Adams, No. 1-05-0908 (2006) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
In the course of doing so, we set forth the underlying facts of the case. Those facts will be
repeated here to some extent due to the nature of defendant’s postconviction claims.
¶3 Prior to trial, the court granted the State’s motion to present evidence of a March 20,
2003, domestic battery involving defendant and the victim, Raama Baker. Defendant had
pleaded guilty to this offense, and the order of protection referenced in the indictment was
issued as a result of this incident. The court specifically admitted the evidence to demonstrate
defendant’s animosity toward the victim, intent to harm or kill her, and motive. The court
found that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial value. At trial, the
State presented the protective order to the jury.
¶4 Larry Lewis, the victim’s boyfriend, testified with regard to the domestic battery. He
testified that on March 20, 2003, he was at a lounge with the victim. About 8:30 p.m., he
learned that the victim and defendant were outside fighting. When he went outside, he saw
defendant punching the victim in the face and broke up the fight. He then drove the victim
1
We note that the record includes several spellings of defendant’s first name, including
Leivaunte, Lei’vaunté, and Leivaunde.
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to his uncle’s house and called the police. The victim sustained a swollen eye, which he
identified in a photograph at trial.
¶5 Bonnie Baker McCain, the victim’s mother, testified that the victim and defendant had
been in a relationship a couple of years prior to her murder on May 15, 2003, and that they
had a daughter together. About 11:30 p.m. on May 15, 2003, Bonnie received a phone call
from Larry Lewis. Larry informed her that the victim had been attacked and was in the
hospital. At the hospital, Bonnie learned that the victim’s arm had been broken and that her
skull had been “bashed in.” She died the following day. Dr. Kendall Crowns, who performed
the autopsy on the victim, testified that she died as a result of homicidal assault injuries
consistent with being hit with a blunt object and from falling to the ground.
¶6 Terrence Whisby, defendant’s brother, testified that on May 15, 2003, he, his brother
Anthony Oliver, and his girlfriend, Kim Washington, were living with his mother, Barbara
Oliver, in Chicago. They were all home that night watching a basketball game. Defendant
and Toni Washington, the mother of defendant’s child, were visiting. About 11 p.m., Whisby
answered the doorbell, saw the victim walk by the house, and then returned to his bedroom.
About 20 minutes later, he heard arguing and went outside where he saw defendant on the
porch and the victim on the sidewalk. Defendant approached the victim and they walked
down the street together, yelling all the while. Defendant and the victim then started to
“tussle,” and the victim fell to the ground. After noticing that defendant had a stick in his
hand, Terrence ran toward defendant, who was “constantly” hitting the victim with the stick,
and pulled defendant away from her. The victim was lying on the ground motionless, and
blood was on the ground and on her face. After defendant dropped the stick, Terrence
retrieved it, took it home, washed it off, and gave it to Toni Washington. Defendant did not
return home that night.
¶7 Terrence acknowledged giving three different statements to the police between 10 a.m.
on May 17, 2003, and 9:40 p.m. on May 19, 2003, while he was being held at the police
station. In his final statement, Terrence substantially corroborated his trial testimony, except
for his statement that defendant hit the victim with a bat. When he testified before the grand
jury on June 5, 2003, he stated that defendant had a bat in his hands when he left the house.
He further testified that no threats or promises were made in exchange for his statement,
contrary to his testimony at trial, where he stated that the police threatened that he would not
be allowed to leave until he gave a signed statement. The assistant State’s Attorney (ASA)
who presented Terrence to the grand jury verified his grand jury testimony at trial.
¶8 Anthony Oliver, another brother of defendant, testified that about 11 p.m. on the night
in question, defendant left the house, then returned, saying that the victim “shouldn’t be
walking down the block.” Defendant’s mother went outside and told Anthony to call the
police. Anthony complied, telling them that there was a fight in the alley. Anthony did not
see defendant again that night, but the following day, he spoke to defendant on the telephone,
although he could not recall their conversation.
¶9 On May 21, 2003, however, Anthony testified before the grand jury that when defendant
called, he asked if the police had been asking questions. Defendant told Anthony that he
“snapped and started hitting [the victim] with the bat” because he warned her not to walk
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down his street anymore, and because she called him a “bitch” and said she would walk
anywhere she wanted. Anthony further testified that when he looked outside, he saw the
victim’s body lying on the ground, then saw defendant pull away in a car. The ASA who
presented Anthony to the grand jury verified his grand jury testimony at trial.
¶ 10 Kim Washington, Terrence’s girlfriend, testified that she was outside and saw the victim
walk down the street. Defendant, who was also outside, gave the victim “a warning,” then
followed her with a bat in his hand. Kim went back into the house to get shoes for
defendant’s mother, heard a “thump,” then saw the victim lying on the ground. Defendant
was standing next to the victim with the bat in his hands. When Terrence grabbed defendant,
defendant dropped the bat. Terrence picked it up and brought it inside the house.
¶ 11 On June 6, 2003, Kim testified before the grand jury that defendant came in the house
and said that the victim was not supposed to be on the block, then grabbed a bat from the
doorway. She then saw the victim lying on the ground and watched defendant hit her two or
three times with the bat. The ASA who presented Kim to the grand jury verified her grand
jury testimony at trial.
¶ 12 Barbara Oliver, defendant’s mother, testified that about 11 p.m. on the night in question,
defendant entered her bedroom and told her that the victim was on the block and was going
to call the police and attempt to have him arrested. Barbara told defendant to leave the house,
and defendant got in his car and left.
¶ 13 However, on June 5, 2003, Barbara testified before the grand jury that when the victim
walked down the block, she was standing on the porch and told the victim that she was not
supposed to be there. Defendant, who was in his car with Toni Washington, got out of the
car, entered the doorway to the house, and then left immediately. Barbara asked Kim
Washington, who was on the porch with her, to get her shoes. Then Barbara heard noises,
like someone was being hit with a bat. Barbara walked down the street and saw the bloodied
victim lying on the ground. Terrence, who had also been outside, grabbed defendant, and
Barbara told defendant to leave. Defendant drove away in his car, but called her later that
night to apologize. Barbara further testified that no promises or threats were made in
exchange for her testimony. The ASA who presented Barbara to the grand jury verified
Barbara’s grand jury testimony at trial.
¶ 14 Toni Washington, the mother of defendant’s son, testified that on the night in question,
she and defendant went out to his car to talk. At that time, they saw the victim walk by the
house. Defendant got out of the car, talked to the victim in front of the house, and then
walked down the street with her. After that, defendant drove away in his car and Toni drove
home in her car. Toni returned to the house minutes later to return a camcorder, at which
time Terrence gave her defendant’s gym bag. The bag contained a black garbage bag, which
she threw away without looking inside it.
¶ 15 On May 27, 2003, Toni testified before the grand jury that after defendant left the house,
he returned to retrieve a bat. Defendant walked down the street with the victim, carrying the
bat in his hand. When they reached an alley, he warned the victim that she was not supposed
to be on the block. They started to walk away from each other, but then defendant turned
around and hit the victim with the bat. Toni approached as defendant hit the victim with the
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bat six to seven times. Terrence retrieved the bat, brought it back to the house, washed it off,
and put it in a black bag. Toni left for about five minutes. When she returned, Anthony gave
her a black gym bag, which contained the bat. Toni drove back to her apartment and threw
the bag into a Dumpster outside of her complex.
¶ 16 Toni further testified that no promises or threats were made in exchange for her
testimony, contrary to her statement at trial that the police had promised not to charge her
with anything and had said she could see her son again if she cooperated. The ASA who
interviewed Toni and presented her to the grand jury, testified that Toni’s grand jury
testimony was not coerced. In addition, Toni’s attorney, Steven Weinberg, testified that he
accompanied Toni when she testified before the grand jury, and that prior to her testimony,
the State’s Attorney did not threaten her, nor did Toni complain that she was mistreated by
the police. Weinberg further testified that he made an agreement with the State’s Attorney
that if Toni told the truth, she would not be charged with hiding the murder weapon.
¶ 17 In his own defense, defendant testified that he had slept with the victim in 2001, but he
denied having a relationship or a child with her. He did admit, however, to occasionally
seeing her after their affair in the neighborhood or at the lounge. On March 20, 2003, he went
to the lounge and asked the victim, who was there, if she would step outside to talk to him
about problems she was having with his mother and his brother, Terrence. They eventually
began hitting each other, but the fight was broken up. Defendant went to his mother’s house,
and shortly thereafter, the victim and her boyfriend drove up and “slammed” into his
mother’s rental car. Defendant eventually turned himself in and pleaded guilty to domestic
battery.
¶ 18 Defendant testified that on the night in question, he was watching a basketball game at
his mother’s house. Afterwards, he and Toni Washington walked out to his car, which was
parked across the street, to discuss their son. They saw the victim walk by, then slow down
to “have words” with his mother and his brother Terrence, who were standing on the porch.
Defendant approached the victim and they walked south together, discussing the problems
she was having with Terrence and defendant’s mother. When they reached a vacant lot,
defendant turned around and walked back to the house. Defendant’s mother told defendant
and Toni to leave, and they did. Defendant denied that he had a baseball bat, hit the victim
with a bat, or that he murdered her. No other evidence was presented by the defense.
¶ 19 The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder. The trial court entered judgment
on the verdict. The court subsequently found defendant death-penalty eligible, but sentenced
him to 45 years’ imprisonment in light of the mitigating evidence presented.
¶ 20 In 2007, following our decision on direct appeal, defendant filed a pro se postconviction
petition alleging, among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move
to dismiss his indictment due to a speedy trial violation or to preserve the issue for appellate
review by raising it in a posttrial motion. Shortly thereafter, defendant filed a supplemental
pro se postconviction petition raising multiple claims of prosecutorial misconduct,
ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, and judicial bias. The trial court
summarily dismissed both the initial petition and the supplemental petition. Defendant
appealed, contending that he had set forth the gist of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial
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counsel based on counsel’s omissions with regard to speedy trial violations. We affirmed the
trial court’s judgment. People v. Adams, No. 1-07-3215 (2009) (unpublished order under
Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶ 21 In 2010, defendant filed a pro se petition for relief from judgment pursuant to section 2-
1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2010)). The trial court
dismissed the petition sua sponte. On appeal, we affirmed, but directed the clerk of the
circuit court to correct the mittimus to reflect the appropriate amount of presentence custody
credit. People v. Adams, 2011 IL App (1st) 101034-U.
¶ 22 In November 2011, defendant moved for leave to file a successive petition for
postconviction relief, arguing that the State failed to disclose both that his car was examined
for forensic evidence and the results of that testing. Defendant also argued that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain the results of the State’s forensic testing and for
failing to hire experts to conduct their own forensic examination of the car. The trial court
denied leave to file. We granted appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw as counsel and
affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. People v. Adams, 2013 IL App (1st) 120213-U.
¶ 23 In February 2011, defendant filed the instant motion for leave to file a successive
postconviction petition, in which he alleged actual innocence based on newly discovered
evidence in the form of affidavits of three potential witnesses identifying someone else as
the victim’s murderer. Defendant asserted that his supporting affidavits “would appear to be
‘newly discovered’ evidence that was not available to the petitioner at the time of the trial,
or when petitioner filed his initial petition for post-conviction relief.” He stated, “In addition,
the evidence could not have been discovered by the petitioner sooner through due diligence,
and the affidavits are material and non-cumulative and are of such conclusive character that
had the jury known of this evidence, this would probably change the result on retrial.”
Defendant further asserted that the affidavits could not have been discovered sooner through
due diligence “due to his incarceration.” In support of his petition, defendant attached
affidavits executed by Muhammad Williams, Brigette Rush, and Tijatta Williams.
¶ 24 In his affidavit, dated September 1, 2010, Muhammad Williams stated that between 11
p.m. and 12 a.m. on the night in question, he was driving past the scene of the crime when
he saw four or five people in the middle of the street. As he got closer, he saw “a man about
6’0”–6’1” in height, light brown complexion, with braids, beating someone on the ground
with a baseball bat.” Muhammad quickly turned down an alley and went home. He learned
the next day that someone had been killed at the location where he witnessed the beating, but
did not call the police. He explained that he did not feel he could have been of any help
because he did not know the perpetrator. According to Muhammad’s affidavit, months later,
he found out defendant had been arrested for the murder. He did not know defendant
“personally” but “did know of him” because he had seen defendant playing basketball at a
park. Muhammad averred that the man he saw commit murder “was definitely not”
defendant. Muhammad stated that he moved to California for a few years, and when he
moved back to Chicago, he found out defendant was in prison for the murder he had
witnessed. He still did not go to the police because he thought he could get into trouble for
not contacting them earlier. Muhammad stated that he was coming forward now because he
knew defendant was innocent and his conscience had been weighing on him.
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¶ 25 In an affidavit dated September 14, 2010, Brigette Rush averred that on the night in
question, she went to defendant’s mother’s home to get information about a job. Defendant’s
mother, Anthony Oliver, Kim Washington, and Terrence Whisby were in the house;
defendant and Toni Washington were sitting in defendant’s car. While Brigette was writing
down details about the job, someone began arguing outside of the house. Brigette saw
defendant’s mother go outside and heard her tell defendant to leave. Brigette stepped out
onto the porch and saw defendant get into his car and drive off. Terrence and the victim were
in the middle of the street, arguing. Defendant’s mother repeatedly told Terrence to come
inside, but he refused. The victim started walking down the street and Terrence followed her.
At this point, Brigette saw “Mike, Dominick and several other men who were friends of
Terrence” standing near the alley. Mike, who had a bat in his hands, walked up to the victim
and hit her over the head. The victim fell to the ground and Mike repeatedly hit her with the
bat. Then Mike dropped the bat, and he and “the other guys” ran from the scene. Terrence
picked the bat up from the ground and ran into the house with it. Brigette went into the house
to get her keys and purse. Terrence grabbed her by the throat, put a gun to her head, and said,
“Keep your mouth shut or the same thing will happen to you.” After Terrence let go of her
neck, Brigette left immediately.
¶ 26 Brigette stated that Chicago police detectives contacted her about the murder and that
defendant and “several people involved in his case” asked her to come forth and tell what she
witnessed. However, due to Terrence’s threat and out of fear for her own and her children’s
lives, she refused to cooperate with the police or get involved. Brigette stated, “Despite still
being afraid and fearful of Terrence and his friends I’ve decided to come forward and tell
what happened because it’s the right thing to do.”
¶ 27 Tijatta Williams, in an affidavit dated December 7, 2010, stated that on the night in
question, she was walking past the scene of the crime and saw a crowd of people in the
middle of the street near the alley. She saw “Mike” walk up to a woman and strike her over
the head with a bat. The woman fell and Mike struck her several more times. When the
crowd began to disperse, Tijatta left the area. Tijatta stated that she did not report what she
saw to the police because she was scared of being killed by Mike if she did so. She also
stated that she did not see defendant at the scene on the night of the beating. At an
unspecified time, she ran into defendant’s sons and their mother at a mall, felt bad for them,
and felt compelled to tell about the incident that put defendant in prison.
¶ 28 The trial court denied defendant’s motion to file a successive postconviction petition.
¶ 29 On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying him leave to file
because he presented a colorable claim of actual innocence based on the exculpatory
affidavits of Muhammad Williams, Brigette Rush, and Tijatta Williams, who all attested that
they saw someone other than defendant commit the murder of which he was convicted.
Noting that his conviction was based solely on the testimony of eyewitnesses, defendant
argues that the affiants’ potential testimony would have cast strong doubt on his guilt by
identifying a different perpetrator. Defendant asserts that the affidavits presented newly
discovered, material, non-cumulative evidence that would most likely change the result on
retrial.
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¶ 30 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2010))
contemplates the filing of only one postconviction proceeding. People v. Edwards, 2012 IL
111711, ¶ 22. However, our supreme court has provided two bases upon which the bar
against successive proceedings may be relaxed. Id. The first basis is when a defendant
establishes “cause and prejudice” for failing to raise the claim earlier. Id. The second is the
“fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception, under which the defendant must show actual
innocence. Id. ¶ 23. When a defendant claims actual innocence, the question is whether his
motion and supporting documentation set forth a colorable claim; that is, whether they raise
the probability that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted
him in light of the new evidence. Id. ¶¶ 24, 31, 33. The evidence supporting the claim of
actual innocence must be (1) newly discovered; (2) material and not merely cumulative; and
(3) of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on retrial. Id. ¶ 32.
We review the denial of leave to file a successive petition de novo. People v. Edwards, 2012
IL App (1st) 091651, ¶ 25.
¶ 31 As to the first element, evidence is considered “newly discovered” if it has been
discovered since trial and if the defendant could not have discovered it sooner through due
diligence. People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 334 (2009). Defendant asserts that the affidavits
of Muhammad Williams, Brigette Rush, and Tijatta Williams constitute newly discovered
evidence because they could not have been discovered prior to trial. He argues that because
he left the scene of the crime before it occurred, he would not have known that these
witnesses happened to be present at the time of the offense, and that he had no way of
knowing what these eyewitnesses had seen until they voluntarily came forward long after the
crime had occurred. The State maintains that while the affidavits may have been executed
by new sources, they do not present any new facts that were unknown to defendant prior to
trial. With regard to Brigette Rush, the State further argues that defendant knew about her
at the time of his trial, as evidenced by her statement that defendant had asked her to come
forth but she refused to get involved. Defendant counters that Brigette’s lack of cooperation
indicates that he was not privy to her knowledge of the crime.
¶ 32 We first address the affidavits provided by Muhammad Williams and Tijatta Williams.
Because Brigette Rush, unlike Muhammad and Tijatta, averred that she was known to
defendant prior to trial, we will consider her affidavit separately.
¶ 33 Taking the information contained in Muhammad’s and Tijatta’s affidavits as true, the
circumstance that they each passed by the scene of the crime and witnessed someone other
than defendant committing the murder was not discovered until years after the offense, when
they came forward and signed their affidavits in 2010. Prior to Muhammad and Tijatta
coming forward, defendant would not have had any reason to seek them out. According to
defendant’s trial testimony, he was not at the scene at the time the victim was beaten.
Therefore, he would not have known Muhammad and Tijatta had happened to pass by and
witness the crime. Further, nothing indicates that either of these witnesses spoke with
defendant or the police about what they observed. In these circumstances, we find that the
evidence was discovered since trial and could not have been discovered earlier through due
diligence.
¶ 34 The second requirement for a successful claim of actual innocence is that the newly
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discovered supporting evidence be material and not merely cumulative. Evidence is deemed
cumulative if it does not add anything to what was previously before the jury. Ortiz, 235 Ill.
2d at 335. Evidence is not cumulative if it would create new questions in the mind of the trier
of fact. People v. Williams, 392 Ill. App. 3d 359, 369 (2009).
¶ 35 Here, viewing the facts alleged in Muhammad’s and Tijatta’s affidavits as true, evidence
that someone other than defendant killed the victim and that defendant was not present at the
scene is certainly material. See People v. Lofton, 2011 IL App (1st) 100118, ¶ 38. Both
affidavits concern the ultimate issue of whether defendant was the person who beat the
victim to death. The affidavits would also add to what was previously before the jury in that
the jury had heard defendant’s testimony that he left the scene before the victim was killed,
but had heard no evidence pointing to the identity of an alternate perpetrator. Muhammad’s
and Tijatta’s attestations exonerating defendant are sufficient to create a new question of
defendant’s innocence in the eyes of the jury. See Williams, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 370. Thus,
defendant has made a showing that the evidence contained in Muhammad’s and Tijatta’s
affidavits is material and not merely cumulative.
¶ 36 The third and final requirement is that the evidence must be so conclusive that it would
probably change the result on retrial. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 32. Evidence of actual
innocence must support total vindication or exoneration, not merely present a reasonable
doubt. Lofton, 2011 IL App (1st) 100118, ¶ 40; People v. Green, 2012 IL App (4th) 101034,
¶ 36. Where the statement of a witness is both exonerating and contradicts a State witness,
it can be capable of producing a different outcome on retrial. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d at 336-37.
¶ 37 In the instant case, defendant testified at trial that he walked and talked with the victim,
but left the area before she was beaten. Both Muhammad and Tijatta corroborate this version
of events, which would exonerate defendant. Muhammad stated that the man he saw commit
murder was not defendant and offered a physical description of the perpetrator. Tijatta
identified the murderer as “Mike,” and even stated that she did not see defendant at the
scene. The evidence offered by Muhammad and Tijatta would be capable of changing the
result on retrial because, where there was no physical evidence implicating defendant and
defendant did not confess, the evidence of defendant’s innocence would be stronger when
weighed against the contradictory testimony given by the State’s eyewitnesses. See Ortiz,
235 Ill. 2d at 337.
¶ 38 The State maintains that defendant’s supporting affidavits would not probably change the
result on retrial because they contradicted his own trial testimony. Specifically, the State
notes that defendant testified that he walked and talked with the victim, but left the area
before she was beaten, and that Muhammad and Tijatta attested that they passed by the
murder scene, but “contrary to defendant’s testimony, neither of these affiants saw defendant
on the street that night.” We disagree with the State that a contradiction exists. According
to defendant’s testimony, he left the scene before the victim was beaten. Muhammad and
Tijatta averred that they passed by the scene during the beating. Taking the statements as
true, Muhammad and Tijatta could have arrived at the scene after defendant left. The State’s
argument is unpersuasive.
¶ 39 Having determined that Muhammad’s and Tijatta’s affidavits provide newly discovered
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evidence, we need not resolve the question of whether Brigette’s affidavit, by itself,
constitutes newly discovered evidence. Defendant has set forth a colorable claim of actual
innocence based on two of the attached affidavits. That is, defendant’s successive
postconviction petition has raised the probability that it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence, if credible. See
Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 24. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying leave to file the
successive petition. We reverse and remand for further postconviction proceedings.
¶ 40 For the reasons explained above, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Cook
County.
¶ 41 Reversed and remanded.
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