Nyquist v. Mauclet , 97 S. Ct. 2120 ( 1977 )

MR. Justice Blackmun

delivered the opinion of the Court.

New York, by statute, bars certain resident aliens from state financial assistance for higher education. N. Y. Educ. Law § 661 (3) (McKinney Supp. 1976). This litigation presents a constitutional challenge to that statute.

I

New York provides assistance, primarily in three forms, to students pursuing higher education. The first type is the Regents college scholarship. These are awarded to high school graduates on the basis of performance in a competitive examination. §§ 605 (1) and 670. Currently, in the usual case, a recipient is entitled to $250 annually for four years of study without regard to need. §§ 670 (2) and (3)(b).¹ The second and chief form of aid is the tuition assistance award. These are noncompetitive; they are available to both graduate and undergraduate students “enrolled in approved programs and who demonstrate the ability to complete such courses.” §§ 604 (1) and 667 (1). The amount of the award depends on both tuition and income. The ceiling on assistance was $600, although it has been increased for undergraduates to $1,500. §1 667 (3) and (4). The third form of assistance is the student loan. §§ 680-684. The loan is guaranteed by the State; a borrower meeting certain income restrictions is entitled to favorable interest rates and generally to an interest-free grace period of at least nine months after he completes or terminates his course of study. §§ 680, 682 (2) and (3).-²

There are several general restrictions on eligibility for participation in any of these programs. § 661. For example, there is a modest durational residency requirement. § 661 (5).³ The instant dispute, however, concerns only § 661 (3). That subsection provides:

“Citizenship. An applicant (a) must be a citizen of the United States, or (b) must have made application to become a citizen, or (c) if not qualified for citizenship, must submit a statement affirming intent to apply for United States citizenship as soon as he has the qualifications, and must apply as soon as eligible for citizenship, or (d) must be an individual of a class of refugees paroled by the attorney general of the United States under his parole authority pertaining to the admission of aliens to the United States.”⁴

The statute obviously serves to bar from the assistance programs the participation of all aliens who do not satisfy its terms. Since many aliens, such as those here on student visas, may be precluded by federal law from establishing a permanent residence in this country, see, e. g., 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (a) (15) (F) (i); 22 CFR §41.45 (1976), the bar of § 661 (3) is of practical significance only to resident aliens. The Court has observed of this affected group: “Resident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the economy, serve in the Armed Forces, and contribute in myriad other ways to our society.” In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 722 (1973).

II

Appellee Jean-Marie Mauclet is a citizen of France and has lived in New York since April 1969. He has been a permanent resident of the United States since November of that year. He is married to a United States citizen and has a child by that marriage. The child is also a United States citizen. App. 49. Mauclet by affidavit stated: “Although I am presently qualified to apply for citizenship and intend to reside permanently in the United States, I do not wish to relinquish my French citizenship at this time.” ⁵ Id., at 50. He applied for a tuition assistance award to aid in meeting the expenses of his graduate studies at the State University of New York at Buffalo. Because of his refusal to apply for United States citizenship, his application was. not processed. Id., at 49-50.

Appellee Alan Rabinovitch is a citizen of Canada. He was admitted to this country in 1964 at the age of nine as a permanent resident alien. He is unmarried and, since his admission, has lived in New York with his parents and a younger sister, all of whom are Canadian citizens. He registered with Selective Service on his 18th birthday. He graduated in 1973 from the New York public school system. Id., at 68, 71. As a result of a commendable performance on the competitive Regents Qualifying Examinations, Rabinovitch was informed that he was qualified for, and entitled to, a Regents college scholarship and tuition assistance. He later was advised, however, that the offer of the scholarship was withdrawn since he intended to retain his Canadian citizenship. Id., at 69, 25. Rabinovitch entered Brooklyn College without financial aid from the State. He states that he “does not intend to become a naturalized American, but . . . does intend to continue to reside in New York.” Id., at 65.

Mauclet and Rabinovitch each brought suit in United States District Court (Mauclet in the Western District of New York and Rabinovitch in the Eastern District), alleging that the citizenship bar of § 661 (3) was unconstitutional. The same three-judge court was convened for each of the cases. Subsequently, it was ordered that the cases be heard together. App. 45. After cross motions for summary judgment, the District Court in a unanimous opinion ruled in appellees’ favor. It held that § 661 (3) violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in that the citizenship requirement served to discriminate unconstitutionally against resident aliens.⁶ 406 F. Supp. 1233 (WDNY and EDNY 1976). Its enforcement was enjoined in separate judgments. App. 103, 106.

Appellants — the various individuals and corporate entities responsible for administering the State’s educational assistance programs — challenge this determination.⁷ We noted probable jurisdiction. 429 U. S. 917 (1976).

III

The Court has ruled that classifications by a State that are based on alienage are “inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.” Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 372 (1971). See Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S. 572, 601-602 (1976); In re Griffiths, 413 U. S., at 721; Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634, 642 (1973). In undertaking this scrutiny, “the governmental interest claimed to justify the discrimination is to be carefully examined in order to determine whether that interest is legitimate and substantial, and inquiry must be made whether the means adopted to achieve the goal are necessary and precisely drawn.” Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S., at 605. See In re Griffiths, 413 U. S., at 721-722. Alienage classifications by a State that do not withstand this stringent examination cannot stand.⁸

Appellants claim that § 661 (3) should not be subjected to such strict scrutiny because it does not impose a classification based on alienage.⁹ Aliens who have applied for citizenship, or, if not qualified for it, who have filed a statement of intent to apply as soon as they are eligible, are allowed to participate in the assistance programs. Hence, it is said, the statute distinguishes “only within the 'heterogeneous’ class of aliens” and “does not distinguish between citizens and aliens vel non.” Brief for Appellants 20.¹⁰ Only statutory classifications of the latter type, appellants assert, warrant strict scrutiny.

Graham v. Richardson, supra, undermines appellants’ position. In that case, the Court considered an Arizona statute that imposed a durational residency requirement for welfare benefits on aliens but not on citizens. Like the New York statute challenged here, the Arizona statute served to discriminate only within the class of aliens: Aliens who met the durational residency requirement were entitled to welfare benefits. The Court nonetheless subjected the statute to strict scrutiny and held it unconstitutional. The important points are that § 661 (3) is directed at aliens and that only aliens are harmed by it. The fact that the statute is not an absolute bar does not mean that it does not discriminate against the class.¹¹ Cf. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 504-505, n. 11 (1976);¹² Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 169, 172 (1972).

Appellants also assert that there are adequate justifications for § 661 (3). First, the section is said to offer an incentive for aliens to become naturalized. Second, the restriction on assistance to only those who are or will become eligible to vote is tailored to the purpose of the assistance program, namely, the enhancement of the educational level of the electorate. Brief for Appellants 22-25. Both justifications are claimed to be related to New York’s interest in the preservation of its “political community.” See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S., at 642-643, 647-649; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 344 (1972).

The first purpose offered by the appellants, directed to what they describe as some “degree of national affinity,” Brief for Appellants 18, however, is not a permissible one for a State. Control over immigration and naturalization is entrusted exclusively to the Federal Government, and a State has no power to interfere. U. S. Const., Art I, § 8, cl. 4. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 84-85 (1976); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 376-380; Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U. S. 410, 419 (1948). But even if we accept, arguendo, the validity of the proffered justifications, we find them inadequate to support the ban.¹³

In Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S., at 642, the Court recognized that the State’s interest “in establishing its own form of government, and in limiting participation in that government to those who are within 'the basic conception of a political community’ ” might justify some consideration of alienage. But as Sugarman makes quite clear, the Court had in mind a State’s historical and constitutional powers to define the qualifications of voters,¹⁴ or of “elective or important nonelective” officials “who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy.” Id., at 647. See id., at 648. In re Griffiths, decided the same day, reflects the narrowness of the exception. In that case, despite a recognition of the vital public and political role of attorneys, the Court found invalid a state-court rule limiting the practice of law to citizens. 413 U. S., at 729.

Certainly, the justifications for § 661 (3) offered by appellants sweep far beyond the confines of the exception defined in Sugarman. If the encouragement of naturalization through these programs were seen as adequate, then every discrimination against aliens could be similarly justified. The exception would swallow the rule. Sugarman clearly does not tolerate that result. Nor does the claimed interest in educating the electorate provide a justification; although such education is a laudable objective, it hardly would be frustrated by including resident aliens, as well as citizens, in the State’s assistance programs.¹⁵

Resident aliens are obligated to pay their full share of the taxes that support the assistance programs. There thus is no real unfairness in allowing resident aliens an equal right to participate in programs to which they contribute on an equal basis. And although an alien may be barred from full involvement in the political arena, he may play a role — perhaps even a leadership role — in other areas of import to the community. The State surely is not harmed by providing resident aliens the same educational opportunity it offers to others.

Since we hold that the challenged statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee, we need not reach appellees’ claim that it also intrudes upon Congress’ comprehensive authority over immigration and naturalization. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 378; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 42 (1915).

The judgments of the District Court are affirmed.

It is so ordered.

1 There also are other special competitive awards: Regents professional education in nursing scholarships, N. Y. Educ. Law §§ 605 (2) and 671 (McKinney Supp. 1976); Regents professional education in medicine or dentistry scholarships, §§ 605 (3) and 672; Regents physician shortage scholarships, §§ 605 (4) and 673; Regents war veteran scholarships, §§ 605 (5) and 674; and Regents Cornell University scholarships, § 605 (6).

2 The loan program is largely subsidized by the Federal Government. See 20 U. S. C. §§1071 to 1087-2 (1970 ed. and Supp. V). (In fiscal 1976 the federal expenditure for New York’s loan program was $67,208,000 and the state contribution was $9,466,000. Brief for Appellants 8 n. * and 17 n. *.) Although it appears that federal administrators have not lodged objections to the State’s practice of disqualifying certain resident aliens, see App. 82, the federal standards would make eligible for assistance an alien student who “is in the United States for other than a temporary purpose and intends to become a permanent resident thereof.” 45 CFR§ 177.2 (a) (1976).

3 This requirement is not the subject of challenge here. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441 (1973); Starns v. Malkerson, 401 U. S. 985 (1971), aff’g 326 F. Supp. 234 (Minn. 1970).

4 Section 661 (3) replaced former § 602 (2) of the State’s Education Law, in effect at the times appellees’ complaints were filed. 1974 N. Y. Laws, c. 942. Clause (d) was added after the commencement of the suits. 1975 N. Y. Laws, c. 663, § 1. Since clause (d) serves to make a class of aliens eligible for aid without regard to citizenship or intent to apply for citizenship, its inclusion serves to undermine the State’s arguments as to the purposes served by the first three clauses. See n. 13, infra.

5 In order to become a United States citizen, Mauclet would be required to renounce bis French citizenship. 8 U. S. G. § 1448 (a).

6 Other courts also have held that discrimination against resident aliens in the distribution of educational assistance is impermissible. See, e. g., Chapman v. Gerard, 456 F. 2d 577 (CA3 1972); Jagnandan v. Giles, 379 F. Supp. 1178 (ND Miss. 1974), appealed on damages and aff’d, 538 F. 2d 1166 (CA5 1976), cert. pending, No. 76-832.

7 Appellants also argue that the District Court should not have reached the question of the applicability of § 661 (3) to the loan program because appellee Rabinovitch, who alone challenged this aspect of the assistance program, had not been denied a loan. Hence, appellants assert, he lacks standing. Early in the litigation, however, Rabinovitch submitted an unrebutted affidavit to the effect that he believed that he “may require student loans to help cover the cost of” his education and that he was “barred from receiving a student loan simply because of [his] status as an alien.” App. 71. Indeed, appellants conceded in the District Court that any application from Rabinovitch for a loan would be refused because of § 661 (3). 406 F. Supp., at 1235. It is clear, therefore, that Art. Ill adverseness existed between the parties and that the dispute is a concrete one. The only obstacle to standing, under the circumstances, would arise from prudential considerations. And we see no reason to postpone resolution of the dispute. Rabinovitch has been denied other forms of aid and little is to be served by requiring him now to go through the formality of submitting an application for a loan, in light of the certainty of its denial. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 264 (1977). Until oral argument, appellants suggested no reason why the loan program should differ from the other forms of assistance. Tr. of Oral Arg. 7. In the absence of a more timely suggestion supporting a distinction among the forms of aid, we think that nothing is to be gained by adjudicating the validity of § 661 (3) with regard to only two of the three primary assistance programs. After all, the single statutory proscription applies with equal force to all the programs.

8 In Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67 (1976), the Court applied relaxed scrutiny in upholding the validity of a federal statute that conditioned an alien’s eligibility for participation in a federal medical insurance program on the satisfaction of a durational residency requirement, but imposed no similar burden on citizens. The appellants can draw no solace from the ease, however, because the Court was at pains to emphasize that Congress, as an aspect of its broad power over immigration and naturalization, enjoys rights to distinguish among aliens that are not shared by the States. Id., at 84-87. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88, 100-101 (1976); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351, 358 n. 6 (1976).

It is perhaps worthy of note that the Medicare program under consideration in Diaz granted a permanent resident alien eligibility when he had resided in the United States for five years. Five years’ residence is also the generally required period under federal law before an alien may seek to be naturalized. 8 U. S. C. § 1427 (a). Yet, ironically, this is precisely the point at which, in New York, a resident must petition for naturalization or, irrespective of declared intent, lose his eligibility for higher education assistance.

9 Appellants also seem to assert that strict scrutiny should not be applied because aid to education does not deny an alien “access to the necessities of life.” Brief for Appellants 21. They are joined in this view by The Chief Justice in dissent. Suffice it to say, the statutory statement of purpose for the aid programs reflects the State’s contrary position:

“In a world of unmatched scientific progress and technological advance, as well as of unparalleled danger to human freedom, learning has never been more crucial to man’s safety, progress and individual fulfillment. In the state and nation higher education no longer is a luxury; it is a necessity for strength, fulfillment and survival.” 1961 N. Y. Laws, c. 389, § Ka).

And, in any event, the Court noted in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 376 (1971), that classifications based on alienage “are inherently suspect and are therefore subject to strict scrutiny whether or not a fundamental right is impaired.”

10 The District Court dealt abruptly with appellants’ contention:

“This argument defies logic. Those aliens who apply, or agree to apply when eligible, for citizenship are relinquishing their alien status. Because some aliens agree under the statute’s coercion to change their status does not alter the fact that the classification is based solely on alienage.” 406 F. Supp., at 1235.

11 Our Brother Rehnquist argues in dissent that strict scrutiny is inappropriate because under § 661 (3) a resident alien can voluntarily withdraw from disfavored status. But this aspect of the statute hardly distinguishes our past decisions. By the logic of the dissenting opinion, the suspect class for alienage would be defined to include at most only those who have resided in this country for less than five years, since after that time, if not before, resident aliens are generally eligible to become citizens. 8 U. S. C. § 1427 (a). The Court has never suggested, however, that the suspect class is to be defined so narrowly. In fact, the element of voluntariness in a resident alien’s retention of alien status is a recognized element in several of the Court’s decisions. For example, the Court acknowledged that In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717 (1973), involved an appellant who was eligible for citizenship, but who had not filed a declaration of intention to become a citizen, and had “no present intention of doing so.” Id., 718 n. 1. And, insofar as the record revealed, nothing precluded the appellees in Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634 (1973), from applying for citizenship. Id., at 650 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Rehnquist argued in dissent there, just as he does here today, that strict scrutiny was inappropriate in those cases because there was nothing to indicate that the aliens’ status “cannot be changed by their affirmative acts.” Id., at 657. Nonetheless, the Court applied strict scrutiny in the cases. We see no reason to depart from them now.

12 The footnote reads in part:

“That the statutory classifications challenged here discriminate among illegitimate children does not mean, of course, that they are not also properly described as discriminating between legitimate and illegitimate children.”

13 In support of the justifications offered for §661 (3), appellants refer to a statement of purpose in legislation adopted in 1961 that substantially amended the State’s aid programs. 1961 N. Y. Laws, c. 389, § 1. But the statement speaks only in general terms of encouraging education so as “to provide the broad range of leadership, inventive genius, and source of economic and cultural growth for oncoming generations,” § 1 (a), and of developing fully a “reservoir of talent and future leadership,” § 1 (c)— purposes that would be served by extending aid to resident aliens as well as to citizens — and hardly supports appellants in clear and unambiguous terms. Moreover, the statutory discrimination against aliens with regard to certain Regents scholarships dates from long before. 1920 N. Y. Laws, c. 502, § 1. And the very 1961 legislation on which appellants rely abolished the statutory disqualification of aliens in favor of an administrative rule. 1961 N. Y. Laws, c. 391, §§ 2 and 18. See also §§ 7, 14, and 19. In fact, it appears that the state administrators of the aid programs did not find the purposes in the 1961 legislation that appellants urge, since between 1961 and 1969, when the precursor of § 661 (3) was adopted, resident aliens were allowed to receive tuition assistance awards. Brief for Appellants 15.

14 See also Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (Md. 1974), summarily aff'd, 426 U. S. 913 (1976).

15 Although the record does not reveal the number of aliens who are disqualified by §661 (3), there is a suggestion that the number may be exceedingly small. See Brief for Appellee Mauclet 9 n. 4. Indeed, when asked about the cost of including aliens, appellants conceded at oral argument that “we may not be speaking about very much.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. Thus, it appears that the inclusion of resident aliens in the assistance programs will have an insubstantial impact on the cost of the programs. And, in any event, the suggestion that the State can favor citizens over aliens in the distribution of benefits was largely rejected in Graham v. Richardson, supra.