CBS, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission , 101 S. Ct. 2813 ( 1981 )

Chief Justice Burger

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to consider whether the Federal Communications Commission properly construed 47 U. S. C. § 312 (a) (7) and determined that petitioners failed to provide “reasonable access to . . . the use of a broadcasting station” ■ as required by the statute. 449 U. S. 950 (1980).

I

A

On October 11, 1979, Gerald M. Rafshoon, President of the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee, requested each of the three major television networks to provide time for a 30-minute program between 8 p. m. and 10:30 p. m. on either the 4th, 5th, 6th, or 7th of December 1979.¹ The Committee intended to present, in conjunction with President Carter’s formal announcement of his candidacy, a documentary outlining the record of his administration.

The networks declined to make the requested time available. Petitioner CBS emphasized the large number of candidates for the Republican and Democratic Presidential nominations and the potential disruption of regular programming to accommodate requests for equal treatment, but it offered to sell two 5-minute segments to the Committee, one at 10:55 p. m. on December 8 and one in the daytime.² Petitioner American Broadcasting Cos. replied that it had not yet decided when it would begin selling political time for the 1980 Presidential campaign,³ but subsequently indicated that it would allow such sales in January 1980. App. 58. Petitioner National Broadcasting Co., noting the number of potential requests for time from Presidential candidates, stated that it was not prepared to sell time for political programs as early as December 1979.⁴

On October 29, 1979, the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee filed a complaint with the Federal Communications Commission, charging that the networks had violated their obligation to provide “reasonable access” under § 312 (a)(7) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended. Title 47 U. S. C. § 312 (a) (7), as added to the Act, 86 Stat. 4, states:

“The Commission may revoke any station license or construction permit—

“(7) for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy.”

At an open meeting on November 20, 1979, the Commission, by a 4-to-3 vote, ruled that the networks had violated §312 (a)(7). In its memorandum opinion and order, the Commission concluded that the networks’ reasons for refusing to sell the time requested were “deficient” under its standards of reasonableness, and directed the networks to indicate by November 26, 1979, how they intended to fulfill their statutory obligations. 74 F. C. C. 2d 631.

Petitioners sought reconsideration of the FCC’s decision. The reconsideration petitions were denied by the same 4-to-3 vote, and, on November 28, 1979, the Commission issued a second memorandum opinion and order clarifying its previous decision. It rejected petitioners’ arguments that § 312 (a) (7) was not intended to create a new right of access to the broadcast media and that the Commission had improperly substituted its judgment for that of the networks in evaluating the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee’s request for time. November 29, 1979, was set as the date for the networks to file their plans for compliance with the statute. 74 F. C. C. 2d 657.

The networks, pursuant to 47 U. S. C. § 402, then petitioned for review of the Commission’s orders in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court allowed the Committee and the National Association of Broadcasters to intervene, and granted a stay of the Commission’s orders pending review.

Following the seizure of American Embassy personnel in Iran, the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee decided to postpone to early January 1980 the 30-minute program it had planned to broadcast during the period of December A-7, 1979. However, believing that some time was needed in conjunction with the President’s announcement of his candidacy, the Committee sought and subsequently obtained from CBS the purchase of five minutes of time on December 4. In addition, the Committee sought and obtained from ABC and NBC offers of time for a 30-minute program in January, and the ABC offer eventually was accepted. Throughout these negotiations, the Committee and the networks reserved all rights relating to the appeal.

B

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s orders, 202 U. S. App. D. C. 369, 629 F. 2d 1 (1980), holding that the statute created a new, affirmative right of access to the broadcast media for individual candidates for federal elective office. As to the implementation of §312 (a)(7), the court concluded that the Commission has the authority to independently evaluate whether a campaign has begun for purposes of the statute, and approved the Commission’s insistence that “broadcasters consider and address all non-frivolous matters in responding to a candidate’s request for time.” Id., at 386, 629 F. 2d, at 18. For example, a broadcaster must weigh such factors as: “(a) the individual needs of the candidate (as expressed by the candidate); (b) the amount of time previously provided to the candidate; (c) potential disruption of regular programming; (d) the number of other candidates likely to invoke equal opportunity rights if the broadcaster grants the request before him; and, (e) the timing of the request.” Id., at 387, 629 F. 2d, at 19. And in reviewing a broadcaster’s decision, the Commission will confine itself to two questions: “(1) has the broadcaster adverted to the proper standards in deciding whether to grant a request for access, and (2) is the broadcaster’s explanation for his decision reasonable in terms of those standards?” Id., at 386, 629 F. 2d, at 18.

Applying these principles, the Court of Appeals sustained the Commission’s determination that the Presidential campaign had begun by November 1979, and, accordingly, the obligations imposed by § 312 (a) (7) had attached. Further, the court decided that “the record . . . adequately supports the Commission’s conclusion that the networks failed to apply the proper standards.” Id., at 389, 629 F. 2d, at 21. In particular, the “across-the-board” policies of all three networks failed to address the specific needs asserted by the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee. Id., at 390, 629 F. 2d, at 22. From this the court concluded that the Commission was correct in holding that the networks had violated the statute’s “reasonable access” requirement.

Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected petitioners’ First Amendment challenge to § 312 (a) (7) as applied, reasoning that the statute as construed by the Commission “is a constitutionally acceptable accommodation between, on the one hand, the public’s right to be informed about elections and the right of candidates to speak and, on the other hand, the editorial rights of broadcasters.” Id., at 389, 629 F. 2d, at 25. In a concurring opinion adopted by the majority, id., at 389, n. 117, 629 F. 2d, at 25, n. 117, Judge Tamm expressed the view that § 312 (a) (7) is saved from constitutional infirmity “as long as the [Commission] . . . maintains a very limited ‘overseer’ role consistent with its obligation of careful neutrality . . . .” Id., at 402, 629 F. 2d, at 34.

II

We consider first the scope of §312 (a)(7). Petitioners CBS and NBC contend that the statute did not impose any additional obligations on broadcasters, but merely codified prior policies developed by the Federal Communications Commission under the public interest standard. The Commission, however, argues that § 312 (a) (7) created an affirmative, promptly enforceable right of reasonable access to the use of broadcast stations for individual candidates seeking federal elective office.

A

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, which Congress enacted in 1972, included as one of its four Titles the Campaign Communications Reform Act (Title I). Title I contained the provision that was codified as 47 U. S. C. §312 (a)(7).⁵

We have often observed that the starting point in every case involving statutory construction is “the language employed by Congress.” Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 337 (1979). In unambiguous language, § 312 (a)(7) authorizes the Commission to revoke a broadcaster’s license

“for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by .a legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy.”

It is clear on the face of the statute that Congress did not prescribe merely a general duty to afford some measure of political programming, which the public interest obligation of broadcasters already provided for. Rather, § 312 (a) (7) focuses on the individual “legally qualified candidate” seeking air time to advocate “his candidacy,” and guarantees him “reasonable access” enforceable by specific governmental sanction. Further, the sanction may be imposed for “willful or repeated” failure to afford reasonable access. This suggests that, if a legally qualified candidate for federal office is denied a reasonable amount of broadcast time, license revocation may follow even a single instance of such denial so long as it is willful; where the denial is recurring, the penalty may be imposed in the absence of a showing of willfulness.

The command of § 312 (a) (7) differs from the limited duty of broadcasters under the public interest standard. The practice preceding the adoption of §312 (a)(7) has been described by the Commission as follows:

“Prior to the enactment of the [statute], we recognized political broadcasting as one of the fourteen basic elements necessary to meet the public interest, needs and desires of the community. No legally qualified candidate had, at that time, a specific right of access to a broadcasting station. However, stations were required to make reasonable, good faith judgments about the importance and interest of particular races. Based upon those judgments, licensees were to 'determine how much time should be made available for candidates in each race on either a paid or unpaid basis.' There was no requirement that such time be made available for specific 'uses' of a broadcasting station to which Section 315 'equal opportunities’ would be applicable.” (Footnotes omitted.) Report and Order: Commission Policy in Enforcing Section 812 (a)(7) of the Communications Act, 68 F. C. C. 2d 1079, 1087-1088 (1978) (1978 Report and Order).

Under the pre-1971 public interest requirement, compliance with which was necessary to assure license renewal, some time had to be given to political issues, but an individual candidate could claim no personal right of access unless his opponent used the station and no distinction was drawn between federal, state, and local elections.⁶ See Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U. S. 525, 534 (1959). By its terms, however, §312 (a) (7) singles out legally qualified candidates for federal elective office and grants them a special right of access on an individual basis, violation of which carries the serious consequence of license revocation. The conclusion is inescapable that the statute did more than simply codify the pre-existing public interest standard.

B

The legislative history confirms that § 312 (a) (7) created a right of access that enlarged the political broadcasting responsibilities of licensees. When the subject' of campaign reform was taken up by Congress in 1971, three bills were introduced in the Senate — S. 1, S. 382, and S. 956. All three measures, while differing in approach, were “intended to increase a candidate’s accessibility to the media and to reduce the level of spending for its use.” Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971: Hearings on S. 1, S. 382, and S. 956 before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Pastore). The subsequent Report of the Senate Commerce Committee stated that one of the primary purposes of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 was to “give candidates for public office greater access to the media so that they may better explain their stand on the issues, and thereby more fully and completely inform the voters.” S. Rep. No. 92-96, p. 20 (1971) (emphasis added). The Report contained neither an explicit interpretation of the provision that became § 312 (a) (7) nor a discussion of its intended impact, but simply noted:

“[The amendment] provide[s] that willful or repeated failure by a broadcast licensee to allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of his station’s facilities by a lagally [sic] qualified candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy shall be grounds for adverse action by the FCC.

“The duty of broadcast licensees generally to permit the use of their facilities by legally qualified candidates for these public offices is inherent in the requirement that licensees serve the needs and interests of the [communities] of license. The Federal Communications Commission has recognized this obligation . . . Id., at 34.

While acknowledging the “general” public interest requirement, the Report treated it separately from the specific obligation prescribed by the proposed legislation. See also id., at 28.

As initially reported in the Senate, § 312 (a) (7) applied broadly, to “the use of a broadcasting station by any person who is a legally qualified candidate on behalf of his candidacy.” Id., at 3. The Conference Committee confined the provision to candidates seeking federal elective office. S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-580, p. 22 (1971); H. Conf. Rep. No. 92-752, p. 22 (1971). During floor debate on the Conference Report in the House, attention was called to the substantial impact § 312 (a) (7) would have on the broadcasting industry:

“[B]roadcasters [are required] to permit any legally qualified candidate [for federal office] to purchase a ‘reasonable amount of time’ for his campaign advertising. Any broadcaster found in willful or repeated violation of this requirement could lose his license and be thrown out of business, his total record of public service notwithstanding.

“[Ujnder this provision, a broadcaster, whose license is obtained and retained on basis of performance in the public interest, may be charged with being unreasonable and, therefore, fall subject to revocation of his license.” 118 Cong. Nee. 326 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Keith).

Such emphasis on the thrust of the statute would seem unnecessary if it did nothing more than reiterate the public interest standard.

Perhaps the most telling evidence of congressional intent, however, is the contemporaneous amendment of § 315 (a) of the Communications Act.⁷ That amendment was described by the Conference Committee as a “conforming amendment” necessitated by the enactment of §312 (a)(7). S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-580, supra, at 22; H. Conf. Rep. No. 92-752, supra, at 22. Prior to the “conforming amendment,” the second sentence of 47 U. S. C. § 315 (a) (1970 ed.) read: “No obligation is imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate.” This language made clear that broadcasters were not common carriers as to affirmative, rather than responsive, requests for access. As a result of the amendment, the second sentence now contains an important qualification: “No obligation is imposed under this subsection upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate.” 47 U. S. C. § 315 (a) (emphasis added). Congress retreated from its statement that “no obligation” exists to afford individual access presumably because § 312 (a) (7) compels such access in the context of federal elections. If § 312 (a) (7) simply reaffirmed the pre-existing public interest requirement with the added sanction of license revocation, no conforming amendment to § 315 (a) would have been needed.

Thus, the legislative history supports the plain meaning of the statute that individual candidates for federal elective office have a right of reasonable access to the use of stations for paid political broadcasts on behalf of their candidacies,⁸ without reference to whether an opponent has secured time.

C

We have held that “the construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong, especially when Congress has refused to alter the administrative construction.” Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 381 (1969) (footnotes omitted). Accord Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 121 (1973). Such deference “is particularly appropriate where, as here, an agency’s interpretation involves issues of considerable public controversy, and Congress has not acted to correct any misperception of its statutory objectives.” United States v. Rutherford, 442 U. S. 544, 554 (1979).

Since the enactment of §312 (a)(7), the Commission has consistently construed the statute as extending beyond the prior public interest policy. In 1972, the Commission made clear that § 312 (a) (7) “now imposes on the overall obligation to operate in the public interest the additional specific requirement that reasonable access and purchase of reasonable amounts of time be afforded candidates for Federal office.” Use of Broadcast and Cablecast Facilities by Candidates for Public Office, 34 F. C. C. 2d 510, 537-538 (1972) (1972 Policy Statement) (emphasis added). Accord, Public Notice Concerning Licensee Responsibility Under Amendments to the Communications Act Made by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 47 F. C. C. 2d 516 (1974). In its 1978 Report and Order, the Commission stated:

“When Congress enacted Section 312(a)(7), it imposed an additional obligation on the general mandate to operate in the public interest. Licensees were specifically required to afford reasonable access to or to permit the purchase of reasonable amounts of broadcast time for the ‘use’ of Federal candidates.

“We see no merit to the contention that Section 312 (a)(7) was meant merely as a codification of the Commission’s already existing policy concerning political broadcasts. There was no reason to commit that policy to statute since it was already being enforced by the Commission. . . .” 68 F. C. C. 2d, at 1088.

See also 1978 Primer, 69 F. C. C. 2d, at 2286-2289. The Commission has adhered to this view of the statute in its rulings on individual inquiries and complaints. See, e. g., The Labor Party, 67 F. C. C. 2d 589, 590 (1978); Ken Bauder, 62 F. C. C. 2d 849 (Broadcast Bureau 1976); Don C. Smith, 49 F. C. C. 2d 678, 679 (Broadcast Bureau 1974); Summa Corp., 43 F. C. C. 2d 602, 603-605 (1973); Robert H. Hauslein, 39 F. C. C. 2d 1064, 1065 (Broadcast Bureau 1973).

Congress has been made aware of the Commission’s interpretation of § 312 (a)(7). In 1973, hearings were conducted to review the operation of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1973: Hearings on S. 372 before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Commission Chairman Dean Burch testified regarding the agency’s experience with § 312 (a)(7). Id., at 136-137. He noted that the Commission’s 1972 Policy Statement was “widely distributed and represented our best judgment as to the requirements of the law and the intent of Congress.” Id., at 135. Chairman Burch discussed some of the difficult questions implicit in determining whether a station has afforded “reasonable access” to a candidate for federal office, and in conclusion stated: “We have brought our approach to these problems in the form of the 1972 Public Notice to the attention of Congress. If we have erred in some important construction, we would, of course, welcome congressional guidance.” Id., at 137. Senator Pastore, Chairman of the Communications Subcommittee, replied:

“We didn’t draw the provision any differently than we did because when you begin to legislate on guidelines, and on standards, and on criteria, you know what you run up against. I think what we did was reasonable enough, and I think what you did was reasonable enough as well.

“I would suppose that in cases of that kind, you would get some complaints. But, frankly, I think it has worked out pretty well.” Id., at 137-138.

The issue was joined when CBS Vice Chairman Frank Stanton also testified at the hearings and objected to the fact that § 312 (a) (7) “grants rights to all legally qualified candidates for Federal office . . . .” Id., at 190. He strongly urged “repeal” of the statute, but his plea was unsuccessful. Ibid⁹

The Commission’s repeated construction of § 312 (a) (7) as affording an affirmative right of reasonable access to individual candidates for federal elective office comports with the statute’s language and legislative history and has received congressional review. Therefore, departure from that construction is unwarranted. “Congress’ failure to repeal or revise [the statute] in the face of such administrative interpretation [is] persuasive evidence that that interpretation is the one intended by Congress.” Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 11 (1965).

D

In support of their narrow reading of § 312 (a)(7) as simply a restatement of the public interest obligation, petitioners cite our decision in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94 (1973), which held that neither the First Amendment nor the Communications Act requires broadcasters to accept paid editorial advertisements from citizens at large. The Court in Democratic National Committee observed that “the Commission on several occasions has ruled that no private individual or group has a right to command the use of broadcast facilities,” and that Congress has not altered that policy even though it has amended the Communications Act several times. Id., at 113. In a footnote, on which petitioners here rely, we referred to the then recently enacted § 312 (a) (7) as one such amendment, stating that it had “essentially codified the Commission’s prior interpretation of § 315 (a) as requiring broadcasters to make time available to political candidates.” Id., at 113-114, n. 12.

However, “the language of an opinion is not always to be parsed as though we were dealing with language of a statute.” Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S., at 341. The qualified observation that § 312 (a) (7) “essentially codified” existing Commission practice was not a conclusion that the statute was in all respects coextensive with that practice and imposed no additional duties on broadcasters. In Democratic National Committee, we did not purport to rule on the precise contours of the responsibilities created by § 312 (a) (7) since that issue was not before us. Like the general public interest standard and the equal opportunities provision of § 315 (a), § 312 (a) (7) reflects the importance attached to the use of the public airwaves by political candidates. Yet we now hold that § 312 (a) (7) expanded on those predecessor requirements and granted a new right of access to persons seeking election to federal office.¹⁰

Ill

A

Although Congress provided in § 312 (a) (7) for greater use of broadcasting stations by federal candidates, it did not give guidance on how the Commission should implement the statute’s access requirement. Essentially, Congress adopted a “rule of reason” and charged the Commission with its enforcement. Pursuant to 47 U. S. C. § 303 (r), which empowers the Commission to “ [m] ake such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of [the Communications Act],” the agency has developed standards to effectuate the guarantees of §312 (a)(7). See also 47 U. S. C. § 154 (i). The Commission has issued some general interpretative statements, but its standards implementing § 312 (a) (7) have evolved principally on a case-by-case basis and are not embodied in formalized rules. The relevant criteria broadcasters must employ in evaluating access requests under the statute can be summarized from the Commission’s 1978 Report and Order and the memorandum opinions and orders in these cases.

Broadcasters are free to deny the sale of air time prior to the commencement of a campaign, but once a campaign has begun, they must give reasonable and good-faith attention to access requests from “legally qualified” candidates¹¹ for federal elective office. Such requests must be considered on an individualized basis, and broadcasters are required to tailor their responses to accommodate, as much as reasonably possible, a candidate’s stated purposes in seeking air time. In responding to access requests, however, broadcasters may also give weight to such factors as the amount of time previously sold to the candidate, the disruptive impact on regular programming, and the likelihood of requests for time by rival candidates under the equal opportunities provision of § 315 (a). These considerations may not be invoked as pretexts for denying access; to justify a negative response, broadcasters must cite a realistic danger of substantial program disruption — perhaps caused by insufficient notice to allow adjustments in the schedule — or of an excessive number of equal time requests. Further, in order to facilitate review by the Commission, broadcasters must explain their reasons for refusing time or making a more limited counteroffer. If broadcasters take the appropriate factors into account and act reasonably and in good faith, their decisions will be entitled to deference even if the Commission’s analysis would have differed in the first instance. But if broadcasters adopt “across-the-board policies” and do not attempt to respond to the individualized situation of a particular candidate, the Commission is not compelled to sustain their denial of access. See 74 F. C. C. 2d, at 665-674; 74 F. C. C. 2d, at 642-651; 1978 Report and Order, 68 F. C. C. 2d, at 1089-1092, 1094. Petitioners argue that certain of these standards are contrary to the statutory objectives of § 312 (a) (7).

(1)

The Commission has concluded that, as a threshold matter, it will independently determine whether a campaign has begun and the obligations imposed by § 312 (a) (7) have attached. 74 F. C. C. 2d, at 665-666. Petitioners assert that, in undertaking such a task, the Commission becomes improperly involved in the electoral process and seriously impairs broadcaster discretion.

However, petitioners fail to recognize that the Commission does not set the starting date for a campaign. Rather, on review of a complaint alleging denial of “reasonable access,” it examines objective evidence to find whether the campaign has already commenced, “taking into account the position of the candidate and the networks as well as other factors.” Id., at 665 (emphasis added). As the Court of Appeals noted, the “determination of when the statutory obligations attach does not control the electoral process, . . . the determination is controlled by the process.” 202 U. S. App. D. C., at 384, 629 F. 2d, at 16. Such a decision is not, and cannot be, purely one of editorial judgment.

Moreover, the Commission’s approach serves to narrow § 312 (a) (7), which might be read as vesting access rights in an individual candidate as soon as he becomes “legally qualified” without regard to the status of the campaign. See n. 11, supra. By confining the applicability of the statute to the period after a campaign commences, the Commission has limited its impact on broadcasters and given substance to its command of reasonable access.

(2)

Petitioners also challenge the Commission’s requirement that broadcasters evaluate and respond to access requests on an individualized basis. In petitioners’ view, the agency has attached inordinate significance to candidates’ needs, thereby precluding fair assessment of broadcasters’ concerns and prohibiting the adoption of uniform policies regarding requests for access.

While admonishing broadcasters not to “ ‘second guess’ the ‘political’ wisdom or . . . effectiveness” of the particular format sought by a candidate, the Commission has clearly acknowledged that “the candidate’s . . . request is by no means conclusive of the question of how much time, if any, is appropriate. Other . . . factors, such as the disruption or displacement of regular programming (particularly as affected by a reasonable probability of requests by other candidates), must be considered in the balance.” 74 F. C. C. 2d, at 667-668. Thus, the Commission mandates careful consideration of, not blind assent to, candidates’ desires for air time.

Petitioners are correct that the Commission’s standards proscribe blanket rules concerning access; each request must be examined on its own merits. While the adoption of uniform policies might well prove more convenient for broadcasters, such an approach would allow personal campaign strategies and the exigencies of the political process to be ignored. A broadcaster’s “evenhanded” response of granting only time spots of a fixed duration to candidates may be “unreasonable” where a particular candidate desires less time for an advertisement or a longer format to discuss substantive issues. In essence, petitioners seek the unilateral right to determine in advance how much time to afford all candidates. Yet § 312 (a) (7) assures a right of reasonable access to individual candidates for federal elective office, and the Commission’s requirement that their requests be considered on an individualized basis is consistent with that guarantee.

(3)

The Federal Communications Commission is the experienced administrative agency long entrusted by Congress with the regulation of broadcasting, and the Commission is responsible for implementing and enforcing § 312 (a) (7) of the Communications Act. Accordingly, its construction of the statute is entitled to judicial deference “unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong.” Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S., at 381. As we held in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S., at 120, the Commission must be allowed to “remain in a posture of flexibility to chart a workable ‘middle course’ in its quest to preserve a balance between the essential public accountability and the desired private control of the media.” Like the Court of Appeals, we cannot say that the Commission’s standards are arbitrary and capricious or at odds with the language and purposes of §312 (a) (7). See 5 U. S. C. §706 (2)(A). Indeed, we are satisfied that the Commission’s action represents a reasoned attempt to effectuate the statute’s access requirement, giving broadcasters room to exercise their discretion but demanding that they act in good faith.¹²

B

There can be no doubt that the Commission’s standards have achieved greater clarity as a result of the orders in these cases.¹³ However laudable that may be, it raises the question whether § 312 (a) (7) was properly applied to petitioners.¹⁴ Based upon the Commission’s prior decisions and 1978 Report and Order, however, we must conclude that petitioners ■ had adequate notice that their conduct in responding to the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee’s request for access would contravene the statute.

In the 1978 Report and Order, the Commission stated that it could not establish a precise point at which § 312 (a)(7) obligations would attach for all campaigns because each is unique:

“For instance, a presidential campaign may be in full swing almost a year before an election; other campaigns may be limited to a short concentrated period. . . . [W]e believe that, generally, a licensee would be unreasonable if it refused to afford access to Federal candidates at least during those time periods [when the ‘lowest unit charge’ provision of §315 applied]. Moreover, it may be required to afford reasonable access before these periods; however, the determination of whether ‘reasonable access’ must be afforded before these periods for particular races must be made in each case under all the facts and circumstances present. . . . [W]e expect licensees to afford access at a reasonable time prior to a convention or caucus. We will review a licensee’s decisions in this area on a case-by-case basis.” 68 F. C. C. 2d, at 1091-1092 (emphasis added).

In Anthony R. Martin-Trigona, 67 F. C. C. 2d 743 (1978), the Commission observed: “[T]he licensee, and ultimately the Commission, must look to the circumstances of each particular case to determine when it is reasonable for a candidate’s access to begin . . . .” Id., at 746, n. 4 (emphasis added). Further, the 1978 Report and Order made clear that “Federal candidates are the intended beneficiary of Section 312 (a) (7) and therefore a candidate’s desires as to the method of conducting his or her media campaign should be considered by licensees in granting reasonable access.” 68 F. C. C. 2d, at 1089, n. 14. The agency also stated:

“[A]n arbitrary ‘blanket’ ban on the use by a candidate of a particular class or length of time in a particular period cannot be considered reasonable. A Federal candidate’s decisions as to the best method of pursuing his or her media campaign should be honored as much as possible under the ‘reasonable’ limits imposed by the licensee.” Id., at 1090.

Here, the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee sought broadcast time approximately 11 months before the 1980 Presidential election and 8 months before the Democratic National Convention. In determining that a national campaign was underway at that point, the Commission stressed: (a) that 10 candidates formally had announced their intention to seek the Republican nomination, and 2 candidates had done so for the Democratic nomination; (b) that various states had started the delegate selection process; (c) that candidates were traveling across the country making speeches and attempting to raise funds; (d) that national campaign organizations were established and operating; (e) that the Iowa caucus would be held the following month; (f) that public officials and private groups were making endorsements; and (g) that the national print media had given campaign activities prominent coverage for almost two months. 74 F. C. C. 2d, at 645-647. The Commission's conclusion about the status of the campaign accorded with its announced position on the vesting of § 312 (a) (7) rights and was adequately supported by the objective factors on which it relied.

Nevertheless, petitioners ABC and NBC refused to sell the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee any time in December 1979 on the ground that it was “too early in the political season.” App. 41-43, 52-74; nn. 3 and 4, su-pra. These petitioners made no counteroffers, but adopted “blanket” policies refusing access despite the admonition against such an approach in the 1978 Report and Order. Cf. Donald W. Riegle, 59 F. C. C. 2d 1314 (1976); WALB-TV, Inc., 59 F. C. C. 2d 1246 (1976). Likewise, petitioner CBS, while not barring access completely, had an across-the-board policy of selling only 5-minute spots to all candidates, notwithstanding the Commission’s directive in the 1978 Report and Order that broadcasters consider “a candidate’s desires as to the method of conducting his or her media campaign.” 68 F. C. C. 2d, at 1089, n. 14. See App. 44-45, 75-93; n. 2, supra. Petitioner CBS responded with its standard offer of separate 5-minute segments, even though the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee sought 30 minutes of air time to present a comprehensive statement launching President Carter’s re-election campaign. Moreover, the Committee’s request was made almost two months before the intended date of broadcast, was flexible in that it could be satisfied with any prime time slot during a 4-day period, was accompanied by an offer to pay the normal commercial rate, and was not preceded by other requests from President Carter for access. See App. 27-40; n. 1, supra. Although petitioners adverted to the disruption of regular programming and the potential equal time requests from rival candidates in their responses to the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee’s complaint, the Commission rejected these claims as “speculative and unsubstantiated at best.” 74 F. C. C. 2d, at 674.

Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the Commission abused its discretion in finding that petitioners failed to grant the “reasonable access” required by § 312 (a) (7).¹⁵ See 5 U. S. C. § 706 (2)(A). “[T]he fact that we might not have made the same determination on the same facts does not warrant a substitution of judicial for administrative discretion since Congress has confided the problem to the latter.” FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U. S. 223, 229 (1946). “[CJourts should not overrule an administrative decision merely because they disagree with its wisdom.” Radio Corp. of America v. United States, 341 U. S. 412, 420 (1951).

IV

Finally, petitioners assert that § 312 (a) (7) as implemented by the Commission violates the First Amendment rights of broadcasters by unduly circumscribing their editorial discretion. In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S., at 117, we stated:

“Th[eJ role of the Government as an 'overseer5 and ultimate arbiter and guardian of the public interest and the role of the licensee as a journalistic 'free agent’ call for a delicate balancing of competing interests. The maintenance of this balance for more than 40 years has called on both the regulators and the licensees to walk a 'tightrope’ to preserve the First Amendment values written into the Radio Act and its successor, the Communications Act.”

Petitioners argue that the Commission’s interpretation of §312 (a)(7)’s access requirement disrupts the “delicate balance] ” that broadcast regulation must achieve. We disagree.

A licensed broadcaster is “granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the public domain; when he accepts that franchise it is burdened by enforceable public obligations.” Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 123 U. S. App. D. C. 328, 337, 359 F. 2d 994, 1003 (1966). This Court has noted the limits on a broadcast license:

“A license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional right to be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a . . . frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others . . . .” Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S., at 389.

See also FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U. S. 775, 799-800 (1978). Although the broadcasting industry is entitled under the First Amendment to exercise “the widest journalistic freedom consistent with its public [duties],” Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, supra, at 110, the Court has made clear that:

“It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that-market .... It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here.” Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 390 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

The First Amendment interests of candidates and voters, as well as broadcasters, are implicated by § 312 (a)(7). We have recognized that “it is of particular importance that candidates have the . . . opportunity to make their views known so that the electorate may intelligently evaluate the candidates’ personal qualities and their positions on vital public issues before choosing among them on election day.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 52-53 (1976). Indeed, “speech concerning public affairs is . . . the essence of self-government,” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 74-75 (1964). The First Amendment “has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.” Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265, 272 (1971). Section 312 (a)(7) thus makes a significant contribution to freedom of expression by enhancing the ability of candidates to present, and the public to receive, information necessary for the effective operation of the democratic process.

Petitioners are correct that the Court has never approved a general right of access to the media. See, e. g., FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U. S. 689 (1979); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, supra. Nor do we do so today. Section 312 (a) (7) creates, a limited right to “reasonable” access that pertains only to legally qualified federal candidates and may be invoked by them only for the purpose of advancing their candidacies once a campaign has commenced. The Commission has stated that, in enforcing the statute, it will “provide leeway to broadcasters and not merely attempt de novo to determine the reasonableness of their judgments . . . .” 74 F. C. C. 2d, at 672. If broadcasters have considered the relevant factors in good faith, the Commission will uphold their decisions. See 202 U. S. App. D. C., at 393, 629 F. 2d, at 25. Further, § 312 (a)(7) does not impair the discretion of broadcasters to present their views on any issue or to carry any particular type of programming.

Section 312 (a) (7) represents an effort by Congress to assure that an important resource — the airwaves — will be used in the public interest. We hold that the statutory right of access, as defined by the Commission and applied in these cases, properly balances the First Amendment rights of federal candidates, the public, and broadcasters.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

1 The text of Mr. Rafshoon’s letter to the three networks read as follows:

“On behalf of the Carter/Mondale Presidential Committee, Inc., I am requesting availabilities for a thirty (30) minute program on [ABC, CBS, or NBC] between 8:00 p. m. and 10:30 p. m. E. S. T. on December 4, December 5, December 6, or December 7, 1979. This program, to be run in conjunction with an announcement concerning his candidacy by President Carter for the Democratic nomination for President, consists of a documentary outlining the President’s record and that of his administration. At the time this program is aired, it may be assumed that President Carter will be a legally qualified candidate under the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and that the President would appear on the program.

“As you know, the first official contest to select delegates to the Democratic National Convention occurs January 21, 1980, in Iowa, which is 47 days after December 7, 1979, our last requested date for availabilities.

“Unlike all previous Presidential.election years, the news media has chosen to focus enormous attention on the Florida Caucus (October 13, 1979) and Convention (November 16-18, 1979) as well as other aspects of the 1980 campaign. As illustration, I have noted that in the six-week period from September 1 through October 9, 1979, ABC devoted 51 minutes, 22 seconds to the 1980 campaign; CBS devoted 51 minutes, 17 seconds to this subject; and NBC devoted 70 minutes. Therefore, our request for the above time seems eminently appropriate in view of the escalating political climate already generated by both print and broadcast media.

“I will expect to hear from one of your sales representatives within the next week regarding a selection of times in order that we may choose a mutually agreeable date.” App. 35-40.

2 The letter (dated October 17, 1979) to Mr. Rafshoon from Raymond E. Dillon, Director of Political Sales at CBS, read in pertinent part: “Because of the large number of present and potential candidates for the Republican and Democratic presidential nominations, we are at this time unable to accede to your request to purchase a half-hour program. We note that three Democrats and eleven Republicans have already announced, or may reasonably be expected shortly to announce, their presidential candidacies; indeed two candidates for the Republican presidential nomination have already requested to purchase half-hour programs on the CBS Television Network, and their requests have been declined on the same basis as indicated below.

“In light of the above circumstances, were we to provide the half-hour program you seek, accommodating potential requests for equal treatment from other candidates for presidential nomination would involve massive disruptions of the regular entertainment and information schedule of the CBS Television Network. Accordingly, we must respectfully reject your request.

“We are, however, prepared to make one 5-minute segment in prime time and one 5-minute daytime segment available for purchase by your committee. We note that this is the same offer made to the Republican candidates referred to above in response to their requests to purchase half-hour time periods.

“While we are unable to make available time on the dates you have specified, we are able to offer for your purchase a 5-minute period on December 8 between approximately 10:55 and 11:00 PM. We will also provide a specific 5-minute daytime availability for your purchase on request.” Id., at 44r-45.

3 The letter (dated October 23, 1979) to Mr. Rafshoon from Charles C. Allen, Vice President for Sales Administration at ABC, read in pertinent part:

“[T]he ABC Television Network has not reached a decision as to when it will start selling political time for the 1980 Presidential campaign, and, accordingly, we are not in a position to comply with your request. As I mentioned on the telephone, I believe that later this year a decision will be made to make political time for the Presidential campaign available on ABC-TV early next year.” Id., at 41.

4 The letter (dated October 23, 1979) to Mr. Rafshoon from Joseph J. Iaricci, Vice President for Sales and Administration at NBC, read in pertinent part:

“We have evaluated your request carefully. Based upon our experience with past campaigns, we believe it is too early in the political season for nationwide broadcast time to be made available for paid political purposes. In addition, we believe that honoring your request at this early stage of the Presidential campaign would require NBC to honor similar requests from a number of other Presidential aspirants. The impact of such an undertaking at this time is, of course, a significant factor in our decision.

“Insofar as the nomination process is now focused on political activities in individual states like Iowa, you may wish to contact stations serving those particular states.

“Please be assured that NBC News will continue to cover important and newsworthy aspects of President Carter's political activities.” Id., at 42-43.

5 Title I also provided: (a) that during a specified period before a primary or general election, a broadcast station was not permitted to charge a legally qualified candidate for any public office a fee in excess of its “lowest unit charge ... for the same class and amount of time for the same period,” 47 U. S. C. § 316 (b) (1); and (b) that in using the communications media, candidates for federal elective office were not allowed to exceed established spending limits, 47 U. S. C. § 803 (1970 ed., Supp. II), repealed, Pub. L. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1278 (1974).

6 The public interest requirement still governs the obligations of broadcasters with respect to political races at the state and local levels. See Public Notice: The Law of Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting, 69 F. C. C. 2d 2209, 2290 (1978) (1978 Primer).

7 Title 47 U. S. C. § 315 (a) provides that, if a legally qualified candidate for public office is permitted to use a broadcasting station, the licensee must afford “equal opportunities to all other . . . candidates for that office in the use of [the] station.³’

8 No request for access must be honored under § 312 (a) (7) unless the candidate is willing to pay for the time sought. See Kennedy for President Comm. v. FCC, 204 U. S. App. D. C. 160, 174-178, 636 F. 2d 432, 446-450 (1980); 1978 Primer, at 2288.

9 Broadcasters have continued to register their complaints about § 312 (a)(7) with Congress. See First Amendment Clarification Act of 1977: Hearing on S. 22 before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 67 (1978). And Congress has considered specific proposals to repeal the statute, but has declined to do so. See S. 22, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3 (1977); S. 1178, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., §2 (1975). Indeed when the Federal Election Campaign Act was amended in 1974, § 312 (a) (7) was left undisturbed. See Pub. L. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1272.

10 See generally Note, The Right of “Reasonable Access” for Federal Political Candidates Under Section 312 (a) (7) of the Communications Act, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1287 (1978).

11 In order to be “legally qualified” under the Commission's rules, a candidate must: (a) be eligible under law to hold the office he seeks; (b) announce his candidacy; and (c) qualify for a place on the ballot or be eligible under law for election as a write-in candidate. Persons seeking nomination for the Presidency or Vice Presidency are “legally qualified” in: (a) those states in which they or their proposed delegates have qualified for the primary or Presidential preference ballot; or (b) those states in which they have made a substantial showing of being serious candidates for nomination. Such persons will be considered “legally qualified” in all states if they have qualified in 10 or more states. See 1978 Primer, 69 F. C. C. 2d, at 2216-2218.

12 The dissenters place great emphasis on the preservation of broadcaster discretion. However, endowing licensees with a “blank check” to determine what constitutes “reasonable access” would eviscerate §312 (a)(7).

13 In 1978, the Commission issued a Notice of Inquiry, which asked whether rulemaking proceedings should be commenced in order to clarify licensee obligations under § 312 (a) (7). 43 Fed. Reg. 12938. Petitioners and others in the broadcasting industry expressed strong opposition to the promulgation of specific rules, and none were formulated. 1978 Report and Order, 68 F. C. C. 2d, at 1079-1081. Petitioners, therefore, must share responsibility for any vagueness and confusion in the Commission’s standards.

14 Section 312 (a) empowers the Commission to “revoke any station license or construction permit.” (Emphasis added.) In the Court of Appeals, petitioners argued that the statute applies only to licensees, not to networks. However, the court rejected that contention, reasoning that the Commission’s jurisdiction to “mandate reasonable network access ... is 'reasonably ancillary’ to the effective enforcement of the individual licensee’s Section 312 (a) (7) obligations . . . .” 202 U. S. App. D. C., at 393-395, 629 F. 2d, at 25-27. Petitioners do not contest that holding in this Court. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 16-17. In any event, as the Commission noted, each petitioner is “a multi-station licensee fully reachable [as to its licenses] by [the express] revocation authority” granted under § 312 (a) (7). 74 F. C. C. 2d, at 640, n. 10.

15 As it did here, the Commission, with the approval of broadcasters, engages in case-by-case adjudication of § 312 (a) (7) complaints rather than awaiting license renewal proceedings. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-16. Although the penalty provided by § 312 (a) (7) is license revocation, petitioners simply were directed to inform the Commission of how they intended to meet their statutory obligations. See 74 F. C. C. 2d, at 651; 74 F. C. C. 2d, at 676-677. In essence, the Commission entered a declaratory order that petitioners’ responses to the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee constituted a denial of “reasonable access.” Such a ruling favors broadcasters by allowing an opportunity for curative action before their conduct is found to be “willful or repeated” and subject to the imposition of sanctions.

3 Of a similar tenor is the Court of Appeals’ observation that “[t]he interference with editorial discretion” created by the rigid scheme of regulatory oversight it was endorsing “seems no more or less” than had existed under the broad public interest standard. 202 TJ. S. App. D. C. 369, 391, n. 102, 629 F. 2d 1, 23, n. 102.