Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps , 106 S. Ct. 1558 ( 1986 )

Justice Brennan,

with whom Justice Blackmun joins, concurring.

I believe that where allegedly defamatory speech is of public concern, the First Amendment requires that the plaintiff, whether public official, public figure, or private individual, prove the statements at issue to be false, and thus join the Court’s opinion. Cf. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 29 (1971). I write separately only to note that, while the Court reserves the question whether the rule it announces applies to nonmedia defendants, ante, at 779, n. 4, I adhere to my view that such a distinction is “irreconcilable with the fundamental First Amendment principle that ‘[t]he inherent worth of . . . speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of the source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.’” Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U. S. 749, 781 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 777 (1978)).