California v. Brown , 107 S. Ct. 837 ( 1987 )

Chief Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented for review in this case is whether an instruction informing jurors that they “must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling” during the penalty phase of a capital murder trial violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We hold that it does not.

Respondent Albert Brown was found guilty by a jury of forcible rape and first-degree murder in the death of 15-year-old Susan J. At the penalty phase, the State presented evidence that respondent had raped another young girl some years prior to his attack on Susan J. Respondent presented the testimony of several family members, who recounted respondent’s peaceful nature and expressed disbelief that respondent was capable of such a brutal crime. Respondent also presented the testimony of a psychiatrist, who stated that Brown killed his victim because of his shame and fear over sexual dysfunction. Brown himself testified, stating that he was ashamed of his prior criminal conduct and asking for mercy from the jury.

California Penal Code Ann. § 190.3 (West Supp. 1987) provides that capital defendants may introduce at the penalty phase any evidence “as to any matter relevant to . . . mitigation . . . including, but not limited to, the nature and circumstances of the present offense,. . . and the defendant’s character, background, history, mental condition and physical condition.”^* The trial court instructed the jury to consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and to weigh them in determining the appropriate penalty. App. 23-24. But the court cautioned the jury that it “must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling.” Id., at 20. Respondent was sentenced to death.

On automatic appeal, the Supreme Court of California reversed the sentence of death. 40 Cal. 3d 512, 709 P. 2d 440 (1985). Over two dissents on this point, the majority opinion found that the instruction at issue here violates the Federal Constitution: “ ‘federal constitutional law forbids an instruction which denies a capital defendant the right to have the jury consider any “sympathy factor” raised by the evidence when determining the appropriate penalty ....’” Id., at 537, 709 P. 2d, at 453, quoting People v. Lanphear, 36 Cal. 3d 163, 165, 680 P. 2d 1081, 1082 (1984). Relying on Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 (1982), Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978), and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 (1976), the court ruled that the instruction “is calculated to divert the jury from its constitutional duty to consider ‘any [sympathetic] aspect of the defendant’s character or record,’ whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial, in deciding the appropriate penalty.” 40 Cal. 3d, at 537, 709 P. 2d, at 453. We granted certiorari to resolve whether such an instruction violates the United States Constitution. 476 U. S. 1157 (1986).

The Eighth Amendment jurisprudence of this Court establishes two separate prerequisites to a valid death sentence. First, sentencers may not be given unbridled discretion in determining the fates of those charged with capital offenses. The Constitution instead requires that death penalty statutes be structured so as to prevent the penalty from being administered in an arbitrary and unpredictable fashion. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972). Second, even though the sentencer’s discretion must be restricted, the capital defendant generally must be allowed to introduce any relevant mitigating evidence regarding his “‘character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense.’” Eddings, supra, at 110, quoting Lockett, supra, at 604. Consideration of such evidence is a “constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.” Woodson v. North Carolina, supra, at 304 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). The instruction given by the trial court in this case violates neither of these constitutional principles.

We think that the California Supreme Court improperly focused solely on the word “sympathy” to determine that the instruction interferes with the jury’s consideration of mitigating evidence. “The question, however, is not what the State Supreme Court declares the meaning of the charge to be, but rather what a reasonable juror could have understood the charge as meaning.” Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S. 307, 315-316 (1985); see Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510, 516-517 (1979). To determine how a reasonable juror could interpret an instruction, we “must focus initially on the specific language challenged.” Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S., at 315. If the specific instruction fails constitutional muster, we then review the instructions as a whole to see if the entire charge delivered a correct interpretation of the law. Ibid. In this ease, we need not reach the second step of analysis because we hold that a reasonable juror would not interpret the challenged instruction in a manner that would render it unconstitutional.

The jury was told not to be swayed by “mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling.” Respondent does not contend, and the Supreme Court of California did not hold, that conjecture, passion, prejudice, public opinion, or public feeling should properly play any role in the jury’s sentencing determination, even if such factors might weigh in the defendant’s favor. Rather, respondent reads the instruction as if it solely cautioned the jury not to be swayed by “sympathy.” Even if we were to agree that a rational juror could parse the instruction in such a hypertechnical manner, we would disagree with both respondent’s interpretation of the instruction and his conclusion that the instruction is unconstitutional.

By concentrating on the noun “sympathy,” respondent ignores the crucial fact that the jury was instructed to avoid basing its decision on mere sympathy. Even a juror who insisted on focusing on this one phrase in the instruction would likely interpret the phrase as an admonition to ignore emotional responses that are not rooted in the aggravating and mitigating evidence introduced during the penalty phase. While strained in the abstract, respondent’s interpretation is simply untenable when viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances. This instruction was given at the end of the penalty phase, only after respondent had produced 13 witnesses in his favor. Yet respondent’s interpretation would have these two words transform three days of favorable testimony into a virtual charade. We think a reasonable juror would reject that interpretation, and instead understand the instruction not to rely oh “mere sympathy” as a directive to ignore only the sort of sympathy that would be totally divorced from the evidence adduced during the penalty phase.

We also think it highly unlikely that any reasonable juror would almost perversely single out the word “sympathy” from the other nouns which accompany it in the instruction: conjecture, passion, prejudice, public opinion, and public feeling. Reading the instruction as a whole, as we must, it is no more than a catalog of the kind of factors that could improperly influence a juror’s decision to vote for or against the death penalty. The doctrine of noscitur a sociis is based on common sense, and a rational juror could hardly hear this instruction without concluding that it was meant to confine the jury’s deliberations to considerations arising from the evidence presented, both aggravating and mitigating.

An instruction prohibiting juries from basing their sentencing decisions on factors not presented at the trial, and irrelevant to the issues at the trial, does not violate the United States Constitution. It serves the useful purpose of confining the jury’s imposition of the death sentence by cautioning it against reliance on extraneous emotional factors, which, we think, would be far more likely to turn the jury against a capital defendant than for him. And to the extent that the instruction helps to limit the jury’s consideration to matters introduced in evidence before it, it fosters the Eighth Amendment’s “need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.” Woodson, 428 U. S., at 305. Indeed, by limiting the jury’s sentencing considerations to record evidence, the State also ensures the availability of meaningful judicial review, another safeguard that improves the reliability of the sentencing process. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U. S. 325, 335, and n. 11 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.).

We hold that the instruction challenged in this case does not violate the provisions of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The judgment of the Supreme Court of California is therefore reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

* We have noted our approval of this statutory scheme. California v. Ramos, 468 U. S. 992, 1005, n. 19 (1983). See also Pulley v. Harris, 465 U. S. 37, 53 (1984).