In Re Dorey's Estate , 62 Wash. 2d 152 ( 1963 )

Ott, C. J.

October 17, 1957, Waltera Dorey died intestate, leaving as her heirs, George R. Dorey, surviving spouse, and Irene Zuber and Richard Wojcik, both children of the decedent by a former marriage. November 15, 1957, George R. Dorey was appointed administrator, and, on November 22, 1957, caused notice to creditors to be published. No creditors’ claims were filed. August 24, 1960, the estate was inventoried and appraised. The appraised value of the estate was $19,000, consisting of household furniture valued at $500, a residence property valued at $13,500, a $2,600 savings account, and cash in the sum of $2,400.

August 26, 1960, George R. Dorey petitioned the court for a $6,000 homestead award, and to have the entire estate awarded to him. He alleged in his petition that he was entitled to the remaining portion of the estate for the reason that he had advanced $4,000 of his separate funds to the marital community for the purchase of the residence property; that he had satisfied two mechanics’ and material-men’s liens upon the residence totaling $1,298.67; that he had paid the expenses of last illness of the decedent in the sum of $4,221.28, and funeral expenses in the sum of $1,-031.62; that he had agreed to pay $648.43 attorneys’ fees for probating the estate and defending an action involving the mechanics’ and materialmen’s liens; that the court had awarded him $150 a month as a family allowance for 12 months; that these credits due him from the estate totaled $13,000, and that, with the $6,000 allowance as a homestead award, nothing remained for distribution.

Irene Zuber and Richard Wojcik appeared and objected to the administrator’s being awarded reimbursement from the assets of the estate for items for which no creditor’s claim had been filed.

At the hearing upon the petition, the court denied the administrator’s request for reimbursement of the $4,000 item allegedly advanced from separate property. The court granted the administrator reimbursement from the assets of the estate for all remaining items, as requested, but reduced reimbursement for expenses of last illness to $3,279.32. It granted the household furniture, valued at $500, and a lien upon the residence property in the sum of $5,500 as a homesteád award, and ordered that the remaining value of the estate, in the sum of $5,240.63, “shall be subject to the laws of descent and distribution of the State of Washington.”

From the judgment entered accordingly, Irene Zuber and Richard Wojcik have appealed.

Appellants do not question the validity of that portion of the decree which granted respondent the homestead award in the statutory amount of $6,000.

The sole issue is whether the court erred in allowing the administrator to be reimbursed from the assets of the estate for items of expense for which no creditors’ claims were filed.

RCW 11.40.010 provides:

“Every executor or administrator shall, immediately after his appointment, cause to be published in some newspaper printed in the county, if there be one, if not, then in such newspaper as may be designated by the court, a notice that he has been appointed and has qualified as such executor or. administrator, and therewith a notice to the creditors of the deceased, requiring all persons having claims against the deceased to serve the same on the executor or administrator or his attorney of record, and file with the clerk of the court, together with proof of such service, within six months after the date of the first publication of such notice. Such notice shall be published once in each week for three successive weeks. If a claim be not filed within the time aforesaid, it shall be barred. Proof by affidavit of the publisher of the publication of such notice shall be filed with the court: Provided, however, In cases where all the property is awarded to the widow, husband or children as in this act provided, the notice to creditors herein provided for may be omitted.”

This estate does not qualify within the proviso of RCW 11.40.010 for-the reason that all of the property in the estate could not be awarded as a homestead.

The cited statute provides that “If a claim be not filed within the time aforesaid, it shall be barred.” Compli-anee with the statute is mandatory. First Sec. & Loan Co. v. Englehart, 107 Wash. 86, 181 Pac. 13 (1919); Davis v. Shepard, 135 Wash. 124, 237 Pac. 21, 41 A.L.R. 163 (1925); Horton v. McCord, 158 Wash. 563, 291 Pac. 717 (1930); Parchen v. Hauschild, 159 Wash. 49, 292 Pac. 116 (1930); In re Sykes’ Estate, 11 Wn. (2) 278, 118 P. (2d) 961 (1941); In re Krueger’s Estate, 11 Wn. (2d) 329, 119 P. (2d) 312 (1941). The administrator or executor cannot waive the requirements of the statute. Baumgartner v. Moffatt, 113 Wash. 493, 194 Pac. 392 (1920); New York Merchandise Co. v. Stout, 43 Wn. (2d) 825, 264 P. (2d) 863 (1953).

RCW 11.40.140 provides that, when the administrator or executor is a creditor of the testator or intestate, he shall file a claim. Such a claim is subject to the same bar of the statute as that of any other creditor. Connell v. Tack, 185 Wash. 489, 55 P. (2d) 1090 (1936); In re Sykes’ Estate, supra.

The expense of last illness is a debt which accrued during the lifetime of the decedent, and is an item for which a claim must be filed. RCW 11.40.010, 11.40.020. In Tucker v. Brown, 20 Wn. (2d) 740, 796, 150 P. (2d) 604 (1944), we said:

“The general rule is that an administrator is a trustee of the estate funds. He is bound by the statute, Rem. Rev. Stat., § 1484 [P. C. § 9835], relative to the filing of claims, and cannot waive, as against the rights of heirs or creditors, any requirement of the statute. [Citing cases.]”

Respondent contends, however, that the homestead exemption statute, infra, requires that, when he establishes that he has paid the expense, he is to be reimbursed out of the assets of the estate.

RCW 11.52.010 provides:

“If it is made to appear to the satisfaction of the court that no homestead has been claimed in the manner provided by law, either prior or subsequent to the death of the person whose estate is being administered, then the court, after hearing and upon being satisfied that the funeral expenses, expenses of last sickness and of administration have been paid or provided for, and upon petition for that purpose, shall award and set off to the surviving spouse, if any, property of the estate, either community or separate, not exceeding the value of six thousand dollars at the time of death, exclusive of general taxes and special assessments which were liens at the time of the death of the deceased spouse, and exclusive of any mortgage or mechanic’s, laborer’s or materialmen’s or vendor’s liens upon the property so set off, and exclusive of funeral expenses, expenses of last sickness and administration, which expenses may be deducted from the gross value in determining the value to be set off to the surviving spouse; provided that the court shall have no jurisdiction to make such award unless the petition therefor is filed with the clerk within six years from the date of the death of the person whose estate is being administered.”

RCW 11.52.020 provides in part:

“In event a homestead has been, or shall be selected in the manner provided by law, whether the selection of such homestead results in vesting the complete or partial title in the survivor, it shall be the duty of the court, upon petition of any person interested, and upon being satisfied that the value thereof does not exceed six thousand dollars at the time of the death, exclusive of general taxes and special assessments which were liens at the time of the death of the deceased and exclusive of mortgages, mechanic’s, laborer’s, materialmen’s or vendor’s liens thereon, and exclusive of funeral expenses, expenses of last sickness and of administration, which expenses may be deducted from the gross value in determining the value to be set off to the surviving spouse, to enter a decree, upon notice as provided in RCW 11.52.014 or upon longer notice if the court so orders, setting off and awarding such homestead to the survivor, thereby vesting the title thereto in fee simple in the survivor:

The legislature provided that the specified items “may be deducted from the gross value in determining the value to be set off to the surviving spouse.” By statute, the deductions are for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient property over and above the preferred items to grant the homestead award.

The statute establishes an accounting procedure by which certain items of expense can be deducted from “the gross value in determining the value [not to exceed $6,000] to be set off to the surviving spouse.” It limits consideration of the deductible items for the sole purpose of determining the gross and net value of the estate.

There is nothing in the homestead exemption statute which indicates a legislative intent to grant to a homestead petitioner reimbursement out of the assets of the estate for expenses of last illness for which no claim has been filed. Nor does it authorize reinstatement of a claim for expenses of last illness which has been outlawed as a legal debt against the estate for more than 2 years and 3 months. Nor is there anything in the homestead exemption statute which establishes a legislative intent that, at the hearing upon a petition for a homestead award, the amount or the legality of the alleged preferred claims can be adjudicated and ordered paid. The express legislative intent is to the contrary. RCW 11.52.012 provides in part:

“The property so set off shall include the home and household goods, if any, and such award . . . shall vest the absolute title, and thereafter there shall be no further administration upon such portion of the estate so set off, but the remainder of the estate shall be settled as other estates: . . . ” (Italics ours.)

The remainder of the estate includes everything other than the homestead award, which, by statute, is limited to a value of $6,000.

The court exceeded its jurisdiction at the hearing on the petition for a homestead award when it granted to the respondent anything in excess of the $6,000 homestead award.

The cause is remanded with instructions to modify the award to the respondent in accordance with the views herein expressed. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

The appellants will recover costs.

Hill, Donworth, Weaver, Hunter, and Hamilton, JJ., concur.