Toronto v. Sheffield , 118 Utah 460 ( 1950 )

WADE, Justice.

The question presented here is: Does Section 104 — 2— 5.10, Chapter 19, Laws of Utah 1943, page 22, and the amendment thereto by Chapter 8, Laws of Utah 1947, page 19, bar defendants’ defense to plaintiffs’ action to quiet their tax title to the real property involved in this action? Many problems of construction are hereinafter suggested to bring them to the attention of the bench, bar and legislature in case there is further legislation on this subject, but they are not decided because their determination is not necessary for the disposal of this case.

Plaintiffs sue to quiet title to a tract of land in Salt Lake City, alleging ownership and possession in themselves. The defendants Sheffield answered denying plaintiffs’ ownership, admitted that they claim an interest in the property, but deny that their interest is inferior to plaintiffs’ claim. The defendant, Salt Lake City, alleged that it has a lien on the property for unpaid special assessments which it described in detail. The other defendants defaulted or disclaimed any interest. None of the defendants asked for any affirmative relief, but merely prayed that plaintiffs’ complaint be dismissed. In reply plaintiffs alleged that Salt Lake City’s lien was extinguished by the Auditor’s Tax Deed hereinafter described, and that its claim was barred by Sections 104 — 2—5, 104 — 2—5.10, and 104 — 2—6, Laws of Utah 1943, Chapters 18, 19, and 20 at pages 21 and 22 and other sections of the statute of limitations.

At the trial plaintiff produced evidence to the effect that this was unimproved vacant city property for which plaintiffs paid $400.00 cash to Salt Lake County and introduced a Certificate of Tax Sale to Salt Lake County dated December 21, 1923, for the delinquent taxes for that year, an Auditor’s Tax Deed dated May 24, 1928, to the county and a Quitclaim Deed from Salt Lake County conveying such property to plaintiffs, dated July 5, 1946, and rested. The only evidence on behalf of the defendants was an oral stipulation in court by the parties that neither of the Auditor’s affidavits, required by sections 5982 and 6006, C. L. U. 1917, now Sections 80 — 7—9 and 80 — 8—7, U. C. A. 1943, were attached to the assessment roll for 1923. Defendants’ claim that under the evidence plaintiffs’ title was invalid and the action must be dismissed. See Telonis v. Staley, 104 Utah 537, 144 P. 2d 513; Equitable Life and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Schoewe, 105 Utah 569, 144 P. 2d 526; Tree v. White, 110 Utah 233, 171 P. 2d 398; Petterson v. Ogden City, 111 Utah 125, 176 P. 2d 599; Anson v. Ellison, 104 Utah 576, 140 P. 2d 653.

The court found that the plaintiffs are the owners and in possession of the property, that the defendants and each of them are barred from attacking the Certificate of Tax Sale and the Auditor’s Tax Deed to this property by Sections 104 — 2—5, 104 — 2—5.10, and 104 — 2—6, Laws of Utah 1943, supra and the amendment to 104 — 2—5.10 in Laws of Utah 1947 and quieted plaintiffs’ title to the property. From this judgment defendants Sheffield and Salt Lake City appeal.

Under the above decisions plaintiffs’ title is defective and unless Section 104 — 2—5.10, supra, bars the defendants from interposing that defense to plaintiffs’ action, the judgment must be reversed. Section 104 — 2—5.10, after being in effect for the full four year period, was amended by Chapter 8, Laws of Utah, 1947 at page 19. I have set out below in composite form the original act of 1943 and the 1947 amendment. The words in ordinary print are in both the original and the amendment. Those with lines through them were in the original act but not in the amendment, and the italicized words were placed in the statute by the amendment. So to get the- act as originally passed, read only the words which are in ordinary print and the words with a line running through them; and to get the amendment, read only the words in ordinary print and the italicized ones:

“No action for the recovery of real property struck off and sold to the County as provided by under the provisions of Section 80 — 10—68(6), Utah Code Annotated 1943, or conveyed to the County prior to September 1, 1939, by auditor’s deed under the provisions of Section 80 — 10—66, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, or for the possession thereof, shall be maintained, and no defence or counterclaim to sny action involving tbe recmr£irT?' ci prcpsi,i"u', or tbs defense oí title to property, sold at sucb or public c** for the recovery of such property or for the possession thereof shall be set up or maintained interposed unless the same be brought or SSt up interposed within four years from the date on which the ssle was held of such sale, or within four years from the date of the issuance of such auditor’s deed. Provided, however, that an action may be maintained er da-■Pansa a ¿ib un Wí¿-Iíi,'v •£<■»*'**» xraara ívCm ■fUn xaT "f tb’“ SCw "tV’IvIS Í2“

Plaintiffs must rely on the act as it was originally enacted without the aid of the amendment because any changes made by the amendment which were not contained in the original has not been in effect for the full four years. The 1947 amendment expressly extends the bar to actions for the recovery of real property “conveyed to the County prior to September 1, 1939, by auditor’s deed under the provisions of Section 80 — 10—66, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933” which would probably cover this case, for the auditor’s tax deed to Salt Lake County dated May 24, 1928, was made pursuant to Section 6030, C. L. U. 1917, which with slight amendments, was the same as Section 80 — 10—66, R. S. U. 1933. The amendment deletes from the act the. provision “that an action may be maintained or a defense set up within four years from the effective date of this act with respect to real property sold prior to said effective date.” The full four years had expired after this deed was issued before the 1943 enactment or the 1947 amendment thereto. So, if this case is covered by the amendment but not by the original 1943 enactment, then there was an attempt to bar this action upon the effective date of the amendment without allowing any time thereafter within which to bring an action. The Legislature may bar a claim within a reasonable time within the effective date of a statute enacted for that purpose, but may not constitutionally bar such claim without allowing some time to elapse during which claimant may bring an action thereon after the effective date of the statute. See Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. 596, 84 U. S. 596, 21 L. Ed. 737; Thoeni v. City of Dubuque, 115 Iowa 482, 88 N. W. 967; Western Holding Company v. Northwestern Land & Loan Co., 113 Mont. 24, 120 P. 2d 557; Wallace v. McEchron, 176 N. Y. 424, 68 N. E. 663. So, either this amendment must be construed to commence the running of the four years period of limitations at the time of the enactment or be held to be unconstitutional.

By its terms, this statute, contrary to most such statutes, bars actions, counterclaims, or defenses brought or interposed either to sustain or overturn a tax title. So construed, the purpose of the statute would not be that of a limitation to actions which is to settle stale claims but would be to bar the courts from adjudicating the title to any such property. So construed such a statute would probably be unconstitutional, for it is inconceivable that a legislature has the power to prevent the litigation of claims in the courts. Wisconsin has construed a statute somewhat similar to this one in this respect as barring an action for the recovery of property sold at a tax sale by either the purchaser at such sale or by the original tax debtor owner, whichever one was not in possession; and in cases of vacant and unoccupied property, the purchaser of a tax title which was good on its face was held to have constructive possession of such property.¹ Where the tax title was void, on its face, an action by the purchaser of such tax title would be barred by the statute except where he was in actual possession of the property. Egerton v. Bird, 6, Wis. 527, 70 Am. Dec. 473; Knox v. Cleveland, 13 Wis. 245; Sprecker v. Wakeley, 11 Wis. 432; Hill v. Kricke, 11 Wis. 442; Falkner v. Dorman, 7 Wis. 388; McMillan v. Wehle, 55 Wis. 685, 13 N. W. 694.

This 1943 original statute is also unusual in that it expressly bars defenses as well as actions and counterclaims. Usually it is held that a statute which bars a defense against an action by the holder of the tax title to recover property from the owner who has retained actual possession thereof is unconstitutional. See Buty v. Goldfinch, 74 Wash. 532, 133 P. 1057, 46 L. R. A., N. S., 1065, also note at page 1066, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 604 and note at 608.

To understand our problem we must keep in mind the procedure prescribed by statutes for tax sales. Under section 80 — 10—32, U. C. A. 1943, on January 10th, of each year all real estate subject to a lien for delinquent taxes are deemed sold to the county to pay such tax at preliminary tax sale. With a few changes in minor details this is the same as section 80 — 10—32, R. S. U. 1933, and a similar procedure is provided for by sections 6018 to 6023, O. L. U. 1917, pursuant to which this sale was conducted and the tax sale certificate issued in 1923. Thereafter, any real estate sold to the county under a preliminary sale for delinquent taxes may, under sections 80 — 10—59, U. C. A. 1943 and R. S. U. 1933 and Section 6024, C. L. U. 1917, be redeemed by any person having an interest therein while such property is held by the county under such preliminary sale prior to April 1st next following the lapse of four years from the date of the preliminary sale. There are three different kinds of sales by which the county may transfer the title to property sold to it under the preliminary sale for taxes which is not redeemed within the time specified therefor other than by a foreclosure suit; (1) by private sale; (2) by public sale; and (3) by striking it off to the county under subdivision (6), Section 80 — 10—68, U. C. A. 1943.

(1) Under section 80 — 10—36, U. C. A. 1943, and R. S. U. 1933 and Section 6023, C. L. U. 1917, as amended by Laws of Utah for 1919, page 339, at any time after the preliminary sale and before the expiration of the redemption period the county treasurer is required to sell and assign the interest of the county in any real estate which is subject to such preliminary delinquent tax sale to any person holding a recorded mortgage or lien against such property upon his payment of the amount of the delinquent taxes, interest, penalties and costs thereon. Thereupon, such purchaser is entitled to receive an assignment of the county’s interest in such property from the county auditor. In case the property is not redeemed within the redemption period, such assignee may thereafter present such assignment to the county auditor who is required to make out a deed conveying such property to him from the county. Here there is no deed conveying the property to the county except the record of the preliminary sale but the deed conveys the property directly from the county to the recorded lien holder assignee.

(2) Under section 80 — 10—68 (2), (3), (4) and (5), U. C. A. 1943, 80 — 10—68, R. S. U. 1933 and Section 6056, C. L. U. 1917, the county is required to advertise for sale and sell at public sale all real property previously sold to the county at preliminary tax sale and not redeemed or sold at private sale under section 80 — 10—36, for which an acceptable bid is made, and upon which the period of redemption has expired. Here again since the 1939 amendment the deed runs directly from the county to the purchaser but prior to that amendment under section 80 — 10— 66, R. S. U. 1933, the county auditor deeded all the property which was subject to the May sale to the county after the redemption period expired and prior to the May sale, and thereafter the Board of County Commissioners might sell the same at any time at public or private sale.

(3) Then, under section 80 — 10—68 (6), U. C. A. 1943, after all the real property which has been previously sold to the county at preliminary tax sale and not redeemed or sold at private sale under Section 80 — 10—36 and upon which the redemption period has expired has been offered for sale at the May sale, all of such property for which no acceptable bid is received, is then struck off and sold to the county and a record made thereof. This property may thereafter be sold by the Board of Commissioners at any time at public or private sale. This sale is in many respects similar to the sale to the county provided for under section 80 — 10—66, R. S. U. 1933, except that that sale is made prior to the May sale upon the expiration of the redemption period, and not at any specified occasion but a separate auditor’s deed is made to the county for each parcel of land and it covers all the property which under section 80 — 10— 68 (2), (3), (4) and (5) is offered for sale and sold at the May sale to a bidder as well as that which is struck off and sold to the county at that sale.

Section 104 — 2—5.10 as enacted in 1943, bars only an action “for the recovery of real property struck off and sold to the county as provided by section 80 — 10—68 (6), Utah Code Annotated 1943”. It does not bar an action for the recovery of real property which is sold to a recorded mortgage or lien holder at private sale under section 80— 10 — 36 as described in paragraph (1) above nor for the recovery of real property sold to a bidder under section 80 — 10—68 (2), (3), (4) and (5) at the May sale as described in paragraph (2) above. It covers only the property struck off and sold to the county under the last of these three kinds of sales.

But, in dealing with defenses it bars a defense or counterclaim

“to any action involving the recovery of property, or the defense of title to property, sold at such sale, or public or private sale.”

This language enlarges the bar so as to include defenses and counterclaims to actions for the recovery of real property sold at public and private sales described in paragraphs (1) and (2) above as well as for the recovery of property struck off and sold to the county as described in paragraph (3) above. And it not only bars a defense or counterclaim to an action involving the recovery of real property which has been so sold but also bars the defense of title to such property.

By its terms the language of the 1943 enactment of section 104 — 2—5.10, bars only an “action for the recovery of real property struck off and sold to the county, as provided by section 80 — 10—68 (6), Utah Code Annotated 1943”. As pointed out above, prior to 1939 this property was, with other property, conveyed to the county by auditor’s deed under section 80 — 10—66, R. S. U. 1933, which was the procedure followed in this case. Thereafter, the May sale provided for under Section 80 — 10—68, R. S. U. 1933, was held and the property for which a suitable bid was received was sold to such bidder under general provisions of section 80 — 10—68, R. S. U. 1933, but there was no subdivision (6) of that section authorizing the conveyance of any property to the county. This procedure was quite a departure from that provided for under section 80 — 10—68 (6), U. C. A. 1943. It seems unusual that the legislature intentionally enacted a statute barring only actions involving tax sales made since the 1939 amendment under section 80 — 10 —68 (6), U. C. A. 1943, and not cover tax sales made under section 80 — 10—66, R. S. U. 1933, where the claim would have to be much more stale. But the history of the bill which was later, after amendments, enacted into this statute indicates that the legislature deliberately chose that narrow limitation, for the bill as originally introduced was much broader in its bar of actions than it was when enacted.

Below is a composite form of the bill as introduced and as finally enacted. As in the composite form of the original and amended acts the words in ordinary print and those with the line running through them are the bill as originally introduced and the words in ordinary print and those which are italicized constitute the act as it was enacted.

“No action for the recovery of real property Sfld at tax sale or public or private sals struck off and sold to the county, as provided by section 80 — 10— 68 (6) Utah Code Annotated 1943, or for the possession thereof shall be maintained and no defense or counter-claim to any action involving the recovery of property, or the defense of title to property, sold at such tax sale, or public or private sale, or for possession thereof, shall be set up or maintained, unless the same be brought or set up within t',ve four years from date on which the sale was held. Provided, however, that an action may be maintained if brought within t'.vo or defense set up within four years from the effective date of this act with respect to real property sold prior to said effective date.”

From the foregoing it is evident that the bill as introduced is much broader in its bar to actions than it was as enacted, and that parts of the original coverage was switched to bar only defenses and counterclaims. Such changes would require considerable study and indicate that they were made deliberately and we must conclude that the legislature intended to exclude from the limitations of this section, all actions, defenses and counterclaims for the recovery of real property except those expressly specified in the statute. The statute specifies only actions “for the recovery of real property struck off and sold to the county, as provided by section 80 — 10—68 (6), Utah Code Annotated 1943” and defenses and counterclaims “to any action involving the recovery of property, or the defense of title to property, sold at such tax sale, or public or private sale, or for possession thereof.” This provisions does not bar a defense to an action such as this for the recovery of real property transferred to the county by auditor’s deed under section 80 — 10—66, R. S. U. 1938, for no reference is made to such a transaction.

Our State Constitution, Article 1, section 24 provides that “all laws of a general nature shall have some uniform operation.” And Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal- constitution forbids any state to “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Under these provisions in State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, at page 507, and 78 P. 2d 920, at page 923 and 117 A. L. R. 330 through Mr. Justice WOLFE, we said:

“Of course, every legislative act is in one sense discriminatory. The Legislature cannot [in one act[ legislate as to all persons or all subject matters. It is inclusive as to some class or group and as to some human relationships, transactions, or functions and exclusive as to the remainder. For that reason, to be unconstitutional the discrimination must be unreasonable or arbitary. A classification is never unreasonable or arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion features so long as there is some basis for the differentiation between classes or subject matters included as compared to those excluded from its operation, provided the differentiation bears a reasonable relation to the purposes to be accomplished by the act.”

To the same effect, see Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 113 Utah 284, 194 P. 2d 464; Broadbent v. Gibson, 105 Utah 53, 140 P. 2d 939; State v. Walker, 100 Utah 523, 116 P. 2d 766; State v. Sopher, 25 Utah 318, 71 P. 482, 60 L. R. A. 468, 95 Am. St. Rep. 845.

Here, there is no basis whatever for the distinction made. The conditions surrounding the sale to the county under section 80 — 10—68 (6), U. C. A. 1943, since the 1939 amendment and the objects and purposes thereof are exactly the same as those of section 80 — 10— 66, R. S. U. 1933, prior to that amendment. The only factual difference whatever is a slight change in the procedure and the fact that the sale made under the former statute must have been made before the one under the present statute and therefore deals with a claim which is more stale. Certainly that fact would not justify the distinction of barring the newer claims while not barring the older ones. We therefore conclude that this differentiation between these two classes of sales bears no reasonable relation to the purposes to be accomplished by this act and therefore hold that the discrimination, against persons who as plaintiffs here purchased tax titles transferred to the county under the statute in effect prior to the 1939 amendment is arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore is unconstitutional.

Again we are confronted with the hard situation resulting from our decisions in Bolognese v. Anderson, 97 Utah 136, 90 P. 2d 275; Fisher v. Wright, 101 Utah 469; 123 P. 2d 703; Anson v. Ellison, 104 Utah 576, 140 P. 2d 653; referred to by Mr. Justice WOLFE in Mercur Coalition Min. Co. v. Cannon. 112 Utah 13, 184 P. 2d 341 and Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. Robbins, 116 Utah 314, 209 P. 2d 739. Plaintiffs at the soliciation of their county government pursuant to a state statute paid the county the delinquent taxes, thereby discharging the tax lien therefor against this property. But through no fault of their own, they failed to obtain a valid title. As the result of this action plaintiffs’ title will be • adjudicated to be invalid thereby in substance and effect quieting the delinquent tax debtor owner’s title and relieving it from the cloud of plaintiffs’ claim. But because defendants merely denied plaintiffs’ ownership and asked for no affirmative relief, plaintiffs are unable to recover from such defendants, who should have paid these taxes, the money they are out. Had such defendants commenced this action or demanded affirmative relief plaintiffs could have recovered, although the effect of this suit on the title to the property would have been the same in both cases, and it is the effect which the delinquent tax debtor intended desired and by denying the validity of plaintiffs’ title in effect asked for.

I think, speaking only for myself and not for the court, that the cases which create such a situation should be overruled to the extent of allowing the tax title purchaser to recover from the delinquent tax debtor whenever it appears that he has put in issue the validity of such tax title and the court holds that it is invalid. This, regardless of whether he asks for affirmative relief or not, though I recognize that such holding might be contrary to the weight of authority. For it is more important that we have rules that bring practical, consistent and just results than that we sustain ancient technical concepts though they are, in a way, logical.

The legislation could very easily correct this situation by creating a lien in the tax title purchaser against the property which he thereby released from the delinquent tax lien in all cases where he failed to obtain a valid title to such property.

The judgment is reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Appellants may recover their costs.

McDonough, j., concurs. PRATT, C. J., concurs in the result.

1 Section 104 — 2—7, U. C. A. 1943, providing that “the person establishing a legal title to the property shall be presumed to have been possessed thereof ■within the time required by law; and the occupation of the property by any other person shall be deemed to have been under and in subordination to the legal title, unless it appears that the property has been held and possessed adversely to such legal title for seven years before the commencement of the action,” might change the presumption of possession in our state.