Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Dowdle ( 1971 )

MADDOX, Justice

(dissenting):

I agree with the majority as to the holding with regard to the first proposition, but' respectfully disagree with the majority on the point that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to permit Bagley to testify about the “agreement” he had made with the District Attorney about pleading guilty to manslaughter in the second degree.

The general rule is well settled that mental status is not the subject of direct testimony, to which, of course, there is an exception, the exception being that when the witness has admitted on cross-examination certain statements which tend to discredit his testimony, he may on redirect state what induced him to make the statements, although the reason is but an uncommunicated motive. But the exception is inapplicable where the witness is discredited by showing that he has entered a plea of guilty to a crime. See Lee v. State, 37 Ala.App. 321, 69 So.2d 467, cert. den. 260 Ala. 698, 69 So.2d 470 (1953).⁴

Admittedly, the authorities are not in agreement as to whether a witness may explain his plea of guilty or his conviction of crime, but I think our Alabama cases hold such evidence to be inadmissible. See Annotation 166 A.L.R. 211. The better rule would probably be to allow the trial court wide discretion in determining whether to allow a witness to explain the reason why he entered a plea of guilty to an offense, but I frankly doubt if our cases are this liberal.

I do not think Sovereign Camp W. O. W. v. Gunn, cited by the majority, is applicable here. As I read that case, it merely holds that the record of conviction of the beneficiary for murder of the insured is admissible in the civil proceeding, and while not conclusive of the issue, is nevertheless prima facie evidence of guilt when offered in the civil proceeding. We there held, and correctly, I think, that the beneficiary should be allowed to prove all facts tending to show her innocence. In the case now before us, the insurance company was allowed to show by extensive evidence that the insured was the aggressor and that its witness, Bagley, was really not guilty of the offense for which he entered a plea of guilty. In fact, had all this evidence not been presented on direct there would have been no occasion for the plaintiff on cross-examination to attempt to discredit the witness by showing that he had entered a plea of guilty to a charge of second degree manslaughter.

In any event, the trial court allowed the insurance company to show that the witness was indicted for a more serious offense of manslaughter in the first degree, that he entered a plea of guilty to manslaughter in the second degree and was sentenced to twelve months hard labor and put on probation. Therefore, I do not think the trial court committed reversible error and I would affirm the judgment.

4 . In Lee, supra, the defendant was on trial for transporting illegal liquor and one of the arresting officers testified that the defendant had his hand over a pistol on the seat of the automobile. On cross-examination by the solicitor the 'defend- ' ant claimed he did not know the pistol was in the car, and that it belonged to his wife, whereupon the solicitor asked him if he had not pleaded' guiltj to a charge of carrying a concealed weapon,, involving the pistol, and the defendant admitted that he had. On redirect, defendant’s lawyer attempted to rehabilitate him by asking him “ * * * if you didn’t plead' guilty just to get it settled?” The State objected and the objection was sustained. In Lee, supra, the trial court allowed the defendant to testify to the fact that he did not own the pistol and that he did not know it was in the car, but the Court refused to allow him to explain his motive for pleading guilty.