Langdon v. Jaramillo , 80 N.M. 255 ( 1969 )

OPINION

TACKETT, Justice.

This case comes before us as a result of an appeal by defendant-appellant Bernalillo County Clerk in which plaintiffs-appellees Tiled an action to compel the county clerk to accept their affidavits of voter registration. Appellant refused to register appellees on the grounds that they resided within areas under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States and that the laws of New Mexico, § 3-1-1, N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp., would not permit voter registration under the circumstances. The trial court ordered the registration of appellees, from which this appeal ensued.

Under points I, II and III, appellant alleges that the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that (I) both the United States and the State of New Mexico have jurisdiction over the land whereon appellees reside; (II) that appellees have met all the qualifications to vote as reqttired by the State of New Mexico, including that of residency; and (III) that appellant wrongfully refused to allow appellees to register to vote and in ordering appellant to so register appellees.

Appellees admit in paragraph 9 of the complaint that each resides on the area of Sandia Base, New Mexico, which was purchased by the United States government pursuant to Art. I, § 8, Clause 17,. United States Constitution, which reads as follows :

“To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings; — And”

In paragrpah 10 of the petition, appellees allege that they were denied the right to register to vote because they reside upon land that is within exclusive federal jurisdiction. '

The trial court entered judgment finding that:

“* * * [T]he parties stipulated in open Court that the allegations set forth in said petition were true and correct except that respondent did not stipulate as to the allegation of paragraph 4 [which states ‘Registration was wrongfully refused as to all of the Petitioners by the County Clerk of Bernalillo County at direction of the registration officers.’] and [also] did not stipulate as to the allegation that the petitioners were presently domiciled in the state of New Mexico; [as alleged in paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the petition.]”

The trial court’s pertinent conclusions are: (2) Appellees were residents of New Mexico; (3) met all qualifications to vote; and (4) both New Mexico and the United States had jurisdiction over the land where appellees resided.

Conclusion No. 4 is contrary to the stipulation of the parties in open court and paragraph 10 of the petition, as to the exclusive federal jurisdiction over the involved area. The record before us does not reveal sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings and conclusions. It is fundamental that a judgment cannot be sustained on appeal, unless the conclusion on which it rests finds support in one or more findings of fact. Thompson v. H. B. Zachry Co., 75 N.M. 715, 410 P.2d 740 (1966).

This case is controlled by Arledge v. Mabry, 52 N.M. 303, 197 P.2d 884 (1948), and cases cited therein, with respect to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States over the land in question, which was ceded by New Mexico and accepted by the United States and not receded. Royer v. Board of Election Supervisors, Cecil County, 231 Md. 561, 191 A.2d 446 (1963); Annot. 34 A.L.R.2d 1193. Compare, Montoya v. Bolack, 70 N.M. 196, 372 P.2d 387 (1962).

• We are not unmindful of the case of Arapajolu v. McMenamin, 113 Cal.App.2d 824, 249 P.2d 318, 34 A.L.R.2d 1185 (1952), but ft is adequately disposed of and distinguished in the Royer case, supra, in which the court said:

“* * * The Arapajolu case was decided by an intermediate court, and the case was denied review by the Supreme Court of California, three judges dissenting. The decision turned on the court’s construction of the local statute. * * *»

Neither are we unmindful of the case of Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965), nor Rothfels v. Southworth, 11 Utah 2d 169, 356 P.2d 612 (1960). The Carrington case, supra, did not involve a federal enclave, but was a problem involving the constitutionality of a Texas constitutional provision which prohibited some members of the armed forces from voting. It is to be noted that the Rothfels case, supra, was a three-to-two decision. Attention is specifically invited to the dissent in that case. In Arledge v. Mabry, supra, this court said:

“* * * The question is a legislative one and, however strong our wish that residents of this community might enjoy the elective franchise, we may not prbperly further that desire by an act of jii-' dicial legislation.”

The legislative action necessary to con-' fer state jurisdiction over the area of the’ federal enclave pointed out in Arledge, supra, is by an act of the Congress. Wé do not find a federal statute receding jurisdiction to New Mexico of the area involved herein.

This court has not considered the Attorney General’s amicus curiae brief supporting the position of appellees.

The case is reversed and remanded with instructions to the learned trial judge to proceed in a manner not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

NOBLE, C. J., and COMPTON, J., coiv cur.