Wing v. Munns , 123 Idaho 463 ( 1993 )

BAKES, Justice Pro Tern.

This is a review of a decision of the Court of Appeals in Wing v. Munns, 123 Idaho 493, 849 P.2d 954 (App.1992). The Court of Appeals reversed a judgment in favor of Munns on his counterclaim for damages for interference with an oral lease. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment on the counterclaim and directed entry of judgment for the plaintiff Wing on the ground that Munns’ evidence in support of his claim of oral lease was insufficient as a matter of law to establish an oral lease. The Court of Appeals held (1) that Munns’ claimed oral lease was too indefinite because of lack of an agreement as to the amount of and the description of the property to be leased, and (2) that the oral lease was barred by the statute of frauds.

We have reviewed Munns’ evidence in support of his claim of an oral lease and agree with the Court of Appeals that, reviewing the evidence in the record most favorably in support of Munns, as we must do, Lopez v. Langer, 114 Idaho 873, 761 P.2d 1225 (1988), there is no evidence that Munns and Wing ever orally agreed as to the amount of property to be leased, or what the boundaries of the property to be leased were. Munns acknowledged in his testimony that he never discussed with Wing the amount of or the boundaries of the property which was to be the subject of the oral lease and, while he had an idea as to what the boundaries were, “Woody [Wing] maybe had his opinion of another.” Aside from the problem of the statute of frauds, an oral agreement which lacks an understanding of the amount and description of the property to be leased is too indefinite to be enforced. Bennett v. Richards, 80 Idaho 140, 326 P.2d 986 (1958); Wolske Bros., Inc. v. Hudspeth Sawmill Co., 116 Idaho 714, 779 P.2d 28 (Ct.App. 1989).

Since we agree with the Court of Appeals that the oral agreement was not sufficiently definite and certain in all its material terms to be enforceable, we need not address the balance of the Court of Appeals opinion dealing with the statute of frauds and injunction issues. We affirm the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the judgment of the district court.

The judgment of the district court is reversed. Costs to appellant; no attorney fees allowed.

McDEVITT and TROUT, JJ., concur.