Hague v. STATE, DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFE., FIN. RESPON , 23 Utah 2d 299 ( 1969 )

CROCKETT, Chief Justice

(concurring).

I concur in affirming the judgment but add this comment: It seems to me that the majority opinion may well be interpreted, at least by implication, as leaning toward making a judicial procedure out of the determination to be made by the Department of Public Safety (Sec. 41-2-5, U.C.A.1953). It is my opinion that the duty imposed upon the Department by the statutory mandate to “determine the amount of security * * sufficient in its judgment to satisfy any judgment” is intended to be administrative rather than judicial. It is of course essential that some judgment and common sense be used in determining what “amount of security” would be sufficient to satisfy any judgment. (See discussion of quasi-judicial function of administrative agencies in 1 Adm. Law Treatise, Davis, p. 67.) If on the basis of the reports, it would be plain to any one using common sense that there is no possibility whatever of any judgment, then it would be a useless gesture, and a capricious and arbitrary imposition upon a citizen, to require a bond. If this is done, it can be rectified by resort to the court as has been done here under the standard rule of administrative review which corrects such arbitrary actions. (See Kent v. Industrial Comm., 89 Utah 381, 57 P.2d 724.)

In order to provide a guide in such matters, and to protect the Department from becoming involved in adversarial disputes as to the merits of such claims, and thus involved in judicial proceedings, I think It should be made as definite as possible that the Department is authorized and obliged to require security, except only where from the reports made it appears so clearly as to be without substantial question that there could in no event be any liability.