Toland v. Schneider , 94 Idaho 556 ( 1972 )

SHEPARD, Justice.

Claimant-appellant Toland has appealed from a ruling of the Industrial Accident Board denying him unemployment compensation. The Board ruled that Toland had voluntarily terminated his prior employment without good cause therefor. We affirm the ruling of the Board.

Intermittently and over a two year span, Toland had been employed by Carl Schneider in the woods as a sawyer. In the period between December 16 and December 29, 1970, claimant worked eight days for Schneider. The first two and one-half days he was paid at a flat rate of $45 per day and, during the remainder of the period, he was paid at a rate of $2.60 per thousand board feet of lumber sawed. To-land earned an average wage of $37 per working day.

Shortly after December 29, 1970 Toland terminated his employment with Schneider, stating among his reasons therefor that he was not being paid at an agreed upon $45 per day rate, that he could not meet his expenses upon the salary he received and that he was not being paid on the proper “pay days.” Following his termination, Toland sought unemployment benefits. At the administrative level Toland was declared eligible for unemployment benefits hut upon the case being appealed by the •employer, the appeals examiner reversed that administrative finding, holding that Toland’s unemployment was due to the fact that he had left his employment voluntarily without good cause. Toland appealed to the Industrial Accident Board, which affirmed the appeals examiner’s decision, agreeing with the examiner’s findings of fact and his conclusions of law.

On an appeal from an Industrial Accident Board finding in an unemployment compensation case, this Court is restricted to deciding questions of law. I.C. § 72-1368 (i). Questions of fact are for the Board, and its findings will not be disturbed on appeal when its findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Boodry v. Eddy Bakeries Co., 88 Idaho 165, 397 P.2d 256 (1964); Watts v. Employment Security Agency, 80 Idaho 529, 335 P.2d 533 (1959).

In his testimony before the Board claimant contradicted and supplanted his former testimony given before the appeals examiner. Claimant asserted to the Board that he had earned only $205 in the eight working days prior to his termination rather than $295 as he had previously testified. Claimant also noted additional expenses to those found as fact by the appeals examiner. Since the Board had before it the previous testimony of the claimant which essentially contradicted the testimony of the claimant at the Board hearing, there exists conflicting evidence which substantiates the findings of the Board and this Court will respect the factual determinations made by the Board based upon previous hearings.

The question of law fundamental to the disposition of this appeal is whether claimant, who concededly terminated his employment voluntarily, acted with good cause. Such good cause is a requisite for eligibility for unemployment compensation. The statutory provision governing that determination is contained in I.C. § 72-1366:

“The personal eligibility conditions of a benefit claimant are that * * *

“(f) His unemployment is not due to the fact that he left his employment voluntarily without good cause, or that he was discharged for misconduct in connection with his employment.”

This Court has held that claimant has the burden of proving such “good cause” for voluntarily terminating his employment. The burden of establishing eligibility is placed upon the claimant whenever his claim for benefits is questioned. Boodry v. Eddy Bakeries Co., supra; Clark v. Bogus Basin Recreational Association, 91 Idaho 916, 435 P.2d 256 (1967); Burroughs v. Employment Security Agency, 86 Idaho 412, 387 P.2d 473 (1963); Roby v. Potlatch Forests, 74 Idaho 404, 263 P.2d 553 (1953).

Claimant asserts that he was not paid at a contract rate of $45 per day but that for five and a half days of the eight days worked prior to his termination he was paid at a rate of $2.60 per thousand board feet of lumber sawed. Claimant however introduced no evidence other than his oral statement to support his claim that $45 per day was in fact the stipulated wage for his employment. His failure to establish a binding $45 per day agreement militates against his assertion that Schneider’s failure to pay him at the rate of $45 per day amounted to good cause for quitting. A claim of low wages does not in and of itself establish good cause for terminating employment. Claimant must show either that his wages were abnormally low or that his wage was below the prevailing wage paid to other workers similarly employed in the same locale. Clark v. Bogus Basin Recreational Association, supra; Roby v. Potlatch Forests, supra. No evidence was adduced which indicates that the wages earned by claimant were abnormally low as compared with those of other sawyers working at comparable locations and at comparable times of the year. The record establishes that weather conditions common to the winter season generally make working conditions unfavorable for sawyers and that the compensation anticipated during the winter months is anticipated to be set off by above-average earnings during the remainder of the year when better weather conditions prevail.

The wages earned by claimant, found by the Board to be $295 for eight working days, produces an average of $37 per day. This is not shown by the record to be an unduly low wage as compared to the average sawyer’s wage in that area during that time of year.

Claimant also urges that his expenses were inordinate as compared with his earnings. The record fails to disclose that the claimant has met his burden of proof in this regard.

Claimant finally suggests that Schneider did not make his salary payments on established “pay days.” Claimant had testified before the appeals examiner that regular “pay days” were the 10th and 25th of each month. His employer countered with testimony that the 10th was the only pay day during the month but the 25th day constituted an “advance” day on which an employee could request and, at the discretion of the employer, receive an advance on his salary. The record discloses that claimant made no such request on the 25th of December, 1970. The appeals examiner concluded, and the Board concurred, that this factor did- not contribute to, nor show good cause for voluntarily terminating employment.

The legislative policy enunciated by unemployment compensation legislation is declared in I.C. § 72-1302. That policy is to encourage employers to provide stable employment and to relieve the burdens of unemployment by providing compensation to persons unemployed through no fault of their own. Previous decisions of this Court have indicated that I.C. § 72-1366 (f), requiring good cause to be shown when employment termination has been voluntary, should be somewhat narrowly construed. The decision to voluntarily terminate employment must be reasonable, substantial and there must be some compulsion produced by necessitous circumstances. The standard of what constitutes good cause is a standard of reasonableness as applied to the average man or woman. Conrad v. Altmiller, 89 Idaho 214, 404 P.2d 337 (1965); Roby v. Potlatch Forests, supra; Burroughs v. Employment Security Agency, supra.

The record herein establishes that the claimant has failed to carry his burden of showing that his voluntary termination of employment was based upon good cause. The order of the Industrial Accident Board was based upon claimant’s failure to show good cause for voluntarily terminating employment.

The ruling of the Industrial Accident Board is affirmed. Costs to respondents.

McQUADE, C. J., and McFABDEN, DONALDSON, JJ., concur.