Reinstein v. McGregor Land & Livestock, Co. , 126 Idaho 156 ( 1994 )

SILAK, Justice,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. Zolber’s accident did not occur during his personal departure, but after he had resumed the return portion of his business trip. “Generally, compensation is not allowed to workers for injuries occurring on the way to or from work, based on the perception that such injuries are not sufficiently causally linked to employment.” Pitkin v. Western Constr., 112 Idaho 506, 507, 733 P.2d 727, 728 (1987). An exception to this “going and coming” rule is what has become known as the “traveling employee” doctrine. In explaining the traveling employee rule in Ridgway v. Combined Ins. Cos. of Am., 98 Idaho 410, 565 P.2d 1367 (1977), the Court stated:

The appropriate rule to be applied to determine the scope of workmen’s compensation coverage for employees whose work entails travel away from the employer’s premises at which the employee normally works is set forth in 1 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 25.00, p. 443:

“Employees whose work entails travel away from the employer’s premises are held in the majority of jurisdictions to be within the course of their employment continuously during the trip, except when a distinct departure on a personal errand is shown.”

Ridgway, 98 Idaho at 411-12, 565 P.2d at 1368-69; see also Kirkpatrick v. Transtector Sys., 114 Idaho 559, 562, 759 P.2d 65, 68 (1988). In Ridgway, the Court explained that a traveling employee’s injuries are not compensable where the employee is injured while engaged in a distinctly personal departure unrelated to the employment, such as “an employee who is injured while engaged in a non-business related activity such as skiing or who drowns while scuba diving during a break in a business trip.” Ridgway, 98 Idaho at 412, 565 P.2d at 1369.

These examples and the Court’s language clearly show that while a traveling employee’s injuries are not compensable when they occur during a purely personal departure from the business trip, a personal departure takes an employee out of the course of his or her employment only until the employee returns to the course of business. Once the employee resumes the route or activities of the business trip, the employee is again within the course of his or her employment. Id. at 412, 565 P.2d at 1369 (traveling employee is within the course of employment continuously during business trip, except during period of purely personal departure); Kirkpatrick, 114 Idaho at 562, 759 P.2d at 68; Larson, § 19.00 (deviation from business trip for personal reasons takes employee out of course of employment only until return to route of business trip). This rule is logical, for any business trip that begins from a particular place, such as the employee’s home or office, must necessarily contemplate both an outgoing and a returning trip. See 1 Larson § 19.29(a) at 4-370. “[T]he return trip from a dual-purpose journey, at any point where it constitutes a return from places that had to be reached for business reasons, is within the course of employment.” 1 Larson § 19.29(a) at 4-368.

The nature of Zolber’s purpose in going to the bars with Baker was vigorously disputed by the parties. Claimants pointed to evidence that Zolber, who grew up in the Nezperce community and knew many of the area’s farmers, accompanied Baker to the bars at least with the concurrent purpose of furthering McGregor’s business interests by helping Baker develop business relationships with current and prospective clients. McGregor points to evidence that Zolber’s business-related activities at the bars, if any, were insignificant and merely incidental to his personal purposes. The Commission determined that Zolber’s departures to the bars were not business related, but purely personal. The Commission further concluded that Zolber’s personal departures broke the causal chain such that his subsequent accident could not be said to have arisen in the course of his employment. In reaching this conclusion, the Commission and the majority misapplied the traveling employee doctrine, as set forth above.

As a traveling employee, Zolber was within the course of his employment continuously during the trip, except during any distinctly personal departures. It is immaterial whether Zolber’s activities at Rosi’s and the Clover Club are characterized as “dual purpose” or purely personal departures from his business trip, because it is undisputed that Zolber’s fatal accident did not occur until after he had left the bars and had begun his return trip to Lewiston. Zolber’s return to Lewiston was obviously a contemplated and necessary part of his business trip. Based on the undisputed facts, Zolber’s fatal accident did not occur during any personal departure, but during the return portion of his business trip, and therefore the accident arose out of and within the course of his employment as a matter of law.

The majority incorrectly holds that this case is indistinguishable from Morgan v. Columbia Helicopters, 118 Idaho 347, 796 P.2d 1020 (1990), in which this Court affirmed the Commission’s denial of compensation benefits. I view the facts in Morgan as distinguishable from this case, because in Morgan this Court never stated that Morgan was in fact traveling home; Morgan’s pattern of stopping here and there along his route of travel is in marked contrast to this case, where it is undisputed that Zolber had completed any personal departures from his business errand and resumed the course of his business trip at the time the accident occurred.

The Commission found that Zolber’s intoxication was the proximate cause of his fatal accident. I.C. § 72-208(2) provides as follows:

If an injury is the proximate result of an employee’s intoxication, all income benefits shall be reduced by fifty per cent (50%), provided that such reduction shall not apply where the intoxicants causing the employee’s intoxication were furnished by the employer or where the employer permits the employee to remain at work with knowledge by the employer or his supervising agent that the employee is intoxicated.

Although there is substantial competent evidence to support the Commission’s finding that Zolber’s injuries were the proximate result of his intoxication, I would remand the case to determine whether either of the exceptions mentioned in I.C. § 72-208(2) applies to prevent the statute’s application. Should the Commission then determine further that neither of the exceptions applies to prevent the statute’s application, the Commission should reduce the claimants’ award of benefits by fifty percent.